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شعبہ 954.79

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عدد داخلہ 48981

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# FATESING GAIKWAD

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**THE THIRD ENGLISH EMBASSY TO POONA**

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**THE GAIKWADS OF BARODA**

**English Documents**

*VOLUME I*

**PILAJI & DAMAJI GAIKWADS**

**1720—1768**

# THE GAIKWADS OF BARODA

## ENGLISH DOCUMENTS

VOLUME II

## FATESINGRAO

(1771—1776)

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11 JUN 1946

BOMBAY:

D. B. TARAPOREVALA SONS & CO.

"Treasure House of Books"

Hornby Road, Fort.

*Printed at*
**VAKIL & SONS PRESS**
*By*
**K. R. SUDDER**
*18, Narandas Building, Ballard Estate, Bombay*
*and Published by*
**JAL H. D. TARAPOREVALA,**
*for*
**D. B. TARAPOREVALA SONS, & Co**
*Hornby Road, Fort, Bombay.*

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# INTRODUCTION

## Fatesing's Ascendency

The death of Damajirao in 1768 inaugurated a protracted period of political unrest, characteristic of what was the bane of many a realm in the past—a disputed succession to the throne. On such occasions internal dissensions gave usually rise to a conflict between the contending claimants; and not unfrequently did the final issue benefit a third party, fishing in troubled waters and landing the pikes under the very nose of the rival fishermen squabbling about the small fry. This is what happened during the family quarrel which developed upon Damajirao's demise. Govindrao, Sayajirao and Fatesing were divided among themselves, and Raghoba, Madhavrao and the English East India Company profited thereby to further their own interests.

As regards the Gaikwad brothers, Govindrao and his half-brother, Sayajirao, were the two claimants to the gadi of Baroda. Govindrao was the son of Damajirao's first and eldest wife, while Sayajirao was born of a younger wife, but was actually the elder of the two. Govindrao was a man of weak and vacillating character, who from the outset took the advice of foolish counsellors—an unfortunate creature destined to be abandoned by every person with whom he successively sided: Raghunathrao, the English, the Poona Court, Sindia and his cousin of Kadi. Sayajirao was mentally weak. In his father's lifetime he had conducted campaigns, but later on was not strong enough to take the lead in the difficult situation that emerged. He was, however, supported by his younger full brother, Fatesing, who was undoubtedly the most capable of Damajirao's sons; he was a man of many parts: shrewd, active and ambitious, a soldier and a politician. He was clear-headed and possessed the ability to save the State from the dangers which surrounded it on all sides.

The rival brothers were under the necessity of abiding by the arbitration of the Peshwa, who did not lose the opportunity of weakening by dividing the family interests of his late enemy. In the Hindu law current amongst the Marathas there were to be found precedents in favour of the heirship of either Govindrao or Sayajirao. Now the custom of succession of the eldest is fully established; but in those times some authorities supported the right of the son of the first wife, whether he were the eldest or not; others regarded simply the age of the clai-

mants, deciding in favour of the first born, of whichever wife he might be the son.

When Damajirao died, Govindrao was a prisoner in Poona, but his jailors did not forget him. Negotiations were opened between Govindrao and the Darbar, and they ended in the Peshwa recognising Govindrao as senakhaskhel, the title of the Gaikwad rulers. On that occasion Govindrao agreed to pay upwards of 50 lakhs: 23 lakhs as a fine for the 'rising' in 1768, 1 lakh for the new conquest from the Babis, 5½ lakhs as arrears of tribute, an additional 50,000 Rupees for Darbar expenses, and 20 lakhs and 1 Rupee as "feudal dues" or nazranah, which is conveniently defined 'a present for the official confirmation of the title of senakhaskhel.' Fatesing, who was in Gujarat at the time of his father's death, promptly secured Baroda for Sayajirao, a town he subsequently never abandoned.

In 1771, Fatesing, strengthening his party at home, went to Poona and won a reversal of the above-mentioned decision. Ram Shastri, the celebrated Judge of Madhavrao Peshwa, is said to have expressed an opinion in favour of the right of Sayajirao, who was now proclaimed senakhaskhel. As he was, however, of a weak mind, Fatesing was appointed his *mutalik* or deputy. Fatesing's promise rivalled Govindrao's: the fine was estimated at 21 lakhs, the nazar at 20 lakhs and the Darbar expenses at half a lakh. In the same way as the Peshwa had promised before to support Govindrao against his brother, Sayajirao, so in the present treaty a stipulation was made that Fatesing was to be supported if the discarded rival should attempt to disturb the State. Nevertheless Govindrao was to get two lakhs a year and Padra, and it was also settled that certain guaranteed bankers' debts were to be paid, and that the Dabhade family was to be satisfied.

Raghoba is more difficult to appraise, because failure dogged his steps from one end to the other of his political career; yet failure is not necessarily a proof of inefficiency. He seems to have always been pitted against more clever men, even his triumphs were shortlived, because more than once his allies left him in the lurch or even turned against him. He was ambitious and daring, but lacking in discernment and never counting the cost till it was too late.

Madhavrao, the Peshwa, was a talented ruler. He had already proved his worth by restoring the lost prestige of his countrymen at a most critical period in the history of Maharashtra. He was a soldier and a statesman, who never let an

opportunity slip by to add to his personal influence or to his country's greatness. Thus, for example, even before the contest for the succession had fairly started, he managed to secure for himself the lion's share. His was the right, if not to appoint the successor to the Gaikwad gadi, at least to confirm and ratify the accession of the new ruler.

After Madhavrao's death and the murder of Narayanrao, the same policy of dividing the family was pursued by Raghoba not so much with the intention of weakening the Gaikwads, but rather to gain an ally in his struggle for supremacy, For towards the end of 1773, and prior to the birth of Narayanrao's posthumous son, Raghoba had already realised that the opposition of the ministerial party was steadily growing. He, therefore, recognised his old ally, Govindrao as senakhaskhel. Shortly afterwards when the Ministers openly rose against Raghoba, Fatesing, in behalf of Sayajirao, sided with them.

But Raghoba was soon to experience that Govindrao was not a useful ally, and the Peshwa's initial success over the ministerial party was not due to Govindrao but to British support. Raghoba knew full well that Fatesing was the better man to have as an ally; and when in 1775 the latter made overtures of peace, Raghoba abandoned Govindrao, and made a treaty with Fatesing, in which Sayajirao was formally acknowledged as senakhaskhel.

In 1778 Fatesing obtained from the Peshwa, who was much in need of his support great remissions of tribute and of service-payment with other most advantageous terms. He paid 10 lakhs, gave the ministers a present of one lakh. and obtained the title of senakhaskhel, while Govindrao was promised a jagir of 2 lakhs from the Peshwa, and Khanderao was to retain the position he had formerly held. Sayajirao was still living and was given the same consideration as before as Head of the family, though not of the State.

From the above account it may readily be inferred that Fatesing, the most capable of Damajirao's sons, played the most important part in the history of the Gaikwads during the period that followed upon Damajirao's death.

Fatesing's supremacy during 20 years sufficiently explains why this collection of documents is entitled FATESINGRAO. However the whole period of the 20 years of Fatesing's power is not dealt with in this volume. The documents here gathered deal with the first six years of Fatesing's ascendency; and they are distributed into two parts.

At first (1771-1773) the Gaikwads of Baroda had to assert the rights and privileges secured by them in Broach prior to its capture by the Bombay Government in 1772. The first part of this collection of documents deals, therefore, with the capture of Broach, under the heading: THE TRAGEDY OF BROACH.

The next three years (1774-1776) contain an account of the struggle for supremacy between Fatesing and Govindrao; and the second part of this collection of documents is, therefore, entitled: THE GAIKWAD CONTEST.

### The Tragedy of Broach

If tragedy is a drama with unhappy ending, the documents in the first part of this volume may rightly be published under the heading: THE TRAGEDY OF BROACH. They refer to events which took place from 1770 to 1773, and deal with the passing of a little State that was yet young in years when dawned the day of its doom. This was the State of Broach, whose independence, first recognised in 1726 by Nizam-ul-mulk of warlike fame, was irretrievably lost less than half a century afterwards, in 1772. What was it that brought about this premature end and dissolution ?

From the English documents it may be gathered that the downfall of Broach was not the result of cankering internal disorders inherent in the body politic. Broach was not worse administered than the territories of neighbouring Powers. It fell a victim to external aggressiveness, mainly because its capital, the town of Broach, happened to be favourably situated, close to the seaboard, easily accessible; so that it had become an important trading centre. This explains why the servants of the Company, Fatesing Gaikwad, the Peshwa and the Nawabs of Surat and Cambay cast all of them wistful glances on the harbour-town, and were anxious to acquire it.

The servants of the Company were the first in attempting to win the coveted prize on the plea that, for the previous last six years or so, the Nawab of Broach had surcharged English protected goods imported into his country to the extent of 1,50,000 Rupees. They also alleged that the Nawab of Broach had long been defrauding the Nawab of Surat of his share in the Broach phurja, thus causing Surat a loss of 28 lakhs of Rupees; and they made bold to claim this sum in behalf of the ruler of Surat, after having come to a previous understanding with that prince that two-thirds of the money recovered would go to the Company to pay them for their trouble.

At Bombay and Surat the servants of the Company were fully convinced that right was on their side. Accordingly they embarked upon a first expedition against Broach, which however ended in failure. Shortly afterwards it must have come as a shock to the President and Council at Bombay that the Hon'ble Court of Directors did not see eye to eye with them as regards the righteousness of their cause; in fact the Directors blamed them for having decided on the expedition from "unjustifiable motives, reviving old and doubtful claims upon the Nawab of Broach."

Meanwhile, though the Nawab had succeeded in warding off the fatal blow, he realised that his triumph was likely to be shortlived. He, therefore, made up his mind to befriend the English and set out for Bombay. He was honourably received, but was told that he would either have to pay or to face the risk of war. He boldly resisted as long as he could or dared, and finally yielded, promising to pay to his opponents four lakhs of Rupees. Shortly afterwards he returned to Broach. But when the first instalment of the sum he had promised to pay fell due, the Nawab, either because he was unwilling or was in truth unable, refused to pay 2,00,000 Rupees in specie. He set about gathering ornaments of silver and gold; necklaces, ear-rings, bracelets, pendants, and what not. As the contents of his own treasure-house fell short of the stipulated amount of two lakhs, which he had to hand over, he naturally turned to his subjects. In his own words "I imposed a tax on my subjects, brothers, ministers and people at the place, a thing which was never done before even in my ancestors' time." He forced them to contribute their jewels and heirlooms, with the result that several chests of jewellery were tendered to the Company in lieu of two lakhs of Rupees in specie.

But the servants of the Company declined to have anything to do with jewels; they asked for cash. Then the Nawab had recourse to desperate pleading. He wrote to the President at Bombay, "I did through great endeavours collect as much as I could, and have lodged the same into the chests, not only to comply with my word, but also to please Your Honour." Unfortunately the President was not pleased, and Broach was a second time attacked. This second expedition proved successful, and after a brief resistance, the Nawab fled from his capital and was Nawab no more—neither was there anyone to say a kind word for him. In a letter of that period it may be read, "that the late Nawab of Broach was in very miserable

circumstances, entirely destitute of friends and even of subsistence, owing to his infamous conduct to all who had any connection with him, whilst he was Nawab."

Truly an unhappy ending, which raises the downfall of the State to the rank and dignity of a tragedy, the tragedy of Broach.

It might perhaps be argued that, since the first expedition against Broach was to the mind of the Court of Directors unjustifiable, as based on the revival of old and doubtful claims, the treaty, which was subsequently forced upon the Nawab from the same motives, was equally unjustifiable. On this hypothesis the Nawab's refusal to pay 2,00,000 Rupees in specie merely amounted to the discarding of a promise made under threat of dire retribution; so that, in fine, the second expedition against Broach would share in the same high-handed opportunism which characterised the first attempt against that city.

But the servants of the Company at Bombay and Surat thought otherwise. They looked upon the treaty, which the Nawab had made, as a free act, unfettered by constraint and not vitiated by compulsion. Hence they considered themselves justified in unsheathing the sword to vindicate their outraged rights.

It rests with the student to infer from the documents to what extent the servants of the Company were justified in their policy of territorial aggrandisement at the cost of Broach. But whatever conclusion he may arrive at, he will not be able to deny that the downfall of Broach is a story of pain and distress, centering round Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung, the last Nawab of Broach, and is in the strict sense of the word a tragedy.

As regards the part played by the rulers of Baroda in the conquest of Broach, the beginnings of Gaikwad influence and power in Broach are already recorded in the first volume of this series, where it is evidenced that in about 1744 the Gaikwads had acquired a considerable share in the Broach revenue. In the partition of Gujarat with the Peshwa they kept the Maratha share in the Broach revenue to themselves. Accordingly when the English set about to conquer Broach, they apparently chose to ignore the Gaikwads' rights, hoping perhaps to face them later on with the accomplished fact of being the sole masters of Broach. It may also be that they had come to a secret understanding with the Gaikwads, and had given them an assurance that their rights would not be interfered with—a similar

agreement had been made in 1759, when the English gained possession of Surat. In any case if they had ever cherished the hope to secure for themselves the full disposal of the Broach revenue, they had therein reckoned without their host. No sooner had they taken possession of their newly acquired territories than Fatesing came forward to claim his own, and a treay recognising these claims was entered into,—the first treaty between the East India Company and the Gaikwads of Baroda. (*Aitchison's Treaties*, VIII, 23)

It is, therefore, but natural that Fatesing Gaikwad should not be often mentioned in the documents dealing with the first expedition against Broach, the treaty with the Nawab, the renewed dissensions between the English and Masud Khan and the capture of Broach. Yet the Gaikwad claims are not altogether omitted, though they are relegated to the background. On the contrary, the documents, treating of the final settlement and the division of the spoils, are almost exclusively concerned with Fatesing. In the negotiations which followed an attempt was made to make capital out of the rivalry between the Gaikwad and the Peshwa, but this attempt was frustrated by Fatesing, who succeeded in safeguarding his share in the Broach revenues.

There is an additional justification for the caption: THE TRAGEDY OF BROACH. Though not connected with the papers in this volume, Broach is associated with another tragic event connected with the history of the Gaikwads. The Gaikwads' share of Broach revenues had been ceded by them to the English by the treaty of Surat in 1774. Though that treaty was abrogated by the treaty of Purandhar, the Broach revenue was not restored to the Baroda Government. Later on the English gave it to Mahadji Sindia as a reward for his bringing about the treaty of Salbai in 1782, and Sindia finally gave it back to the East India Company. The Gaikwads never acquiesced in this summary transfer of their revenues, and made it an excuse for leaving unpaid equivalent arrears out of the moneys due by them to the Peshwa. In order to settle these accounts which had swollen enormously, the Gaikwad Minister, Gangadhar Shastri, proceeded to Poona in 1812 under the guarantee of the East India Company. On one side of the balance sheet was the following item :

"He (the senakhaskhel) had been unjustly deprived of Broach. If the revenues of Broach were computed at between

8 and 9 lakhs, and the Gaikwad was entitled to two-thirds of this sum, the claim would amount to two crores and a half."

This financial item was one of the most formidable difficulties in the settlement of the accounts. The Gaikwad minister was murdered under circumstances well known to students of history, before a final settlement had been arrived at, and then the East India Company forced on the Peshwa a solution of their own.

## The Gaikwad Contest

First phase of the contest: The leading members of the Gaikwad family were divided among themselves ever since the death of Damajirao; but these dissensions would before long have gradually died out, if the smouldering embers had not been fanned into leaping flames by Raghoba, who in 1773 reversed the Poona decision of 1771, and restored to Govindrao his title of senakhaskel. Therewith opened the first phase of the Gaikwad contest, when Govindrao, supported by Raghoba, took up arms against Fatesing. This initial campaign (January-September, 1774) was little more than a private family feud between the two rival claimants and their henchmen. During these nine months Govindrao's star was in the ascendant, and Fatesing came off second best.

Second phase of the contest: What saved Fatesing was the revolt of the ministerial party at Poona against Raghoba and their determination to assist Fatesing just as Raghoba had given his support to Govindrao. By this sudden turn of events the family feud between the Gaikwads assumed an unexpected political significance. For the contest between Raghoba and the Ministers shifted from Poona to Gujarat, and a new champion, the East India Company, entered the lists at the request of Raghoba; for the latter, in desperate straits, made a successful bid for English friendship, in the hope that with their support he might crush his enemies once for all. This development of a local contest into national conflict constitutes the second phase of the Gaikwad contest (September 1774-March 1775). It was above all a period of diplomatic negotiations, and the Bombay Government proved themselves the shrewdest of merchants. They were anxious to throw in their lot with Raghoba, if the latter was ready to pay the price; and a heavy price it was. Never before was a political bargain carried on with greater thoroughness; four drafts of the would-be treaty were rejected as unsatisfactory, inadequate, ambiguous. The

fifth and final draft, known as the treaty of Surat, signed by Raghoba on the 7th March, 1775, and ratified at Bombay on the 16th of the same month, secured for the Company parganas yielding an annual revenue of over 19 lakhs, a stupendous sum, if it be taken into consideration that it represents the interest at 5 per cent. on a capital of 3 crores and eighty lakhs of Rupees.

In these diplomatic negotiations the Gaikwads did not play a prominent part as principals. It would even seem that they were not consulted, though they were expected to make great financial sacrifices. For according to the sixth article of the treaty of Surat "Raghoba also engages immediately to procure from the Gaikwads a grant to the Hon'ble Company forever with all the necessary sanads of their share in the revenue collected by the Gaikwads in the town and parganas of Broach." This article, therefore, brings the negotiations between the English and Raghoba within the purview of the history of the Gaikwads of Baroda, and at the same time it gives a new orientation to the Gaikwad contest, which is henceforth merged into the struggle for supremacy between Raghoba and the Ministers at Poona.

As regards the military activities during this period, the only important engagement worth mentioning was the victory which Fatesing won at Vasad on the plains of Arras, where he routed the forces of Raghoba, who had to seek safety in precipitate flight. This victory was gained on the 17th February, 1775, and therefore prior to the signing of the treaty of Surat. Had Fatesing scored his success a few weeks earlier, the Bombay Government might have reconsidered their position and backed out of the treaty. As it was, the expeditionary force that was to support Raghoba had already left Bombay. Besides which, Robert Gambier, Chief at Surat, who was mainly instrumental in concluding the treaty with Raghoba, presented matters in such a light as to belittle Fatesing's success; and his example was followed by Colonel Keating, the commanding officer of the Bombay forces. The latter had come all the way from Bombay in order to fight, and the idea of returning to head-quarters without having achieved anything did not appeal to him. In spite of Fatesing's victory, the treaty was signed; and the stage was now set for the contending parties—Raghoba, Govindrao and the English against the Poona Ministers and Fatesing—to show of what stuff their soldiers were made.

However, if Fatesing's victory at Vasad did not have any tactical importance at the time when it was won, it was

eventually destined to bring about the triumph of the ministerial party and the discomfiture of the English, of Raghoba and, by a dire irony of fate, of Fatesing himself, as will be shown afterwards.

Third phase of the contest: The third phase of the Gaikwad contest or the struggle for supremacy between Raghoba and the Poona Ministers opened with the treaty of Surat and lasted from March to August 1775. It was to a great extent a period of active warfare, during which Raghoba and his allies had things much their own way and were successful all along the line. Time after time the ministerial armies were defeated and had to retreat. The best proof of Raghoba's victorious campaign is provided by Fatesing's complete change of front. For Fatesing, the alliance with the Poona Ministers was merely a means to an end, a stepping-stone to the much coveted leadership in Gujarat. When he realised that the ministerial cause was in jeopardy, he determined to look after his own interests and made overtures of peace to Raghoba. There followed protracted negotiations, but at last an agreement was arrived at, and on the 18th July, 1775, a treaty was signed between Raghoba on the one hand and Fatesing and Sayajirao on the other.

This treaty was the crowning success of the struggle for supremacy between Raghoba and the Poona Ministers. Incidentally it was also a triumph for the Bombay Government, for according to the 5th and 6th articles it was settled "That the government and revenues of the pargana of Broach have been ceded to the Hon'ble Company agreeable to the agreement between them [*the Company*] and Shrimant Pant Pradhan [*Raghoba*]; about which Sayaji and Fatesing are not to make any dispute" (5th article). "The parganas of Chikhli, Variav near Surat, and Koral near the Narbada and about 15 kos distant from Broach, which altogether makes three parganas, the Gaikwads have ceded to the Hon'ble Company on account of the peace they made between the Gaikwad [*Fatesing*] and Shrimant Pant Pradhan" [*Raghoba*] (6th article).

There is, therefore, every likelihood that in the ordinary course of events Raghoba would shortly have been reinstated at Poona, and the Bombay Government would have been in possession of an annual revenue of 22 lakhs.

Fourth phase of the contest: But, when the Bombay Government had put the finishing touch to the lofty structure

of their financial ambitions, the work of much anxiety and long planning was suddenly upset from plinth to pinnacle, as though it had been a frail house of cards.

In 1774, when the Company applied to the British Government for help in the form of a loan of £ 10,00,000, Lord North took that occasion to force upon the Company the control of the Home Government—a control exercised in regulating the government of the Company. Hence the Act was called the Regulating Act. By one of the clauses of the Regulating Act the Governor of the Bengal Presidency was made Governor-General, to whom the Governors of Madras and Bombay were declared subordinate. Warren Hastings was the first Governor-General, and in his capacity of supreme head of the Company in India he wrote an epoch-making letter to the Bombay President and Council. The letter was dated Fort William, 31st May, 1775, but only reached Bombay on the 12th August of that year. In this letter the Governor-General declared the Surat treaty invalid, recalled the Bombay forces from the theatre of war, blamed those who were responsible for the treaty of Surat, and opened negotiations with the Ministers at Poona. This fourth phase of the Gaikwad contest, from August, 1775, to March, 1776, is a period of bewildering confusion.

The Bombay Government are indignant and disgusted; Raghoba is helpless and in despair, Govindrao and Fatesing assert their personal rights, the Maratha Ministers make preposterous demands, whilst the Proconsul at Fort William, apparently unaware of the upheaval he has caused, takes cover behind the newly created dignity which an Act of Parliament has thrust upon him. The documents which deal with this period must be read in conjunction with those published by Forrest in his *Selections, Maratha Series*, which are too voluminous to be inserted in this compilation. But the following summary of events may help the reader, not only to form an adequate idea of the sequence of events and their relative importance, but also to estimate correctly Warren Hastings' policy.

On the 31st December, 1775 the President and Council at Bombay wrote to Warren Hastings, advising him of the capture of Thana, Versova and Karanja. They also spoke of their negotiations with Raghoba, and incidentally mentioned Raghoba's hurried flight to Indore. (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, 204-208)

On the 8th March, 1775, Warren Hastings acknowledges the receipt of the Bombay letter dated 31st December, 1775,

and writes: "We are alarmed at the declaration of your intentions of joining Raghoba." This was the first warning received at Bombay that Raghoba was not *persona grata* at Fort William. This letter, which is published by Forrest (*Selections, Maratha Series*, 235), was received in Bombay on 21st June, 1775.

Again on 31st March, 1775, the President and Council of Bombay wrote to Warren Hastings, giving a detailed account of their negotiations with Raghoba. In their letter they mentioned Fatesing's victory at Vasad on the 17th February, 1775, doing however their best to put this set-back in the most favourable light so far as Raghoba was concerned. At the same time they stated that Raghoba had signed the treaty of Surat on the 7th March, 1775. This mention of Fatesing's victory over Raghoba proved their undoing; for on the 31st May Warren Hastings acknowledged the Bombay letter of the 31st March; and branded the Bombay venture with Raghoba as "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust, expressly contrary to the late Act of Parliament." Thus it came about that Fatesing's victory, which from a military point of view was little more than a flash in the pan, was in reality fraught with weighty political consequences; for it was instrumental in confirming Warren Hastings in his strange distrust of Raghoba. This letter of the 31st May, 1775, reached Bombay on the 12th August, 1775, when Fatesing had thought it prudent to pass from the Ministers' camp to Raghoba's side, when the ministerial army was discouraged and disorganised, and when the Bombay Government felt so sure of the coveted prize that they were confident that nothing could come between the cup and the lip.

The occasion here offers to point out that in forming an estimate of Warren Hastings' determined opposition to the Bombay Government and their policy, it is imperative to take into account not so much the date on which letters were dispatched by their writers, but rather the date on which these letters reached their destination. For not taking into account the all important factors of distance and time, historians have supposed that Warren Hastings was acting on good grounds and with a full knowledge of the facts. Nothing could be further from the truth; and Warren Hastings, whatever may have been his much vaunted broadness of outlook, dismally failed to take into account circumstances of place, time, and persons; and when his error was brought home to him, he entrenched himself behind his proconsular dignity.

When the Bombay Government received Warren Hastings' letter. they obeyed like the much maligned old man's

staff, "which serves him who holds it in his hand, where and in what use soever he pleases." At the same time they felt keenly that all their attempts at furthering the financial position of their Presidency should thus be frustrated by one, who no doubt was vested with the supreme authority, but who also showed himself strangely misinformed with regard to Maharashtra, its rulers and its political situation. What they resented especially was that Colonel Upton should have been sent from Calcutta to negotiate with the Poona Ministers—a step which was in their eyes derogatory to the dignity of the Bombay Presidency. For some time they cherished the forlorn hope that they might prevail upon the Governor-General to alter his decision by supplying him with reliable information. Accordingly they dispatched William Tayler to Calcutta to champion their cause, which he did in a masterly manner in his letter of the 9th October 1775 (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series,* 248-268). The historical account which Tayler gives of Raghoba's antecedents is both one-sided and unfair to his political opponents; but the general description of the financial advantages accruing to Bombay and of the favourable aspect of the military situation is true to fact and should have carried conviction to any man with an open mind. But Warren Hastings had Raghoba on the brain, and curtly informed William Tayler that, "We are confirmed in our opinion of the expediency of the Company's troops being immediately recalled from the service of Raghoba into their own garrison." (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series,* 269)

It did not take Warren Hastings long to make up his mind. William Tayler's letter, which runs to over 13,000 words, is dated the 9th October. 1775; Warren Hastings answer of two small paragraphs of about 165 words in all is likewise dated the 9th October, 1775. (Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series,* 269, 270) Yet the Governor made bold to say, "After duly considering the representations which you have been pleased to deliver to us as well as the several informations which you have communicated respecting the nature, motives and objects of the engagements of the Bombay Presidency with Raghoba and the present state of the Maratha Government at Poona" etc. Anyway we have Warren Hastings' word for it that he read William Tayler's letter; though it may be remarked that he did not spend much time in duly considering it. Meanwhile the Bombay Government were not idle. They wrote to Colonel Upton who had taken up his residence at the Poona Darbar, and supplied him the same information which William Tayler

had given to the Governor General. But their efforts, like those of William Tayler, were of no avail, and on the first of March, 1776, Col. Upton signed the treaty of Purandhar, with which the fourth phase of the Gaikwad contest came to a close.

Fifth phase of the contest : The final phase of the Gaikwad contest is both dramatic and tragic ; dramatic on account of the unexpected hopes with which it filled the Bombay authorities, and tragic because their hopes were ruthlessly reduced to final disappointment by Warren Hastings.

On the 5th April, 1775, the Company wrote to Bombay, fully approving of their negotiations with Raghoba. The letter reached Bombay on the 17th August, 1775, but it had reached Calcutta at an earlier date. The Bombay President and Council now felt assured that the treaty of Purandhar would have to be abandoned, and that their own treaty with Raghoba would be re-validated. But they had reckoned without their host. Warren Hastings, so far from seeing eye to eye with the Bombay Government, insisted on their giving up all their pretensions ; and if they were not ready to do so, he threatened to deprive them of all financial assistance. Without money, justly called the sinews of war,' Bombay was powerless. Accordingly the Bombay Government had to give in, and the treaty of Purandhar remained the corner stone of the British policy towards the Marathas.

*Bombay St. Xavier's College, May*, 1937.

N.B. The English documents are taken from various sources : the *Public Department Diaries*, the *Public Department, Letters to the Court of Directors*, the *Surat Factory Diaries*, the *Secret and Public Department Diaries*, the *Broach Factory Diaries*.

At the beginning of each document its source of origin is given in abbreviated form according to the following scheme: the year to which the document refers, the diary from which it is taken, and the number of the diary.

The following abbreviations are used :

| | |
|---|---|
| P.D. | Public Department Diary. |
| P.D. Let to C. of Dir. | Public Department, Letters to the Court of Directors. |
| S.F. | Surat Factory Diary. |
| S. & P. D. | Secret and Political Department Diary. |
| Br. F. | Broach Factory Diary. |

The marginal notes and words printed in italics between square brackets do not form a part of the manuscript, but have been added with a view to facilitate the reader's task.



FATESINGRAO

کتب خانہ جامعہ ملیہ اسلامیہ
جامعہ نگر دہلی

# FATESINGRAO

## 1. The Tragedy of Broach

### No. 1 FIRST EXPEDITION AGAINST BROACH (1771)

THE first expedition against Broach was the beginning of the end of the shortlived independence of the State of Broach, which had been set up with Nizam-ul-mulk's sanction in 1736. For, though the expedition ended in failure, it served the purpose of awakening the destructive instincts of ambitious neighbours: the English, Fatesing Gaikwad, the Nawab of Surat and the Nawab of Cambay, everyone of them ready to seize on Broach in its entirety, or at least to secure the largest possible share of the spoils.

The documents referring to the first expedition are here printed for two reasons. In the first place the account given in the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency is both incomplete and one-sided. It is incomplete because it is mainly based on the letters of the President and Council at Bombay to the Honourable Court of Directors, whilst far more important documentary evidence is contained in the Surat Factory Diaries, the Public Department Diaries, the Secret and the Political Department Diaries, and the letters from the Honourable Court of Directors to the President and Council at Bombay. It is one-sided because the President and Council at Bombay were above all eager to justify themselves, and left no stone unturned in order to lay the blame of the failure at other people's door.

In the second place the documents referring to the first expedition give us incidentally an insight into the political aspirations of Fatesing Gaikwad, and thus bring the first expedition within the purview of the history of the Gaikwads of Baroda.

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# DOCUMENTS

1770 *Bombay, 1st. March,* 1770 (1770, *S. & P. D.* 11.)
*At a Consultation.*

*Fatesing threatens Broach*

The President lays before the Board a letter, as entered hereafter, from the Chief of Surat to him, advising that Fatesing, who is now near Surat, has sent a number of troops to Broach with the intention, as is said, of attacking that place; and proposing to us to interfere for reasons set forth by him, which being taken into mature consideration, it appears to us that Fatesing has sent his troops to Broach with no other view than to extract money from the Nawab of that place; but, if he even had an intention to attack it, we are of opinion that the Nawab is possessed of a sufficient force to repel him; besides which, the object proposed by the Chief is by no means of sufficient consequence to induce us to interest ourselves, now especially at this juncture, when we are so extremely bare both of men and money; though, if it even was, we should not interfere, unless the Nawab first made application to us for assistance, and made such proposals as we might deem for our Hon'ble Masters' interest, which from the tenor of the Chief's letter it does not appear he has done, or even thought of; which seems to confirm us further in our opinion that he apprehends no danger from any attempts Fatesing may make upon his city, and [*which*] determines us to take no measures whatever in consequence of this letter from the Chief; which must be signified to him accordingly.

1770 *Surat, 24th February,* 1770 (1770, *S. & P. D.* 11.)
*Letter from James Ryley, Chief at Surat.*

*Broach in danger*

My last address waited on you under the 5th instant; and this is purposely to advise that Fatesing, who is at present encamped within a few miles of Surat, has sent a number of troops to Broach in order, as it is said, to attack that place. I am well assured there is a strong discontented party in that town, and that Fatesing, being acquainted therewith, trusts to what they may do for him more than to his own force. On that account I am apprehensive Broach may fall into his hands, unless we interfere. Should he get it, it will in many respects, as you well know, Sir, be of great prejudice to the Company's affairs. There are, I think, two ways to prevent this, and either might prove very advantageous to our Employers. The first is to assist the present Nawab with our troops, either openly or in the name of our Nawab; and I believe 200 Europeans and about 800 sepoys would be quite sufficient to do this effectually. I have good reason to think that in consideration of this assistance, the Broach Nawab would agree to allow the Hon'ble Company a considerable sum annually, propably Rs. 50,000, as their share of the phurja, and would pay all charges of the expedition, and give good security here for the performance of this agreement. The other way is for us to make use of this discontented party in Broach,

*Chief's proposal*

and by the assistance of a proper force from Bombay and here to put Ali Nawaz Khan, who, I understand, is well-known to you, Sir, into the possession of that Nawabship on his consenting to the terms abovementioned; which, I have reason to think, he would readily do, and give very good security for the strict performance of his engagement. The force requisited for this latter scheme, I imagine, would be about 400 Europeans and a battalion of sepoys with a small train of artillery; and I have reason to think that with the appearance of this force and proper management Ali Nawaz Khan might be put in possession of Broach without any bloodshed. The plea for assisting the Nawab of Surat, as a Mussulman Governor, subject to Delhi, and we in possession of the Castle here, and in treaty with him, is, I think, a very plausible one; and the opportunity which now presents itself very fair for largely increasing the Hon'ble Company's revenue here without much present risk or any future trouble, as the security given in the town will answer for the punctual payment of whatever is settled; and I am really of opinion that another such opportunity will not present itself, as the Marathas most probably will reduce the town. If, Sir, you approve of what I have here proposed, no time, I think should be lost in concerting the necessary measures for carrying it into execution, and to authorise me to enter into a treaty, or settle the terms with either party, as You, Sir, may judge. *Unique occasion*

*Bombay*, 19*th March*, 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57) 1771
*At a Consultation.*

The President lays before the Board the translate of a letter from the Nawab of Surat, as also his sentiments on the subject of that letter, and the measures most eligible to be pursued, both of which are entered hereafter; on consideration of which it is resolved the Chief and Council be instructed to make suitable application to the Nawab of Broach for the difference of the customs he has collected, as well as for the arrears of the phurja, and that they endeavour to enter into a treaty with him to put the same on a proper footing in future; which if he should evade, they must be directed, as soon as the present service will permit, to order Colonel Gordon to transport the troops under his command toward his territories to compel him to enter into the best terms possible, which we flatter ourselves will induce him at least to pay some ready money and settle a mode for the certain payment of an annual sum in future, as also to put the customs on the same footing as settled between the late Nawab and Mr. Hodges when he was Chief at Surat. *Nawab against Broach*

As the phurja of Broach was granted to the nawabship of Surat, and not to the Castle, it becomes necessary the Chief and Council should enter into a previous agreement with the Nawab of Surat at least to give up the greatest part of what may be received, and hereafter annually received, as well as to pay the expense incurred thereby.

*Translate of a letter from Mir Haffiz-ud-din Ahmad Khan Bahadur, Nawab of Surat, dated the 4th and received the 8th March, 1771.*

*Surat Nawab's letter*

The Faujdar of Broach was under this Government for a number of years. Whereas Neknam Khan[1] (the father of Masud Khan the present Faujdar of Broach) did break that old rule of obeying this Government, and took away the property of the Surat Nawabs, and as your army is lately marched against the Kolis and mastered their country, I hope Your Honour will order the Commanding Officer of that force to march therewith into the country of Broach to settle the said dispute relating to the Faujdar as above-said, and to oblige the said Masud Khan to pay me all the customs which he has received for so many years, it being my property, and that the said Faujdar may in future be put into my possession, doing which, I as well as the Hon'ble Company will have profit.

*The President's sentiments on the letter from the Surat Nawab.*

*President's approval*

The Surat Government has large and just demands on that of Broach, and as we have a large and sufficient force to the northward, and as I understand the Nawab of Broach is under great apprehensions of their being employed against him, it is a good time to make demands on him with which his fears may bring him to a compliance.

*Bombay demands*

The first demand is for the produce of the Broach phurja granted about 150 years by the Mogul unto the Surat Government and possessed by them till within about forty years, when the Broach Nawab finding himself strong enough refused to pay it, and threw off his dependence. The phurja was computed at about Rs. 70,000 a year, which amount the Surat Government usually received from it, and now amounts to twenty-eight lakhs. The next demand is for a considerable difference of customs, which contrary to an express treaty the Nawab has collected on all merchandise belonging to those trading under the Company's protection to Broach. In the time of Mr. Hodges'

1. The following list of the Broach Nawabs is given by James Morley in a letter of the 6th May 1772 of the Surat Diary. See III Part, *Renewed Dissensions*, 6th May, 1772.

(Three Brothers)

Mirza Abdullah Beg — Nek Alam Beg — Khar Talab Khan
1726-1739 — 1739-1753 — (1753-1754)

- Mirza Abdullah Beg (1726-1739)
  - Mahomed Khan (died in 1728)
    - Neknam Khan (1756-1769)
      - Masud Khan (1769-1772)
- Nek Alam Beg (1739-1753)
- Khar Talab Khan (1753-1754)
  - Husain Ali Khan (1754-1755 or 56)

This list differs considerably from that given in the *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, II, 469. Morley's list seems the more trustworthy. Up to 1756 the rulers of Broach were called Governors, from 1756 they were styled Nawabs.

chiefship,[1] the Nawab of Broach (the father of the present one) entered into a treaty with him for settling the duties to be paid at Broach on all goods belonging to those under the English protection at 1½ per cent, and according to this the duties were collected 2 or 3 years, but afterwards without any reason assigned the Nawab raised them to 2½, and this difference one year with another has amounted to Rupees 25,000, and as about six years[2] have elapsed since it was imposed, the demand on this account may be reckoned Rs. 1,50,000, so that the just demand the Government has on that of Broach is about thirty lakhs. The Broach phurja was by firman granted to the nawabship of Surat and not to the Castle, but that, I apprehend, may easily be settled with the present Nawab. As he himself can have no hopes of recovering it by his own power, I presume he will have no objections to transferring his right and title to the Company, who have the means in their hands of conducting them to good purpose and advantage, if he is to receive a small part thereof.

*Justice of Bombay demands*

The demands for these arrears and for the future possession of the Broach phurja revenue and the duties on English goods being collected, as settled with Mr. Hodges, are in themselves just and proper to be made; and no time can be more convenient than the present, when we have so large a force that way, and the Nawab himself [*is*] frightened and apprehends we have designs against him. I therefore propose that the Chief and Council should be directed to demand in the most peremptory manner of the Broach Nawab immediate payment of the arrears due on the phurja, also the difference of the customs collected from the merchants, and full security for the annual payment of the produce of the phurja in future, and the duties on English [*goods*] properly being collected, as settled with Mr. Hodges. I apprehend the Nawab of Broach would be so much intimidated in receiving the letter which makes the demand that he will immediately enter into a treaty and consent to very advantageous terms, without our forces proceeding against him. If so, a proper treaty might be conducted with him, and he remain and be supported in the possession of his territories.

*Likely success*

*Bombay, 26th March,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57) 1771
*At a Consultation.*

*Preparing against Broach*

Should they not be able to induce the Nawab (of Cambay) to enter into such terms as they maybe judge proper to accept, the fort

1 (The following is the agreement made in Hodges' time: Agreement under the hand and seal of the Nawab of Broach relative to the duties to be paid at his port: Whereas Thomas Hodges Esq., English Chief at Surat, and Governor of the Mogul's Castle and fleet, has represented to me that the heavy charges for several years past, which have been taken on English goods exported from, and imported at, this port of Broach, have proved detrimental to the English trade and the revenue of this place, I do by this writing promise and agree in future to receive on all cotton exported belonging to the English a peshkash only of Rs. 1,.2,.4 on every Surat candy, and all other goods whatsoever belonging to the English imported or exported a peshkash only of Rs. 1, 1 per cent to be collected on their raj nirakh or current value; and in testimony hereof have hereunto put my hand and seal in Broach, this 3rd May, 1764. (Recorded on the 7th May, 1764, in 1763/64, S. F. 17)

2 The President seems not to have known when this Nawab raised the duties to 2½ per cent. According to his own words it was after 2 or 3 years, either in 1766 or in 1767. It is therefore difficult to understand how the President could in 1771 claim a refund for six years.

[*Tulaji*] must then be destroyed; and we are inclined to hope from the great damage the Kolis have sustained in this expedition that they will not molest our trade in future; and by pursuing this plan they [*the Company's servants*] will be enabled the more speedily to carry our orders respecting the Nawab of Broach into execution, which we much wish to have happily effected before the close of the season.

1771 *Bombay, 12th April,* 1771 (1771, *P. D. Let. to C. of Dir,* 18)
*William Hornby to the Court of Directors.*

*Expedition against Broach*

12. The President laid before us in consultation the 19th ultimo a letter he had received from the Nawab of Surat, as also his sentiments on the subject of that letter and the nature of the Surat Government's demand on that of Broach, both of which are transmitted in the packet under No. 36, by which it appearing, as also from our own knowledge of that affair, that the Broach Government was very largely and justly indebted to that of Surat for the phurja of Broach, which for upwards of 40 years the former had collected, owing to the inability of the latter to obtain redress, and also that the Nawab of Broach had, contrary to a treaty with us, collected a duty of 2½ per cent, for many years on all goods, the property of merchants under our protection, whereas the same had been settled at 1½ per cent, which alone amounted to full 1½ lakhs of Rupees to this time; all which being considered and the advantage which would in all probability accrue to Your Honours by our obligating the Nawab of Broach to give ample satisfaction for both these points, and the present opportunity, when our troops were so near his territories, being as favourable as could present itself, we, therefore, directed your servants at Surat to make a peremptory demand on the Nawab for the difference of the customs he had collected as also for the arrears of the phurja and to put the same on a proper footing in future; and should he endeavour to retard or evade the same, they are to direct Col. Gordon to transport the troops under his command towards his territories to compel him to enter into the best terms possible, which we doubt not will induce him to pay at least some ready money and settle a mode for an annual future payment as also to put the customs on the same footing as settled by treaty.

13. The Broach phurja belonging to the nawabship and not to the Castle of Surat, we have directed your servants, previously to enter into an agreement with the Nawab [*of Surat*] to make over the greatest part, if not the whole, to Your Honours, in consideration of the expense you will thereby incur, and that they likewise stipulate the largest share of what may be in future annually received should be on your account; which we doubt not he will readily agree to, as he well knows, without our interfering, he could never expect to recover any part thereof. We hope our expectations herein will not be disappointed, and that this measure will meet with your entire approbation.

1771 *Bombay, 12th April,* 1771 (1771, *P.D.* 57)
*Letter from the Chief at Surat.*

*Nawab of Surat amenable*

Messrs Gambier and Stratton had been deputed to wait on the Nawab [*of Surat*][1] to communicate our orders regarding the Broach

[1] See entry: 23rd April, 1771, the concluding paragraph.

phurja, a copy of whose report they enclosed, by which it appeared that the Nawab, though he was at least entitled to half the arrears and whatever might be settled to be paid annually in future, he nevertheless left it to them to settle this affair, and would very willingly pay half the charges which might be incurred in recovering the same. That on consideration of these proposals the Chief and Council were of opinion that, if the Nawab would accept of 1/3 of the arrears which might be recovered and of what might be settled to be paid in future, and likewise pay a third of whatever charges might be incurred in recovering the demand, it would be very equitable and advantageous to our Hon'ble Employers, which the Nawab had accordingly agreed to, and they hoped would meet our approbation.

*Surat*, 15*th April*, 1771 (1771, *S. F.* 658) 1771

*At a Consultation.*

*Mysterious informer*

The Chief acquaints the Board that he had yesterday evening a long conversation with a man who was formerly an officer in the service of the Nawab of Broach, and in whose service his relations still are; and that by the man's account it appears that the Broach Nawab has not in all above 1,500 sepoys in his service, who are very badly paid and very discontented, and most of them are armed with matchlocks, but none with muskets; that he has not above one hundred cannon in all, and these in very bad condition, particularly the carriages; and that he is very badly furnished with powder and shot; that in his opinion the weakest part of the fort is on the river-side opposite to Anklesvar, where the river, he says, is not broader than the flight of an arrow, and the bank on the Anklesvar side is so high as to command the town. Taking this account to consideration, as also the great likelihood there is that the vessels will not arrive at Broach from Sultanpur so as to save the springs and get conveniently into the river, which if they should even meet, that from the neaps so immediately coming on, it would be very difficult for them to proceed up the river, as it is, from all the accounts we can learn filled with shallows, and the town at a great distance from the bar, it is agreed that it will be the surest way of executing the service proposed to order the troops back to Surat, to land them on their arrival at Rander or any convenient place on the other side of the river, that they may immediately begin their march for Broach; and orders are directly to be dispatched to Colonel Gordon by malasaries both to Sultanpur and Broach Bar, the latter for fear the troops should have proceeded from Sultanpur before the order arrive there, to direct his coming with all expedition to Surat and proceeding as above-mentioned. The Colonel must be directed, as soon as he anchors at this Bar, to send up the river in the boats all the troops as well as the artillery and, in short, everything which he may want on the proposed service, that he may be in readiness to march without any loss of time; and as he may be in want of some carts and draft bullocks for the transportation of the stores, etc., agreed that 50 of the former and 200 of the latter or, as many as can be got ready, be immediately provided, and that our superiors be advised of our motives for the above resolution.

*Change of plan*

1771 *Bombay, 17th April,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Expedition against Broach* Received per pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat, which bore date the 12th instant, and advised that the Chief, not having received any answer to the letter he had wrote the Nawab of Broach, he had again wrote to him; shortly after which he received replies to both letters; and as by the tenor of these letters he seemed to be only endeavouring to amuse them, the Chief and Council had determined to lose no further time in correspondence, but to direct the troops to be embarked with all expedition from the Koli country and proceed to Broach river, there to take the proper measures for bringing the Nawab to our terms; for which purpose they had likewise determined to send Mr. Gambier on this service, who was to proceed to Anklesvar with the Nawab's forces[1] and act alone till joined by Mr. Halsey, who were to form a Committee for the management of the business of this expedition.

1771 *Bombay, 23rd April,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57).
*At a Consultation.*

*Bombay disapproval* It appears to us very extraordinary the Chief and Council should alter the mode of proceeding, in the expedition against Broach, pointed out to them in our letter of the 22nd ultimo, and which they had ordered to be carried into execution upon the mere information of a man whose relations are in the service of the Broach Nawab. It is, however, difficult for us from the slight information before us to know what further directions are necessary to be given them for their conduct herein, or whether to approve or blame the same, as we do not comprehend upon what grounds it has proceeded.[2]

But it appears from the information before us that no difficulties, which the troops could have met with by the boats and gallivats being caught by the neaps in the Narbada river, could equal the inconveniences and delays which they will unavoidably be subjected to by the march from Rander to Broach overland.

And from the correspondence between the Chief and Council and Colonel Gordon we are afraid that an additional number of carts, carriages and draft-bullocks will be wanted for the troops.

We are likewise apprehensive that many obstacles will arise to the success of this expedition from the troops being on the south side of the Narbada river without vessels of any kind, or pontoons, or rafts, or any means of constructing them, as by their account of it the river is too broad for the guns to be brought near enough to batter the walls in Broach, and by our information the river is too deep to be forded anyway near to town.

We imagine that, if the troops had been landed on the north side of the Narbada river, the town of Broach might have been invested, and all communication between it and the country cut off, by which

1 The Nawab of Cambay. See entry: Bombay 19th May 1771.

2 In the light of this public avowal of their inability to advise it is difficult to understand how the Bombay authorities could afterwards state that they had given orders countermanding the new plan of attack.

every possibility of a reinforcement of troops or a supply of provisions coming into town would have been guarded against.

Our troops appearing before the town would in all probability have so far intimidated the Nawab as to have brought him to terms immediately, and would at the same time have effectually prevented the removal of their women and valuable effects; whereas by the method they have pursued an opportunity has been given them to convey everything without molestation or difficulty.

If the Nawab's troops be discontented, as the Chief and Council have been informed, we imagine they would have been more likely to have taken their part decisively, seeing the troops ready to enter the town, than seeing the river Narbada between the troops and the town.

Perhaps, too, if the troops had been on the same side of the river with the town, the place might have been taken by assault or by surprise; and at this advanced season of the year we believe the Chief and Council must have known that we were very anxious to have the troops and vessels, at present under their directions, returned hither as soon as possible; and that we never could have intended to undertake (at this time) the tedious and uncertain operations of a regular siege with the field-train of artillery under Colonel Gordon's orders.

We, therefore, much fear the disposition they acquaint us they have now made will defeat our intentions; and they must be acquainted that in case of failure we shall deem them answerable for it, as they have acted entirely contrary to our directions; and as we can by no means permit that any of the troops belonging to this garrison shall be absent during the approaching monsoon, the Chief and Council must be positively directed to embark the forces for their return hither by the 20th May.

*Bombay resolution*

As they have agreed that the Nawab of Surat shall receive one-third of the sum which may be recovered from the Broach Nawab for the phurja, or settled to be paid for the same in future, we acquiesce therein, though at the same time we are of opinion a quarter part would have been sufficient.

*Bombay, 24th April,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57) 1771

*Letter from Surat.*

*Initial delay*

Received per pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat, which bore date the 18th instant, and advised that the Nawab [*of Cambay*][1] had assured the Chief that his troops to the number of 700 should be ready to march the day after the date of this letter to Variav; but that he thought it proper they should wait there till joined by a considerable part of our forces, lest they should meet with any interuption in their march. That the Nawab had further represented to the Chief that he was in absolute want of the sum of Rs. 15,000, without which his troops could not set out; for which reason his demand was complied with upon his engaging to consider it as a loan to be made good out of the revenues.

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1 See entry: Bombay, 19th May, 1771

1771 *Bombay, 25th April,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Expedition about to start*

Received per express pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat, which was dated the 22nd instant, and advised that all the troops, except four hundred men left for the garrison at Tulaji Fort, had arrived in the river from Sultanpur and, they hoped, by the day after the date of this letter would be in readiness to set out on the intended expedition against Broach. They enclosed copy of their instructions to Mr. Gambier.

1771 *Bombay, 28th April,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Further delay*

Received per pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat, which was dated the 23rd instant, in which they enclosed copy of their orders to Colonel Gordon ; and acquainted us that the troops were not then ready to march, owing to their having been obliged to leave near 300 bullocks at Sultanpur, and as they found great difficulty in getting a sufficient number of carts and coolies; but that the Nawab's[1] troops had marched to Variav under the command of the Bakhshi. That Colonel Gordon, having been seized with an indisposition, had resigned his command, to which Colonel Cay had succeeded.

*In command*

1771 *Bombay, 2nd May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Letter from Surat.*

*European troops delayed*

Received per pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat, which bore date the 28th ultimo, and advised that the troops had set out for Broach the day before; but they had learnt by a letter from Mr. Gambier that many of the Europeans were so much affected by the heat of the weather that they were obliged to encamp at about 8 or 9 miles' distance. That they had sent a supply of provisions and ammunition by water to Broach River; and that they proposed dispatching the Drake Snow and Ranger Ketch in a few days with a convoy to this place.

1771 *Bombay, 2nd May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D. Let. to C of Dir.* 18)
*Extract from a letter from the President and Council at Bombay to the Court of Directors.*

*Expedition against Broach*

13. Your servants at Surat having made the demand on the Nawab of Broach which we decided, they acquaint us his reply thereto was such as plainly showed he only intended to amuse them, in hopes that from the lateness of the season they would be able to do nothing before the rains. They, therefore, determined to lose no time in correspondence, but immediately on the conclusion of the treaty with the Nawab of Cambay, they directed that all the troops employed on the expedition against the Kolis (except such a number as was requisite to remain at Tulaji, until the fort could be put into the hands of the Nawab of Cambay) should be immediately embarked and proceed to

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1 The Nawab of Surat; see entry: 6th May 1771, marginal heading *Future of Broach*, where mention is made of the forces of the Nawab of Surat under the command of the Bakhshi.

the river of Broach, wait there until they were joined by the forces of the Nawab of Surat; and Mr. Gambier, whom they had appointed jointly with Mr. Halsey a Committee for the management of this business, either to accommodate this affair with the Nawab of Broach by treaty, or otherwise to direct the forces to act against him.

14. And they also acquainted us that agreeable to our directions to settle with the Nawab of Surat for his share of what might be recovered on account the Broach phurja, or [*whatever might be*] annually settled to be paid in future,that it had been mutually agreed the Nawab should receive one-third of each, and that he should be likewise bear one-third part of the charges which may be incurred by it. *Agreement with Surat*

15 From the orders, which had been given in consequence of our directions for the forces immediately to embark and proceed to Broach river, we flattered ourselves this affair would have been brought to a speedy conclusion; but on the 29th ultimo we received a letter from your servants at Surat acquainting us that, notwithstanding our orders and directions they had themselves given for the troops to embark and proceed to Broach river, they had determined to order them back to Surat, on the Chief having been acquainted by a man, whose relations are in the service of the Nawab of Broach, that it was in his opinion the best method to march the troops from Surat thither; of which the Chief acquainted his Council, who concurred thereon. *Change of plan*

16 From the slight information they have given us it is absolutely out of our power either to approve or blame their conduct in this respect, though we are inclined to believe it will be attended with more impediments and delays than the method pointed out bv us; and we have acquainted them thereof and that, should our intentions be defeated by the measure they are now pursuing, we shall deem them answerable for deviating from our directions. *Bombay disapproval*

17 Our apprehensions of this measure being attended with much delay have proved too just; for by letters from thence we learn, though the troops returned thither on the 21st ultimo, yet on the 24th they advise us they were not then able to proceed, owing to their having left the greatest part of their oxen behind at Tulaji, and [*owing to*] the difficulty they experienced in procuring a sufficient number of carts and coolies to transport their artillery and necessaries by land. In what time they will be enabled to set out. they have not acquainted us; but, as the season is so far advanced, we have been obliged for that reason to direct that the troops belonging to this place must be embarked for their return hither by the 20th instant. We, therefore, are very dubious regarding the success of it. *Fears well-grounded*

18 Colonel Gordon, having been seized with a disorder which put it out of his power any longer to command the army, he requested to resign the same; which the Chief and Council have permitted him to do, and have appointed Lieut. Colonel Cay thereto. *In command*

*Bombay, 6th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Letter from Surat.*

The letter from the Chief and Council at Surat was dated the 1st instant, in which they gave their reasons for departing from the *Change of plan defended*

first plan against Broach, which were the difficulties that were likely to occur from the circumstance of the tide, which were such as in their opinion might have entirely defeated the enterprise; and they enumerated the difficulties our vessels and boats might have met with on the river. That as they had sent round armed boats and malasaris,[1] the inconvenience apprehended by us of the difficulty of finding means to cross the river would be abundantly obviated; but they were assured that there was a very good ford within three kos of the town; and the breadth of the river was not so considerable, but that such poor defences as the town was reported to have on that side might be easily ruined by our batteries from the southern shore, which was so high as to command the town. That all these circumstances considered they thought their operations were brought to a greater certainty by ordering the troops to march from Surat than they would be if the first plan had been pursued; and that his certainty was much to be preferred to the very chance of gaining two or three days; and they were even much in doubt if any time had been lost, as the troops. when they arrived there, had many wants to be supplied, which, had they been at Broach, could not have been so readily known and remedied. That although more time than was expected had been lost there in procuring about 300 bullocks in the room of those which had been left behind at Sultanpur, yet the same want would have occurred at Broach if the troops had landed at any distance from the town; and the inconveniences attending the transportation of cattle thither would have been a much greater delay to their operations. They supposed that an assault would not be attempted by choice on the land side, as from the best information they could procure the fortifications there were the strongest; and as the Nawab had so long a notice of our intentions, they did not expect that anything could be done against him by surprise; but they still flattered themselves that there would be time enough to accomplish our designs, as they did not expect that the regularity of a siege would be necessary to the success of them.

*Bombay orders discussed*

They observed that, as we in our letter of the 22nd March had told them that we should rely on them for such an exertion of the force as would answer the end proposed, they could not lay down to themselves any other limitations in the pursuit of that end than those by which the service we had entrusted to their direction was necessarily bounded: and as we had only given them general orders to direct Colonel Gordon to transport the troops towards the Broach territories, they thought it their duty to vary the mode of proceeding as the alteration of circumstances might render necessary. That they had duly acquainted Mr. Gambier and the Nawab [*of Surat*] of our directions respecting the return of the troops and our acquiescing in the agreement about the Broach phurja; and advised that the Chief had received a note from the former acquainting him that our troops had been attacked on their march by about two thousand of the Broach troops, but after a sharp engagement, which lasted about an hour and three quarters, they were driven back with great slaughter. That the loss on our side was very small; and as soon as the artillery carriages

*Skirmish*

1 Boats for carrying goods.

could be repaired, which were broke in the action, the troops would proceed to Anklesvar.

*Camp before Broach, 6th May, 1771, 8 at night, (1771, P. D. 57)* 1771
*Letter from Robert Gambier to Daniel Draper.*

*Siege of Broach*

Contrary to our expectation we were not attacked last night in any part, nor can we imagine the reason we were not, as certainly a great number of boats were made ready. Nothing material has happened since I wrote you last night. Our battery has been playing all to-night, and I hope with good execution, as the town has been twice set on fire since morning, and most of the shells fell in [*it*]. As our people on the island were under arms all night as well as here, little was done to advance the battery for the eighteen pounders; and owing to some unlucky mistake the shot and platforms for these guns were not put on board the boat mentioned in Captain Nelson's account, but were in another, which, as thought not to be wanted, did not pass up to the island with the rest. However that mistake is remedied by our having to-day landed all the stores wanted at the place the boats lie down in, and sent them up to the island in carts; and now we hope that the 18-pounders will without fail begin to play to-morrow morning, and in 24 hours make a practicable breach, which of course will soon after be stormed; and, therefore, if God is pleased to give us success, we may hope to be masters of the place within three days.

*Little information*

It is now become extremely difficult to get any intelligence from the town. [*The watch*] is very suspicious and severe. All I have been able to learn to-day is that he has sent away his family and Lallubhai's up to a Koli place about six kos off, called Duraseer, which is situated on an hill in the middle of thick woods, and that many of his people desert daily. It is said that he waits for a number of sepoys from Rajpipla, etc, places, which he expects to arrive in 3 or 4 days; and that then he means to make one grand attack on us and hazard all on the fortune of that push. If we succeed, as we hope, he will not have time for this; and I much wish the issue of the whole business depended on an engagement with him.

*Bombay, 7th May, 1771 (1771, P D. 57)* 1771
*Bombay Resolution.*

*Bombay's disapproval*

Read likewise the letters above extracted from Surat; and the President lays before the Board a letter from the Chief, with copy of a letter from Mr Gambier to the Chief, which are now read and entered hereafter; on which it is observed the advices now before us still further convince us of the propriety of the remarks made in our Consultation of the 23rd ultimo on the mode of proceeding they have adopted in respect to the expedition against Broach, of which they were immediately advised; and should the hopes we have formed of success in this expedition be frustrated, we must impute it to their deviation from our orders, and to their tardiness in carrying into execution our intentions, by which an entire springs was lost. We shall, therefore, esteem them answerable for it.

*Future of Broach*

But, as we still hope for success, in such a case it becomes necessary to take into consideration whether it would be most eligible to keep

possession of Broach or not; and as the former appears to be the most proper, until a more certain knowledge can be obtained of the advantages or disadvantages which may accrue from it, it is, therefore, resolved the Chief and Council be directed to keep possession of it, and that the following troops remain there for that purpose to be commanded by a field-officer, *viz.* one captain, three subalterns, one hundred Europeans, and non-commission officers in proportion, thirty artillery men and three officers, four companies of Bombay sepoys, four companies of Surat sepoys with 100 cavalry and 200 sepoys belonging to the Nawab of Surat under the command of the Bakhshi, and as this arrangement will render the reduction of the Surat irregulars for the present improper, directions are to be forwarded thither agreeable thereto as soon as possible.

*In command* Lieutenant-Colonel Cay must have his option to continue in command of the troops at Broach or to return hither; and should be prefer the latter, Major Hassard must be appointed to that command. We shall hereafter give such further directions as may appear necessary for the proper government of that place.

*Wedderburn disapproves* Read a letter from the Brigadier-General disapproving of the power vested in Mr. Gambier by the Chief and Council as entered hereafter; on consideration of which the Board are of opinion the powers which Mr. Gambier ought to have been invested with, should have been of the same tenor as those before given to Messrs. Halsey and Horsley on the expedition against the Kolis.

1771 *Bombay, 7th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Daniel Draper to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing's proposals* Agreeable to what I acquainted you in my address of the 25th ultimo, the person I therein mentioned is this day returned from Baroda, accompanied by another called Anand Ram Pandit, who have brought me a letter from Fatesing or his Diwan, Bhallubhai Nana, a translate of which I enclose, wherein you will observe he seems very desirous his proposals should be accepted; but in order to gain time in receiving your reply, I have declined hearing what they have to say till to-morrow; and as you will have been informed that the Nawab of Broach thought proper to attack our troops on their march, if he should continue to oppose them, I hope they may succeed in reducing his town. *Progress against Broach* I hade not heard from Mr. Gambier to-day, but learn that our troops arrived at the bank of the river opposite to the town yesterday morning, and that our vessels were within two kos of it.

P S. I enclose a copy of a note just received from Mr. Gambier

*Letter from Robert Gambier to Daniel Draper, dated Camp near Surat 1st May, 1771.*

*Losses of Broach troops* I have been so very busy and so much fatigued since I last wrote you, which was from the field of battle yesterday morning, that I have not been able to write again. By all accounts the Broach troops suffered in the action very much, and I have reason to believe had about 200 killed and wounded. The Broach Bakhshi, who commanded them, is amongst the latter; and among the former two Arab and one Sindi Jamadar.

*Advance on Broach*

After the action, as soon as we got the artillery carriages repaired, which took us till near 12, we marched without opposition to Anklesvar and encamped on this side the town; and this morning about eight came here very quietly, which is within a mile of Broach fort. We have been to the water-side to reconnoitre, and find the distance about six hundred (600) yards; and in the middle of the river opposite to the fort is an island of firm ground, which runs a long way up the river, and is within 200 yards of the fort; but unluckily that [*the fort*] and the town command it. However, if we cannot make a proper impression on the fort from our batteries on this side, we must then endeavour to possess this island and carry on our attack from thence.

*Dangerous delay of boats*

The boats and vessels to our great mortification are not arrived in the river, though from report by many people I believe they are at the Bar. I have sent people to endeavour to open a communication with them and by them sent orders for them to come up the river immediately. With them we could do a great deal; and if they do not come up these springs, which are now almost over, our affairs will bear a very bad aspect. What can keep them, I cannot imagine. I do not find that any boats have been sunk in the river or any means used to prevent their coming up. God send them soon, or we have come to little purpose.

*Letter to Nawab*

I have wrote to the Nawab as per copy enclosed, but though the harkara went away at 11 this morning he is not yet returned, though I positively ordered him not to stay, whether he got an answer or not, above 3 hours. He must be, I suppose, detained.

*The Broach troops*

The Nawab of Broach remains quite silent, nor can I get any intelligence of what he is doing in his place. All is hush and calm, which in my opinion forebodes a storm, though all people think the spirit of his sepoys is too much broken by the late action for them to venture a second attack. None of his troops are now on this side, and he has got all the boats, which seem very numerous, lying under his walls. Were our armed boats here, we could soon take them.

*Gaikwad's horse*

About 50 of Damaji's horse[1] came to-day, and took post on this side of Anklesvar. I have sent to see what they are about and intention.

*Boats awaited*

As far as I can now judge, if the boats join us to-morrow, we shall do very well, and be able to return to Surat as ordered; but if they do not these springs, all hopes of success are over.

*Copy of Robert Gambier's letter to the Nawab of Broach.*

*Accusations*

The English Chief at Surat a long while ago made some just demands on you for what you owed our friend, the Nawab of Surat, for the phurja, and the Hon'ble Company, for customs. You have taken wrong for some years, and you had full time enough given you to make proper satisfaction without obliging us to draw the sword; but your enemies gave you bad council, or your bad fortune would not allow you to listen to justice and reason. As the English Chief wrote you, I set out from Surat to come to settle matters with you at

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1 Troops under the command of Fatesing. In a letter of 26th April, 1772 it is said that Fatesing made a show of marching some troops to the relief of the Nawab of Broach. See entry: 26th April, 1772.

Anklesvar; but on my way, the first day, your people affronted us, and were punished for it. Next day, I heard you had turned the Hon'ble Company's people out of their own village at Anklesvar, and then you sent your troops and attacked all the Hon'ble Company's forces. What good you get, you yourself know by this time very well, and you know what force I have with me.

*Ultimatum* I now write to know whether you will immediately satisfy our demands, to which must be added the charges of bringing all our forces so far. If you will do it directly and fully, there may yet be peace between us, and no other way; and I will wait only two or three hours for your answer.

1771 *Bombay, 7th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*David Wedderburn, Brigadier-General, to William Hornby.*

*Wedderburn's disapproval* Observing by the instructions from the Chief and Factors at Surat to Colonel Robert Gordon and Mr. Robert Gambier that the entire command of the troops employed in the service against the Nawab of Broach is vested in Mr. Gambier alone, till he be joined by Mr. Halsey, I think it my duty to declare my disapprobation of this measure, because I consider it contrary to the intentions of our Hon'ble Masters and highly detrimental to their military service.

1771 *Surat, 9th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Daniel Draper to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing's offer* The two agents from Baroda, mentioned in my address of the 4th instant, accompanied by another called Bappaji Bawa met me this morning, Mr. George Perrott being likewise present; and after many arguments they agreed to allow us five lakhs of Rupees for our charges and the annual sum of 1,25,000 Rupees for our chauth of the revenues, in case of our delivering Broach to Fatesing; and possibly, if we get possession, we may increase the latter, though they declare they have exceeded their commission.

*The Bakhshi's offer* Mr. Gambier has acquainted me, the Bakhshi[1] has likewise offered three lakhs of Rupees for our charges and 50,000 Rupees per annum as long as he or his heirs may hold the place, in case we deliver it to him. His troops are ready to take charge immediately, and all he will want from us (I conclude on paying for them), Mr. Gambier remarks, would be about four or five hundred Surat musket sepoys, some powder and shot, and a few guns; and I cannot but concur with that gentleman in thinking he [*the Bakhshi*] would be a firm ally to us, and of very great service, if ever this place is attacked, or we ever act this way against the Marathas; and as he has long been thought an improper person to be in power here and to rule the Nawab's councils, I beg leave to observe that this seems a very good way of removing him; and possibly he may be induced to increase the annual allowance, if you should judge it politic to deliver the place to him in preference to the Marathas.

*Future of Broach* You will please to observe, Sir, by the enclosed extract, received this day from Mr. Gambier, the prospect of our soon getting possession

1 The Bakhshi of the Nawab of Surat.

of Broach; and as he desires me to determine as soon as possible to whom it is to be given, I shall be very glad to receive your commands in reply to my address of the 25th ultimo.

*Camp before Broach, 8th May, 1771, at 10 a.m.* (1771, *P. D.* 57) 1771
*Robert Gambier to Daniel Draper.*

*Bombardment of Broach*

I received your letter the 6th, but the pattemar boat with the mortar, etc. is not arrived. I did not write you yesterday as I had nothing very material to say, and we were employed in moving our camp much nearer the island in order to cover better the attack, and to be at hand to support our people when they storm. We have at last raised a battery within 350 paces of the town-wall, and yesterday one 18-pounder was mounted upon it and fired with good success on the enemy's towers and batteries, many of which it silenced. The other 18-pounder is now also mounted, as are the twelves and all the mortars; and by noon we shall begin to batter in a breach, and hope by to-morrow night or the next at furthest that a practicable one will be made.

*News from Broach*

I have hopes of bringing over to our interest some of the Nawab's people and am treating secretly for that purpose. It is very difficult to get intelligence of what passes in this town; but from the best I can get it appears that all the town-people and a great number of sepoys have run away, that all the women are removed and all the valuable effects; so that if we do take the town, we shall find it very empty.

*Fatesing*

We have many reports here of the Marathas intending to act against us, and to that end that Fatesing himself is coming towards Broach,[1] and forces assembling from all quarters. I do not think this to be true, but you know better than I, and will take measures accordingly.

It is surprising that I have had no offers whatever made me of accommodation on the part of the Nawab of Broach since Lallubhai was with me.

*Health of the troops*

Since we came here, we have had two Europeans and three sepoys killed, and two wounded in the batteries; but all three have suffered by their own folly in keeping out of the bounds of the defences thrown up. All our men are very healthy, though the weather is severely hot.

*Future of Broach*

If we take the place, I request you will as soon as possible determine whom it is to be given to. If the place is to remain long in our hands, how am I to garrison it properly and at the same time return the troops for Bombay. Pray tell me what you would have me to do in these circumstances.

*Surat, 14th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57) 1771
*Daniel Draper to William Hornby.*

*Breaking the news*

The general letter of this date was no sooner dispatched than I received one from Mr. Gambier as per copy enclosed, which, I am truly

1 See entry: 26th April, 1772: the last document of I Part, *First Expedition against Broach.*

concerned to acquaint you, gives a very unpromising prospect of our succeeding in the very short time yet unexpired for their stay, and this, chiefly from the unlucky accident to their powder, shells, etc.

*Fatesing* I likewise enclose you copy of Fatesing's letter to Mr. Gambier, his answer, and my letter to the former of this date, which, I hope, you will approve. I have enclosed it to Mr. Gambier, and also sent him a translate of (*it*), that, in case of any fortunate turn to our affairs, Mr. Gambier may suppress it, though from the receipt of our general letter this morning he can scarcely think of anything, I imagine, but returning immediately hither; and, therefore, I have countermanded all the supply of powder (except that from the Revenge) as likewise the Surat sepoys proceeding thither in part of the intended garrison.

*Robert Gambier to Daniel, Draper dated Camp before Broach, 13th May,* 1771.

*Fatesing* I wrote you last night by a harkara, and since received a letter from Fatesing, of which I send you a translate. He is about seven kos distant from Broach with, it is said, two thousand horse and about five hundred foot.

I also send you a copy of my answer; and after you have read the information I am now going to give you as to our affairs here, I beg you will tell me what further I shall do with Fatesing.

*The accident* I advised you of the accident which happened yesterday evening on the island to a magazine of ours and the loss as to men we sustained by it. Two are since dead of their wounds, and unluckily Captain Nelson lost all the shells, except about 35, and all the fuses but for those 35.

*Unsuccessful attempt* Notwithstanding, orders were given out for storming the breach this morning, as Captain Nelson reported it practicable. All necessary preparations were accordingly made, and in the morning the boats put off, but the tide was too strong for them to get over to the breach, and consequently the enterprise for that time was laid aside, and the troops returned to their quarters.

*Unpleasant discovery* Since then the Engineer, etc. Officers have discovered that the enemy have stockaded the breach quite across with strong timbers well secured, and by this rendered, as it seems to be their opinion, the breach impracticable; and, therefore, as it is too late in the season to batter a fresh and make another, I suppose the siege must be raised.

*Consultations* But of this I am not yet certain, and all I now write is what I judge from the discourse I have had with the Colonel, the Engineer, etc. This afternoon the Colonel intends to take the opinion of the Engineer, etc. in writing, and to give me his own by letter, which, when received, I shall immediately forward to yourself and Council and wait your determination. It is very hard on us after all we have gone through to be just foiled, just as the fruit was within our grasp, and to be foiled too by one particular single circumstance, which might easily have been foreseen and provided against, I suppose, or else we were engaged in a very fruitless attempt.

*Fatesing's offer* As the Marathas would assist us, if the troops could be kept at Surat [*during*] the rains, the plan of our acting in conjunction yet might

be carried [*out*]; but then it [*Broach*] must be ceded to them of course. However I should think anything bettei than retreating wth disgrace.

*Ammunition* I cannot determine whether it would now be right to send the ammunition and stores I wrote for last night, but I suppose not. I have asked the Colonel, but he will not take upon himself to determine till this evening.

*Camp before Broach*, 15*th May*, 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57) 1771
*Robert Gambier to Daniel Draper.*

*Col. Cay's opinion* The Colonel has this morning been over to the island to inspect the breach and town-wall. The former he seems to form a more favourable opinion of, than he did yesterday, and thinks that it is a good and practicable one, if it was not for the stockade within. and part of that is broke by our shot; but still he thinks an assault at present would be very dangerous and the success very doubtful; and he seems not as yet determined whether to try it to-night or not. However, as it is his opinion and mine, and I believe the Engineer's–but the latter is at too great a distance for me to get it from him in writing–that, considering the two large guns are arrived and a supply of powder very soon expected, and that many of the shot now sent will suit the eighteen-pounders, if we could be supplied, which I suppose we can, by you with the remainder of the indent already forwarded you, and 1,000 or 1,500 more 18-pounds shot, and Major Hassard's detachment could join us in 4 or 5 days, and we could be allowed to stay out till the 25th of this month, there is a very great prospect of our in that time reducing the place and giving a good account of the expedition.

*Instructions requested* I, therefore, write to advise you of this opinion and these favourable circumstances, and beg you will lay this letter before the Board and return me an immediate answer to advise me whether you can permit of this further time or not; and as I send this by a camel, whose driver has engaged to be in Surat in six hours, I may have your answer by express pattemars by sunrise to-morrow morning; and by that time it is impossible for us to be ready to move; but the 17th we shall, as we shall go on with all our measures for retreating. Notwithstanding, I write you this letter: and if we march the 17th in the morning, the Colonel makes no doubt of being at Vaux's Tomb by the 20th.

*The Nawab's agent* Lallubhai[1] came over to the Bakhshi [*of Surat*] this morning, but I find his Master is not yet humbled. He talked in a most saucy and proud manner to the Bakhshi's man The most I can possibly bring him to [*is to*] send Lallubhai and two other of his principal men to you at Surat along with us to settle the demands there, and to make some trifling presents to myself the Colonel and the Bakhshi as tokens of respect, and his desiring us to withdraw , and this I shall accept of, if your answer to the proposal of staying out till the 25th does not allow of it, because it will take off in some measure the disgrace of our retreat, leave our demands as free to be made as ever,

1 Lallubhai is described in the *Bombay Gazetteer* as the farmer of the Broach revenues. (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* II, 551-552) The Nawab of Broach calls Lallubhai "a principal jamadar, a trusty man, and all the business of the Diwan is transacted by him, he having my power." See II Part, *the Treaty with Broach*, Nawab's letter to the Presidency, received in Bombay 28th July, 1771.

and prevent our being molested in our march back, which will save a good deal of time; and besides the safe return of our vessels will be secured.

*Plan of action* The settling of this business will necessarily take up till to-morrow forenoon, so that at all events we could not move till the 17th in the morning ; and that, if not at all molested in our march, we shall get to Variav by the 19th. A copy of the Colonel's letter, giving his opinion, accompanies this, and I have also sent him to peruse this letter which he approves of.

I have [*received*] this morning your letter with that for Fatesing, which I shall use if we retreated.

1771 *Camp before Broach 15th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Colonel Robert Cay to Robert Gambier.*

*Colonel Cay's letter* In answer to your requisition I have to inform you that, if we be allowed to remain ten days longer here, liberally supplied with ordinance, stores and ammunition, and joined by the troops under Major Hassard, I believe we shall have a fair prospect of success.

1771 *Surat. 15th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Daniel Draper to Robert Gambier.*

*Orders to return* It gives us the most unfeigned concern to find that your attempts to take Broach have proved ineffectual, more particularly as the stay of the troops for ten days longer would almost ensure success. We sincerely wish it was in our power to comply with your proposal, but the orders from the Presidency are too positive to admit of any deviation; and we therefore depend on the utmost dispatch being used in their return, that, if possible, they may arrive by the 19th. Was it in our power to comply with your proposal, we fear it would have taken a longer time than you suppose to have supplied you with the several articles you have mentioned, as the boat, dispatched hence Monday night, has not to our knowledge yet been on board the Revenge though the Bunder Master was sent in her to hasten the service.

*Nawab's proposal* We think it a fortunate circumstance in the present situation of affairs that the Nawab will consent to send Lallubhai with you hither in order to settle the demands; and we would have you accept the same, as it will in a great measure obviate the disgrace and be a means of preventing his harrassing against us, if such should be their *Fatesing* intention. but which we do no suspect will be the case. Fatesing's agents have [*been,*] and still shall be, amused with the hopes of our renewing our pretentions as soon as the season will permit.

1771 *Bombay, 19th May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Failure* Received per pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat, dated the 15th instant, in which they enclosed copies of several letters from Messrs. Gambier and Colonel Cay, by which we might observe that all hopes of succeeding against Broach were at an end, and that orders were issued for the return of the troops ; that Mr. Halsey had acquainted them that 150 of the Nawab of Cambay's troops

had arrived at Tulaji out of 350 men who had left Cambay, the rest having deserted in consequence of the vessels being forced into Jambusar; and earnestly requested that some of our troops might be left with him, the officer having refused to take charge of the fort without it, which Mr. Halsey had complied with till a reinforcement from Cambay could arrive, as there was not time to set on foot a treaty with the Raja of Bhavnagar or demolish the fort; and Major Hassard having given it as his opinion that 140 men would be sufficient, Mr. Halsey had judged it preferable to secure the embarkation of the rest of the garrison that spring rather than lose any more time.

*Bombay, 22nd May,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57) 1771
*Letter from Surat.*

*Arrival of troops*

Received per pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat which bore date the 18th instant, and advised that Mr. Halsey had arrived there the 15th with the vessels and troops from Tulaji, except 150 men, left at the request of the Nawab of Cambay's officer for security of the fort under the command of Captain Fewtrell.

*Bombay, 5th June,* 1771 (1771, *P. D. Let. to C. of D.* 18) 1771
*Extract from a letter from the President and Council at Bombay to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

*Failure of Broach expedition*

12 Your Honours have already been fully advised of our motives for undertaking an expedition against Broach, which, we doubt not, will prove satisfactory to you; and from the directions we gave to your servants at Surat to embark all the forces employed against the Kolis and proceed on board the vessels up the river of Broach with the utmost expedition, we doubted not but that affair would have been shortly brought to a speedy and successful issue.

*Change of plan*

13 But on the 21st April, when we had reason to conclude our forces were before Broach from the orders we had given to your servants at Surat, and which they had, previous to that date, acquainted us they had directed to be carried into execution, we received a letter from them, advising us that they had given directions for the forces to return to Surat in order to march from that place by land against Broach, and that they were induced to act thus in direct opposition to our orders on the Chief having been acquainted by a man, who had been long in the service of the Broach Nawab, and whose relations, they acquaint us, still served him, that it was in his opinion the most likely method of ensuring success against it.

*Bombay disapproval*

14. We acquainted them in reply thereto that the mode of proceeding they had adopted appeared to us liable to many impediments and delays—all which we pointed out to them—and that we could see little prospect of success against that place, as the river, which was both broad and rapid, would thus be between the troops and the town; which would in our opinions unavoidably occasion at least a great delay in their proceedings; whereas, had the troops proceeded immediately up the river, they might have landed on the side on which the town is situated, and attacked it from thence with a much greater probability of success; and as the season was so far advanced, it

behoved them to avoid every unnecessary delay, as we could by no means permit of the troops belonging to this garrison being absent during the rainy season; and, therefore, at all events they must be embarked for their return hither the 28th May. At the same time we informed them that, should our hopes of success be frustrated by their deviation from our orders, we should deem them answerable for it.

*Advice ignored*

15. The Chief and Council, instead of endeavouring to rectify the mistake they had committed by listening to a man's advice evidently interested to render the expedition unsuccessful, still persisted in their error and vindicated their conduct, notwithstanding our objections reached them time enough to have altered it, and though they themselves experienced the justice of some of our remarks on it by the delay that happened in their setting out from Surat owing to the want of carts and bullocks for the artillery and necessaries, which prevented their leaving it for some days after their arrival there.

*Expedition starts*

16. The troops, however, at last set out from thence the 27th April under the command of Lieut-Colonel Cay, who was instructed to observe all orders he received from Mr. Gambier. The Nawab of Surat also sent about 700 men on this expedition, to act in conjunction with our forces, under the command of the Bakhshi, who likewise set out at the same time.

*Skirmish*

17 On their march they were attacked very briskly by about 2,000 of the Nawab's forces; but beat them off with a very small loss on our side, though the Broach troops, it is said, suffered considerably.

*Disappointed*

18 They arrived on the banks of the river opposite Broach on the 1st May, and there found that, contrary to the report of the person who furnished the Chief with his information, that the river, instead of being 200 yds broad, was in reality 1400 yds;[1] but that there was an island in the middle of it, of which they took possession, and from thence attacked the town. A breach was made, which was once judged to be practicable and intended to be stormed; but on the troops having embarked for that purpose they were by the rapidity of the stream come much below the intended place; and, therefore, it was at that time laid aside, and it shortly after appeared that the enemy had estockaded the breach quite across with strong timber, in such a manner as to render it in the opinion of the Engineer inpracticable.

*Attack on town*

1 Robert Gambier, in command of the expedition, wrote that the river was 600 yards broad, and that the distance between an island in the river and the town was 200 yards (1-5-1771). It would seem as though the Bombay authorities were over-anxious to make out a case against Surat. There was a considerable difference of opinion about the breadth of the Narbada. The mysterious informer, spoken of in the documents, said that the river was not broader than the flight of an arrow (15-4-1771), which is rather vague. The Chief at Surat believed that the breadth of the river was not so considerable (6-5-1771), which is vaguer still. On the 15th November, 1771, a Committee was appointed to report on the depth and the breadth of the Narbada: Captain Moore was of opinion that the river was about half a mile broad (15-11-1771), Mr. Luxore estimated that the river was about a mile broad (15-11-1771). This divergence of opinion is probably due to the estimate being made by guess, at different spots and at different seasons of the year. There may have been a spot where the Narbada was 600 yards broad as stated by Gambier in May, 1771; which was prior to the rainy season.

*Retreat*

So much time was then elapsed, as to put it out of their power to make another [*breach*]; which, together with the loss of almost all their shells by the blowing up of a magazine, induced Mr. Gambier to apply to the Commanding Officer for his opinion whether it was possible to reduce the place so as to have the troops embarked by the 20th, agreeable to our orders; and he having given it in the negative, orders were given for their return to Surat, which they shortly reached, and embarked by the time we directed, and are since returned hither.

*Agreement with Nawab*

19 But in order to obviate the disgrace, which would otherwise have been incurred by the siege being raised, Mr. Gambier in consequence of some overtures, which had been made him by the Nawab of Broach, induced him (previous to the troops marching from thence) to make his public request that they should be withdrawn; and his diwan and some of his other principal people accompanied Mr. Gambier to Surat to endeavour to settle affairs with the Chief and Council; by which the march of the troops thither was unmolested.

*Enquiry*

20 As it still appears to us that, had our first directions regarding this affair been carried into execution, the issue of it would have been very different from what it is at present, we, therefore, propose to make a strict enquiry into the cause of the failure of it; for which purpose we have already appointed a Committee; and Your Honours may depend that, wherever it may appear the blame may lay, a suitable resentment shall be shown by us for thus trifling with the credit of your arms.

*Bombay Castle 11th June,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 57).
*Brice Fletcher's Minute.*[1]

*Surat Council blamed*

By the general letter to our Hon'ble Employers under date the 5th instant we acquaint them our orders for prosecuting the expedition against Broach had been received by the Chief and Council at Surat, and that they had directed the same to be carried into execution; notwithstanding which in a later advice they mention that they had altered their resolution in direct opposition to the orders we gave them, assigning such reasons as were in no wise judged by us to be satisfactory and evidently, in my opinion, calculated to frustrate our designs, I, therefore, deem the Chief and Council at Surat highly answerable for deviating from our most positive orders, more especially as they persisted in their error notwithstanding the opportunity we gave them of rectifying it; and the deference they paid to a man, whom the Nawab most probably might have sent to mislead their judgments, shows a total inattention to the interest of our Employers, and which I look upon to be the primary cause of the failure of the expedition, and the discredit we have suffered.

*Futile excuses*

I must further beg leave to remark that the attempt to vindicate themselves in the manner they have done appears a tacit confession of their improper and unjustifiable conduct; and though a Com-

1 Brice Fletcher was a member of the Bombay Council. His minute is an instance in point of zeal outrunning discretion His accusations of trifling with the Bombay orders, of a total inattention to the Company's interests, of glaring misconduct seem to suggest that he was anxious that he himself should not be held responsible.

*Proposed punishment* mittee is appointed to enquire into the failure thereof, and the Board will on their report come to a further determination, I cannot but in justice to my Employers and my own conscience acknowledge a removal of the Chief and such of his Council who deviated from our orders ought previously to take place, that we may fully acquaint them we have not, nor shall be deficient in punishing those whose glaring misconduct obliges us thereto; for, if orders from this Board are to be thus trifled with in affairs where the credit of our Employers is so much at stake, it behoves us surely by such examples to free our selves from their censure, which most probably they would otherwise judge us deserving of.

*Resolution* The rest of the Board are of opinion that the consideration of the conduct of the Chief and Council in regard to the Broach expedition ought to be deferred, as a Committee has been appointed for that enquiry until their proceedings and report be laid before us.

1771 *Bombay, 25th June,* 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 58)
*Letter from the Committee.*

*Causes of failure* Having conformable to Your Honour &ca's orders made the most minute and circumstantial enquiry into the cause of the failure of the late expedition against Broach, we now enclose our proceedings for Your Honour &ca's notice and observation ; and from whence it appears to us that the failure therein has been principally occasioned by the Chief and Factors' misconduct in the following, among many other, particulars :

1st Having taken no means to get information about the situation of the town, the state of the works, the strength of the garrison, breadth and depth of the Narbada river.

2nd Having altered the very wise and judicious plan first laid down, upon the slightest information given to the Chief by a person who from his situation and connections was very much to be suspected of a design to impose upon him and mislead him.

3rd Having invested Mr. Gambier with the chief command of the troops, and taken it from the military officer.

4th Having neglected to consult with the military officer and the engineer upon the future plan of attack on Broach.

5th Having at a very critical season of the year lost fourteen days, which might have been employed in bringing this expedition to a happy issue.

6th Having, for want of the necessary knowledge of, and information with respect to, the river and town, attacked it on that side where there was no probable prospect of success.

1771 *Bombay, 26th June,* 1771 (1771, *P, D.* 58)
*At a Consultation.*

*Committee's report* Read likewise the report of the Committee appointed to inquire with the cause of the failure of the expedition against the town of Broach enclosing their proceedings in the enquiry, which is also read;

both of which are entered hereafter; and being now taken into consideration the following remarks are made therein and resolutions agreed to.

*Bombay remarks*

The capital cause of the failure in the expedition appears to have arisen from the deviation in the original plan in ordering the troops back from Sultanpur to Surat,. as, had they proceeded directly from thence, they might have been landed on the same side of the river with the town. By this step being pursued fourteen days were lost at that critical season. They were also particularly failing in their duty for total inattention, which appears throughout the whole in not endeavouring to procure the necessary intelligence and information of the strength and situation of the town with the breadth and depth of the river Narbada, which it was certainly in their power to do. But, instead thereof, they sat down perfectly contented with the information of a man who, from his own account of himself, ought to have been suspicious of an intention to impose on them; and even had they no other means of procuring intelligence, they certainly ought to have sent some persons in whom they could confide (as such there doubtless were) to Broach for that purpose.

Their orders to Mr. Gambier were improper, and it seems he even assumed more power than we can suppose the Chief and Council really intended to invest him with, which we never meant should have extended to the exclusive part in any military operations, though from some examinations now before us we have reason to think he actually took that power upon him.

The Chief and Council ought to have consulted the military commanding officer and principal engineer during the time they were at Surat in regard to the intended operations against Broach; and as it appears they did not, they are highly culpable for omitting it.

They are likewise very blamable for directing the attack to be made from the south side of the river, as from the information before us it was evidently the most improper part, and it is observed that our letter dated the 24th April, disapproving of this plan of attack and enforcing[1] the former, actually arrived in time sufficient for them to have altered their resolves on the plan and mode of it, and to have carried it on from the land-side of the town, which, it appears from the opinions of all the officers examined before the Committee that, had it been pursued, the operations would in all human probability have been crowned with success; and it was still more improper commencing the attack on the side on which it was made, as it gave the Nawab every opportunity he could desire either for receiving succour or sending away his valuable effects.

1 The Bombay authorities did not "enforce" the first plan. On the 2nd May, 1771, they wrote to the Directors: "From the slight information which they (the Surat Chief and Council) have given us, it is absolutely out of our power to approve or blame their conduct, though we are inclined to believe that it will be attended with more impediments and delays than the method pointed out by us." (2-5-1771) Their letter of the 24th April is not recorded in the Diary; but on the 24th April, 1771, there is an entry to the following effect: "Signed a letter to the Chief and Council of Surat, to go by express pattemar, exactly conformable to our resolution in the preceding consultation." (1771, S. F. 57). It may, therefore, be inferred that in their letter of the 24th April they did not enforce the first plan.

1771 *Bombay, 31st October, 1771* (1771, *P. D.* 59)
*At a Consultation.*

*Causes of failure* The capital cause of the failure in the expedition still appears to be owing to the deviation by the Chief and Council from the original plan in ordering the troops back from Sultanpur to Surat, instead of letting them proceed directly from Sultanpur to Broach, as they had first directed them to do.[1]

Mr. Robert Gordon, who was not a member of the Board at the time the resolution for commencing the Broach expedition was taken, is of opinion that it would probably have succeeded, had not the plan originally laid down, been altered by the Chief and Council; but he is also of opinion that the capital cause of the failure in it was owing to its being directed to be undertaken from hence so late in the season; for, had it been commenced sooner, it appears it would have succeeded even by the mode of proceeding which the Chief and Council adopted, as at the time the troops left the place it appears that, could they have stayed 15 or 20 days longer, it would have ensured success.

The Board observe thereon, that the directions from hence to the Chief and Council were forwarded to them on the 20th of that month, and it appears in the course of the enquiry the troops might have arrived at Broach as soon as they did at Surat, which was on the 21st of April, the intermediate time to their lodgement on the island was 14 days, which, together with the number of days fruitlessly spent there, clearly proves that, though 20 days might be wanting to give success, yet the Chief and Council only are blamable for it, as full that time was lost by their misconduct; and moreover Lieut.-Colonel Cay in his letter declares that, could he have stayed even a week or ten days longer, it would have given him a fair prospect of success.

Beside all which, it is proper here to remark that by the deviation from the first plan an increased expense of Rupees........[2] was at least incurred.

And it is necessary to observe that, though we were sensible it [*was*] late in the season, yet there was near 8 weeks from the receipt of our orders by the Chief and Council to the time limited for the return of the troops hither, a time we judged full sufficient for effecting the service; and as the troops were already to the northward at a considerable charge, and but a very small additional expense would be incurred by their remaining there a short time longer to effect this service, induced us to give orders for its being undertaken. The expense of landing the troops at Broach would have been no more than it was by landing them near Surat, and then the additional charge above noticed by the march overland would not have been incurred, and our Hon'ble Employers would have gained a considerable permanent revenue had it succeeded.

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1 It would seem that the Directors were severe taskmasters, otherwise it is difficult to explain that the Bombay authorities should have thus exerted themselves to put all the blame on Surat.

2 There is a blank space in the Diary. In the negotiations with the Nawab of Broach prior to the treaty signed between him and the Company, the President estimates the expenses of the expedition at from 2 to 3 lakhs of Rupees. See II Part, *Treaty with Broach*, 27th November, 1701, marginal heading: *Bombay demands.*

We are still of opinion the Chief and Council did not properly exert themselves to procure the necessary intelligence of the strength and situation of the town and the breadth and depth of the river; and that what intelligence they did procure was very vague and useless, and that which they depended upon proved to be false.

With respect to the powers with which the Chief and Council invested Mr. Gambier, we are of opinion that, provided the powers they invested him with had been as clearly explained to him, and his authority as a Civil Servant over the military as clearly pointed out, as they have now done in their defence, the powers would have been very proper. But the Chief and Council, having couched their instructions to Mr. Gambier in such general terms, certainly authorised him to interfere in the executive part of the military department, and therefore no particular blame reverts to Mr. Gambier in this respect.

It was highly improper in the Chief and Council pointing out the place from whence to attack; for they ought to have left it to the commanding officer to have acted therein as he judged most proper, when on the spot.

As it appears the Chief officially forwarded to Mr. Gambier a copy of the letter from this Board to the Chief and Council of the 24th April, 1771, we are of opinion, he ought on the receipt of it to have communicated the purport of it to Lieut.-Colonel Cay, as this probably might have induced him to propose a different mode of attack.

The Chief and Council are highly culpable for not paying the deference to our sentiments contained in that letter, which they ought to have done by furnishing Mr. Gambier with a copy of it and giving him the necessary directions accordingly, especially as it would have overtaken him on the march from Surat to Broach, before any of the operations were commenced.

For the reasons assigned in the letters of Messrs Halsey, Bourchier and Perrott we do not include them in the censure passed upon the other members of the Surat Board.

The Board, having come to the resolutions, attentively reperused and considered them, and is, thereupon, of opinion that the Chief and Council of (Surat except the three members before mentioned) by deviating from the original plan laid down for the Broach expedition without sufficient cause by treating the orders of this Board with negligence, slight and disrespect, and following their own misguided opinions, have thereby occasioned the failure of the expedition, by which the Hon'ble Company have incurred a very considerable and heavy expense to no use or purpose; but at the same time their fidelity to their Employeers is not impeached; but it appears to proceed from a repeated persisting error in judgment and disregard to our orders on the subject.

The President thereupon proposed to the Board to consider what resentment ought to be shown for their repeated misconduct, and whether they ought to be dismissed or suspended from the Hon'ble Company's service, whether they should be removed from their stations at Surat, or whether they should be severely reprimanded only and continued there, Which being debated, and the question at length *Penal proceedings*

put, resolved that Mr. Daniel Draper, the Chief, Messrs Gambier, Stratton, Day, Horsley and Seton be removed from thence, and that Mr. Robert Gambier should be dismissed therefrom.

Messrs. Watson, Stackhouse, Shaw and Garden are of opinion, as their integrity has never been impeached, that they should be severely censured and reprimanded for their conduct, but continued there.

The Brigadier-General is of opinion. that the Chief, Messrs Stratton, Day, Horsley and Seton should be suspended from the Hon'ble Company service, and that Mr. Robert Gambier should be dismissed therefrom.

Mr. Price then proposed to take into consideration the case of Messrs Stratton and Seton, whom for the reasons they have set forth in their separate defence, and particularly as they have thrown themselves on the lenity of the Board, he deemed worthy of their consideration; to which the President desired might be added, Messrs Day and Horsley, the former of whom having resided only a short time at that settlement, and the latter being one of the younger servants and in a bad state of health during the greatest part of the time he has resided there; resolved for these reasons, that we permit of their being at present continued in their stations at Surat during the Board's pleasure; but they must be acquainted we expect their future behaviour and attention to their Employers' interests will be such as to merit this mark of our lenity. But Mr. Price objects to Mr. Horsley being continued there, as he can see nothing in extenuation of his conduct.

Mr. Garden then begged leave to move, that the case of Mr. Robert Gambier be likewise considered, and that he be permitted to remain at Surat as well as the other servants under the Chief, he esteeming him equally entitled to the lenity of the Board.

Mr. Price observed thereon that in consideration of Mr. Gambier's large outstanding concerns at Surat and the very great injury and prejudice his removal from thence would be to his private fortune, he acquiesced in his being continued there, but it was on these considerations alone he did it, as he still esteems him equally culpable; Messrs Jervis and Tayler for the same reasons only. It is therefore resolved by the majority that Mr. Robert Gambier be permitted at present to continue there during the Board's pleasure.

Mr. Watson is of opinion, as the integrity of the Chief and Factors at Surat concerned in the failure of the Broach expedition as set forth by the Committee stands unimpeached, as so many of the members of their Council were concerned equally with the Chief who was appointed to that station by our Hon'ble Masters, and some of them in his opinion more culpable than he, he therefore wishes to submit the whole to the Hon'ble Company for their determination, and in the meantime that they be severely censured, not as a punishment, but as a mark of our disapprobation of their measures.

As the removal of the present Chief has been determined on, the President nominates, Mr. William Andrew Price for that chiefship, judging him the most proper person to succeed thereto, in which nomination the Board unanimously concur.

*Surat, 21th November*, 1771 (1771, *S. F.* 659) 1771
*Letter from Daniel Drape.* *Causes of failure*

The causes, to which I impute the failure of the Broach expedition, are the four following.[1]

1st The lateness of the season, which allowed very little time for the management of the necessary business; and had the expedition been commenced only one month sooner than it was, the place in all probability must have fallen; and this it might have been, had it not been made dependent on the Koli expedition by the express orders of the Hon'ble the President and Council under the 22nd March, though they had long before known, this last was likely to turn to very little account. The importance of this cause appears from Colonel Cay's letter to Mr. Gambier, wherein he declares that, if allowed ten days more, he had the greatest prospect of success.

2ndly Not carrying with the troops more battering cannon, mortars and powder, which, if applied for, might have been furnished at Surat, and conveyed to Broach at the same time the two eighteen-pounders and the stores went. These were indented for afterwards, but could not be sent in time to be of any service, as the stay of the troops was limited to a day. The want of more battering cannon and heavy mortars seems by all the accounts I have had of the siege to have been of the greatest detriment to the service, and as certainly, had they had a sufficient number, more breaches might have been made and in less time, and that which was made kept clear; and as there seems much reason to think that the town would have been carried, if the breach had been stormed, when reported by the Engineer to be practicable, this single circumstance may be said to have alone caused the failure of the expedition.

3rdly Not making an assault at the breach or some of the low towers, which I am informed were every easily assailable; and since the return of the troops, it has been confidently said that the Broach Nabob's sepoys were determined not to stand the assault and had agreed among themselves, on that occasion, either to force the Nabob to capitulate, or to desert from him, whenever the storm was begun.

4thly The troops, being limited to a day for their return, as it was the Colonel's and seems to be the general opinion that in ten days more they would have reduced the place; and as the rains at, and about, Surat, seldom set in till the middle of June, the fixing the embarkation of the troops from Surat for Bombay to the 20th May was in my humble opinion a very fatal measure and not absolutely necessary: fatal it certainly was, if success might have been insured by a stay of ten days longer; and I say, not, in my opinion, absolutely necessary, because the number of troops to be returned to Bombay after garrisoning Broach, in the manner directed by the Hon'ble the President and Council, would have been no more than 150 Europeans

1 From the previous documents it may be gathered that the Surat Council were not slow to defend themselves, when charged with the failure of the expedition. Their individual apologies cover many pages of the 1771 Public Department Diary, which the student, anxious to know more about it, can consult. It is sufficient here to give Daniel Draper's apology, taken from the Surat Diary. It may perhaps bring home to the reader that there were two sides to the question.

and 700 sepoys, and the importance of such a small body of men at Bombay, I own, does not appear to me to have been so great as to render absolutely necessary a limitation which disappointed the designs upon Broach, and either occasioned the disgrace brought upon the English arms, or at least by unluckily furnishing an excuse for it, (I mean to those employed on the expedition) rendered the apprehension of it a much lower consideration than it ought to have been for acting with more vigour. I say, too, it appears to me not absolutely necessary, because proper vessels sent up in July, might have carried down this handful of troops, as was afterwards proposed to be done by the Hon'ble the President and Council, when they apprehended that the season was already too far advanced.

1772 *London, 1st. April, 1772 (1772-77, P. D. Let. from C of Dir.)*
*Hon'ble Company's General Letter to Bombay.*

*Expeditions condemned* 34 In regard to the expedition against the Nawab of Broach in which you appear to have engaged from motives as unjustifiable as the former,[1] the same was altogether so vague and ill-conducted that we are surprised you should attempt to exculpate yourselves from blame, which you seem to think due only to want of success. We shall not here point out every circumstance which has excited our displeasure; but we must declare that you have not only weakened our confidence in your administration by involving us in unnecessary expense, but brought discredit on our arms by enterprises, which afforded no probable prospect of advantage; and the more so, as the above expeditions were wantonly undertaken at a time when you declared yourselves under the greatest difficulties to raise supplies for the indispensable occasions of your Presidency, and which you urge as a reason for deviating from our express commands on another subject, namely for exceeding the rate we had fixed for bills of exchange.

*Surat blamed* 35 We observe with what earnestness you charge the ill-success of the Broach expedition to the misconduct of our servants at Surat; and indeed we see enough to convince us how unfit they were for such an undertaking. Their listening to the information of a man who might have justly been suspected of being in the interest of the Nawab and their marching the forces by land when they might with more security and dispatch have proceeded on vessels immediately to Broach, are instances of error and misconduct, we know not how they will justify to us; but as you have directed a strict enquiry to be made into the cause of this failure, we shall suspend our final condemnation of their proceedings, until we shall be furnished with every particular relative thereto; and which we require you to transmit by the first opportunity.

*Bombay blamed* 36 There, however, appears one cause which may have contributed to your disappointment, which cannot be ascribed to our servants at Surat, namely your putting the expedition under the direction of civil servants, who must be supposed ignorant of military operations, and might, therefore, not deem themselves concerned in the

1 The Court of Directors were not taken in by the attempt of the Council of Bombay to hold Surat alone responsible for the failure of the expedition.

events; whereas had the expedition been left wholly to the conduct of the military commander, his honour would not only have been engaged in its success, but he would otherwise have been answerable for any misconduct in the progress of it.

37 Upon the whole we are as little satisfied with the reasons you have urged for permitting expeditions against the Kolis and the Nawab of Broach to take place as with the measures you took for carrying them into execution. We, therefore, deem you responsible for all expenses incurred thereby, and direct that you fail not to transmit us a full and particular account thereof by the returning ship of this season.

*Broach, 26th April,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 66)
*Extract from a letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Fatesing's policy*

At the time of our late expedition against Broach, the Nawab made application for assistance from this quarter (the Gaikwad) and obtained a promise agreeable to his wishes. But Fatesing[1] (whom his brothers entrust with the chief management of all their affairs on account of his superior abilities), though he made a show of marching some troops to his relief (the Nawab's), was far from having a real inclination to see him extricate himself from his trouble, from a disgust which has long prevailed in his family against the Nawab in consequence of many instances of perfidious conduct which they have experienced in him, added to the hopes they had conceived, if we succeeded against it, of obtaining the entire possession of Broach by means of a purchase with money; which, if common fame be credited, they are impatiently desiring of.

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1 The concluding document is the most informative as regards the history of the Gaikwads of Baroda; it gives us in a few words a comprehensive view of Fatesing's first political activities. The letter from which it is taken is recorded in III Part, *Renewed Dissensions,* 26th April, 1772.

## No. 2 TREATY WITH BROACH (1771)

THOUGH the English expedition against Broach had ended in failure, the Nawab seems to have realised that his was only a temporary triumph, and for once the victor was the first to make overtures to the vanquished, with the result that a peaceful settlement was eventually arrived at. The documents give a detailed account of the preliminary discussions and final negotiations; they constitute a fine example of diplomatic fencing as practised in those days, the two opponents making use of all the tricks of the game: guard, thrust and parry—baseless allegations, feigned astonishment, assumed indignation, opportune oblivion, bold defiance, blustering threats—afterwards to greet each other with lowered, slanting foils.

As regards the Gaikwad's share in this battle of wits, the combatants are on several occasions reminded that their duel is in reality a triangular contest. These reminders are few and far between, but they are not lacking; and the English were afterwards to realise that it was a mistake to have ignored them.

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### DOCUMENTS

1771 *Broach, 15th June,*[1] 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 58)
*Letter from George Horsley to Daniel Draper, Chief at Surat, entered in the Diary under* 1st *July,* 1771.

*Nawab's overtures* I was detained here two or three days by a smart attack of a fever; and when that was passed, and I was about to continue my journey, the Nawab sent to let me know he hoped I would not begin it till I had visited him. From this I endeavoured to excuse myself by acquainting him that I had no thoughts of making him a visit and had, therefore, made no provision for it; and lest he might desire to see me upon business, I informed him I had no power to talk to him on any such subjects. He, however, still insisted on seeing me, and I visited him this morning.

*First visit to Nawab* He took me apart and told me that he had heard I intended returning to Surat, and in that case he had something to say, which he desired I would communicate to you. I told him I proposed set-

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1 The date is not entered in the Public Department Diary, but is given in the next document.

ting out for Cambay to-morrow evening. He asked if I would write what he had to say, and wait here till I could inform him of your answer? I said he must excuse my not answering his question, till I knew what he desired I should write; for that I thought I could guess whether his proposals were likely to be agreeable or no; and if they were not, I should not choose to thrust myself into a business, which I foresaw would come to nothing. He was satisfied with this answer, and began to say much of the injustice and exorbitance of the English demands on him, his inability to satisfy them, and the overrated value of the Broach phurja on which they were calculated. He told me that the proposal that had been made to Lallubhai was that he should pay 50,000 Rupees a year to Surat as the computed general worth of the phurja, that the English customs should be settled as in Mr. Hodges' time, and that three lakhs should be paid by him for a full acquittance from all our demands on account the arrears of the phurja, etc. His orders to Lallubhai, he said, were to agree to pay 10,000 Rupees a year to Surat for the Broach phurja, which, he declared, never yielded him more than from 10 to 13,000 Rupees a year, and to pay as far as 40,000 Rupees for the demands for the phurja arrears, etc. Therefore Lallubhai was returning to Broach, and he desired me to tell him what I thought of the several circumstances he mentioned.

*Conversation with Nawab*

Our conversation lasted above three hours, principally employed in his objections to the terms, he said, were offered and in my defending them and urging to him the many reasons that should determine him not to refuse them, if he really could settle upon them. He declared he would be content to give up the phurja to our management, and whatever his share of that revenue was, let us collect and make the most of it. He made no difficulty of putting the English customs on the footing Mr. Hodges had settled, but the three lakhs stuck with him. Sometimes he seemed inclined to yield the point, then again flew off and declared he never would. I at last asked him what he wished me to communicate to you. He said the purport of our conversation and what I should say about the three lakhs. That he never would agree to pay them. I said that was only to write what I supposed, from what he had said, Lallubhai had told you; and that I would not trouble you so much, or make myself so ridiculous as to write to you to repeat the same thing you had been hearing for a month together from another person. He then desired that I would write you that he should be glad you would send me powers to treat with him. I told him he must excuse me, lest it might be thought I had aimed at being so employed, which would seem very presuming in me, after he had sent a person expressly to Surat on this business, who was returning without concluding anything. That I would not have entered at all on the subject, if he had not insisted on it; and that I would not expose myself to be thought forward in putting myself on a service for which I had no orders, without he enabled me to give you a very fair prospect of the matters being brought to a speedy conclusion. He said he always wished to settle business of importance himself; but he could not say anything more positive till he saw Lallubhai whom he expected from Surat to night; that, therefore, he wished me to defer my journey one day longer, that Lallubhai might arrive, when he

would see me again. This I complied with, and as the Nawab seemed to waver how he should determine, I flatter myself you will not think I was too complaisant. I write this to be in readiness to have anything I may have to say added to it, after I have seen the Nawab to-morrow, when I shall dispatch it to you.

In the course of our conversation, when I was urging the expense of the great number of new troops he is entertaining, and setting his expense against the three lakhs, he says, he is unable to pay, he told me he had, 8,000 foot and 2,000 horse already in his service, which he owned he had entertained entirely on account of what he thought he had to fear from us after the rains. But he added he should not keep them idle, but think of making them pay themselves by raising contributions on the whole neighbouring country. He said that the Raja of Rajpipla, who is at present on ill terms with the Marathas, has offered him his assistance. He continues to enlist men every day and, it is said, intends to continue his levies, till he has completed the number of 20,000 men.

*Second visit* 17th June, 1771: Lallubhai did not arrive till yesterday evening, so that I did not see the Nawab till to-day again. I found him entirely altered in the disposition he seemed to be in, when I saw him before, to conclude on the terms which he said had been offered to Lallubhai. He said he was willing to put himself entirely under the English protection and was ready, if necessary, to go to Surat. or even to Bombay to make the same terms, if what he said here was doubted; but was very positive in his declaration that he would not pay any sum of money, and talked of a continuance of hostilities as necessary, in case this point was insisted on. If they did continue, he said, war was always uncertain, and God decided the success of it. I accordingly made but a short visit, and to-morrow I set out for Jambusar.

*The Nawab's people* The Nawab, I believe, is himself rather inclined to peace, and so all his family and principal people are said to be, excepting those who think that, if money is to be paid, they must furnish it, of which number I take Lallubhai to be one; and if I might venture to give my opinion, I should think an agent of your own would be more likely to conclude with the Nawab himself than any persons he may employ at Surat for that purpose. One Saïd Kassam, who was the only person present of the Nawab's attendants during my first conversation with him, and who seemed very desirous that the Nawab should yield to our terms, sent me word that he had great hopes that the Nawab would settle. But at my second visit this person received me at the door and conducted me to the Nawab, but did not stay during the conversation.

1771 *Bombay, 1st July,* 1771 (1771 *P. D.* 58)
*At a Consultation.*

*Bombay resolution* The President lays before the Board the copy of a letter from Mr. Horsley to the Chief of Surat, dated Broach the 15th June, 1771, giving an account of a conference he held with the Nawab of Broach by the Nawab's desire. Ordered it be entered after this consultation, and the president acquaints the Board that he proposes taking every suitable measure to bring about an advantageous accommodation.

*Broach*, 1771, (1771, *P. D.* 58) 1771
*Translate of a letter from Lalludas,*[1] *without date, received the 28th July,* 1771.

*Professions of friendship*

I had an acquaintance with the late Governor of Bombay by letters. Your Honour has a friendly correspondence with the Nawab of this place. I am, therefore, ready to transact the Hon'ble Company's business of Surat Factory (whenever they desire me) by making my requests to the Nawab. I have been lately at Surat to see Mr. Draper; and since my return therefrom I am doing all the good services to the Hon'ble Company that I can; all which your Honour may have heard from the gentlemen of Surat; and I had great desire to write to Your Honour.

*Nawab to visit Bombay*

The Nawab was favoured with your letter by a pair of pattemars; and I was very glad to observe its contents. The Nawab had no thought to go out; but, as Your Honour has wrote him very handsomely, I did persuade and entreat him to resolve to go to Bombay. Your pattemars are now dispatched with his answer. The Nawab also now sends you a copy of a paper, which Your Honour will be pleased to order to be copied fair, sealed with the Hon'ble Company's, Your Honour's and your Councillors' seals, and send to him for his security. His coming to Bombay is only on account of your desire. He has governed this place since his forefathers for these fifty years; but never removed to any place, though Bajirao, the Peshwa, Raghunathrao, and other great men have desired to see him, when they came this way. The Gaikwad does always come near this place in a distance of 5 or 6 kos; but the Nawab did never meet him, notwithstanding he is a friend. He has nevertheless now resolved to go to Bombay on Your Honour's friendly desire. Your Honour will, therefore, comply with his desire regarding the security paper directly; and when he will receive it, I shall write to you about the Hon'ble Company's ship for his accommodation. Your Honour will look on me as your well-wisher and continue favouring me with your letters.

*Translate of a security paper.*

*Safe-conduct*

The Nawab Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung may freely come to Bombay without any fear; and after his arrival here a friendship shall be made agreeable to his wishes, that we may part in stronger friendship than ever, without difference. Whenever he chooses to return to his place, I shall send him there, giving the Hon'ble Company's vessels to carry him up to Broach. Should any enemy proceed against Broach during his absence at Bombay, I shall in such case join him and will never fail to assist; for which I have given him this security paper signed by myself and other gentlemen; and I promise in the Company's name to dispatch him with credit.

*Bombay*, *30th July*, 1771 (1771. *P. D.* 58) 1771
*At a Consultation.*

*Safe-conduct granted*

The President lays before the Board a translate of a letter he has received from the Nawab of Broach, also a translate of one from his minister, Lallubhai, which are read and entered hereafter; and as it

1 Lallubhai Lalludas.

thereby appears the Nawab is desirous of coming hither with a view of settling the dispute at present subsisting, provided only a passport for himself and security for his territories during his absence is granted him under the hands of the President and Members of the Board, agreeable to a form enclosed in his letter to the President, the same is now read, as entered hereafter; and being taken into consideration, it is observed that his coming hither will certainly reflect great credit on the Company and may probably be productive of future advantage. Resolved the security he has desired be granted him, and the President will advise him to observe great caution in the choice of the persons, in whose hands he shall trust his affairs during his absence.

1771 *Translate of a letter from Masud Khan Bahadur, Nawab of Broach, without date, received the 28th July*, 1771.

*Horsley's letter* By a pair of pattemars I have received Your Honour's friendly letter and was very glad to observe its contents. Your Honour therein says that you were acquainted by the copy of a letter from Mr. George Horsley[1] to the Chief of Surat that it's my desire and wish that matters could be accommodated between us. Hon'ble Sir, the said gentleman, Mr. Horsely, did not come here, either upon my calling or anybody's sending him to me; but he happened to call here in his journey. He came to see me ; and what I talked to him was nothing else, but on the subject of my old friendship with the Hon'ble Company.

*Cause of dissensions* Your Honour says that it was always your desire from the first writing to me about your and the Surat Nawab's demands, when everything might have been accommodated, had I thought proper. Hon'ble Sir, when I received Mr. Draper's letter, I gave him an answer that the imprudent people of Surat were persuading him to do all these things, because they have nothing else to do but create disputes between us; and I wrote Your Honour the same: which letter must be with you. I also said in the same letter that I had no dealings with the Nawab of Surat by which he could make any demands on me. I have governed this country for these 50 years, but nobody has made any demands on me. Had you taken my said letter into your consideration, no dispute would have happened between us...The tricks they have played with Rustam Ali Khan, Fakir-ul-daulah, &ca [*and with the*] Rajas and jamadars of this side are very well known to this world.

*Visiting Bombay* Your Honour says that I mentioned my readiness either to come to Surat or Bombay to settle our dispute; to which I replied that I never spoke such a word to any person. God knows I had no thought to go anywhere ; but I was, however, very glad at your writing me to come to Bombay, because I think it is God's pleasure that our friendship should be renewed. Your friendship to me has, indeed, given me so much encouragement that, if the season had not been too far advanced, and the roads too bad, I would have waited on Your Honour directly.

*Professions of friendship* Your Honour wrote me that, if I come to Bombay, everything will be settled in a satisfactory manner, and that we may part in stronger friendship than ever. I am much obliged to you for your kind offer. Your Honour may look upon this place, my person, forces,

1 See entry: 15th June, 1771.

&ca as yours. Your Honour wrote me that, if I will acquaint you that it is my desire to come to Bombay, you will order one of the Company's ships for my accommodation; for which I also am obliged to you. What more can I expect ? I am very desirous to see you, more than you are to see me. Your Honour wrote me that for my safe return, if I have the least doubt, you will pawn your word and honour; to which I replied that I believe the Hon'ble Company's word and their gentlemen's agreements to be true and firm, especially Your Honour's word, you being a principal man belonging to the Hon'ble Company; and [*I*] am sure there will be no manner of difference in your word.

But I have now enclosed you a copy of a security paper, which you will please to order to be copied fair, sealed with the Hon'ble Company's and Your Honour's seal, as also the seal of your three or four trusty Councillors (whose names I do not know). Send it then to me, and [*I*] shall be ready to come. *Safe-conduct*

Your Honour will observe all the rest by the letter Lallubhai now writes you. He is a principal jamadar, a trusty man; and all the business of Diwan (whenever offered) is transacted by his means, he having my power—and also from the officers—of Diwan for the same; you will send him a proper answer to his letter. *Lallubhai*

*Bombay, 5th August*, 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 58) 1771
*At a Consultation.*

The passport and security, desired by the Nawab of Broach, having been drawn out agreeable to his request and our resolution in our last consultation, is now signed by the President and Members of Council in order to its being forwarded unto him. *Safe-conduct*

*Bombay, 10th September*, 1771 (1771, *P. D.* 58) 1771
*At a Consultation.*

The President lays before the Board a translate of two letters he has received from the Nawab of Broach, also a translate of two letters from Lallubhai, with copies of those the Nawab desires, on his coming hither, be wrote to the Nawabs of Surat and Cambay, and to be sent from Broach before he leaves that place; all of which are entered after this consultation. *Letters from Broach*

*Translate of a letter from the Nawab of Broach Imtiyaz-ud daulah Masud Bahadur, dated the 18th August and received the 1st September, 1771.*

By the return of your pattemar I have sent you my answer to your favour of the 5th July, dated the 18th of the same month ; and now it is one month past, yet I have had no answer thereto I do not know the reason for this delay, but think the pattemars may have been stopped on account of the heavy rains rivers, &ca overflowed. I, therefore, write Your Honour a second time. *Delay*

Mr. Cooper, who came here on his way to Bombay, called to see me, and told me that he was going to Bombay, that therefore I would give him my commands, if I had any that way. In answer whereto I desired that he would present my compliments to Your Honour and inform you that I have received no aswer to my letter to *Cooper's advice*

you. Mr. Cooper advised me that I should write Your Honour a letter by him and promised to inform you verbally, too; which I did.

*Agent's letter* As I omitted to mention to you in my above said letter about the number of people I must bring with me (though I look upon your place as my own house) [*I*] have, therefore, now directed Lallubhai to write you fully on that head. [*I*] hope you will send him an answer thereto, and favour me with your commands this way till such time as we can meet together.

*Translate of a letter from Lalludas [Lallubhai], without date, received the* 1*st September*, 1771.

*Nawab's retinue* One month ago I wrote Your Honour by the return of your pattemars; but I am not yet honoured with any reply thereto. The Nawab is very anxious for Your Honour's answer. We think the pattemars may have been stopped on account of heavy rains or rivers.

The Nawab had wrote you about the Hon'ble Company's ship for his accommodation; but he did not at that [*time*] mention to you the number of people that he will carry with him. I, therefore, write you now that one ship is not sufficient to accommodate his people, necessaries, &ca; for he will take with him at least 400 men, besides provisions, necessaries, &ca. Therefore Your Honour will order one ship and two, or three other vessels for his accommodation. Your Honour will send one good and proper gentleman on the said ship to compliment and conduct the Nawab to Bombay; and be pleased to let me know his name. The Nawab will keep all his troops at this place for its garrison, because he is very sure that he is going to his own house; but, however, he will take with him about 200 Arabs, some musketeers, servants, etc. I have already desired him to carry as few people as he can. Your Honour will, looking on me as yours, favour me with your friendly letter.

*Translate of a letter from Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur, Nawab of Broach, without date, received the 9th September*, 1771.

By your pattemars I have been favoured with Your Honour's friendly letter the 5th instant. I wrote you one by a pair of pattemars

*Letter received* the 3rd instant, which I doubt not but you must have received. I was extremely glad to receive Your Honour's above-said letter and the security paper signed by yourself and three other Gentlemen, and sealed with the Hon'ble Company's seal; but I shall be glad to know those Gentlemen's names in Persian characters. I hope our friendship will be daily increased, thank God.

Since the receipt of your said letter I am getting myself in readi-

*Requests* ness, and Your Honour will prepare a ship and two, or three other vessels for my accommodation and to carry my people &ca, necessaries I have now dispatched my man Wajiramal purposely to communicate to you some matters and to put you in mind about getting the above-said vessels in readiness, who will inform you all the particulars; and I hope that Your Honour will grant his request without loss of time, that my departure to Bombay may not be delayed. Your Honour will return my pattemars, who carried you my letters some time before the receipt of your above-said favour, directly with your answer,

as I am very anxious for the same. I now send you true copies of such letters as I want you to write, to Lallubhai, the Nawab Mir Hafiz-ud-din Ahmed Khan and the Nawab Momin Khan, which I desire you will order your munshi to copy fair, agreeable to the custom, and send them to me, and I will forward them on my leaving this place. I entirely depend upon Your Honour's word and friendship, so that there is no need of any written agreements; for the word of a man is more valuable than anything else; and as Your Honour has assured me with your word, I want nothing else. The writing which I desired you to send me was only to show the world. Your Honour will order your people to keep this affair in profound secret, as I have done the same on my part. Your Honour will hear all the rest from Lallubhai.

*Translate of a letter from Lalludas* [*Lallubhai*], *without date, received the 9th September*, 1771.

I have been honoured with Your Honour's favour in answer to mine. The Nawab is much obliged to you for the security paper you sent him, signed by your self, &ca Gentlemen, and sealed with the Hon'ble Company's seal. You ought to have wrote their names in Persian characters. *Letters received*

He is getting himself in readiness. Many of his friends and principal persons here dissuaded him from it, alleging, although the Governor was his well-wisher, yet he [*was*] to send one of his brothers and some trusty men to Bombay to get the affairs settled, because he is prudent enough to consider that this place stands between the jurisdiction of the Marathas, and enemies are searching opportunities. Therefore his ancestors, who governed this place upwards of 50 years, never went out of it; so that they are much surprised at the Nawab's intention to go. But the Nawab, being too fond of your friendship, never gave his ear to their advice and request, answering them that he will himself go to Bombay. I gave him my opinion that he should go to Bombay, as it would turn to his advantage. I have given an order to his people privately to get everything ready for the Nawab's departure. I have in my letter, addressed you before, wrote Your Honour that the Nawab will at least take 200 sepoys with him, besides his servants, &ca; to which I beg Your Honour will send an answer directly. I have made Your Honour a request about a ship and three other vessels for the Nawab's accommodation, which you will order to be prepared secretly, not letting anybody know they are for Broach, till such time as the Nawab may embark on board of it. I am finding out a lucky hour for the Nawab's departure, and will send you my arzi[1] or request, on the receipt of your answer to this, about the ship, &ca, as Your Honour wants to see the Nawab to have our friendship strengthened. What need I say more? *Preparing for the journey*

Your Honour assured the Nawab that he might freely come to Bombay without any fear; from which assurance he rejected his friends, &ca's advice, as above said, and told me with the greatest pleasure that the unjust claims form his enemies are also set aside from your afore-said assurances. He also said that he has no words to express *Diplomatic hints*

1 A petition, a memorial.

Your Honour's wisdom. Your Honour may believe me that the Nawab is much pleased and is your well-wisher, You both are great men, and I doubt not but you will compliment and regard the Nawab handsomely, not failing in your word; for you call him to your house; and even a small man, when he invites another to his house, pays him much regard. I have desired you to send a proper man in the ship to Broach for the Nawab's reception; to which I beg you will send me an answer; and be pleased likewise to write two letters, one to the Nawab of Surat and the other to the Nawab of Cambay, agreeable to the copies herein enclosed; and send them to the Nawab. Your Honour will always please me with your friendly letters and commands.

*Translate of a copy of a letter which the Nawab Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung desires the President to write to the Nawab of Surat.*

*Letter of protection* I have agreed with the Nawab Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung that he should come and meet me at Bombay. On whose arrival here a friendship shall be made agreeable to his wishes, and it shall be increased more than ever. In consequence whereof he is preparing himself to set out; and as you have an old and firm friendship, I, therefore, write you this in a friendly way that, if any enemy should think of attacking his place during his absence at Bombay, you will in such case not fail to assist him, at the application of his uncle, Izzatullah Khan, and his son, Mumtaz Khan though I hope there will be no occasion for any assistance; for the Nawab will secure the place in a proper manner before his leaving it; but, should there be an occasion for any assistance, the Hon'ble Company will never fail to grant him it.

*Translate of the copy of a letter which the Nawab of Broach desires the President to write to Lalludas [Lallubhai] of Broach.*

*Invitation to Lallubhai* The Nawab Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung is, in consequence of my desire and the Hon'ble Company's agreements with him, coming to Bombay to meet me; and as you are my friend and a well-wisher to both, and trusty man to the said Nawab, I assure you that you may freely come with him here. On your arrival here a friendship shall be made, agreeable to the Nawab's wishes and for the good of both parties, and [*I*] shall dispatch you back with credit. I promise you in the name of the Hon'ble Company that there will be no difference in our friendship.

1771 *Translate of a letter from Fatesing Gaikwad, without date, received the 26th September,* 1771.

*Plain warning* Through persuasion of some improper persons[1] you did the last year quarrel with Broach, in which we both were sufferers; and I now

1 The names of these improper persons are not mentioned. Fatesing perhaps refers to the Nawab of Surat. A somewhat similar phrase occurs in a letter from the Nawab of Broach: "The imprudent people of Surat were persuading him [*Mr. Draper*] to do all those things, because they have nothing else to do but create disputes between us." See entry: 28th July, 1771. That the Nawab of Surat is among the improper persons here mentioned is borne out by that ruler's letter to the President at Bombay; See I Part, *The First Expedition against Broach,* **19th March, 1771.**

hear they want to do the same again by joining with Your Honour. The country of Broach does not only belong to the Nawab of Broach, but I have also a concern therein; and my sarkar has suffered a loss in the late troubles. The time of gathering in the corn, &ca is now come on; and if the troubles should be again continued against that place, we both must lose a great deal thereby. Your Honour will, therefore, prevent those improper persons from acting so again; and it is not right that Your Honour should join them now, otherwise I shall look upon your march, as not only against the Nawab of Broach, but also against me; and as Your Honour is a prudent man, what need I say more?

*Bombay, 10th October,* 1771 (1771. *P. D.* 58) 1771
*At a Consultation.*

Ordered that Mr. James Morley holds himself in readiness for *Morley*
proceeding on Board the Revenge to Broach, to receive and conduct the Nawab hither.

*Translate of a letter from Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung, Nawab of Broach, without date, received the 8th October,* 1771. 1771

Wajiramal sends me his arzi from time to time, in which he says *Final*
that Your Honour is very kind to him, and that you are very much *request*
my friend; at which I am much rejoiced. Some time ago I have received Your Honour's letter, wherein you say that you had sent me the names of the gentlemen, who have signed the passports, in Persian, which letter I have read over and over, but found no names therein. I am waiting for the ships, and make no doubt but you will send a principal gentleman by them; but it is necessary that one gentleman must be out of those who have signed the passports, whom I desire you will send without fail, because the custom of this place is that the man who becomes a security must come in person to carry another for whom he stands security; besides which, there is a credit, too. Credit is the chief thing in the world. Wajiramal has already informed you [*of*] some matters (and will hereafter do the same), which I did not choose to write to you but to him; and as they are trifling. you will agree to them. You may dispatch your ships whenever you please with the above-mentioned gentleman, I mean one out of those who have signed the passport, acquainting him the whole history from the beginning.

*Bombay, 4th November,* 1771 (1771. *P. D.* 59) 1771
*At a Consultation.*

Imported the *Revenge*, Captain George Emptage from Broach *Nawab's*
with Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung, Nawab of Broach on board *arrival*
and Mr. James Morley with the *Eagle, Fancy, Bomb*[1] *Yacht*, in company with several boats, bringing the Nawab's sepoys and attendants.

*Bombay, 4th November,* 1771 (1771, *P D.* 59).
*At a Consultation.*

The President appointed William Andrew Price, Esqr., Bri- *Nawab's*
gardier General Wedderburn and John Watson, Esq. to congratulate *reception*

1 In the lists of vessels given by Forrest and others no such name occurs. Perhaps the passage should read "The Bombay Yacht," *Bomb* being an abbreviation.

the Nawab on board the *Revenge* on his arrival. At 10 a.m. he quitted that vessel, when he was saluted with 19 guns from that ship and the other ships in the road. Near 11 o'clock the Nawab landed at the Marine House under a salute of 19 guns from the Castle, when he was received by Messrs. Stackhouse and Tayler, shortly after which he waited on the President at the Government House, a detachment of artillery and infantry with a battalion of sepoys being drawn up in two lines while he passed. On his interview being finished with the President a salute of 19 guns was fired from the artillery on the Green, placed for that purpose; and he was afterwards conducted by the above gentlemen to the house known by the name of Maulana's house, situated between the Mandvi and the Commanding Officer's barracks, which had been previously fitted up for his reception, the infantry artillery and sepoys being drawn up as before while he passed.

1771 *Bombay, 15th November,* 1771 (1771, *S. & P. D.* 12)
*At a Consultation.*

*Narbada and Broach report* The President and Council having appointed a Committee to take the examination of such persons, who were lately at Broach to bring the Nawab hither,[1] in respect to the strength of that town, and the breadth and depth of the Narbada river, the same was this day laid before them, and with the concurrence of the Committee is to be entered in this Diary.

Agreeable to your commands of the 5th instant we have examined such gentlemen as we thought could give us any information respecting the strength of Broach and depth of that river, and now enclose our proceedings for Your Honour, &ca's observations.

*Bombay, 15th November,* 1771.

At a Committee held pursuant to an order from the Hon'ble the President and Council dated the 5th November, 1771, to inquire into the breadth and depth of the river Narbada and the strength of the town of Broach.

*Moore's evidence* Captain Moore of the Marine, being called in, was asked the following questions upon oath:

*Question:* What observations did you make respecting the Narbada river and the town of Broach?

*Answer:* He went up the river in the Yatch as a passenger, and made no particular observations; but he thinks the Broach river more navigable than the Surat River, and during the springs capable of admitting any of the Company's cruisers that do not draw above two fathoms water such as the *Revenge* or *Bombay Grab,* as far up as the town. Where the *Yacht* lay opposite to the town, he believes the river to be about half a mile broad and about half that distance between the island and the town. The banks of the river appeared

1 The errand of the ships that went to fetch the Nawab of Broach was more peaceful in appearance than in reality. That this report on the Narbada and Broach should have been considered by the Bombay authorities, whilst the Nawab was in their midst to conclude a treaty of alliance, is a clear proof that other eventualities, besides a peaceful settlement, were possible.

to be high; but he apprehends any vessels going up the river might keep them clear with grape-shot. The town does not appear to be in a very defensible state, particularly as the wall on the N. E. side is in many parts broken down, whence he thinks approaches might be made within ten yards of the ditch under cover of the houses and hedges. The asccent up the hill from the ditch is about 40 yards, and whence the wall is standing the curtain appears to be about 18 feet; but the towers, which are more advanced on the descent, are about 24 feet high. There were very few guns mounted on the works and those mostly of a small calibre.

*Question:* What do you suppose the distance between the town and the Nawab's garden house?

*Answer:* He believes it to be about 200 yards.

Lieutenant Skynner of the Marine was then sworn and asked the following questions: ***Skynner's evidence***

*Question:* What is the breadth and depth of the river of Broach and what water had you going over the bar?

*Answer:* He delivers in the following report.[1]

Directions for anchoring in Broach road; bring the entrance of the river E. N. E. ¼ E.; Talaja Hill W. ¾ S.; Perim Island W. ¾ N.; distance of the nearest shore 3 leagues in eleven fathoms mud at high water. At fall and change, high water in the road, ¼ past five, ebbs and flows 2½ fathoms perpendicular, runs at the rate of five miles per hour.

For going over the bar and up to Broach bring the entrance of the river E. N. E., run in with that bearing until you have brought Broach Point N. ½ E., which is the northernmost point; then upon the outer part of the bar soundings at 3 fathoms to 2 fathoms sand. Steer E. by N., or bring the entrance of the river N. E. by E. at 2½ to 3 fathoms Broach Point N. W., steer E. N. E. at 2 or 3 fathoms; and when you have got the above-mentioned point W. N. W. you must stand for a steep bank, bearing N. E. E. and keep within a cable's length of the shore, soundings at 3 to 5 fathoms; then within the bar (this is the place where the Surat gallivats wait for the merchant-boats until they return from town, and it is a good place for a vessel to lie in) when you have got Broach Point W., the S. part of a low sandy island in the middle of the river S. E. ½ E., steer for it. Soundings at 4 to 2 fathoms. The western extremities W. ½ S. steer S. E.

1 Commander R. C. McClement, R.I.N., an ex-Hydrographic Surveyor of the Marine Survey of India, who has also surveyed in the Gulf of Cambay, has made the following comment on these navigational directions: In general the directions seem quite in order, when compared with Admiralty Chart No. 50, though the survey of the Narbada river (made in 1910) has been produced in a smaller scale on chart No. 50. The directions are of course valueless from a navigational point of view nowadays; they would probably prove to be a source of danger to a ship using them, since river-entrances and the sand-banks in a river change constantly. They were compiled many years ago, when compasses and their errors were not yet fully understood, and when navigational facilities were in the craft of that time very poor. Their general correctness is, therefore, all the more remarkable.

by E. at 2 to 2½ fathoms. South part of the island S. E. by E., steer E. N. E. at 2 to 4 fathoms. Amitta a small town upon the Broach side N. by E., steer E.S.E., soundings as before mentioned, when N. N. W. keep N. E. by E until you get within 1½ cables' length of the bank at 3 to 5 fathoms. Two small pagodas N. by E. stand S. by W. to avoid a shoal that runs 1/3 over from the Broach side (upon this bank at high water 1 fathom). Soundings in the channel at 2 to 4 fathoms. When Barbouch bears N. E. by E. steer over for it, and abreast of it within two cables' length of the banks is 6 fathoms at low water, soundings in this reach at 3 to 9 fathoms, lies E. by S. and W. by N.; the banks all the way up from the aforesaid town to Broach is, from 12 to 20 feet high, which you must keep within a cable's length of (sounding at 2 to 6 fathoms) as there is very little water in several places upon the south shore.

Broach is situated upon an eminence, but very ill fortified and walled all-round, but in several places not above ten feet high; [*there*] don't seem [*to be*] above 30 guns in the whole, and those from 2 to 6 pounders; opposite to the town is an island about 600 yards across, and from Broach to the southern shore it is 1800 yards over. The tide runs very little between the town and the island, will have four fathoms within pistol-shot of the shore. The southern shore opposite the custom-house is very shoal water, and dry 2/3 over at spring-tide; therefore in going to Broach you must keep the northern shore close aboard. Below the town the tide runs very strong, and the flood sets between the island and the southern shore.

*Luxore's evidence*

Mr. Luxore was then asked the following question upon oath.

*Question:* What observations did you make respecting the town and river of Broach?

*Answer:* He lays before the Committee the several drafts he has made of the town. The walls of the town opposite to the Nawab's gardens are in a very bad condition, being broken down in many parts; and in many other places the walls have been newly repaired. The highest part of the town seems to be about 200 feet perpendicular from the level of the country, but the hill up to the wall is of easy descent. There appeared to be good landing places all the way up the river on the north side. The river is a mile broad, clear of the westernmost part of the island. Opposite to the south gate, where the *Yacht* lay, and within about 20 yards of the wall, they had seven fathoms at high water, and at low water one less. The wall to the riverside appears to be about 30 or 36 feet high. All the guns he saw mounted were eleven whole and two broken ones, all of a small calibre, and in a shed he saw 22 guns, *viz.* 6 six-pounders, 4 four-pounders, and the rest two-pounders; all old iron guns dismounted. There were no gun carriages in this shed, but he saw two or three on the west side of the town without guns.

*Johnstone's evidence*

Lieutenant Johnstone of the Marine was then called in and asked the following question upon oath:

*Question:* What observations did you make respecting the Narbada river and the town of Broach?

*Answer:* He went over the bar in command of the *Yacht*, about 3/4 flood, and the least water was 2½ fathoms. There is a good channel on the northern side; but having got out of it they grounded about half an hour after they had passed the bar, where they lay till the next flood. They weighed and sailed up about 3 or 4 leagues, when they anchored; and at low water grounded, and had it dry all round them. Weighing in the next flood they stood up about 2 or 3 leagues, and in passing a small village they had nine fathoms water. They came to anchor upon the ebb, but did not ground. Next flood they stood up about 200 yards below the town, in 5 fathoms water, where they had 3 fathoms at low water. He believes they would have got up to the town in two tides, provided two or three boats had gone ahead to sound for the channel. The Nawab desiring the *Yacht* might come up near to the town, they the next day weighed and anchored opposite to the Darbar and within twenty yards of it, where he had six fathoms at high water, and five at low water. All the guns he saw were about 28 or 30 in number, and of these there were 13 or 14 mounted. He thinks none of them were above six-pounders, and they all appeared to be very old, except two field-pieces. The tide runs slack between the island and the town; but between the island and the Surat shore it runs very rapid, as it does also on the west point of the island. Where the *Yacht* lay single anchored, she rode head to the wind, and never tended with the tide. There is a very excellent landing place about a mile and a half below the town, and from this landing place to the town the ground is very hard and level, and would bear any carriages. The nearest part of the town to the Nawab's garden is about 200 yards. On his return over the bar with the Nawab it was the dead of the neaps, and at high water they had a fathom and 3/4 on it.

*Morley's evidence*

Mr. Morley was then sworn and asked the following question:

*Question:* What observations did you make respecting the town of Broach and the strength the Nawab had there?

*Answer:* The town appeared to him in a very defenceless state, the wall in many places being broken down, and very few guns mounted on it. He was informed the Nawab had about 6,000 sepoys in his pay, but he believes they could not exceed 3 or 4000; and these, he understood, had of late been ill-paid and very clamorous for their arrears. When the Nawab showed him his sepoys, he observed the same men pass him twice.[1]

*Godwin's evidence*

Captain Godwin being sworn was asked the following questions.

*Question:* What observations did you make with respect to the Narbada river and the strength of the town of Broach?

*Answer:* The banks of the river on the north side appeared in general to be about 15 feet from the surface of the water. There is an excellent landing place about a mile and a half below the town and from thence to the town-walls good ground for marching troops and transporting guns; and he thinks an approach might be made within 100 yards of the town under cover of the suburb and trees. The walls of the town are broken down in several places, and there were very

1 The Nawab was evidently anxious to impress his guests.

few guns mounted on the works. He could not make very particular observations, as the Nawab's people always accompanied him when he went abroad; and he suspected they watched his motions. Besides, he was the less particular in making his remarks, as Mr. Luxore was sent there for that purpose. But from what he saw he believes that, had the troops gone on the land side, the reduction of the place would have been effected in two or three days from their opening the batteries. It was reported at Broach that the Nawab's troops were 5 or 6,000 in number; but he thinks they could not exceed 2,000, and these a mere undisciplined rabble armed with matchlocks. He saw no more than one firelock during his stay there, though he took particular notice. The masonry of the walls on the river side appeared to him to be much the best and strongest.

*Farquhar's evidence* Ensign Farquhar being them sworn was asked the following questions:

*Question:* What observations did you make with respect to the strength of the town of Broach ?

*Answer:* The town appeared to him to be in a very weak and defenceless state, and several parts of the walls were broken down. The Nawab's garden seemed to him to be a proper place to make an attack from the garden being on an eminence, though not so high as the town, and only 200 yards from the town-wall. The wall opposite to the garden is in a very ruinous condition, many parts of it being fallen down, as also in two other places, one on the east side and another on the west. He saw about 15 guns mounted on the works, some of which he believes were nine-pounders.

1771 *Bombay, 27th November,* 1771 (1771, *S. & P. D.* 12)
*At a Consultation.*

*Nawab unamenable* The President acquaints the Committee[1] he calls this meeting purposely to inform them that he has for some days past been endeavouring to bring the Nawab of Broach (now here) to an accommodation for the Hon'ble Company's demands upon him,[2] as set forth at the time our forces went against him, and for the charges incurred thereby. Translates and copies of the papers which have passed on this occasion he now lays before us, which are read, as entered hereafter, and the translate of the last papers from the Nawab and his ultimate proposals. As the Nawab desired, in case they were not accepted, that he might return to Broach, and as the proposals were such in his opinion as by no means admissible, he immediately acquainted the Nawab of it, and directed the vessel to be ready for his accommodation. The Committee entirely concur in opinion with the President in respect to the Nawab's proposals and unanimously approve his proceedings herein.

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1 From the 4th to the 27th November no mention of the Nawab of Broach is made in the Diary. The nature of the negotiations which took place during that time may be gathered from the correspondence between the Nawab and the President as recorded in the immediately following documents.

2 These demands had been qualified by the Court of Directors unjustifiable old and obsolete. See I Part *The First Expedition against Broach,* 1st April, 1772, and III Part *Renewed Dissensions,* 21st October, 1772.

*Projected expedition*

As the Nawab is, therefore, now on his return without any terms being settled between the Hon'ble Company and him, we deem it highly necessary to have recourse to force, as well to obtain satisfaction as to recover our credit lost by the last expedition, after the Nawab is safely returned there. But Haidar Ali may make such offers for our assistance in consequence of our former resolution, as we may judge for our Hon'ble Company's advantage to accept; and as that is an object of much greater importance, resolved that we defer coming to a final determination with respect to either, until we receive an account of Haidar's offers for assistance, which, we hope, will now shortly arrive; and in the interim it is agreed that everything necessary shall be prepared to carry into execution such measures as may here after appear most for our Employers' interest, respecting which the President will give the necessary directions.

*Translate of a letter from the Nawab of Broach to the Hon'ble President.*

*Profession of friendship*

1st I was on my arrival here extremely glad to see Your Honour and was, God knows, mightily pleased with your friendship, goodness and greatness. I am much obliged to you for your entertainment and civilities. I have experienced your friendship more than what is offered in the Company's agreement, that is to say, "that we may part in stronger friendship than ever." I have hopes that our friendship shall be increased more and more in future. Your Honour will believe me to be your true friend, and look upon Broach and Bombay as one, and my forces as yours. Whenever you shall want me, I shall join you, agreeable to this agreement, without fail.

2nd A long while ago I have no friend at Bombay, nor do I keep friendship with anybody here. Nobody knows me; nor do I know anybody at Bombay, and have no correspondence with anybody by letters. I look upon all the gentlemen here as favourable to me, but there is no mediator between us; for Your Honour is everything to me. I only know you. Whatever friendly offices you will do me, looking upon me as yours, and agreeable to your writing I shall take as if you had done them to me from your generosity, and will never fail from my part in my friendship to you as long as I live.

*Offers of help*

3rd If you will think about having the country of Gujarat into your hands for the Company, I shall agreeable to your order be ready with my forces, being very well acquainted therewith. This affair shall be settled so that you will be much pleased thereby; and it will bring in a large income and profit, because all the country is without proper forces to guard it. The whole of this country can be acquired within a year. Its revenues are no more than one crore of Rupees. When you will settle about this affair and resolve to undertake this enterprise, I shall give you all the particulars regarding it after Your Honour's pleasure.

*Nawab's hopes*

4th On my coming here and meeting you, my heart was entirely cleared, in so much that nothing is remained there. You have agreed in your security paper that a 'friendship shall on my arrival at Bombay be made agreeable to your wishes'; so that, if Your Honour will keep your sight on your said writing, I shall be pleased if you will grant me a written agreement conformable to the copy which I have ready by me; in doing which, it shall be looked upon as [*if*] you have

complied with your writing; if not, there is no matter, for I submit to your pleasure.

5th Everybody knows that you have held my hand and made me wait upon you, though my ancestors, who governed Broach upwards of 50 years, had been nowhere. It is right that Your Honour will always protect me in the above-mentioned manner.

*Nawab's poverty*

6th God knows I can't make you a return for all your favours, civilities, entertainment, etc: for I am empty pocket; all which, I doubt not, but you must have heard from others. I having more expenses than income, especially upon account of the Marathas' trouble. who had surrounded my place till three days, in which I spent all my stock, and am largely indebted to the merchants and my troops for their pay. What can I say more? As I look upon you as my true friend, [*I*] have, therefore, given you an account of my case.

*Nawab's request*

7th Salihbhoy Mazmudar (who has lately opened a correspondence with Your Honour [*and*] is neither mine or the Marathas' servant) has his shops at many places in the Gujarat country, as also at Surat; and if Your Honour will please to grant him your parwanah or order under the Hon'ble Company's seal, he will carry on the affair of his shops at Surat and Bombay; and I will send you a copy thereof if you will grant his request.

*Translate of the terms offered by the Nawab of Broach, the 14th November,* 1771.

*Nawab's terms*

You the Nawab Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung may live at the port of Broach freely and contended by believing me your friend for ever.[1] Whatever dispute and unpleasantness which I had in my heart is now quite cleared, and a firm friendship is become with the Hon'ble Company agreeable to our wishes, and more firm than here before. Should any enemy proceed against Broach, we shall not in such case fail to assist you on the part of the Hon'ble Company, and shall join you, Sir, with necessaries. I shall not in future hear the persons who may be in necessity their information against you, and shall look upon Broach as mine, and you may, Sir, look upon Bombay, as yours. We give you this writing fairly and with the Hon'ble Company's word that we shall not fail in our friendship and to assist you, whenever required; for which purpose I have given you this everlasting agreement from the Hon'ble Company, that no manner of difference may be between our successors. You may, if you choose, come to Bombay with your family. For your coming and going, as well as for the performance of all the conditions herein above-mentioned, this agreement will serve now and in future. Should any merchants of Broach or the persons under your protection choose to trade to this port, I agree to their doing it freely, paying the usual Customs of the place.

*The Governor's answer to the Nawab's letter.*

*Bombay demands*

What is observed in the 1st article of the Nawab's paper,[2] that is to say, "that we may part in a stronger friendship than ever," which

1 This is the draft of a letter prepared by the Nawab and forwarded to the President, so that the latter might make it his own and send it to the Nawab; hence the pronoun "I" whenever it occurs, refers to the President.

2 See two documents back: *Translate of a letter from the Nawab to the Hon'ble President.*

is my hearty wish; and if it is so happened, it will give me great satisfaction and pleasure, and will be much for the interest of both the parties. But the Nawab cannot be ignorant of the demands we have on Broach, those that he was acquainted with last April, before our troops went that way, *viz.* that of the phurja, which has been withheld from the Government of Surat for forty years, the overcharge in the customs in the merchants trading under the Company's protection for near six years past, and the heavy charge we were at in sending our troops that way; all which it is very necessary the Nawab should take into serious consideration, and what he has to say regarding them.

The whole amounts to many lakhs; but notwithstanding that, if he has, or chooses to make any proposals for accommodating this matter, I am very ready and will not be unreasonable in my demand; besides agreeing to pay a certain sum annually on account the phurja in Surat with proper security, the customs to be paid at Broach by those under the Company's protection, as was settled with his father by Mr, Hodges, when he was Chief at Surat. Then will we take into consideration his proposals regarding Gujarat in his third article, and will settle such a strong alliance with him as cannot easily be broken, which, I hope, he will consider of, that we may part with the friendship of brothers.

*The Nawab's reply received the 22nd November,* 1771.

1st Before the Hon'rable Company's troops were dispatched, I wrote Your Honour a letter, in which I have mentioned to you all particulars, which letter be pleased to take out of your office, and peruse what I have therein said regarding your demands. *Nawab's justification*

2nd I have already given you an answer regarding the phurja of Broach in my former letter, which you will please reperuse.

3rd The agreement settled in the time of Mr. Hodges, when Chief of Surat, has been duly performed, notwithstanding which, if you want more favour therein, I am ready.

4th Through the advice of Messrs. Draper and Gambier the Hon'ble Company's troops were sent; they are, therefore, answerable for the charges thereof; for I did not begin myself.

5th Your Honour says that I should take all the matters you have above expressed into my serious consideration, and what I have to say regarding them. To this I reply that I have given you answer before to all the above matters after considering. Therefore it is too far from Your Honour to talk about those things now; for you wrote me at the time of my coming to Bombay that nothing shall be talked of about what has passed.

6th As you have positively wrote me now that you will not act unreasonably with me, therefore, it is right that you should stand to your said writing, as I depend upon your word.

7th I have already given you an answer to your 7th article in this paper art. 2nd; therefore [*I*] need not repeat it again.

8th You wrote me concerning the customs; to which I reply that what was settled in the time of the deceased Nawab by Mr. Hodges is acceptable me, and I will charge no more.

9th What you say regarding Ahmadabad is true.

*Nawab's hopes*

Your Honour gave me fair writing under the Company's seal that, on my coming to Bombay, nothing shall be talked of about what was passed before, and a friendship shall be made agreeable to my wishes, and we may part in a stronger friendship than ever, without difference. You have likewise wrote me concerning the money that I must be thoroughly satisfied that there can be no truth in such kind of news; for there is not the least foundation for it; notwithstanding all which, I was greatly surprised at your friendship and kindness. I hope that you will keep your sight upon your writing, and order your munshi to give me a fair writing conformable to my foul copy, which I gave you the 24th instant, in doing which you will comply with your word, and I shall return from Bombay and from Your Honour well pleased.

*Translate of what the Nawab wrote on the back of the Governor's answer to him.*

If you had such an intention in your heart, why you call me here on your word? This thing is too far from your greatness. You will please to observe all the particulars from a separate paper.

*The Governor's answer.*

Upon the whole you say you have given me answers to everything; if so, you have nothing more to say.

*Promises and demands*

But I wish for your own sake, and it will be for your own interest to adjust everything in such a manner as to make the Company your friend; which will secure you against your enemies, and further may enable you and them to pursue much greater things hereafter, as pointed out by yourself; which will bear no comparison with your present situation. I have for all this time been silent, in expectation that you would of yourself have said something towards an accommodation; but, as you have not, and you desired I will sign the paper you caused to be shown me, I was obliged to send you the memorandum my people showed you to-day; as it is impossible for me to sign such a paper, when you have made no offer to settle our demands. But if you are determined not to accommodate this matter, you may rest secure I shall keep my word in replacing you in your own city, agreeable to my promise, after having given you more honours than were ever given to any person whatever at this place; and that you are as secure, as if you were in your own house or more so, but I must serve my Masters.

*Translate of a letter from the Nawab of Broach, received the 24th November, 1771.*

*Nawab's request*

I have received Your Honour's letter and observe the contents. I readily believe what you say that you will send me to Broach safe; for I have no manner of doubt with regard to your complying with your word. Now I give you a plain answer to your letter that, as you have held my hand and brought me to Bombay, the shortest way to accommodate the matter is this that Your Honour ought to write me plain, that I may clearly understand. The losses and scarcity of cash, which I have suffered these three or four years, are very well-known to Your Honour. Therefore, what you will order me, you will do it keeping your sight on my inability and on the Company's security

paper you have granted me, that is to say "That on my arrival at Bombay a friendship shall be made agreeable to my wishes." I know everything can be done by your favour. I agree to what Your Honour says in your first letter to me regarding the customs, and will abate therein as much as you will say.

*Translate of a letter from the Nawab of Broach, 25th November, 1771.*

*Nawab's agent*

I have sent Your Honour an answer last night, which I doubt not but you have received. I have a long history of my circumstances to tell you, which I wish I could speak to you personally; but my tongue does not permit me to do it. I did, therefore, make Nanabhoy sit down with me till 2 o'clock this morning, and have communicated to him all the particulars. Your Honour will send for him, hear all from him, and favour me with your answer to the above-mentioned letter and his information.

*The President's account of his negotiation with the Broach Nawab.*

*Initial negotiations*

Having signified to the Nawab of Broach, his having been here some time and [*that I*] had not yet heard anything from him with respect to our demand on him, only that he had delivered me a paper with some proposals of his own, without any mention towards an accommodation of our demands, I sent him, wrote in Persian, what it was necessary he should settle before he returns to Broach, as he intends setting out soon; and that I could not think of signing a paper he sent me a translate of, until he had come to some agreement about settling that business, which he attempted to evade by saying that we had signed a security paper, that everything should be settled agreeable to his desire, which is that everything should be forgot, as he had condescended to come to Bombay and deliver his person into our hands on the faith of our writing, and that now he wanted to return back; to which I replied he might depend on our complying with; but that I thought it behoved him to think well, before he went, and settle something before he went away;[1] and that I would not be unreasonable in my demands. On which he sent me yesterday a paper wherein he desires I will write him plain, that he may clearly understand what we expect.

*Bombay demands*

The following is what we demanded of him in April last (1771).

The demands on account of the phurja of Broach is estimated at Rs. 70,000 a year, which, having been withheld for 40 years past, amounts to 28 lakhs; but the Nawab says it has not been paid these 50 or 60 years, which increases the demand proportionately. This was granted by firman from the Mogul to the nawabship of Surat about 150 years since.

The next is for what has been collected on account customs from the merchants trading under the Company's protection for about six years part, estimated at Rs. 25,000 a year, amounts to Rs. 1,50,000.

Next the charge of the expedition last May (1771) amounting to between 2 & 3 lakhs of Rupees, which makes the whole demand on him amount to about 33 lakhs, and that he settles a certain sum to be

1 It is here that the student will have to decide whether the Nawab signed the treaty of his own accord or under compulsion.

paid in Surat annually in the month of July on account of the phurja, *viz.* 12,15, or Rs. 20,000 a year with proper security.

If we can get 5 or 6 lakhs for our demands, it will be well, or more, if possible; when I think we may enter into an alliance with him. and take into consideration what he has pointed out regarding Gujarat,

*Nawab's proposals* Proposals made by the Nawab of Broach as the basis of a treaty between the Hon'rable Company and him.

*First* That we shall promise to get him and his subjects paid their just debts, after being proved, from any of their debtors. Refused.

*Second* Upon his making a firm friendship with us, should the Marathas quarrel with him, or otherwise, we shall in such case join him with our troops, ammunition, etc; and he shall on his part do the same.

*Third* At the time of our marching against the Nawab, Fatesing took his bond for certain sums of money to be paid him at the opening of the season, which he now demands, and we must promise to get back from him by writing to him, or any other means.

The particular payment of 2 Lakhs Rupees.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st payment in the month of Muharram | | 1186 | .. | Rs. | 50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| 2nd | do | 1187 | .. | Rs. | 50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| 3rd | do | 1188 | .. | Rs. | 50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| 4th | do | 1189 | .. | Rs. | 50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | Rs. | 2,00,000 | 0 | 0 |

Pray don't discover this to any person.

1771 *Bombay, 30th November,* 1771, (1771, *S. & P. D.* 12)
*At a Consultation.*

*Compromise* The President acquaints the Committee he has desired this meeting to inform them that the Nawab of Broach, having made some further overtures, he had sent proper persons to represent to him the impropriety of his going from hence without coming to terms of accommodation with the Hon'ble Company for their demands on him, and the disadvantage which must accrue to himself therefrom; in consequence whereof the Nawab had at length offered to pay to the Hon'ble Company the sum of four lakhs of Rs. provided it be accepted in [*acquittal*] our demands and to make over the Hon'ble Company his share of the Customs collected at Broach on goods imported by British subjects, or those trading under English pass and colours. On due deliberation thereon it is agreed to accept those proposals, provided the Nawab agrees to the payment of the stipulated sum within a consistent time; but we wish he could be induced to pay at least a part thereof in ready money.

The Nawab, being immediately acquainted thereof, represented his utter inability to pay any part in ready money but at length offered to pay one half within 6 months, one lakh more within twelve months from the date of the first payment, and the remainder within the following year. A treaty agreeable thereto being drawn up, and

the Nawab consenting to ratify the articles of it, it is, therefore, resolved that it be laid before the whole Board for their approbation and concurrence.

*Bombay, 30th November*, 1771 (1771, *S. & P. D.* 12) 1771

*Articles for a treaty of peace and firm friendship between the Hon'rable William Hornby, Esqr., President and Governor, etc. Council of Bombay in behalf of the Hon'ble United English East India Company and the Nawab Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung of Broach.*

1st Peace and friendship to subsist uninterrupted in future between the Hon'ble Company and the Nawab of Broach, his heirs and successors. ***Treaty with Broach***

2nd All British subjects or persons trading under the protection of the Hon'ble Company's sealed passes and colours shall pay no customs at Broach, etc. places in the Nawab's country, except such as the Hon'ble the President and Council shall impose, which shall be levied by such persons as they shall appoint on account the Hon'ble Company; and the Nawab engages for himself and successors that no fees, dues, or exactions of any sort shall be levied on the said trade by himself on them on any pretence whatever.

3rd The Hon'ble the President and Council shall have free liberty to settle a factory, wherever they think proper, and a suitable portion of ground for building the said factory on, or a convenient house shall be allotted for that purpose.

4th The Dutch have already a factory at Broach; but in future no other European nation shall be permitted to settle a factory at Broach without the consent of the Hon'ble the President.

5th The Nawab engages never to assist the enemies of the English nation, but obliges himself to assist the Hon'ble Company in any wars they may be engaged in, with 1,000 private sepoys and 300 cavalry with their officers, or such larger number as they may want and he can spare, at the following rates; each horseman, Rs. 15 per month; each sepoy, Rs. 7½ per month; or at such rates it shall appear they stand him in.

6th The Nawab will not engage in any war with any of his neighbours without the consent of the Hon'ble the President and Council; but in all wars which he shall engage in, with their consent, or if he shall be suddenly attacked in his territories, they shall give him effectual support and assistance, he paying the troops on the following terms: each European Rs. 15 per month, each sepoy Rs. 7 per month.

*N.B.* The commissioned officers of the Company and the superior officers of the Nawab to be paid at the discretion of the party assisted, but with the concurrence and approbation of the party assisting.

7th The Nawab agrees to pay unto the Hon'ble Company, in consideration and acquittal of all demands to this day, the sum of four lakhs of Rupees, which the Hon'ble the President and the Council agree to accept in full for their claim on him for the phurja and exactions of customs on British merchants, on condition he shall inviolably adhere to the terms herein contained; and on failure hereof, inviolably is hereby declared that the above sum of four lakhs shall be deemed and

taken to be for repaying the expense incurred by the expedition only, and the Hon'ble the President and Council in such case hereby declare themselves at free liberty to pursue the most effectual means for the recovery of any demands, which they or their allies have, or may have upon him. The said four lakhs of Rupees are to be paid within two years and a half from the date hereof at the following stated period: two lakhs within six months from the date hereof; one lakh more within 12 months from the first payment, and the remaining one lakh in the following year; for which he will enter into a bond binding himself and his heirs, and mortgaging his whole territories.

8th In case any expedition shall be hereafter undertaken, and success attend it, the Hon'ble the President and Council will take care that the Nawab of Broach shall have a recompense adequate to the assistance he may afford.

9th In consideration of the friendship established between the Hon'ble Company and the Nawab, he shall have firm friendship with all their friends and allies, particularly the Nawabs of Surat and Cambay, with whom he shall enter in treaty, and shall consider all their enemies as his; and they shall consider all his enemies as theirs. For due performance of this article, we, on the part of the Nawabs of Surat and Cambay, become security.

*Separate article entered into with the Nawab of Broach.*

*Separate article* You, the Nawab Sahib Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung may live at the port of Broach freely, believing us your friends for ever. We have given up the demands of phurja its produce for 40 years, overcharge in the customs on goods belonging to the merchants under the Hon'ble Company, and charge of the expedition sent against you. Our hearts are quite cleared, and we have made a friendship agreeable to your wishes. No demands or answers now remain to make with you. We have given you this acquittance in full of all demands as above-mentioned.

We shall get paid your and your subjects' just debts from any person or place under our Government, on being proved. We shall admit no information against you. We look upon Broach as ours, and Bombay yours. This protection-paper is granted to you from the part of the Hon'ble Company with their word as well as our word and honour that we shall not fail in our friendship and assistance of force and ammunition upon occasion, for which purpose this everlasting protection-paper is given you. All the councillors are bound that no difference will be either with you or your children; and the friendship shall be daily increased more and more. You may, if you choose, come to Bombay with your family. For your coming, and going, as well as for the performance of all the conditions herein above-mentioned, this agreement will serve you as a voucher, which we agree to perform with the Hon'ble Company's word and honour. Should any merchants of Broach, or the persons under your protection choose to trade to Bombay, we agree to their doing it freely and paying the usual customs of this place, without hindrance on the part of the Hon'ble Company.

*Translate of the Nawab's bond to the Hon'ble Company.*

Know all men that Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung, Nawab of Broach have this day agreed and acknowledged myself indebted unto the Hon'ble United English East India Company the sum of four lakhs of Rupees current money of Bombay for the payment of which to be well and truly made unto the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esqr., President and Governor, etc. Council of Bombay at the following stated periods. I hereby bind myself, my heirs and successors, and mortgage my whole territories to be at the disposal of the said Company in case of failure: two lakhs within 6 months from the date hereof, one lakh more within eighteen months from the date hereof, one lakh more within two years and six months from the date hereof. *Nawab's bond*

In witness whereof I have hereunto voluntarily set my hand and seal in Bombay, this 30th day of November, 1771, in presence of my brother, my uncle, my kazi, my munshi, my vakil, who have also signed this bond as witnesses of its being my act and deed.

*Bombay, 29th November,* 1771 (1771 *P. D.* 59)
*At a Consultation.*

The Select Committee lays before us a treaty they acquaint us they have negotiated with the Nawab of Broach, to which he has assented; and which they assure us are the most favourable terms they can induce him to agree to; which is accordingly now read with the separate article, desired by the Nawab for his protection, and a translate of a bond to be executed for the payment of the sum stipulated in the treaty to be made good to our Hon'ble Employers—all which being approved is ordered to be fair transcribed in order to its being duly executed before the Nawab embarks. *Treaty with Broach*

*Bombay, 30th November,* 1771 ( 1771 *P. D.* 59)
*Nawab's departure.*

At 6 p.m. the Nawab of Broach, after taking leave of the Hon'ble the President, embarked on board the *Revenge*, the troops being drawn up and the salutes fired in the same manner as on his arrival here. *Nawab's departure*

## No. 3 RENEWED DISSENSIONS (1772)

THE treaty between the Nawab of Broach and the Company did not inaugurate a new era of friendship and peace, on the contrary it proved a stumbling-block. On their return-journey from Bombay to Broach, some of the Nawab's followers were waylaid by a band of Marathas. The Nawab blamed the Company for not taking any steps to bring the marauders to book, whilst the Bombay Government deprecated all responsibility for the losses incurred on account of this untoward event. Thereupon James Morley, who had been appointed Resident at Broach, arrived there with the Company's present, which the Nawab refused to accept. His refusal was looked upon as an unparalleled insult, and the relations between the Nawab and the English became strained to breaking point. Matters were however patched up, but new difficulties arose when the Nawab was either unwilling or unable to pay in specie the first instalment of two lakhs, which he had promised to hand over, and in lieu thereof tendered a collection of jewels. His offer was rejected, and a second military expedition against Broach was decided on.

During the mutual recriminations prior to the commencement of hostilities Fatesing Gaikwad does not come in the foreground of the picture, but on several occasions explicit mention is made of the Gaikwad's share in the Broach revenue.

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### DOCUMENTS

1771 *Surat, 31st March,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from Bombay.*

Received the following commands from our Superiors (dated Bombay, 21st March, 1772).

*Morley* Having entered into a treaty with the Nawab of Broach, an attested copy of which is now enclosed, we deem it necessary that a covenanted servant shall reside there in behalf of our Hon'ble Employers in order to carry it into effectual execution. We have accordingly appointed Mr. James Morley Resident for that purpose, who proceeds by this conveyance; and as we intend it shall be subordinate to the Chief and Council of Surat, we shall now communicate our intentions

hereby, agreeable to which you are to frame your instructions to Mr. Morley, adding thereto whatever else may appear proper and beneficial to our Hon'ble Employers.

*Custom duties* By the 2nd article you will observe the Hon'ble Company have a right to levy customs on all goods either imported or exported under English sealed passes and colours. We have at present resolved to set this at 3 per cent., except on such as produce a certificate of having paid the Hon'ble Company's duties either at this place or Surat; in which case neither is to be paid; and in like manner on a certificate being produced either here or Surat of this duty having been collected at Broach, the difference between it and the Surat or Bombay customs only will be required, as it is not our intention to load the trader with any fresh duty, but only to collect it on such as otherwise would pay no customs to the Hon'ble Company.

The Resident must particularly observe, that neither the Nawab nor his officers are in any shape to interfere in the collection of this duty; nor must any fees, dues, or exactions of any kind be collected by the Nawab on any goods imported or exported under our pass and colours, agreeable to the express tenor of the said 2nd article.

*Resident's quarters and staff* That the Resident may be able effectually to comply herewith, he must hire a commodious house as near the water-side as possible, on which our colours are to be hoisted; and to prevent any goods under the above description being imported or exported free of customs, he must procure the necessary assistance and hire a proper number of sepoys; which we shall rely on his doing at as little expense to our Hon'ble Masters as this service will admit.

*Money clauses* The Nawab having stipulated by the 7th article to pay the Hon'ble Company 4 lakhs of Rupees at stated periods, the Resident must use his utmost endeavours to see it exactly complied with; and as the first payment will be shortly due, he must omit no opportunity to urge the Nawab for it; assuring him that the continuance of the Hon'ble Company's favour and protection towards him entirely depends on his exact compliance with the terms of the treaty he has entered into with them.

*Expenses* We permit the Resident to charge the sum of Rupees 150 per month for his table as customary at other Residencies with the wages of such servants as are immediately necessary; and you must strongly recommend to him the utmost frugality in the other necessary expenses of this factory.

*Instructions* Deliver him your instructions as soon as possible, and furnish Mr. Morley with a suitable conveyance for proceeding directly to Broach.

Your letter of the 11th instant is duly come to hand, and we permit you in consequence of your request to build upper rooms on the Garden House, relying on your care that it may not exceed the sum at which it has been estimated.

*Ceremonial visit* As we esteem it highly necessary the most friendly intercourse should be kept up between the Chief and Nawab, and frequent visits pass between them, which cannot, we apprehend, be properly done without the ceremonial visit being previously paid, and the Hon'ble Company in their commands of the 22nd March, 1765 having with great propriety given similar directions, we, therefore, cannot approve the

Chief's proposal of declining the customary visit. Though his intent of saving the sum he mentioned is very laudable, nevertheless we would have him act herein as customary, relying on his putting the Hon'ble Company to as little expense as possible.

*Economy* We would have the *Viper* returned hither at the close of the season, as you represent her to be no longer necessary; and we strongly recommend to you to reduce the expenses of our Hon'ble Employers in every branch under your government.

1772 *Surat, 2nd April,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*At a Consultation.*

*Committee* Read also our Superiors' commands of the 26th ultimo; and they having directed us to give Mr. Morley such instructions as may appear necessary for carrying their instructions into execution respecting a residency at Broach, Messrs. Gambier, Halsey and Perrott are appointed a committee for this purpose.

1772 *Surat. 14th April,* 1702 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat, to James Morley, Resident at Broach.*

*Instructions* Our Superiors at Bombay having advised us they have entered into a treaty with the Nawab of Broach for settling a factory there, and have appointed you Resident, we think it necessary to give you the following instructions for your guidance.

*Trading privileges* By the second article of the treaty the Hon'ble Company have a right to levy customs on all goods, either imported or exported under English sealed passes and colours at Broach or any other part of the Nawab's territories; and as it seems to be of the greatest consequence that you and he should be on the best of terms, and every occasion of giving any kind of jealousy or disgust should be continuously avoided, some occasion for which, unless the greatest care is taken, may probably arise in the collection of the Hon'ble Company's customs, it being likely that many persons not entitled to the privilege of trading under the Hon'ble Company's protection may nevertheless fraudulently make use of it, we think it necessary to remark that a general description of boats and vessels trading under English passes and colours to entitle person to this privilege at Broach is liable to many abuses, particularly as boats trading under English colours and passes are often freighted out to persons who are not under the Hon'ble Company's protection. We, therefore, direct that you consider no person as entitled to this privilege, who does not produce to you as a credential a letter from the Governor of Bombay or Chief of Surat, or a certificate from the custom-master at either place We also think it proper that no agents, employed at Broach by merchants trading under the Hon'ble Company's protection, should be subjects of the Nawab. Such, therefore, as are introduced to you by letters from the Governor of Bombay or Chief of Surat, you are to consider as a credential to that particular person, only for one year, or a season, and no longer; but, should he remain afterwards in that character, he must produce a new letter as a credential; and all boats and vessels belonging to merchants under the Company's protection going to Broach with, or for, merchandise will be certified to you by the custom-master of Bombay or Surat.

You are for the present to levy a duty of three per cent on all goods imported or exported as above, unless on such as produce a certificate of having paid the custom duties either at this place or Bombay, in which case nothing is to be levied; and in like manner on a certificate to be produced either at Bombay or Surat of customs having been collected at Broach, the difference of the Surat or Bombay customs and these only will be required; for it is not intended by this to load the trader with a fresh duty, but levy it on such only as would otherwise pay no duty to the Hon'ble Company. You are to be particularly careful that neither the Nawab or his officers interfere in the collection of this duty in any shape, and that no fees, dues, or exactions of any kind be taken by the Nawab on any goods imported and exported under English passes and colours agreeable to the express tenor of the second article. *Custom duties*

But, as it appears to us that it will be impossible for you to ascertain what goods are imported and exported that are chargeable with customs to the Hon'ble Company without having some people belonging to you at all the gates of the town where goods are imported or exported, and yet at the same time it is to be apprehended the Nawab may not choose to submit to such a regulation, you are to endeavour to settle this point with him in some manner, both to avoid giving him disgust and at the same time prevent any fraud; and which we think will be best provided against by prevailing on the Nawab to issue a proclamation directing that all goods whatever chargeable with English customs shall be imported and exported at one particular gate to the land-side and one to the water-side; at which of course we imagine he will have no objection to your having proper people; and that all goods attempted to be passed at any other gates, belonging to people trading under the Hon'ble Company's protection, shall be confiscated, half to the Company and half to the Nawab. But, should he make much objection to our having any people at any of his gates on the land-side, you are not to insist on it so far as to give him any disgust; but in such case [*you*] must manage by Dholka or any other method which shall appear most convenient for the true importation and exportation of goods belonging to our merchants on that as well as the water-side. *Assistants*

You are only to recover customs once on any goods without a change of property, that is such goods as pay import customs are not to be charged with any export duties (and so vice versa), and this, notwithstanding such goods should be exported; for it appears by the express tenor of the treaty with the Nawab that no goods belonging to merchants trading under the Hon'ble Company's protection shall be charged with any customs, duties or fees whatever not only in Broach town but any part of the Nawab's territories.

A list of the fees charged in the collection of the customs at this place is enclosed, agreeable to which you are to charge them at Broach.

The Nawab having stipulated by the 7th article to pay the Hon'ble Company four lakhs of Rupees at stated periods, you are to endeavour to he utmost to see he punctually performs his engagements; and as the first payment will be shortly due, you are to omit no opportunity of urging the Nawab for payment; assuring him that *Money clauses*

the continuance of the Hon'ble Company's favour and protection entirely depends on his exact compliance with the terms of his agreement with them.

*The broker* The public broker should be a person who has no immediate connection with the Nawab of Broach or his Government, nor subject of the Nawab. You will endeavour to find a person so situated, fit for that station, advising us when you have, and waiting our orders for his confirmation.

*Nawab's subjects* You are on no account to give protection to any of the Nawab's immediate subjects, nor interfere with the affairs of this Government. The factory or custom-house servants, and those in the Company's or your pay are not to be considered as the Nawab's subjects while in such pay or so employed, but are during that time entitled to the Hon'ble Company's protection ; and to avoid all contest on this occasion and prevent the Nawab's giving them any molestation, you are to present him with a list of all such people as you consider in that light.

*Other directions* You are to endeavour to acquire as early and perfect a knowledge of the language, the Nawab revenues, forces and alliances as you can, and every circumstance of government which may be of any future service for the Hon'ble Company to be acquainted with, and especially as to the Broach mint, what money is coined there, and particularly of bullion imported from Bombay or Surat, and the standard of the Broach Rupee; advising us thereof.

*Visits* We recommend your keeping up a friendly intercourse with the Nawab and his officers, visiting them frequently. On your first visit you will make them a suitable present, in which you will be as frugal as possible; and we hope it will not exceed the sum of 1,500 Rupees.

*Quarters and staff* For the better enabling you to comply with our directions in respect to the customs, etc. you are to hire a commodious house as near the water-side as possible, on which our colours are to be hoisted; and to prevent any goods belonging to the merchants trading under our protection being imported or exported custom-free, you are to procure such assistance as may be necessary, and have a proper number of sepoys, which you will do with as little expence as the service will admit of.

*Expenses* The sum of 150 Rupees per month for your table, as customary at other Residencies, will be allowed you, and the wages of such servants as are immediately necessary, and in the other necessary expenses of this factory you are to observe the utmost frugality.

*Other directions* For your more particular guidance you have herewith a copy of the treaty entered into between the Hon'ble the President and Council and Nawab of Broach.

Should you require a further sum than the 15,000 Rupees already advanced you for your occasion, we permit of your drawing on us.

But should you find by experience and any knowledge you may acquire, when you arrive at Broach, that any of the above regulations or orders will be attended with great inconveniences, you are for the present to wave carrying them into execution, and represent the same to us, keeping us constantly advised of everything material, in order that we may be enable to give the fullest advices to the Presidency ;

and if any further material appointments or regulations should appear necessary, you are to propose them to us, when we shall immediately give you our sentiments and orders thereon.

The Chief has already wrote the Nawab, advising him of your appointment, and we make no doubt but you will meet with a favourable reception.

*Surat, 15th April,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat, dated* 13*th April,* 1771.

I had the honour of paying my respects to you under the 8th instant, on the 9th landed here, in consequence of a message from the Nawab (who was then out of town and did not return till two days after) requesting I would lodge at his gardens till he could provide a house to accommodate me; and last night I paid him my first visit, at which he treated me with great civility, till he saw the present which I had to make him in behalf of the Hon'ble Company. As soon as that appeared, he desired to know, though I had before informed his diwan, whether it was brought to him on their account or my own; and having answered that I had to request his acceptance of it as a testimony of the sincere friendship which subsisted towards him on the part of my Employers, he declared that, had it come from me (for whom he affected a personal regard because of the attention I had paid to render his situation agreeable to him while he was on his passage to Bombay), he would gladly receive it. But as to the Company, the Governor and Council had proved so faithless in not performing the treaty they had entered into with him that to them he could not carry any force of friendship; and, therefore, insisted I should take back the present, which he accordingly returned. *Present refused*

In reply to this bold and insulting declaration, which was made in a large assembly of his people, I told him that being much attached to his interest from personal considerations, and heartily desirous of using every means in my power not only to continue, but to strengthen, if possible, the foundation of the friendship which had lately commenced between him and the Company-- with whom, I was confident, the Governor and Council were not sensible of having given him any cause to be disgusted—I was much concerned he had in this instance shown so open a contempt of them; and that I wished he had seriously reflected on the consequences that might ensue from it, in which case he would doubtless have seen the danger of acting so hastily; and that he would have been much more prudent had he privately informed me in what particulars he imagined we had violated the treaty, that I might have used my good officers to serve him. *Morley's reply*

After hearing me thus far, the Nawab proposed retiring to an inner appartment, where he said he would more fully explain to me why he was dissatisfied with our conduct; and having removed accordingly, he resumed his discourse, saying the Governor and Council had engaged, in case he should be molested by any power whatever, they would assist him in obtaining satisfaction; and that, therefore, he had repeatedly wrote the Governor and likewise the Chief of Surat, acquainting them with the injury he had received from a party of Marathas *Nawab's complaint*

near Surat, who had seized a great number of his horses and a large quantity of valuable baggage, which were coming back overland from Bombay; but that, notwithstanding such frequent applications, we had taken no steps to procure him redress, nor given him any satisfactory answer. In consequence of which he had sent letters both to the Presidency and Surat to advise us that his treaty with the Governor and Council, from their faithless conduct, was now become void; and that they were no longer to expect his performance of any one of the conditions stipulated therein in favour of the Company; that, such being the terms on which he stood with the English, nothing could give him greater surprise than to see a person come to Broach to establish a factory for that nation; and assured me I was the only one they could have pitched upon for this service, whom he would have permitted to land.

*Morley's reply* In regard to the first part of this representation from the Nawab, I told him I was quite unacquainted with the true state of the affair and, therefore, could say nothing on the subject, till I had orders from my Superiors, whom I should advise of what he had said; and that in the meantime he might be assured it was ever our intention to have the strictest regard to every engagement we had entered into in their true sense. But that as to the immediate business of our settling here, I hoped he would so far forbear coming to any extremity as to permit me to comply with my instructions for hoisting the English flag on our factory, as soon as a house could be procured in town for that purpose; and that he would take off the duties and all other impositions he had hitherto laid on English merchandise, which in future were to pay customs to the Company only.

*Nawab's pretentions* As to the first of these two articles the Nawab pretended that, supposing the treaty still in force, (which, however, he would not admit) we had no right to expect a factory within the town; for that it was there expressly mentioned in the Persian translation it should be built at a place called Idga,[1] situated about a mile from the town, and half that distance from the river-side; and with respect to duties or any fees which have usually been paid here on merchandise, he had only engaged not to take any for his part; but that he could not bind the Marathas (who it seems receive much the greater part of the Broach revenues) to give up what they are entitled to.

*Fatesing*

*Morley's protest* On his mentioning that he would allow no other place for an English factory than that I have described to you above, I represented to the Nawab our property would in such a situation be always in danger of being plundered, particularly by the Grassias,[2] who, I am informed, frequently commit robberies in the suburbs; and that, therefore, it could not be satisfactory to the Governor and Council, who, I was fully persuaded, had ever understood that he had agreed to our having it within the walls. No arguments, however, could prevail

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1 See *Gaz. Bomb. Pres.* II, 552: "Near the village of Vejalpor, the western suburb, where, in Mr. Forbes' time (1780), several factors had their country-houses. Here, too, is the Musalman Idga."

2 "The title of Grassia, originally an honourable one, and indicating its possessor to be a cadet of the ruling tribe, became at last as frequently a term of opprobrium, conveying the idea of a professional robber." (A. K. Forbes Ras Mala, 568, ed. 1878).

on him to give me any other answer on this head than that he would allow no other; and if not convenient, why did we at first accept of it ? Nor could I succeed better in regard to our privilege of being wholly exempt from customs.

In order that I might be enabled to advise you what are really the Nawab's present intentions regarding us, before the conclusion of this conference I requested he would tell me by what method he proposed these differences should be accommodated. On which he informed me it was his determined resolution not to allow the Company any settlement within his territories or have any further connection with them, unless they would oblige the Marathas to restore the horses and baggage of which they had robbed him and pay the whole amount of his expenses in endeavouring to get them back by force; for which purpose he had now all his forces in the field, excepting a few that are kept for the security of the town; and has within these two days received a reinforcement from Cambay, the Nawab of this place having permitted four hundred horsemen to come from thence and enter into his service. *Nawab's terms*

As I have not yet received my instructions, I should have avoided discoursing with the Nawab upon any public business till they came to hand; but a report prevailing here that he intends going into the field in a day or two, I was apprehensive of not having another opportunity of conferring with him for some time and, therefore, judged it my duty not to [*miss*] that [*opportunity*] which offered to learn what success I should meet with, in my endeavours to prevail on him to fulfill the treaty, which I had seen a copy of at the Presidency. *Morley's apology*

In the foregoing letter I omitted to mention a very singular circumstance, which I think necessary to add here, as it seems clearly to show the Nawab's present disposition in regard to the English. As soon as I had taken my leave of him last night, he gave orders it should immediately be made known to all the people under his government that none of them should have the least connection or intercourse with any belonging to our nation on pain of the severest punishment. In consequence of which some sepoys, I engaged on my arrival here, have since disappeared, and not one of the country merchants from whom I had before received frequent visits, now dare come near me. *Nawab's orders*

*Bombay Castle, 17th April,* 1772 (1772, *S. & P. D.* 13) 1772
*Letter from Surat, dated 13th April,* 1772.

Read also a letter from the Chief of Surat as entered after this consultation; and the President acquainting the Committee that the agents from Fatesing, mentioned in Mr. Price's letter, are arrived here, he is desired to learn from them the purport of the proposals they have to make in behalf of their master. *Fatesing's proposals*

*Letter from the Chief at Surat concerning proposals made by Fatesing.*

I trouble Your Honour, etc. with this address to acquaint you that Fatesing lately returned from Poona very much disgusted with Madhavrao, and yesterday two of his agents waited on me to offer an alliance offensive and defensive with the Hon'ble Company. They say their Master can upon occasion raise 8,000 horse and 17,000 foot, *Fatesing's proposals*

and that he will furnish the Hon'ble Company with any parts of these troops they may want, they assisting him with what can be conveniently spared; the pay of these troops to be on the same footing as he understands has been settled with the Nawab of Broach, who, I find, has proclaimed it abroad with a view, I suppose, of intimidating his neighbours.[1]

*Price's reply* I told them Your Honour, etc. might probably accept the proposed alliance; but as the pay of our troops would be entirely made good to them, the Hon'ble Company would reap no benefit from it. It would, therefore, be expected that a further sum of money should be paid by their Master or some territory adequate assigned over to us.

*Fatesing's offer* To this he replied that, whenever it was resolved on to recover the territories formerly anexed to Surat, but now divided between his Master and Madhavrao, the latter's share should devolve to the Hon'ble Company in perpetuum; and if it was more aggreeable to receive the amount in money and let the country remain in the hands of his Master, he would give substantial shroff-security for the amount.

*Surat parganas* These territories are divided into 28 parganas or districts, and from the best accounts I can gather produce about thirty one lakhs of Rupees yearly; of this the Nawab here receives about one lakh and the Hon'ble Company between 50 and 60,000 Rupees. All charges of recoverance deducted, I compute the net profit at about twenty-four lakhs, which is now shared equally between Madhavrao and Fatesing; for, although in some districts one party has more, and the other less, yet upon the whole it is thought the division is pretty just.

*Broach and Cambay* Fatesing is content and even desirous that the Nawabs of Broach and Cambay may be included in the treaty. Such an alliance, I imagine, may one time or other be of great service to the Hon'ble Company and a check to the growing power of the Brahmans, whose oppressive conduct and the contemptible treacherous treatment of the Maratha officers have rendered them so odious that they (the Marathas) are all ready for revolt.

*Fatesing Bhonsla and H. Ali* Fatesing's agents tell me their Master is in league with the Bhonsla, whose territories lie to the eastward of Poona, and [*with*] several other Maratha officers, and that they have even a secret correspondence with Haidar Ali. But that Your Honour, etc. may more fully understand the views and the intentions of Fatesing and plan your measures accordingly, I now despatch the above agents on the *Fox* ketch. They have a letter for the President, and request they may be speedily dispatched by sea, as they choose to avoid going through the Brahman territories for fear of exciting suspicion. I shall shortly send you an amount of what the produce of each pargana is estimated at.

1772 *Surat, 17th April,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*At a Consultation.*

*W. Price's views* Also read the letter received from Mr. Morley representing the gross affront the Nawab of Broach has put on the Hon'ble Company by returning the present offered him in their name, also refusing him the privilege of having a house in the city, hoisting the colours, &ca, and declaring without [*hesitation*] that he esteems the treaty void,

[1] Fatesing's proposal is further alluded to on the 28th April, 1772, and on the 6th May, 1772.

under the frivolous pretence that some horses and baggage of his, coming from Bombay, had been seized by the Marathas; and that, notwithstanding his application both to the President and Chief, no steps were taken towards recovering them. The Chief, as far as regards himself, remarks, that on the 29th December last he did receive a letter from the Nawab of Broach, acquainting him with the above circumstance, and desiring his interposition for procuring their release; to which the Chief replied that, if the Nawab would send him the particulars of which he had suffered, he would as far as in his power endeavour to get them returned; that he never sent him any list, without which no proper application could be made; nor did he hear anything more from him on the subject until the 6th of this month; and as he had long before commenced hostilities against the Marathas by ravaging and plundering their villages, such application would now be fruitless. That he did upon receipt of his first letter represent to the Maratha agents the impropriety of stopping his horses coming from Bombay; desiring they would release them. To which they replied this was no concern of the English, that they had several accounts with the Nawab of Broach, and would settle the point with him, and that we were at that time too much embarrassed with the Marathas in regard to the affairs of this city, to embroil ourselves in the quarrels and disputes of others; and as so many months elapsed without his hearing any more from the Nawab on the subject, concluded he had dropped it.

Upon Mr. Morley's arrival here, the Chief wrote the Nawab that Mr. Morley was going on the part of the Hon'ble Company's Resident of Broach, not doubting but he would accommodate him with a proper place and [*show*] him every instance of credit and regard all which the Nawab in a very polite letter gave the Chief the strongest assurance of, as fully appears by the letters now produced to the Board. The Nawab, therefore, pretending surprise at Mr. Morley's coming there, is highly absurd. So, that part of the Nawab's declaration to Mr. Morley [*is futile*] in which he says that he had sent letters both to Bombay and Surat, advising that the treaty with the Governor and Council from their faithless conduct was now become void, and that they were no longer to expect his performance of any one of the conditions stipulated therein in favour of the Hon'ble Company. The Chief upon his honour declared he never received any such letter from him or the least intimation of the kind; but on the contrary the most friendly correspondence has been carried on between them since his return to Broach.

*Surat resolution* The whole of the above being considered, the Board, fully sensible of the affront offered by the Nawab to Mr. Morley, would not hesitate a moment in recalling him; but, as this treaty was entered into by the Hon'ble the President and Council, they choose not to precipitate matters, but resolve to forward copy of the letter from Mr. Morley to them and wait their orders whether he is to be ordered from Broach, or is to stay there for the purpose of further negotiation.

*Directions to Morley* And it is further agreed to write Mr. Morley to carry matters fairly with the Nawab, not making any application to him for a house, &ca, until we can furnish him with our Superiors' directions; and as by a letter the Chief has received from him it should seem he is appre-

hensive the Nawab will detain him, should be ordered to quit Broach, he is to have permission to keep the *Antelope* until the next springs for the convenience of retiring on board of [*it*], should such step be necessary.

*Letter to Nawab* The Chief is also desired to write the Nawab of Broach a suitable letter, setting forth the impropriety of his conduct; which, there is reason to think, will be highly resented; for, if he thought the treaty in any shape infringed, he should have represented the same to the Hon'ble the President and Council, that it might be amicably settled.

1772 *Surat, 18th April*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter to Bombay.*

*The insult* We send this express to enclose copy of a letter received from Mr. James Morley, whereby Your Honour, &ca will observe the gross affront the Nawab of Broach had put on the Hon'ble Company by returning the present made to him in their name.

1772 *Surat, 19th April*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat, to James Morley, Resident at Broach.*

*Letter to Bombay* In consequence of your representation of the behaviour of the Broach Nawab in refusing to accept the present offered in the name of the Hon'ble Company, not permitting you to have a house in the city or hoist our colours, and his insolent declarations in your interview with him—all which we esteem as gross insults to our Hon'ble Masters—we have thought proper to forward a copy of your letter to the Presidency and wait the President and Council's orders whether we are to recall you or continue you there for the purpose of further negotiation with the Nawab.

*Instructions* Directions as soon as received we shall communicate to you, giving you such instructions for your proceedings as may be necessary, till when, we would not have you make any further application to the Nawab for a house, or his compliance with any of the points recommended to you to obtain from him in our instructions; but carry matters fairly with him, and avoid giving him any disgust so as to precipitate matters. As by your letter to the Chief you seemed to be apprehensive the Nawab may detain you, we have acquainted you by the Secretary our permission to keep the *Antelope* gallivat till next springs to retire on board if you think necessary, though we must recommend to you to act cautiously in this as well as other respects, when you must return her to us.

*Letter to Nawab* The Chief now writes to the Nawab, representing to him the impropriety of his conduct, which, there is reason to think, will be highly resented; and that, if he thought the treaty was in any shape infringed, he should have represented the same to the President and Council, that it might be amicably settled.

*Surprise* We are the more surprised at the Nawab's conduct, as we find the most friendly correspondence has been carried on between the Chief and him since his return to Broach; and that in answer to the Chief's letter, advising him of your appointment and desiring him to accommodate you with a proper house and show you every instance of cre-

dit and regard, he gave him in a very polite letter the strongest assurances thereof.

Enclosed is the Chief's letter to the Nawab, which you are to send to him.

*Broach*, 19*th April*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772

*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Nawab's request*

I have had a visit from Lullabhai, who informed me he came by order of the Nawab to request I would make copies and translates for your perusal of two letters which he has wrote the Hon'ble the President.

*Translate of a letter from the Nawab of Broach to the Hon'ble the President, dated Surat Bar the 4th of the month of Ramazan in the year of the Hijra* 1185.

*Nawab's losses*

Having met with unfavourable winds since my departure from Bombay, I did not arrive at this Bar till yesterday. The commander of a gallivat informing me that on the 27th of Shaban the Marathas near Surat had seized some things belonging to me, which were coming from Bombay, I have stayed here a day and dispatched a harkara to town to know the truth of this information. On his return I received accounts that 1,200 Marathas had fallen upon 100 of my people at Burachka[1] and plundered them of my horses, some of which, as I was once discoursing with you at Bombay, were worth 2,000 Rupees, others 1,000, and the worst of them 700 Rupees each. But these, as they were my own, and I have lost them on your account, I consider as a present made to you. Those belonging to my sepoys, which were worth no more than 500 Rs. each, they will expect me to pay for at the rate of 1000 Rupees each; and I am besides a loser of some camels and all my baggage, which the Marathas have also carried away together with Anandram, my mehta,[2] whom I had made my Diwan for taking care of those things. I hear further that the same Marathas, who have robbed me, are blocking Surat. In short, besides many other things, they have carried off all my necessaries and the Diwan's palanquin, and are people belonging to the Peshwa (the Government of Poona) which I desire you will consider. One hundred men you may imagine could do little against 1,200, but still my people behaved with great courage, having fought with those Marathas till some were killed, and others wounded. This I have wrote for your information, and you may remember I told at Bombay that these people were my enemies; which, you see, is now clearly proved

*Translate of a letter from the Nawab of Broach to the Hon'ble the President, dated the* 16*th of the month Ramazan in the year of the Hijra* 1185.

*Nawab's grievances*

These are the particulars of what I have been robbed by the Marathas; my mehta, Anandram, camels and sundry other things, which were seized at Beracha near Surat, as I wrote you from Surat Bar. To that letter I have yet received no answer, but am in expectation of it every moment. According to the agreement we entered into with each

1 In the next letter it is called "Beracha near Surat."

2 Clerk.

other, in case I should have a dispute with any of my enemies, you are to be my friends and assist me. The disgrace I have now suffered so nearly touches me that I am become deaf and dumb. I will take the measures to obtain satisfaction, as I depend entirely upon your word; otherwise, be assured, I would not tamely submit to the insult. Therefore, agreeable thereto, I request you will make all possible haste in procuring an order to the general of the Maratha horse who have committed this robbing, requiring him to restore what he has taken from me, otherwise I don't expect ever to get back my mehta, Anandram, nor my horses, or any thing else. Another request I have to make is, that you will write Mr. Price and Mir Hafiz-ud-din Khan, the Nawab of Surat, with all expedition to let them know that the Marathas now laying before Surat are the people who robbed me; and that, therefore when they are settling affairs with him, the first article shall be his agreeing to repay my loss; but, should he refuse consenting to this, that then they must not put an end to the Surat affair; for, if you will not write to Mr. Price and the Surat Nawab and also procure an order to the Marathas from Poona, nor give me any effectual assistance in this matter, how then will you observe the agreement you made with me for the Company? I desire you to consider, when one comes your house, and any misfortune befalls him on his way back, whether in such a case the agreement made with him is not cancelled by yourself. As to my engagements with the Company, though they are as plain as if they were engraved on stone, yet if you don't take any care in this affair, of course they become of no force; and you cannot expect I shall perform them, I have ordered this harkara to wait on you purposely to bring me those letters I have requested from Mr. Price and the Surat Nawab; and request you will send him back with them as speedily as possible. The order from Poona I beg you will endeavour to have sent to yourself, and then forwarded to me.

1772 *Surat, 22nd April,* 1772 (1772 *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Morley temporises* The Nawab offering me a house in town two days since for my present habitation, which, from the accounts I have of it, would prove a tolerable shelter from the weather, I thanked him for his civility; but, as it is not to serve the purpose of a factory, and I was in hourly expectation of your orders how to conduct myself in future—to avoid giving any determinate answer regarding it at that time—I informed him I should soon send a person to look at it. In like manner, in consequence of your advising me that you wait the resolutions of the Hon'ble the President and Council, whether I shall be recalled or continued here for the purpose of further negotiation, I will endeavour not to bring this affair to any conclusion, till you finally determine what measures to pursue, unless it should appear impracticable without creating a disgust, which may possibly be hurtful to our future views; in which case I shall act in the best manner circumstances will admit.

*Fatesing peace-maker* The late accommodation between the Nawab and Madhavrao, I understand, was effected by the mediation of Fatesing, who has engaged to satisfy the former for the horses, baggage, &ca seized by the Marathas.

*Broach, 23rd April, 1772 (1772, S. F. 661)* 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Nawab amenable*

Soon after closing the foregoing letter I received a message from the Nawab, intimating he would accept the present if I would again make him an offer of it. In answer thereto I informed him that my Superiors having been advised of his public [*rejection*] of it, it was not in my power to dispose of it without their further orders; but that I did not doubt they would allow me to give it to him, whenever he showed a disposition of complying with his engagements to the Hon'ble Company.

In consequence of which, he desired me to return the letter he first sent me for the Chief; and the enclosed is another which I have this instant received.

Frequent consultations have been held at the Darbar for some days past, which I have private intelligence are on the subject of the Nawab's affairs with the Hon'ble Company; and he now appears to be under no small uneasiness from an apprehension of the consequence that may ensue from his behaviour to us since my arrival here; but one of his favourites has secretly informed me he will relax in no material point, till he hears from the Hon'ble the President, whom he wrote to about nine days since; and that, should he find by the answer he expects to that letter we are inclined to show much resentment against him, he may then by degrees be brought to a compliance with most part and perhaps the whole of the treaty, except the payment of money, which we are never to expect, not only because of his avaricious disposition, but likewise on account of the poverty of his circumstances, which, according to this person's representation, hardly enables him to defray his necessary charges.

*Broach 28th April, 1772 (1772, S. F. 661)* 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Broach revenue*

Since my arrival here it has ever been an object of my attention to procure all possible information concerning the revenues of Broach and its dependencies, the state of the Nawab's force and treasury, and his connections with the neighbouring Powers. But, while the intelligence I received has no better foundation than common report or uncertain accounts, it appeared to me of little use to trouble you on these points. I shall now, however, beg leave to communicate some particulars to you, which I learnt from a Parsi priest, whom I esteem a pretty good authority from his having almost constantly resided here since his birth to an advanced age, and being universally reputed a very sensible man. These are as follows: The customs of Broach amount yearly to about fifty thousand Rupees, and the revenues of the city to about twenty thousand Rupees, both which are equally divided between the Nawab and Damaji's sons.

The villages appertaining to Broach (which are 175 in number) produce at the most favourable times about seven lakhs of Rupees per annum, and scarcely even less than six lakhs and a half, which are also shared between the Nawab and Damaji's sons; the latter taking six parts in ten.

*Military expenses* The troops in constant pay here are about two thousand, of which two hundred are horsemen; and on some extraordinary occasions the Nawab has had one thousand more. The Nawab's annual government charges are about one lakh of Rupees and those of his household about fifty thousand Rupees.

*Parsimony* He has now, there is no doubt, at least forty lakhs of Rupees in specie, and is of so penurious a disposition that probably no emergency of his affairs would induce him to diminish this wealth (some say he cannot have less than sixty lakhs in possession). Lallubhai (who has the chief management of affairs here both for the Nawab and Damaji's sons, and is reputed worth thirty lakhs of Rupees) farms forty of the most considerable villages, by which, and the superintendency of the rest, his just advantages are about forty thousand Rupees yearly. Exclusive of this, he has other opportunities of acquiring large sums of money from his influence with the Government and power over the inhabitants. Some other villages are farmed out by the Diwanji (a favourite of the Nawab), and a few more by the rest of the chief servants in the Darbar.

*Gaikwad troops* Damaji's sons have in constant pay about 1,000 horsemen and the same number of foot; and whenever there is occasion, they can raise a much more considerable force.

*Fatesing and Broach* At the time of our late expedition against Broach the Nawab made application for assistance from this quarter, and obtained a promise agreeable to his wishes. But Fatesing (whom his brothers entrust with the chief management of all their affairs on account of his superior abilities) though he made a show of marching some troops to his relief, was far from having a real inclination to see him extricate himself from his trouble, from a disgust which has long prevailed in his family against the Nawab in consequence of many instances of perfidious conduct which they have experienced in him, added to the hopes they had conceived, if we succeeded against it, of obtaining the entire possession of Broach by means of a purchase with money; which, if common fame may be credited, they are impatiently desirous of. It should seem, therefore, that by amusing them with a negotiation for that purpose, there would be little difficulty in prevailing on them to stand neuter, in case it should ever be necessary to make any future attempt for the reduction of this place.

*Nawab of Cambay* The Cambay Nawab keeps up a friendly correspondence with the Nawab here [*Broach*] and is much dreaded by him from his enterprising spirit, but he is far from being much in his interest except with regard to the Marathas, against whom in general he readily assists him, so that, should Damaji's sons disappoint him of support, the Broach Nawab would have no resources in a time of danger from any other Power in his foreign alliances.

*Visit to Nawab* I was yesterday sitting with the Nawab for some time in his garden, but he seemed to have no desire of discoursing on business, which I equally avoided bringing upon the carpet.[1]

1 Published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series,* II, 169. G. W. Forrest, dated the letter Surat 14th July, 1772, whereas in the 1772 *Surat Factory Diary,* 661 the date given is 28th April, 1772.

*Bombay, 28th April,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 61A) **1772**
*At a Consultation.*

The President also lays before the Board a translate of a letter addressed him by the Nawab of Broach as entered hereafter, which, with the above advices, is now taken into consideration. *Letter from the Nawab*

We cannot sufficiently express our surprise at the treatment Mr. Morley has received from the Nawab; and as we deem it highly inconsistent his continuing at Broach, resolved unanimously that orders be sent to the Chief and Council at Surat to direct him to return immediately, in the securest manner to himself he may be able, without taking leave of the Nawab.[1] *Surprise*

The Nawab mentions that the cause of his esteeming the treaty null is owing to his horses having been taken by the Marathas on their return from hence; for whose release, he says, he has frequently applied by letter, but never obtained any redress. The President to this declares that he wrote to obtain a passport for them for Madhavrao; notwithstanding which, the Nawab, one day previous to its being received, directed them to make the best of their way through the Maratha country to Broach. The capture of them by the Marathas was consequently owing to his own precipitation; and as he immediately commenced hostilities against them on his return to Broach, any further interposition on our part, respecting them, would have been improper; the pretext, therefore, which he makes use of, is highly absurd, respecting which the President will write the Nawab a suitable letter. *Allegations*

*Bombay, 28th April,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 61A) **1772**
*At a Consultation.*

Translate of a letter of Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung, Nawab of Broach, dated the 15th and received 23rd April, 1772.

The officer of the Peshwa having plundered my mehta, Anandram, etc., karkuns of horses, camels, and other things belonging to this sarkar, amounting to a large sum of money, I wrote Your Honour twice about it, saying they had been to Your Honour's house and were returning to Broach without molesting any one in their way; and I desired that you would write to the Peshwa and obtain his order to his officer to return them to me; but you took no notice of it, neither did you send your letters to Mr. Price nor to Mir Hafiz-ud-din Ahmad Khan, though I had wrote to you plain that, if you would not obtain the Peshwa's order as observed, or write to Mr. Price and the Nawab of Surat to deduct the amount of the above my horses, etc. from the chauth they were then to pay the Marathas, the Company's agreements should be annulled, and that I should be free from blame for not complying with my word—which letter must be in your office. Your Honour neither sent me any answer to that letter, nor did you use any endeavours towards getting my things back. After which I am at a loss to know how you could think of sending Mr. Morley. I sent the enclosed paragraph of your agreements to Mr. Price at two different times; but he, not paying any regard to the same, settled with the Ma- *Nawab's complaint*

1 The first two paragraphs of this consultation have been published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series,* II, 168.

[illegible] in his own affairs and made no answer about my things. I have been obliged to enlist a number of horse and footmen at a great expense, and have commenced hostilities in the Maratha country, and have encamped myself. If Your Honour will still write to the Nawab of Surat and make Mr. Price join him, they will get all my things delivered up to me. It is mentioned in the Company's agreements that you are the securities on the part of the Nawabs of Surat and Cambay; but, if you will not comply therewith, it is your pleasure, and I shall have no blame for the same, for it lies on your side. I am informed that you have sent Mr. Morley as a Chief of your Factory at this place, putting the same under that of Surat. As this is not mentioned in our agreements, it must be under Bombay, so that you will not put this Factory under Surat, as it is not acceptable to me. You will, therefore, order Mr. Morley to write to Bombay concerning the business of this place and not [*to*] Surat.

1772 *Bombay, 28th April,* 1772 (1772, *S. & P. D.* 13)
*Address to the Hon'ble Company.*

*Fatesing's proposals* — Under the 17th instant (17 *April,* 1772) in our diary is entered a letter from the Chief of Surat advising of Fatesing's being returned from Poona very much disgusted with Madhavrao, and of his desire of entering into an alliance offensive and defensive with Your Honours.[1] He therein points out the advantages which might result from it and the particulars of his offers. His agents, mentioned in this letter, are arrived, and the President has had several conferences with them, by which he learns their proposals are [*the*] same as those mentioned by Mr. Price. We have not yet been able to give this subject the consideration the importance of it requires, and shall, therefore, advise Your Honours by a future opportunity of our resolution in consequences of these proposals.

1772 *Bombay, 28th April,* 1772 (1772, *P. D. Let to C. of Dir.* 19)
*Letter from the President and Council to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

*Nawab's behaviour* — 55 In our inward Letter-Book now transmitted is entered under the 25th instant a letter from your servants at Surat, enclosing one from Mr. James Morley, dated from Broach (at which place we had appointed him to reside in Your Honours' behalf, as you have already been advised) giving an account of the very extraordinary behaviour of the Nawab on his paying him the usual visit on his arrival, by refusing to accept the present tendered him on your account, or to comply with any of the articles of the treaty we entered into with him on the 30th November last, under the frivolous pretence that some horses, belonging to him, having been taken by the Marathas on their return from hence, had not been released through our interposition, notwithstanding he had frequently applied by letter for that purpose. A copy of Mr. Morley's letter goes under No. 38.

*Summary of events* — 56 A translate of a letter also from the Nawab, dated two days after that from Mr. Morley, is enclosed under No. 39, wherein Your Honours will find he assigns the above reason as the cause of his present proceed

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[1] See 17th April, 1772.

ings, though he well knows that, previous to his departure from hence, the President wrote to Madhavrao to obtain a passport for his horses; but the Nawab, one day prior to its receipt, directed them to make the best of their way to Broach through the Maratha country, which was the cause of their being taken; and as he immediately on his return commenced hostilities against the Marathas, any further interposition on our parts would have been entirely fruitless ; as, therefore, the loss of his horses was owing to his own precipitation, his evading a compliance with the treaty he entered into with Your Honours on that account is highly absurd, and his behaviour on this occasion such as determined us immediately to recall Mr. Morley from thence without taking leave of the Nawab, had not private advices, this day received as per extract thereof under No. 40, mentioned that he has made some overtures to Mr. Morley to accommodate the difference; and we, therefore, wait to hear publicly from the Chief and Council respecting it, previous to our coming to a final resolution; and we hope to be able to advise Your Honours by a boat, after this ship, of the Nawab's determination, as we cannot detain her at this season for that purpose.

*Bombay, 29th April,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 61.4) 1772
*Letter from George Skipp, Secretary, to the Members of the Council.*

I am directed by the Hon'ble the President to acquaint you that in a letter from Mr. Daniel Seton at Surat, dated the 25th and received this day, are the following paragraphs; and the President requests you will be pleased to signify your opinions whether it is necessary in consequence of this intelligence to send other orders than those yesterday resolved on. *Opinion asked for*

"I suppose you have heard what an unpromising aspect our affairs have at Broach Morley advises to-day that the Nawab has tendered him a good house in town and sent him word he wished to receive the Company's present, so that he is coming to again; and it is thought he will fulfil every part of the treaty, but that of paying the four lakhs. Some think he is, others that he is not in a circumstance to comply with this most material article of the treaty." *Nawab's attitude*

"Morley has neither accepted the house nor made him the present: the first he declined by a put-off, the other he refused to comply with without orders from his Superiors, as the Nawab had offered an affront to the Company by not accepting it, when first tendered with."

*Answers of the Members of Council.*

The foregoing letter was returned with the opinions of the gentlemen of Council as follows.

I think it should be added to yesterday's resolves "Unless the Nawab should have seen the impropriety of his conduct, and is willing and ready to fulfil the treaty in every particular." (Benjamin Jervis) *Jervis*

I think we should wait to hear further from the Chief and Council, which, I conclude, we shall very soon do. (Daniel Draper) *Draper*

Mr. Morley having received his instructions from the Chief and Council at Surat, and it is said he has wrote them on the subject, it would be proper to wait for their letter, as we may very shortly expect it. (Brice Fletcher) *Fletcher*

*Garden* In my opinion we should wait till we hear further from Broach or Surat, before we order Mr. Morley down. (Robert Garden)

*Wedderburn* I think Mr. Morley should be peremptorily ordered to quit Broach, without delay and without ceremony, as I know nothing which the Nawab can do in the present circumstances that can atone for the outrage and insult which has by him been offered to the Company. (David Wedderburn)

*Watson* Can it be a question, after the grossest insult offered to your Resident, that even his personal safety has been doubted, and the flagrant and ignominious breach of the treaty publicly in his Darbar, with the most mortifying and unjust reflections on this Board, I say can it then be a question whether we should recall Mr. Morley or not ? It is my opinion if we are not, nor ever should be able to seek redress, yet this much is due to our own credit, to the reputation of the Company, and to the honour of the nation that Mr. Morley should be immediately recalled without ceremony; and this offer to Mr. Morley (if true) of again admitting him into Broach I consider as an aggravation of the outrage already committed, and shows the contemptible ideas he entertained of our Council and power; nor do I think we should hold any further correspondence with him, the Nawab. (John Watson)

*Shaw* As in consequence of the above extract of a private letter from Surat, we may every hour expect a public one on the subject, I am of opinion we should wait till that arrives; when we shall be better able to form a judgment of the whole and thereupon regulate our future proceedings. (Willian Shaw.)

*Tayler* I am of opinion the Nawab's conduct has been being highly insolent and no no account to be forgot; but, as the season is now so far advanced, I am for continuing Mr. Morley at Broach till the time for the first payment of the money he [*the Nawab*] is bound to by the treaty, that from his conduct then we may be able to judge of his future intentions and decide accordingly. (William Tayler)

1772 *Bombay, 1st May,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 61*A*)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Nawab's proposal* Per express pattemar received a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat, which bore date the 25th ultimo, and in which they owned receipt of our commands of the 17th of that month and enclosed extracts of two letters from Mr. Morley, dated 19th and 23rd, in which the Nawab of Broach offered to receive the Hon'ble Company's present. but the Chief and Council declined taking any steps in the affair till our further orders.

1772 *Bombay, 1st May,* 1772 (1772, *P. D. Let. to C. of Dir.* 19)
*Letter from the President and Council to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

*Further news* In compliance with our promise to Your Honour in the 56th and 57th paragraphs of our address of the 28th ultimo, we dispatch this, express boat, in expectation of her being able to overtake the *Godfrey* before her final departure from the coast to inform you of such further intelligence as we have received respecting the conduct of the Nawab of Broach, and of the orders we have given in consequence.

For Your Honours' more full information we enclose two extracts of Mr. Morley's letters from Broach to the Chief and Council at Surat, which contain the whole intelligence we have received from thence since our last address; and as we esteemed it inconsistent with the credit and real interest of Your Honours that Mr. Morley should enter into any further negotiations with the Nawab of Broach, after the Nawab had so shamefully endeavoured to evade a compliance with every article of the treaty he concluded here, we have directed that he should once for all acquaint him publicly that, unless he immediately promises to perform every article of that treaty and again confirms the same by letter to the President, he [*Mr. Morley*] should retire from thence. We have not yet learnt the effect this may have on the Nawab; but we doubt not but Your Honours must approve the directions we have given. *Ultimatum to Broach*

*Bombay, 2nd May*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 61*A*) 1772
*Letter to Surat.*

Signed a letter to the Chief and Council at Surat to be dispatched per pattemar, in which we owned receipt of their letters of the 18th and 19th and 25th ultimo. As we deemed it inconsistent with the credit and interest of our Employers that Mr. Morley should enter into any further negotiation with the Nawab of Broach, we direct that immediately on receipt hereof they should send orders to Mr. Morley personally to acquaint the Nawab in his public Darbar that, if he did not directly perform every part of the treaty and again confirm the same by letter to the President, he [*Morley*] had orders to retire from Broach; and should the Nawab either evade or refuse a full compliance, he in such case was to return without further delay; and as the Nawab might possibly be desirous of endeavouring to learn our intentions, in that case, Mr. Morley was only to acquaint him that our orders to him were as above, but that he was entirely ignorant of the measures we might pursue in consequence. *Direction to Morley*

*Broach, 6th May*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

That [*house*], which I last mentioned to you he had offered me, has formerly been a tolerable house, but at present is no better than a heap of ruins, half of it having fallen to the ground, and the rest altogether untenable. And within a few days past he has spoke to me of another [*house*], which he must also have known could not be acceptable, having no place for keeping any necessaries and consisting of only one room, a closet and a small veranda that would be useless in the rains from its being open on one side to the weather. I can not but wonder, however, at this mark of the Nawab's disesteem for the English nation from a still more disgraceful circumstance attending my situation here, in his keeping the strictest watch on the country-people, particularly the mercantile part, to prevent their having any dealings with me whatever, the effects of which I have experienced by the shroffs lately excusing themselves from advancing me so trifling an amount as about 200 Rupees for a bill on Surat, because it might offend the Nawab. *Morley's trials*

This unjustifiable manner of proceeding I have hitherto connived at, seeing no probability of its answering any purpose to remonstrate with him at present, as he openly disclaims all regard to the treaty; but, should any accommodation hereafter take place, unless there is a favourable change in his conduct, I shall warn him of the ill-consequences it may draw on him from the resentment of my Hon'ble Employers.

1772 *Broach, 6th May*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from J. Morley: Some particulars relative to the Government of Broach from the time of Mirza Abdullah Beg's accession thereto, who was the first person appointed to govern that place of the present Nawab's family.*

*Maratha share in Broach revenue*

Broach and a small extent of country annexed to its government were under the jurisdiction of the subah of Ahmadabad till the decline of the Moghul Power in this quarter from the encroachments made by the Marathas, which commenced about the beginning of this century, when the latter, entering this subahship with very numerous army, defeated the forces sent against them from Delhi, and in a few years entirely subdued some parts thereof, and laid a tribute on the rest; whence arises the Marathas' present claim to a share of the Broach revenues, which they have ever since received.

*Governors of Broach 1726-56*

In 1726 one Mirza Abdullah Beg, who was in the service of a considerable Omrah at Ahmadabad, being much in favour with his master, obtained by his influence with the subahdar the appointment of governor of Broach for his son, named Muhammad Beg. But he dying immediately after, the father solicited it for himself and was sent thither accordingly the same year. He brought with him his grandson, Neknam Khan, descended from Muhammad Beg, and two brothers, named Nek Alam Khan and Khar Talab Khan.

Mirza Abdullah Beg (who henceforward took the name of Khan Murhoom) governed this place without any material occurrence arising till his death, which happened in 1739, and was succeeded by his brother, Nek Alam Khan, of whom also there is nothing more worth observation than that he continued in the government till 1753, and dying then his successor was:

Khar Talab Khan who, having only governed seven months, died in 1754. At this period it happened that one Bhikharidas, who was a desai and favourite of the Governor, infused a jealousy into his master of the designs of Neknam Khan, who, he represented to him, was using his interest at the Court of Delhi to displace Khar Talab Khan and be appointed Governor in his stead; in consequence of which Neknam Khan was ordered to remove from Broach and retire to Surat, where he was soon made subahdar of Rander.

Husain Ali Khan, son to the last mentioned Governor, succeeded him at the age of 18 months; and because of his minority his mother, Bibi Bawlon, undertook the management of his affairs. One Bhaidas, Majmudar, a man of great wealth, now residing at Broach, being much disaffected to the government, in which the influence of Bhikharidas chiefly prevailed, with whom he was at great enmity, and moreover desirous of ruining the latter by effecting a revolution in favour of Neknam Khan, who also entertained a bitter resentment against

him for the disgrace he had suffered in being driven from Broach through his instigation, he (Bhaidas) prevailed on some of the heads of the soldiery by promises of great reward to enter into a conspiracy against Husain Ali Khan and bring in Neknam Khan to govern in his stead. A change in the government accordingly ensued, about nineteen months after Husain Ali Khan's accession thereto.

Neknam Khan having thus become governor by the assistance of Bhaidas, to gratify the resentment of his benefactor and revenge the insults he had himself received, readily agreed to use every means in his power for the destruction of Bhikharidas. With this view, it was determined, as Bhikharidas had fled to Baroda in the late troubles, that Neknam Khan should feign a desire to be reconciled to him and have the benefit of his future services, in order to induce him to return to Broach. The scheme succeeded, and Bhikharidas thus deceived into hopes of regaining his former credit and influence at this place, having quitted his retreat, and put himself into the hands of his enemies, was cut in pieces the moment he appeared in the presence of Neknam Khan.

*Nawabs of Broach*

Hitherto all those who had ruled in Broach were persons of inconsiderable rank, bearing no other title than that of governor, but the one now in that station, finding himself in circumstances of great wealth, which had been amassed by his predecessors, made use of this means to raise himself to the dignity of Nawab, for which purpose a firman was procured by a large present to the Mogul. He lived till the year 1769, and was succeeded by his son, Masud Khan Imtiyaz-ud-daulah Deler Jung, the present Nawab, who has ever distinguished himself by an insatiable thirst for money and a total disregard to good faith. In the management of his affairs, he is greatly influenced by the councils of Lallubhai, who, there is reason to believe, is much averse to the Hon'ble Company's having a settlement in the Nawab's territories, from an opinion it would lessen his consequence, as at present every one there is in great measure dependent on him, which could not be the case with those under the English protection, and therefore is labouring to prevent it, particularly by his representation to the Nawab that it would be dangerous to allow so formidable a nation any footing within his government, lest it should prove a temptation to attempt his destruction and be a means of their more easily accomplishing it. This Nawab has seven sons (of whom the eldest is now in about his fifteenth year), as many daughters, and an uncle named Izent Ullah Canchee. The unfortunate Husain Ali Khan, who was displaced from his government in his infancy, is also yet alive together with his mother, and they receive a small allowance from the Nawab (one of whose daughters is married to the former) for their maintenance.

*Baroda connection*

I beg leave to observe here that a son of Bhikharidas abovementioned (whose name is Jamiat Roy) being now alive at Baroda, and in high favour with Damaji's sons, he would probably be glad to act a part favourable to the Hon'ble Company and be a useful instrument, should they hereafter have any point to carry at that Darbar to the prejudice to the Broach Nawab, from a motive of revenging his father's death by injuring both him and Lallubhai (grandson of Bhaidas); the latter of whom would at least be mortified by the loss

of the extensive power and influence he now enjoys, should this place fall into our hands.[1]

1772 *Surat, 8th May*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat, to James Morley, Resident at Broach.*

*Instructions* In consequence of our Superiors' commands received yesterday, we hereby direct that immediately on the receipt hereof you personally acquaint the Nawab in his public Darbar that, provided he does not directly promise to perform every part of the treaty with the Hon'ble Company and again confirm the same by the letter to the President, you have our orders to retire from Broach; and should the Nawab refuse or evade a compliance, you are in such case to return without further delay. As the Nawab may possibly be desirous of endeavouring to learn from you the intention of our Superiors in case of your return, you are only to acquaint him that our orders to you are as above, but that you are entirely ignorant of the measures that may be pursued in consequence. To-morrow the Chief will forward you the proper parwanahs from the Marathas for your coming overland.

1772 *Bombay Castle, 8th May*, 1772 (1772, *S. & P. D.* 13)
*Bombay resolution.*

*Fatesing's proposals* The President lays before the Committee the proposal made by Fatesing's agent[2] in behalf of his Master on account of the Hon'ble Company, provided we enter into a defensive alliance with him, as entered hereafter. The above letter and paper from the Chief of Surat entered under the 6th instant [*6th May*, 1772] are also read. The Committee, taking the above into the most serious consideration, are unanimously of opinion that it would be highly improper to accept the proposals till the Hon'ble Company's sentiments can be known regarding them, as our acceptance of them must inevitably engage the Hon'ble Company in a war with the Marathas, though at the same time we are of opinion it is for their interest to keep on good terms with Fatesing. The President will, therefore, acquaint him we can take no final resolution, till we receive the orders of our Employers, and will also return a like answer to Fatesing's letter. In the meantime everything in our power will be done to cultivate the good understanding, which at present subsists.

## *PROPOSALS FROM FATESING BY HIS AGENT, BAPAJI.*

*Fatesing's proposals* That his Master, when lately at Poona, met with such treatment that obliged him to leave it suddenly, and is so much incensed thereat that he wishes to shake off all connections with Madhavrao.[3] That all the country of Gujarat and as low down to the southward as Daman is under his government, and was conquered by his grandfather, Pilaji, and his father, Damaji, as were all the parganas belonging to Surat. But his father, Damaji, on a visit to Poona in the time of Nana was detained upwards of three years, until he gave up half

1 Published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series* 1, 389.
2 See entries: 17th April, 1772; 28th April, 1772.
3 See *Gazetteer of the Baroda State*, I, 468, 469.

of the Surat parganas to the Brahmans. But from the late treatment he received, having had two pistols fired at him,[1] he has thought of withholding the same from them, and intends preventing them from collecting any part thereof this year; for which he proposes a defensive alliance with the Hon'ble Company, and that they will assist him, in case the Brahmans come against him, with one thousand sepoys, 300 Europeans, with 20 guns, and ammunition, and artillerymen for the guns; for which he will pay what may be agreed upon; and proposes to give the share the Brahmans received on account the Surat parganas to the Hon'ble Company, and to assist them with any number of men they may want at any time.[2]

On mentioning to him his Master's share of the chauth of Surat, he said that would be easily settled, provided we came into his Master's proposal; but that at present they must have their man in the town.

*Bombay, 8th May,* 1772 (1772, *S. & P. D.* 13) 1772
*Letter to the Hon'ble Company.*

*Fatesing's proposals*

The President and Council, dispatching an express boat after the *Godfrey* with advices to Your Honours, affords us an opportunity of enclosing you an attested copy of a paper the President laid before us, containing the particulars of the offers made by the agents of Fatesing, who, you were acquainted in our address of the 28th ultimo were arrived here.

*Surat parganas*

We also enclose an attested copy of the yearly produce of the parganas or districts formerly annexed to Surat with the manner in which it is at present divided, as received from the Chief of Surat, that Your Honours may be enabled exactly to ascertain the value of the offers made by Fatesing.[3]

*Momentous decision*

We have taken this affair into our serious consideration, and are of opinion it is a matter of too great importance for us finally to determine on it, as, should we accept them, it will doubtly engage Your Honours in a war with the Marathas, but at the same time we think it much for your interest to keep on good terms with Fatesing. We have, therefore, agreed these agents shall be desired to acquaint their Master that we have referred the offers they have made to Your Honours' determination, and until you may think proper to favour us therewith, we shall use every means in our power to cultivate the friendship, he seems at present desirous should subsist between Your Honours and him, though we shall still avoid giving offence to the Marathas.

*Surat, 27th April,* 1772 (1772, *S. & P. D.* 13) 1772
*Letter from William A. Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Surat parganas and other sources of revenue*

My last address waited on Your Honour, etc. the 13th instant, and this serves purposely to enclose the accounts of the parganas, etc.

1 In the light of these attempts to do away with Fatesing it would be highly incongruous to speak of Fatesing having betrayed Madhavrao. Fatesing and Madhavrao were never confederates in the strict sense of the word, which implies common interests and an interchange of good offices.

2 The importance of these proposals may be gathered from the letter which the Bombay authorities sent to London. See next document.

3 See next document.

annexed to Surat. I believe it to be a pretty exact one, and hope it will arrive in time to answer your purpose. The account far exceeds what was at first told me. It has been with great difficulty and under the strongest assurances of secrecy that I obtained it.

*Account of the districts belonging to Surat with the annual produce they are estimated at.*[1]

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ULPAR [*Olpad*] | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | Rs. | 3,50,000 0 0 | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 35,000 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 65,000 0 0 | |
| | | | 4,50,000 0 0 |
| ODASEER [*Anklesvar*] .. | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 1,85,000 0 0 | |
| Surat Castle .. .. .. | | 13,000 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 35,000 0 0 | |
| | | | 2,33,000 0 0 |
| HASSOTE [*Hansot*] .. .. | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 1,27,000 0 0 | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 10,000 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | | 20,000 0 0 | |
| | | | 1,57,000 0 0 |
| BUSSROYAH [*Vasrai*] | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 1,15,000 0 0 | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 600 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 50,000 0 0 | |
| | | | 1,65,600 0 0 |
| TURGASEER [*Tadkeshvar*] | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 5,500 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 4,500 0 0 | |
| | | | 10,000 0 0 |
| GHULAH [*Galha*] | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 90,000 0 0 | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 7,500 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 10,000 0 0 | |
| | | | 1,07,500 0 0 |
| CHORASSY [*Chorasi*] .. | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 1,35,000 0 0 | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 33,000 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 32,000 0 0 | |
| | | | 2,20,000 0 0 |
| BULLASEER [*Balesar*] | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 1,30,000 0 0 | |
| Surat Castle .. .. .. | | 25,000 0 0 | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 52,000 0 0 | |
| | | | 2,07,000 0 0 |

1 The names of the parganas and kasbahs as given by Price differ at times considerably from those found nowadays in books and maps. The modern spelling of these names, here inserted between brackets, was kindly supplied by Mr. Ranadive of the Huzur Political Office, Baroda.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COMRAEZ [*Kamrej*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | Rs. | 75,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 9,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 20,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,04,000 | 0 | 0 |
| TEEMBA [*Temba*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 55,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Castle .. .. .. | | 10,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 24,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 90,000 | 0 | 0 |
| VERRAN & SURRANRAM [*Vyara & Saranjam*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 40,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 6,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 46,000 | 0 | 0 |
| CUNODE [*Kadod*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 50,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 1,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 23,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 74,000 | 0 | 0 |
| VUSSAWPORE [*Bisanpur*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 33,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 2,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 35,000 | 0 | 0 |
| UNTOPPORE [*Antapore*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 26,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 2,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 28,000 | 0 | 0 |
| KIRKAN [*Khadke*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 95,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 15,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,10,000 | 0 | 0 |
| PUNCHAMOLEY [*Panchmouli*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 25,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 5,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 30,000 | 0 | 0 |
| BOANEY [*Bohari*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 9,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 1,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 10,500 | 0 | 0 |
| WALLAW [*Walod*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 60,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 34,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 94,000 | 0 | 0 |
| UNNOWVUL [*Anaval*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 8,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 1,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 9,500 | 0 | 0 |
| MOWAH [*Mahuva*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 52,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 4,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 14,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 70,500 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SUPAH** [*Supa*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. Rs. | 90,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 4,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 35,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,29,500 | 0 | 0 |
| **GANDEVIE** [*Gandevi*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 85,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 14,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 99,000 | 0 | 0 |
| **PARCHOLE** [*Parchol*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 1,35,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 4,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 15,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,54,000 | 0 | 0 |
| **CHICKLED** [*Chikhli*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 90,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 14,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 20,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,24,000 | 0 | 0 |
| **VERSAUL** [*Valsad-Bulsar*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. Rs. | 1,00,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 5,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 10,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,15,500 | 0 | 0 |
| **PORNELLA** [*Parnera*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 31,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 2,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 5,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 38,000 | 0 | 0 |
| **MONROLEY** [*Maroli*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 55,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 4,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 14,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 73,500 | 0 | 0 |
| **TILLAREY** [*Teladi*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 1,20,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 7,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 22,[illegible]00 | | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,49,500 | 0 | 0 |
| **SETTERGOON** [*Satragam*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 70,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 12,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 17,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 99,000 | 0 | 0 |
| **SURBOAM** [*Sarbhon*] .. | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing | .. | 45,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. | .. | 5,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | .. | 7,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 56,500 | 0 | 0 |
| **30 Parganas.** .. .. | .. | | | Rs. | 32,90,600 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FOUR KASBAHS | | | | | | | |
| BURRAON [*Variav*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | Rs. | 17,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Castle .. .. .. | | 7,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. | | 1,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 25,000 | 0 | 0 |
| NOWSARY [*Navsari*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 25,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 7,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 32,000 | 0 | 0 |
| BONDALEY [*Bardoli*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 3,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 800 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 1,500 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 5,300 | 0 | 0 |
| MOOLAH [*Mota*] | | | | | | | |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. | | 12,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | | 1,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 1,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 14,000 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 Castles. | | | | Rs. | 76,300 | 0 | 0 |

Besides there are five mahals[1] the names of which I cannot now obtain, from whence

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fatesing receives .. .. | Rs. | 85,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | | 20,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | | 1,05,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Duties on goods, carts of grain, salt, etc. passing up country or coming into town .. .. .. | | | | Rs. | 1,76,000 | 0 | 0 |

*ABSTRACT OF THE ABOVE.*

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30 Parganas .. .. .. | Rs. | 32,90,600 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 4 Kasbahs .. .. .. | | 76,300 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| 5 Mahals .. .. .. | | 1,05,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Duties on goods etc. .. .. | | 1,76,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | Rs. | 36,47,900 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| Surat chauth, town revenue received by Madhavrao and Fatesing. .. .. .. .. | Rs. | 1 25,000 | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | Rs. | 37,72,900 | 0 | 0 |

1 In the Baroda Records two Panch Mahals are mentioned: the Panch Mahals of Rajpipla (Nandod, Bhalode, Panetha, Gowali and Labda's Naka) and the Panch Mahals north of the Tapti for the purpose of levying jakat or customs (Olpad, Ankleswar, Hansot, Vasrai). The Panch Mahals here mentioned are probably those of Rajpipla, from which Fatesing used to recover the tribute due to him by that State—a tribute which amounted to 85,000 Rs., which coincides with the number in Price's list. (*Note supplied by Baroda*)

| The above divided into shares : | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Madhavrao and Fatesing .. Rs. | 25,43,500 | 0 | 0 |
| Surat Nawab .. .. .. | 1,88,400 | 0 | 0 |
| Grassias .. .. .. .. | 5,99,400 | 0 | 0 |
| Surat Castle .. .. .. | 55,500 | 0 | 0 |
| Fatesing alone .. .. .. | 85,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing's duties on goods .. .. .. | 1,76,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Madhavrao and Fatesing's revenue from Surat city .. | 1,25,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Rs. | 37,72,900 | 0 | 0 |

The Grassias' share is divided amongst four neighbouring Rajas, *viz.*

The Raja of RANJEPUPLEY [*Rajpipla*]
" " " MANDEVIE [*Mandvi*]
" " " FUTTYPORE [*Dharampur*][1]
" " " BAUNSALOW [*Bansda*]

But the proportions each receives I cannot learn.

1772 *Surat, 10th May*, 1772 (1772, *S. & P. D.* 13)

*Letter from William A. Price, Chief at Surat, dated* 10*th May*, 1772.

*Surat parganas* The statement I sent you for the revenue arising from the districts annexed to Surat, it is necessary for me to observe, is as it now stands; the Nawab's share is rated at Rs. 1,88,000, but he only receives about one lakh, the rest being buried in vasavat jagirs, gifts and grants from the crown of many years standing, when the Moguls were in the fulness of their power, to individuals. The Castle revenue is only now Rs. 55,500, but at that time the four following districts were set apart for its maintenance, and were entirely under the command of the Castle-Governor, the Nawab of the City not receiving any share thereof.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ULLASEER [*Anklesvar*] estimated at .. .. Rs. | 2,15,000 | 0 | 0 |
| BARRAON [*Variav*] .. .. .. .. .. | 30,000 | 0 | 0 |
| TEMBA [*Temba*] .. .. .. .. .. | 67,000 | 0 | 0 |
| VESSOW [*Vessow*] 60 stade .. .. .. .. | 18,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Rs. | 3,30,000 | 0 | 0 |

There may be some difference in this estimation, but I have employed a proper person in the Maratha country to get it me exactly. As soon as obtained, it shall be forwarded to Your Honour, etc., and here it may not be amiss to remark that Madhavrao and Fatesing are at very little expense in recovering their revenue. I am told it does not exceed one lakh of Rupees annually. I am also told that from the Grassias' share they exact a tribute of about one lakh and a half.

1 It was impossible to identify *Futtypore*, it is probably another name for Dharampur, as the Raja of that principality, though subordinate to Surat, has nowhere been mentioned. (*Note supplied by Baroda*)

*Surat,*[1] *13th May,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Bombay's ultimatum*

On the receipt of your orders of the 8th instant, which came to hand the following day in the evening, I sent a message to the Nawab to advise him of my intention of waiting on him, which he readily agreed to; and on seeing him I delivered a letter sent me for that purpose by the Hon'ble the President. As soon as he had read it, I proceeded to demand of him a full and immediate answer to the question whether he would fulfil the engagements he had entered into by treaty with the Hon'ble Company in their true sense (which I explained to him as they stood in the English language) and confirm his entire assent thereto by a letter to the Hon'ble the President, expressed in the clearest terms; acquainting him at the same time that, should he persist in his former refusal or attempt to make the least evasion, I was directed to return to Surat without further delay.

*The Nawab's reply*

He seemed struck with astonishment at this peremptory way of dealing, and after a few minutes silence, observed to me that the letter he had received from the Hon'ble the President required more of him than he had ever engaged for, by insisting on the present payment of the whole four lakhs of Rupees, but the half of which would be due in this month, and the rest was payable some time hence. However he said he should consider our demands and give me a final answer the next day evening to every particular, except my continuing under the orders of the Chief and Council at Surat, which required no deliberation, as—for the reasons formerly assigned—he was determined never to acquiesce in it, plainly foreseeing it would be a source of endless disputes between the Hon'ble Company and him; wherefore he wished I would instantly send an express to the Presidency to know our final determination on that head.

*Morley's explanation*

In answer to his observation respecting the Hon'ble the President's requisition for an immediate payment of four lakhs of Rupees, I told him it might probably be owing to the insults he had lately offered the Hon'ble Company and the disregard he had shown to the treaty, which, the President may have judged, required such extraordinary concession from him as an atonement, lest they should otherwise reflect a disgrace on them; but that I was not authorized by my Superiors to enter into any arguments with him on that or any other point, and was equally unacquainted with the motives of their conduct, having no further directions than to demand the answer I had already required of him, which I would wait for till the time he proposed, but longer than that I could not possibly remain in his territories; and unless he then gave me the fullest satisfaction, I should set out for Surat. the morning following

*Nawab's final reply*

Thus ended the conference I had with the Broach Nawab on the 9th, and the next day evening met him at his gardens. He told me that, agreeable to his promise, he was prepared to let me know his ultimate resolutions respecting the Hon'ble Company's affair, and accordingly began with the article of money, observing that by the treaty

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1 From this letter it may be inferred that Morley left Broach for Surat in the early hours of the 11th of May, 1772. The letter itself is written from Surat.

we could yet have no claim on him for the smallest sum; therefore he had only to say regarding it at present that, when the first payment became due, he would put that matter in a way to be settled; which doubtful expression he always made use of in speaking on this subject. On the head of customs (he continued) though he was perfectly content to take none himself, yet having no power over the Marathas,[1] he had never entertained a thought of making himself responsible to us for their relinquishing their share. But as to the other parts of the treaty, we might depend on having no reason to complain of him; and as a token of his sincerity he would immediately furnish me with a proper house in town for a factory, till one could be built by the Hon'ble Company; not doubting the Hon'ble the President would agree to make the settlement at Broach subordinate to none but themselves, as he could not by any means be reconciled to having the least connection with the Chief and Council of Surat, who from the circumstances of their situation, he was persuaded, must necessarily be inclined to do him every injury in their power. Touching the affront he had put on the Hon'ble Company by a refusal of their present and the harsh expressions he made use of upon the occasion, he said it was strange we should think it so extraordinary he had shown a resentment at our inattention to his interest, after receiving the most flattering assurances of our friendship, whereby he had suffered a considerable loss in horses, &ca seized by the Marathas; which, he must still acknowledge, gave him no favourable idea of English integrity; however that he had no sooner a prospect of recovering those horses, &ca in consequence of a promise to which he had forced the Marathas, than he gave a proof of his friendly disposition towards us, in sending a person to acquaint me he would receive the present, if it was again tendered to him; but that I had mortified him in turn by a refusal in answer thereto. The Nawab had proceeded to this length in his discourse before he would hear me in reply.

*Morley's threat*

But the instant he made a pause, I informed him that, since these were his sentiments and resolutions, I must immediately take leave of him and set out the next morning for Surat, agreeable to the orders I had received from my Superiors; which, again I remarked, would not admit of my staying on any terms but those I had mentioned to him, without the smallest deviation.

*Nawab's request*

This determination, notwithstanding all I could urge on the absolute necessity of my obeying a positive order, he long endeavoured to disuade me from; requesting I would remain and endeavour by letters to prevail on my Superiors to admit of his interpretation of the treaty with regard to customs, and prevent a misunderstanding with them in future on any other point.

*Morley's departure*

But finding his entreaties were of no effect, he told me at length in plain terms that he could on no account permit of my going in his present circumstances, and continued thus resolved during the whole time of this interview. At eleven o'clock, however, the same night, waiting on him again at his earnest desire, after he had been a long time in consultation with Lallubhai, he said I might have leave to depart, if I would give him a promise to make a favourable report to the

1 This refers to the Gaikwad's share in the Broach revenues

Hon'ble the President of his late conduct, and return again speedily after using every means in my power to bring about such an accommodation as I found him desirous of. Seeing no other way to prevent his detaining me, I seemed ready to agree to his proposal, professing a hearty desire to serve him ; and after taking leave of him, accompanied Lieut. Easthope on board the *Antelope* gallivat, that gentleman having been obliged to return to Broach to repair some iron works of his vessel's rudder, which being damaged had disabled her from proceeding to Surat at the time she was ordered thither.

*Nawab and Damaji's sons*

Lallubhai was to set out the 11th instant on a journey to Baroda whither the Nawab desired I would mention to the Hon'ble the President he had thought proper to sent him in order to use his endeavours for the recovery of the horses and other things which the Marathas had taken; but I am inclined to believe this is merely a pretext for covering a more important errand, a coolness having for some time past subsisted, between him and Damaji's sons, which the Nawab may wish to remove in consequence of his present situation with regard to the Hon'ble Company.

*Stores and furniture*

The stores sent to Broach for the use of a factory and all my house furniture together with some other necessaries, I was under a necessity of leaving there on my departure, the Nawab having desired they might remain, as he hoped to see me again shortly ; but I don't doubt he would permit them to be brought back on an application from hence.

*Surat*, 13*th May*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772
*Surat to Bombay.*

*Morley's arrival*

In consequence of our directions to Mr. Morley and his having some conference with the Nawab of Broach, [*he*] arrived here yesterday evening. We now enclose copy of his letter to us on this subject and request your directions whether he is to continue here or repair overland to the Presidency.

*Bombay* 20*th May*, 1772 (1772, *P. D* 61*A*) 1772
*Letter from Surat.*

*Morley and the Nawab*

Received per pattemar a letter from the Chief and Council at Surat dated 13th instant, advising us of Mr. Morley's arrival from Broach, and enclosing a letter from him, containing the purport of his conferences with the Nawab, and requesting our directions whether he was to continue at Surat or proceed hither overland.

*Bombay*, 19*th May*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 61*A*) 1772
*Translation of a letter from the Nawab of Broach to the President.*

*Nawab's pleadings*

I have wrote Your Honour a letter, dated the 28th Muharram, acquainting you that I showed Mr. Morley some places, which he did not like; which letter I make no doubt but you may have received ; since which I told him to commence the trade and hoist English colours. He returned me for answer that how can he commence the trade without having a suitable place. I at last agreed to give him a place belonging to this sarkar, although it is very close to my zananah, agreeable to his own choice to trade there and hoist your colours. But in the meantime he received Your Honour's letter, when he came to

me and told me that you had called him down. I told him not to go away now, but begin his trade at that place, and that I shall not refuse to pay the money you wrote me about within the contracted time, nor do I refuse to grant the place. He answered me that, as you have called him down for some business, he will go to you and shall come again; and as Your Honour had likewise wrote that you had other business for him, I gave him leave. You will dispatch him again as soon as he arrives to you, that no difference may happen in our agreements.[1]

1772 *Bombay, 26th May,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 61*A*)
*At a Consultation.*

*Bombay appeased* As the Nawab in his letter promises to pay the sum stipulated by treaty within the limited time, the president will write him in answer that, as the first payment is just due, we expect he will convince us of the sincerity of his professions by remitting the amount by bills either on this place or Surat, when Mr. Morley shall return to Broach as he desires; that gentleman therefore for the present is to remain at Surat.

1772 *Bombay, 14th July,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*At a Consultation.*

*Morley's return postponed* The President lays before the Board translate of a letter he has received from the Nawab of Broach, as entered hereafter, which being considered, we are unanimously of opinion that it would be improper to comply with the Nawab's request by sending Mr. Morley to Broach till he may convince us of the sincerity of his promises by remitting either to this place or to Surat the amount of the first stipulated sum, the time for the payment of which is elapsed, and the President is desired to write him accordingly.[2]

1772 *Translation of a letter from the Nawab of Broach.*

*Nawab's request for Morley's return* I have received Your Honour's letter by a pair of pattemars, at which I was very glad. Your Honour therein says "that I had even forbid any of my subjects to go near Mr. Morley after his arrival here." This history is far from the truth, and it surprises me that Your Honour should give credit to it and write me on the subject. Your Honour likewise says "that I am now inclined to give Mr. Morley a place near my own house and promise to comply with every article of our agreement." It is true I shall never fail to comply with the agreements that have been settled between us. Your Honour will write Mr. Morley to come hither directly. He went from hence with a promise to return from Bombay within 20 days. Had he not stayed at Surat, but remained here, Your Honour would have been in no necessity to write me about sending good bills for the first payment ; however there is not much matter about it now; for I have no difference with the Company. You will write Mr. Morley to come directly hither. Your Honour writes me "that I shall assist Mr. Morley that it will convince you of my sincerity, and that I wish to be on the most friendly foot-

1 Published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series,* II, 168.
2 Published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series,* II, 168.

ing with the Hon'ble Company." Honourable Sir, had Mr. Morley gone to Bombay directly, Your Honour would have heard from him of civilities and compliments I showed him; and as he promised to return from Bombay within twenty days, I desired him to lay before you several matters, he being a trusty man, which I could not write to you on paper; but by his staying at Surat, these matters still remain unknown to you. What has passed is past, but you will now write him to come to Broach directly, and he shall on his arrival here meet with all the compliments and civilities in my power. Your Honour will, looking upon me as a well-wisher for the increase of our friendship; favour me with your letters, as they will afford me the greatest pleasure.[1]

*Bombay, 19th August,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*At a Consultation.*

*Nawab's request granted*

The President lays before the Board translate of a letter from the Nawab, which he has received, as entered hereafter. As the Nawab therein advises that a vessel may be sent with Mr. Morley to receive it [*the money*], it is agreed to comply with his request by sending a vessel with Mr. Morley on board as soon as the season will permit.

*Translation of a letter from Imtyaz-ud-daulah Masud Khan Bahadur Deler Jung, Nawab of Broach, dated the 30th July and received 13th of August,* 1772.

*Nawab's request*

Your Honour's letter in answer to mine I have received. Your Honour therein says that, unless you receive good bills on the shroffs of your place for two lakhs of Rupees, you will not send Mr. Morley to Broach, but that you will send him up on your receiving the above bills. Hon'ble Sir, had Mr. Morley been here, you would have by this time received the money, for there is no difference in my agreements with the Company, and I am very firm to my word with all my heart. If your Honour wishes to send him up after receiving the above bills, it is very well; but, as we have no such shroffs amongst ours at this place, that will draw for such a large sum of money, you will, therefore, send a vessel with your trusty man to this place; for I have the money in readiness, which I will on her arrival here put on board and send her away. Your Honour will, agreeable to your mention to me in the above-said letter, write to Mr. Morley, to embark on board the said vessel and come to the Darbar, when I shall remit the money on board her. He may come to Broach. What need I trouble you more?[2]

*Bombay, 10th September,* 1772 (1772 *S. F.* 661) 1772
*Letter from Bombay to Surat.*

*Morley to go to Broach*

As the President has received a letter from the Nawab of Broach, an attested copy of the translate of which is enclosed, wherein he promises to pay the first sum stipulated by treaty, being two lakhs of Rupees, immediately on Mr. Morley's being sent to receive it, and to fulfil all the other articles which were agreed upon we have determined to leave the Nawab no plea for not adhering to his word and

1 Published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series,* II, 170.
2 Published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series,* II, 171.

promise; and with this view we now despatch the *Fancy* [*from*] Bombay to Surat Bar, on board of which vessel you are to direct Mr. Morley to embark and proceed to Broach Bar, accompanied by a gallivat to be sent from Surat to carry him up the river. On his arrival at the town he is to cause the enclosed letter from the President to be delivered to the Nawab and to acquaint him that he is come to receive the foregoing sum, agreeable to the Nawab's offer.

We permit Mr. Morley either to remain on board or go on shore previous to the receipt of the money, as may appear to him most proper; and in case the Nawab so far complies with his treaty as faithfully to pay this amount, he is then to remain at Broach as Resident for the purposes mentioned to you in our letter of the 21st March last.

1772 *Translation of a letter from the Broach Nawab to Mr. Morley, dated and received the 30th Sept.* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)

*A hearty welcome* I was very happy in receiving your letter. You write by order of the Governor you have come into Broach river. The news of your arrival gave me great, very great satisfaction, and I enjoy from it the highest felicity. As to your expectation of arriving here on Thursday, you are welcome. After we have met, what the Governor has wrote, shall be done, and I am impatient to see you. I wish, therefore, you would come as soon as possible that we may sit down together and settle everything. What more shall I write?

1772 *Translate of a letter from the Broach Nawab to Mr. Morley, dated and received the 1st October*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 761)

*Nawab's request* I have received your letter by Nowroji and have talked with him. Do me the favour to anchor near the phurja. According to the agreement you need not come on shore immediately. To-morrow I shall send off a proper person to wait on you.

1772 *On board the Squirrel, off Broach, 3rd October*, 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Arrival off Broach* The *Fancy* and *Squirrel* arrived at Broach Bar the 29th ultimo; and the latter then entering the river, I dispatched a boat immediately to forward the two letters which were delivered to me for the Nawab from the Hon'ble the President and the Chief. I wrote likewise by the same opportunity to advise him that, in consequence of his assuring the Hon'ble the President he had two lakhs of Rupees in readiness to make good the first payment due to the Hon'ble Company, I had come so far in my way to Broach, and should probably anchor off the town the second day following; that being ordered to remain on board till he had fulfilled his engagement, I flattered myself there would be no unnecessary delay in sending off the money, that I might the sooner have the pleasure of paying my respect to him in person, and carrying into execution the further orders I had received from my Superiors with regard to the establishment of a factory and other particulars mentioned in the treaty.

*Reasons for not landing* The Hon'ble the President and Council having been pleased to leave it to my discretion either to go on shore immediately on my arrival at Broach, or insist on the payment of the Nawab's debt pre-

vious thereto, I must here beg leave to observe to you, Gentlemen, that I considered this matter with the utmost attention and an earnest desire of conducting myself in such a manner as would probably be most conducive to the interest of my Hon'ble Employers. In consequence of which it plainly appeared to me from my own experience of this Nawab's disregard to truth and the faithless disposition universally attributed to him that, notwithstanding his late professions to the Hon'ble the President, it might yet be apprehended, in case I landed immediately, he would endeavour to draw on a negotiation with the hopes of prevailing on us to lessen the amount of the first payment, or at least to be contented with only a part of it at present; which might best be avoided by insisting on a full compliance with the treaty in this article as a proof of his intention to continue on friendly terms with the Hon'ble Company, before they have any further connection with him. Besides that, I am confident he has so little spirit that it would be attended with much happier effects to treat with him in a resolute way than to seem entirely solicitous of keeping up a good understanding with him by soothing measures, more especially as his former conduct fully proved he has no motive for showing the least attention to the Hon'ble Company, exclusive of his fear of their superior force.

*Nawab's request*

The day after the date of my first letter to the Nawab I received a polite answer from him, wherein he expressed much satisfaction at hearing of my arrival, said he should do what the Hon'ble the President had wrote him, and desired I would make all possible haste to town, that we might sit together and settle everything.

*Request not complied with*

The latter part of this letter plainly intimating that the Nawab had still some points to negotiate, it confirmed me in my former opinion that it would yet be very impolitic to enter into any conference with him; which I could not conceive he had any other reason to wish for than to have an opportunity of using some false pretences to avoid the immediate payment of the money, particularly as he had himself proposed to the Hon'ble the President that it should be made good before my leaving the vessel. I continued, therefore, in the resolution of remaining on board till he had fully satisfied the Hon'ble Company in this particular, and wrote a letter accordingly, acquainting him such were my orders, and that I hoped he would make no demur contrary to his engagements, as the exact performance of them would prove a certain means of securing the friendship of the Hon'ble Company, which the Governor and Council now offered him with real sincerity. To this he replied that, according to agreement, I need not come on shore for the present, and the next day he should send a proper person to wait on me, by whom, he told the man who carried him my letter, I should be acquainted with his sentiments.

*Offer of jewels rejected*

A deputation of two of his people came as according to yesterday's warning; and they informed me the Nawab had some chests of treasure in readiness, which he proposed sending on board the gallivat together with one of his people, who should proceed to Bombay to deliver the same to the Hon'ble the President, provided I would immediately repair on shore. I expressed my surprise at this proposal, acquainting them it appeared to me in a very extraordinary light, since the Hon'ble the President had clearly wrote the Nawab he

had sent me to Broach to receive the money; and therefore I could not but insist on counting and examining the same, to be satisfied the chests they spoke of contained the full amount of two lakhs of Rupees in proper specie, especially as I was directed to take no step towards having a factory in Broach till this business was brought to a final conclusion. That I should expect an immediate answer regarding it; and made likewise clear to them that, while the Nawab continued to amuse me with only promises of payment or the frivolous pretence of his having treasure in readiness to send to Bombay, I could not say a word on any other subject he might bring on the carpet; which I thought it necessary to add, as these deputies had observed the Nawab's impatience to see me was owing to his having much to say on the present occasion regarding the Hon'ble Company's affairs, and also hinted to me in a slight manner that, though the Nawab would have no objection to my having a house in town for my own use, yet he supposed we were satisfied to have the factory at the place he had formerly mentioned, called Idga. I represented to them moreover that one of the vessels which had come to receive the money from the Nawab was exposed to a very great risk by lying at the Bar, where she had no shelter from the weather; which, I hoped, would be a further inducement to the Nawab to hasten the payment of it, that she might be removed as soon as possible from that dangerous situation.

*Nawab's promise* On receiving this answer, the deputies had nothing further to say, but immediately returned on shore to communicate the same to the Nawab, who sent them to me again in the evening with the pleasing information that, agreeable to my desire, he would pay the money into my hands, and Monday next the fifth instant being a lucky day, he would then send it on board.

*Instructions asked for* Having received this promise with an assurance that the Nawab has a real intention to perform it, I hope to meet with no disappointment and am to request you will favour me with your orders, as expeditiously as possible, whether I may receive any part of his debt in jewels, as I have reason to believe he will make such an offer.

1772 *Surat, 5th October,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from Surat to Mr. Morley.*

*Jewels refused* We have duly received your letter of the 3rd instant and dispatch this in the most expeditious manner to acquaint you that you are not on any account to receive any part of the sum of two lakhs of Rupees, which the Nawab has engaged the President should be paid in jewels, at it appears to us that this method of payment is open to great objections and, we conclude, would not be approved of by our Superiors.

1772 *On board the Squirrel, off Broach, 6th October,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Letter from James Morley, President at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Morley disappointed* In my advices of the 3rd instant I had the honour to acquaint you the Broach Nawab had given me the strongest assurances that the 5th instant, being esteemed a lucky day among the Moors, he would then pay me the two lakhs of Rupees which I had demanded of him in behalf of the Hon'ble Company. As he has been disappointed in

his repeated endeavours to prevail on me on my first arrival to enter into a conference with him, before he complied with this article of his engagements, which, it evidently appeared from his manner of proceeding, could have no other purpose in view than to amuse us with a long negotiation, I flattered myself he was at length determined to act a more faithful part; the event, however, with concern I inform you, has proved very different from my expectations, as you will perceive from what I am now to relate you.

*Chests with jewels*

Early yesterday morning I had a message from the Nawab, acquainting me that, agreeable to his promise, he was preparing to ship off the treasure; and about two hours after he sent three of his people, who informed me that a large boat, which accompanied them and anchored near the *Squirrel*, had the two lakhs of Rupees on board, which the Nawab proposed to send to Bombay in charge of one of his people, who should deliver the same to the Hon'ble the President, on condition I would previously wait on the Nawab to settle some points with him concerning which he was very impatient to confer with me. I strongly objected to this proposal, observing to them I had no powers to negotiate, nor could I see the least occasion for it, since we required nothing more than we were clearly entitled to by treaty, which the Nawab had very recently promised fully to comply with. That his acting so shuffling a part bore a very ill aspect and, I was apprehensive, would be considered by my Superiors as a notorious proof of his intention to deceive us. Seeing me thus determined, the Nawab's people then told me they would consent to bring the fore-mentioned treasure chests into the *Squirrel* together with the person whom the Nawab had appointed to carry them to Bombay, if I would agree to wait on him immediately on the receipt of them, without any examination of their contents. This offer carrying the same appearance of deceit as the former one, I continued to remonstrate with them on their mysterious conduct, which soon appeared beyond doubt to be founded on treachery from the accompanying report of Capt. Ormond and the Master of the *Squirrel* with regard to what they saw in the boat, where the Nawab pretended there were two lakhs of Rupees.

*Further delay*

The whole morning of yesterday having thus passed away in a fruitless conference, one of the Nawab's people went on shore about noon to make a report thereof to the Nawab and receive further instructions how to proceed. On his return he said that the Nawab, not choosing to pay the money to any one but the Hon'ble the President, he would dispatch a letter to him concerning it, and desired I would wait till he received an answer thereto, which would bring him to a final resolution. So unsatisfactory a way of proceeding having met with many objections, which must naturally arise from it, they all agreed at length to make good the whole amount of the first payment on the following day.

*An other offer*

They came again accordingly this morning, but instead of paying me two lakhs of Rupees, they only offered three thousand rupees in specie, some bills on Surat for about thirty thousand Rupees, and produced trinkets of gold set with pearls and various sorts of precious stones and some silver plate, of which articles they said they had brought a considerable amount, but would not declare how much, though I was privately informed that, according to a great over-valuation the

Nawab had made, he reckoned them at about fifty thousand Rupees. These they desired I would now take an account of, and said that after that, whatever balance remained due to the Hon'ble Company, the Nawab would pay me, if possible, with other jewels, which in the interim he would endeavour to procure; telling me at the same time the Nawab had never promised to make good his debt to the Hon'ble Company in currency, having only wrote the Hon'ble the President he would give him the worth of money as far as his circumstances would permit.

*Jewels refused* As the above-mentioned jewels were of such kinds as could not be disposed of without the greatest difficulty, and must be sold for even less than they cost, exclusive of the objections that might be made to the acceptance of them on account of the discredit it would be attended with to the Hon'ble Company to be concerned in such traffic, I refused taking them, insisting on money only to the amount the Nawab had engaged to pay me, and took notice likewise of the falsity of his assertion with regard to what he pretended to have wrote to the Hon'ble the President. But my representations had no effect; and as their final answer they told me the Nawab could do no more than they had mentioned, and requested I would write my Superiors such was his inability, and that he hoped they would distress him no farther on that head.

*Morley's opinion* Having attentively considered this Nawab's conduct since my arrival here, and the intelligence I have received concerning his views, I think it a duty incumbent on me to acquaint you, Gentlemen, there seems not to be the least probability of his acting agreeable to his engagements, and that, from an apprehension very severe effects of our resentment might follow a discovery of his deceitful intentions, he is now endeavouring to engage our attention as long as possible by false professions, in hopes of finding his security at length from some unforeseen event, which may involve our affairs. Nor is the payment of money the only article of the treaty which the Nawab is yet averse to. On the contrary there is reason to believe he will disappoint us of the advantages we expect from every other [*article*] as well as that; which I judge will appear to you from the following particulars, which I was informed of this morning by the two Banyas, who have been appointed English brokers at Broach. They said that, as soon as the Nawab heard of my arrival in the river, he gave them a positive order on no account to come near me at any time without his express permission; which they imputed to his dislike to our having a factory in town, and being determined to obstruct our trade by preventing the country-merchants from having dealings with us, that we might soon withdraw from it. That after much solicitation they were permitted to pay me a visit this morning, and took the opportunity to inform me that since the opening of the fair season they had received about 250 Rupees in consequence of an order the Nawab had given them to collect one half of the customs in future on goods belonging to such as trade under the English protection, to which he told them he had relinquished his right in favour of the Hon'ble Company; the other half of the customs on the goods, they observed, the Marathas still continued to receive. On inquiring of them how much money the Nawab might probably have in his treasury at this present time,

they said that, in their opinion, he has about 100 lakhs, but that seventy lakhs must be the least amount of it; [*they*] thought he endeavours to make a show of poverty in order to deceive us; and they feared he would hardly be prevailed on to pay any large sum to the Hon'ble Company.

P. S. I have received your orders of yesterday since closing the above. I am likewise to inform you I have this instant had certain intelligence that the Nawab gave orders that no grain should in future be carried out of his town; and it is also reported he is collecting six months' provision for his people; from which it is generally imagined he is preparing for a siege. ***Nawab' intentio***

*On Board the Squirrel, off Broach town, 7th October,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

This is to acquaint you that the shroff I brought with me from Surat, for examining the money I expected to receive here on account the Hon'ble Company, has been privately informed by the shroffs in town that the Nawab has no authority for drawing any bills on Surat or Bombay, so that those he showed me yesterday were sham ones; and the same person observes they were not drawn in the usual form; and that there is still further reason to doubt their validity, as none of the agents in Broach for the people by whom they were to be paid, were brought before me, which is customary on such occasions. ***Morley suspicio***

*Surat, 8th October,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772
*At a Consultation.*

Taking into consideration the letters lately received from Mr. Morley, the Board are sorry to observe the chicanery of the Broach Nawab in not paying the sum of two lakhs of Rupees agreeable to his engagements and assurances to the Hon'ble the President; and as there seems little or no possibility of his making it good, the Board are of opinion that Mr. Morley's retiring on board the *Bombay* ketch may probably have some effect on the Nawab, hastening him to perform his agreements. Mr. Morley has, therefore, our permission so to do, should it appear to him that such a step will promote the public service. At the same time we would not have him precipitate matters as long as there is hope of succeeding without, more especially as the Board observes by his letters the Nawab has wrote to the President and waits his answer before he comes to a final resolution. At the same time we think it may not be improper to desire Mr. Morley not to enter upon any other business with the Nawab until payment is first made of the two lakhs, as that should be a preliminary. Nevertheless these are only to be considered as estimations not orders from us; for, as he is upon the spot, and consequently the best judge how to proceed, we must leave it to his discretion to act as circumstances may require. ***Advice Morley***

*On board the Squirrel, off Broach, 10th October,* 1772 (1772, *S.F.* 661) 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

With regard to the permission you have given me to retire on board the *Bombay* ketch, in case it should appear to me that such a step would promote the public service, I must beg leave to reply that, ***Morley declines responsi bility***

though I think my continuing here any longer, without insisting on a categorical answer from the Nawab respecting the payment of the money, after the repeated instances we have experienced of his breach of faith and trifling conduct, but serves to expose the English name to derision, and scarcely affords any prospect of benefit to the Hon'ble Company, yet I apprehend the experiment as of too much consequence to be attempted on my judgement alone, lest a disappointment, from the consequences not proving so favourable as could be wished, should be detrimental to any plan which may be laid by our Superiors at the Presidency, who, I consider, may possibly have views that do not occur to me; and it seems to me the more necessary to act with this caution from the tenor of your commands with regard to the measure in question, and likewise on account of the short distance between this place and Surat, which need occasion no long delay in waiting for your more determinate resolutions on that head, which you will permit me to request I may be favoured with, as my advices have acquainted you with every circumstance of my situation, respecting which I have now only to observe that since the Nawab delivered me his final answer, as mentioned in my letter of the 6th instant, I have not heard from him in the least concerning the Hon'ble Company's affairs.

Agreeable to your directions I shall studiously avoid entering on any other business with the Nawab till he makes good the first payment on account his debt to the Hon'ble Company.

In case of your coming to a resolution of ordering the *Squirrel* immediately to the Bar, I request you will be pleased to send me one or two pattemar boats for forwarding my advices to you ; and am likewise to inform you that, should that vessel remain here till the spring tides begin to take off, which will be in three or four days hence, there is little probability she can proceed down the river till they rise again on the next new moon.

1772 *Surat, 13th October,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*At a Consultation.*

*Morley to stay at the Bar*

The Board are of opinion, as the Nawab seems to have declined having any further negotiation with Mr. Morley, his continuing off the town at present cannot be of any utility to the public service and will be attended with much disgrace to our Hon'ble Masters; also that, should our Superiors determine on hostile measures in consequence of the copies of Mr. Morley's letters sent them, the permitting the gallivat to lay there [*off the town*] will be putting her in the Nawab's power, as he will not be able to proceed to Broach till the next springs, should he not be immediately ordered down ; it is, therefore, unanimously resolved to direct Mr. Morley immediately on receipt of our orders to retire with the *Squirrel* to Broach Bar and wait there for further orders, which will be given him when the Governor and Council send us their commands on the subject.

1772 *On board the Squirrel, off Broach, 14th October,* 1772 (1772, *S.F.* 661)
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Morley retires to the Bar*

Pursuant to your orders of yesterday's date, which came to hand at past four o'clock this afternoon, I have directed Lieut. Mr. Mullon to proceed to Broach Bar; and the *Squirrel* will weigh from hence

accordingly as soon as the tide permits. I am now also preparing a letter to the Nawab to acquaint him that, having occasion to remove that vessel to the Bar, I shall wait there to receive the money he has engaged to pay the Hon'ble Company, and hope he will soon send it on board. This appears to me necessary, in order to keep open a door for entering into any future negotiation with the Nawab, should the Hon'ble the President and Council think proper to give any such orders, when they are informed of the present situation of our affairs here.

*On board the Squirrel, Broach Bar, 18th October*, 1772 (1772, *S.F.* 661) 1772
*Letter from James Morley, Resident at Broach, to William Andrew Price, Chief at Surat.*

*Nawab's request refused*

The *Squirrel* arrived at Broach Bar this morning, and agreeable to your orders I shall wait here till you are pleased to give me directions for my future conduct.

In consequence of my removal from the station off Broach town, the Nawab sent one of his people to entreat me to return and remain there till I should be informed of the resolution of the Hon'ble the President and Council on the receipt of my late advices, which, from his having represented to me his inability to raise so large an amount as two lakhs of Rupees in specie, the Nawab, [*he said*], flattered himself would induce them to agree to the method of payment he had proposed. In answer to this message I excused myself from complying with the Nawab's request in regard to my return without your further orders, renewed my remonstrances on his very unjustificable conduct in having repeatedly imposed upon us by false promises of fidelity to his engagements, and represented to the person, I was discoursing with on the occasion, the Nawab was so well known to be in wealthy circumstances that in my opinion his plea of poverty could have no such effect as to prevail on my Superiors to be satisfied with anything less than the immediately payment of the two lakhs; recommending to him, therefore, no longer to delay sending it on board, lest he should entirely lose the opportunity that now offered of gaining the friendship of the Hon'ble Company.

*Nawab's protestations*

Having thus failed in his attempt to persuade me to proceed again up the river, the Nawab's agent then endeavoured to engage my promise that, whatever orders might hereafter be sent me, I would on no account leave this place without acquainting the Nawab with the sentiments of the Hon'ble the President and Council in respect to his late proceedings; assuring me he would be much concerned, should they entertain any resentment on that account; and that, could he have found any means of raising the sum of money we required of him, it should have been paid immediately on my arrival in the river without the least hesitation; but that this was really out of his power. Judging from his eagerness to secure my stay here that the Nawab was a good deal alarmed on seeing me remove to a greater distance from Broach (which I had also reason to believe from private accounts), I determined not to relieve him entirely from the uneasiness he was under from that cause, hoping it might suddenly produce a favourable effect; and accordingly told him it was probable the Nawab would hear from me when I received further orders from my Superiors; but I could

not positively say that would be the case, as I shall be under a necessity of pursuing such measures as they may direct.

*Situation at Broach* Though avarice still seems to be the Broach Nawab's ruling passion, I am confidently told, even by some of his own people, he has very particular reasons at this juncture to wish he may avoid a rupture with the English, being on but indifferent terms with the Marathas of Baroda, and having much disgusted his troops (whose number is now less than two thousand) by withholding their pay for several months past, and other acts of tyranny. As to the rest of his subjects, their condition is yet more deplorable, in so much that Broach is now a scene of the most cruel oppression from his perpetually carrying on some scheme of plunder.

1772 *Surat, 20th October,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Surat to Bombay.*

*Morley recalled* In consequence of the orders from the Hon'ble the President to the Chief, Mr. Morley has been ordered to Surat, and we expect him to-morrow or the next day.

1772 *Surat, 21st October,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*James Morley, to William Andrew Price.*

Your favour of the 17th instant came to hand on the 19th, and that dated the 18th reached me yesterday.

*Nawab's proposals* The letter from the Government, which accompanied the former, enclosed one to the Nawab, requiring the immediate payment of the two lakhs of Rupees in specie. This was forwarded to him in the most expeditious manner; and as I wrote him at the same time to desire he would acquaint me with his resolutions in consequence thereof, he sent me the answer, copy and translate of which are herewith delivered to you.

Muhammad Sharif, whom the Nawab refers me to in that letter, being on board the *Squirrel* at the time I received it, he told me it was vain to expect the two lakhs from the Nawab in ready money; for that it was absolutely out of his power to raise that sum, and therefore proposed, since we were dissatisfied with his former offers, that the jewels I had seen should be kept by us in pawn till the Nawab could redeem them; assuring me he would appropriate as much as he possibly could to that purpose of whatever he should hereafter receive on account his revenues; and this answer (which Nowroji informed me was perfectly agreeable to the tenor of the Nawab's discourse with him a few hours before) Muhammad Sharif steadily adhered to, notwithstanding I represented to him my return to Surat must inevitably be the consequence of it. Therefore on his going back to town, I set out from Broach Bar, conformable to your directions.

1772 *Translate of a letter to Mr. Morley from the Broach Nawab, received the 20th October,* 1772.

*Warning* I have received your letter by Nowroji together with that which accompanied it from the Governor and understood their contents. I sent Muhammad Sharif to you in my behalf yesterday and have also spoke to Nowroji; they will inform you of everything. You will consider how you can best keep the Company and me on peaceable terms

and use your endeavours accordingly; which will be acting a wise part, as I have never shown myself backward in anything for that purpose.

*Bombay, 20th October,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*At a Consultation.*

*Wedderburn's letter*

The Brigadier-General lays before the Board a letter assigning his reasons for the opinion he gave at the Select Committee, on the measures necessary to be pursued with the Nawab of Broach, as entered after the Consultation.

The Board deeming the above of too much importance to be directly determined on, do agree to meet to-morrow evening at 6 o'clock for this purpose, and do therefore now adjourn till that time.

*Bombay, 21st October,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*The Brigadier-General's letter.*

*Urged on by duty*

As military men in India have sometimes been supposed to be fond of promoting military enterprises more from a love of glory or selfish views than from a proper consideration of the expenses necessarily attending such undertakings or a just calculation of the advantages which their employers may expect to reap from the conquests, and as the President has laid before the Board what passed at the Select Committee, I think it incumbent on me to state to this Hon'ble Board my ideas on the subject of the Consultation of this 13th instant and the reason for the opinion I have given, that fair and impartial men may judge of my motives.

*Unselfish motives*

I reckon it a very lucky circumstance that I am not singular in my opinion of the measures proper and necessary to be pursued on the present occasion. The gentlemen whom I have the honour to concur with will, I believe, be acquitted of any suspicion of interested views in an expedition against Broach. As to myself I declare I never saw, since I have been a soldier, a service that I so little desired as the service against Broach: and were it not from a sense of the duty I owe to the Hon'ble Company, I would rather choose to decline than to undertake it.

*Risks of commander*

Every member of this Board is now so well acquainted with Broach that, if six or eight hundred trained Europeans and twice as many disciplined sepoys were to achieve the conquest and reduction of the place in 24 hours, they will think, it might be done in a shorter time. If everything were to succeed in the happiest manner possible, little credit would be acquired by the troops or by the commanding officer; but if they were to fail, if their success was by any accident delayed ever so little, they would be overwhelmed with disgrace, perhaps loaded with obloquy. Everything most precious to a soldier may be lost on such an undertaking, and there is nothing to be gained. Every man of reflection must know that in such an enterprise, depending on so many combined circumstances, any untoward accidents may happen, which no human prudence foresee or prevent, and which may overset the best laid plan and render ineffectual the best concerted designs.

*Company's orders*

The commands of the Hon'ble Court in their letter to this Presidency under the 1st of April are stated as the principal ground on which the opinions are founded that incline to timely submitting to

the gross and repeated insults and violations of treaty on the part of the Nawab of Broach and to pacific measures for the present. While I continue in the Hon'ble Company's service, I will endeavour to be as obedient to the Board of the Hon'ble Court as any gentleman at this Board. But I confess, after the most attentive perusal of the Hon'ble Court's commands of the 1st April, 1772,[1] I cannot put the same construction on them as these gentlemen do who have voted for pacific measures.

I cannot persuade myself that the last Directors—who in the whole of this letter have just laid much stress on the advantages of local information, and have studiously avoided giving strict and positive orders in the matters of importance, but have left their President and Council at liberty to pursue such measures as from circumstances and events might appear most for the honour and interest of their constituents—would ever issue orders in April, which would bind this Board or influence their conduct in conjunctures which it was impossible for them to foresee, and which have not happened till October.

From the 32nd paragraph to the 36th I find severe censure upon the past conduct of this Board in the expeditions against the Kolis and Broach. I find particularly in the 34th and 37th paragraphs that the Hon'ble Court is displeased with the motives upon which these expeditions were undertaken, and dissatisfied with the reasons urged by this Board for permitting them to take place. But I must confess I cannot conceive that the motives upon [*which*] these expeditions were first undertaken and the motives which in my humble opinion should now impell this Board to proceed hostilely against the Nawab of Broach are in any respect similar. That the Hon'ble Court disapprove and blame reviving old and doubtful claims upon the Nawab of Broach[2] in order to frame a pretext for attacking him, does by no means imply that they intend, in the situation to which the Hon'ble Company's affairs are now brought at this Presidency, that the President and Council should in the present circumstances remain inactive and tamely submit to the gross, repeated and unparalleled indignities which they have suffered from the Nawab of Broach.

*Honour at stake*

I know that peace is much more for the interest of the Company than war; but I believe it will be found true here, as in all other governments, that the way to avoid war is to be respectable. The Hon'ble Court have done their duty. They have put such a force under your directions as might make this Government respectable in the eyes of all its neighbours, but they can do no more. The rest depends on the Governor and Council.

I need not, I am persuaded, remind this Hon'ble Board of the behaviour of the Nawab of Broach in April last. It cannot be forgotten, till it be punished; nor need I make any observations on his late conduct. Every gentleman must have felt it strongly.

*War advised*

The expenses of an enterprise against Broach cannot be considerable, The success is as assured as the success of any operations of the kind can be. I have deliberately considered the Hon'ble Com-

1 See I Part, *First Expedition against Broach*, the letter from the Court of Directors under date 1st April, 1772.

2 General Wedderburn does not seem to realise that the treaty was forced upon the Nawab by reviving the same old and doubtful claims.

pany's orders; I know the distress we are in for money; I know the force that may be employed against Broach; and I do not hesitate to be of opinion that in the present conjuncture a speedy, vigorous and spirited effort should be made to punish the Nawab of Broach for his insolent, base and perfidious conduct.

*Bombay, 21st October,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*At a Consultation.*

The President then acquaints the Board that since the meeting of the 13th instant the Select Committee had considered of the advices which have been received from Mr. Morley, containing an account of the Broach Nawab's deceitful and perfidious conduct; and as the voices were therein equally divided, whether immediately to send an armament against him to chastise him for his behaviour, or to wait the Honourable Company's directions, it had been resolved therein to refer to the Board for their determination. He, therefore, proposes the following to their consideration: *Committee divided*

First—Whether our sitting down quietly with the treatment we have received from the Nawab of Broach will be for the interest and credit of our Hon'ble Masters; and if we do, may we not expect to meet with the like treatment from other Powers? *President's questions*

Secondly—It is true the Hon'ble Court of Directors have signified to us their disapproval of our having acted hastily against him at first. But now they are advised of the treaty we made with him, do you not think they will expect that he make good the same, or that we oblige him to do it both for their honour and interest, and that we shall be highly blamable should we suffer ourselves to be thus trified with and not resent it?

I am, therefore, of opinion that it is both for the honour and interest of our Hon'ble Masters that immediate satisfaction should be taken for his behaviour; and which I make no doubt will be approved by my Hon'ble Masters. It is their credit and interest I make my motive for urging it; and a better opportunity cannot well offer than the present when most of his Majesty's squadron will be laying here. *President's views*

*Bombay, 22nd October,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*Consideration of the measures to be pursued with reference to the Nawab of Broach.*

A debate arising herein, whether an armament ought to be directly fitted out to procure immediate satisfaction from the Nawab of Broach for the gross, repeated and unparalleled indignities he has offered to the Hon'ble Company and his breach of the treaty entered into on the 30th November last, or whether on account of the Hon'ble Company's orders of the 1st of April last and our present distress for money it ought to be deferred to a more fitting occasion, and after due deliberation and the most mature consideration of the subject, it is resolved by the majority that an armament be immediately fitted out to procure ample satisfaction from the Nawab of Broach for the insult he has dared to offer to our Hon'ble Employers, because it is esteemed inconsistent with their credit and interest to admit of any delay in this business. *Expedition decided upon*

*Dissent* Messrs Draper, Watson, Stackhouse, Shaw and Garden are of opinion that the expedition ought not to be undertaken at this juncture. For many reasons, which will be assigned in the letters these gentlemen acquaint us they propose to address us on the occasion, amongst which are the following:

*Reasons against* Because the Hon'ble Company in their commands of the 1st of April last have expressed their high disapprobation of the first expedition, and termed the motives on which they were told it had been undertaken "unjustifiable", they therefore think these orders preclude them from undertaking another expedition against the Broach Nawab without their previous sanction.

Because the treasury is so very low as hardly to enable us to bear the current expense of the Presidency, and it is at present out of our power to pay the large drafts upon it from Mocha for the Shrewsbury's cargo, or to make the first advantage on account the new settlement at Surat; and consequently it would be imprudent at this juncture to run into any great expenses, which might be put off to a future opportunity; beside, deferring the taking satisfaction for a time does not at all preclude us from doing it whenever the Company's orders or our own situation will with conveniency admit of it.

*Offer of services* The sending a force against the Nawab of Broach to take immediate satisfaction being as above resolved on, the Brigadier-General and Superintendent offer their services to command respectively the military and marine force, which is accepted.

*Plan of campaign* The military force to be employed on this service and which the Brigadier-General concurs with us in opinion will be fully sufficient to effect it, is to consist of 989 Europeans, infantry and artillery, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers; 1,840 sepoys with their officers; 160 lascars and 300 labourers. The marine force to be employed on the occasion and for transporting the troops to Broach is to consist of the undermentioned vessels, which the Superintendent acquaints us he deems sufficient. The *Bombay* grab, *Expedition, Eagle, Terrible,* prahm, 4 gallivats, 16 fishing boats and such other boats as may be required, which the Superintendent must hire for the occasion; and should the *Revenge* arrive in time, she may also be usefully employed.

The Military Paymaster must provide two months' provisions for the troops.

The Military Storekeeper is ordered to furnish such stores for the Expedition as the Committee of Indents may judge necessary; all which are to be delivered to and put under the charge of the Commissary of Stores; the provisions must be delivered in charge of the Commissary of Stores.

Mr. James Morley is appointed Paymaster to the Forces and Judge Advocate; Mr. James Cheape, Commissary of Stores and of Provisions; and the appointment of Secretary to the Brigadier-General and [*to*] Mr. Watson as a Committee is left to their choice.

Resolved that batta and all other extra allowances, made to officers and others during the time that the army is in the field, shall directly cease on our becoming possessed of the town of Broach, and on conformity to our resolution under the 14th June, 1771, the troops must not consider themselves entitled to any gratuity.

The heads of the respective offices are now directed to comply with our foregoing resolutions, but no public orders are to be issued, that our intentions may not transpire.

*Bombay, 23rd October, 1772 (1772, P. D. Lett. to C. of Dir. 19)* 1772
*The President and Council to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

*Summary of events*

42. In the 8th paragraph of our address of the 13th June last we informed Your Honours of the expectation we were then in of an answer from the Nawab of Broach, by which we hoped to be enabled to determine clearly as to his intentions in respect to the treaty which was entered into on the 30th November last year.

43. On the 14th July the President laid before us translate of a letter the Nawab had addressed him on the subject, in which he requested Mr. Morley might be sent back to Broach ; but, as the letter was in general vague and inconclusive, we were of opinion it would be improper to comply with this request till the Nawab might convince us of his sincerity by remitting the first stipulated sum, being two lakhs of Rupees, by bills either on this place or Surat, the time for the payment of it being elapsed.

44. The President accordingly acquainted the Nawab of our determination, who in reply addressed him another letter, which was laid before us on the 19th August, wherein he urges the impossibility of sending bills, as it was not in his power to procure them to so large an amount; but he therein declared that the money was actually ready, and desired a vessel with Mr. Morley on board might be sent for it ; and as he at the same time mentioned that he did not desire Mr. Morley should land till the money was shiped off, we were induced to believe that he really intended to abide by his agreements, and therefore in order to do everything in our power to bring it to a happy issue we determined to send a vessel with Mr. Morley as soon as the season opened.

45. Mr. Morley accordingly arrived there on the 1st October, when the Nawab, instead of adhering to the treaty he had solemnly entered into, or paying any regard to the repeated promises he had since made to abide by it, most basely and perfidiously evaded the same, as Your Honours may see at large in the several letters from Mr. Morley and the Nawab, a copy of all which is transmitted under No. 48.

46. On the 21st October the President in consultation acquainted us that the Select Committee had taken this matter wholly under their consideration; but the voices therein being equally divided on the question, whether immediately to send an armament agains the Nawab of Broach for his base and perfidious conduct, or whether to wait your directions on the subject, it had been agreed to refer the same to our determination A copy of the President's minute is transmitted under No. 49.

47. The Brigadier-General at the same time laid before us a letter containing his reasons for the vote he gave at the Select Committee on this occasion, as entered in our Diary on the same day ; a copy of which is also transmitted in the packet under No. 50.

48. We deferred until the following day the consideration of this subject, the whole being then before us as also Your Honours' sentiments and opinion on the first expedition against the Nawab of Broach,

as contained in your commands of the 1st April last. The majority resolved, after the most mature deliberation, immediately to fit out a suitable armanent to procure ample satisfaction from the Nawab for the insults he had dared to offer to Your Honours and for his base violation of every article of the treaty he had solemnly entered into. In pursuance of which, the necessary marine and military force was ordered to be got in immediate readiness, because it was deemed inconsistent with Your Honours' real interest to admit of any longer delay. By our minutes of the 22nd ultimo Your Honours will please to observe the whole of our proceedings herein and the reasons assigned by Messrs Draper, Watson, Stackhouse, Shaw and Garden for dissenting to an expedition at this juncture.

49. These Gentlemen addressed us a joint letter on the 30th ultimo, assigning their reasons at large for their dissent to the measures which were resolved on; a copy of which agreeable to their request is enclosed in the packet under No. 52, and Messrs Fletcher and Tayler the same day laying before us, each, a letter containing their reasons for voting for the expedition being immediately undertaken. We enclose copies of them under No. 51 for Your Honours' information.

50. The Brigadier-General and Superintendent having tendered their services to command the respective departments, which we accepted, and everything having been prepared with the utmost dispatch that the service would admit, the vessels with the troops on board sailed from hence one the 2nd instant; and as the fleet had arrived at Surat Bar on the 7th, and Mr. Morley in his letter acquainted us that the Nawab had not above 2,000 soldiers in his pay—and those as well as the inhabitants of the town in general much disaffected—we, therefore, have very little doubt that it will become an easy conquest, and that in the latter part of this address we shall be able to advise Your Honours that the discredit which your arms had suffered by the failure of the former expedition has been amply regained, and that they have been restored to that credit in the eyes of the Country Powers, which they formerly used to hold; and we are in hope that it will be attended with many other considerable advantages, and that the expense which will be incurred by it will be but small.

51. Our instructions to Messrs Wedderburn and Watson, who command the military and marine departments, and whom we appointed for conducting this service, are entered under the 1st November in our outward Letter-Book; and under No. 53 is copy of the translate of a letter received from the Nawab under the 31st October, which is couched in the same evasive style as his former ones and, therefore, merited no notice.

52. In our diary under the 14th July is entered a letter from Mr. Morley to the Surat Chief and Council, containing a better account of the Broach Nawab's forces and revenues than we have otherwise procured; and from this letter Your Honours will observe that the plea of inability, which the Nawab made use of to evade discharging the sum due by treaty, must have been false and done only with a design to amuse and deceive. We, therefore, flatter ourselves you will approve the measure we have pursued, more especially as the Gentlemen, who dissented from it, were of opinion with us that such a step would have been really necessary, had not the construction they put upon your

commands of the 1st April last and the other considerations, stated in their letter, induced them to wish to defer it only till what they esteemed a more proper juncture, and [*till*] they could have your sentiments upon the whole.

*Surat, 25th October* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661) 1772
*James Morley to William Andrew Price.*

Having just received a letter from the Broach Nawab and one from Muhammad Sharif, whom lately he chiefly employed to signify his sentiments to me, I beg leave to lay before you copies and translates thereof, and request your directions respecting the answers I should return them; which you will please to observe they are very impatient to receive. *Instructions asked*

*Translate of a letter to Mr. Morley from the Broach Nawab, dated 24th Rajab in the year of the Hijra* 1186, *and received at Surat 25th October,* 1772. 1772

On Muhammad Sharif's return, he informed me of everything you said to him in consequence of what the Governor wrote you. Considering your sense and the friendship you have for me, I am much surprised that, though you know my disposition, these disputes should still continue. Well, suppose you are not contented to take the effects of silver and gold, what is there in it! Those things I will break and, turning them into money with all possible haste, will make up and send you one lakh of Rupees. The remainder, too, I will make good after the grain season. This offer should be satisfactory. Write me so plainly, that I may immediately send you the one lakh of Rupees by Muhammad Sharif. On the receipt thereof you will be pleased to consign the same to Bombay, and come back to Broach with Muhammad Sharif. Believe me I do not wish to have any difference with the Company, but will stand to my word; for I am willing to perform my agreement and to please the Governor; but the doing it slowly or in haste depends upon the times. For the rest you will hear from Muhammad Sharif; and I desire you will send me an answer which will make me glad. What more can I write? *New proposal*

*Translate of a letter to Mr. Morley from Muhammad Sharif, dated 24th Rajab in the year of the Hijra* 1186, *and received at Surat the 25th October,* 1772. 1772

The day after taking my leave of you, I saw the Nawab in the afternoon, and communicated to him the friendly conversation that passed between us, at which he was greatly pleased. Again I tell you the Nawab stands to his word and will never deviate from it, as I gave you to understand from the first day of my having a concern in this business. The offering you jewels was owing to necessity; but, if you cannot take them, for friendship's and your reputation's sake, a thousand other means shall be sought to content you. They shall be broke, and a lakh of Rupees shall be made up in ready money, and the remainder you shall receive in Broach from the parganas after the grain season. Therefore consider well, and send a pleasing answer as soon as possible, that I may bring you that money, and you may come back with me after the receipt of it. Do not be dissatisfied with this offer, *Nawab's good intentions*

because to keep up my credit I have brought it about with much trouble. There is now no room for dispute; for look with justice, and [*you*] will see what is now done, is very fair. To promote our friendship I am ready in everything, which Nowroji can tell you. May it please God that it may appear so to everyone. I expect your answer.

1772 *Bombay, 25th October,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Morley recalled* Per pattemars from Surat received a letter from the Chief and Council dated the 20th instant, in which they advised that in consequence of orders from the President to the Chief Mr. Morley had been ordered to Surat, and they expected him to arrive in a day or two. They also enclosed a copy of a letter from that Gentleman.

1772 *Bombay Castle, 27th October,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Morley at Surat* Came in the Bombay Grab from Surat, by which vessel was received a letter from the Chief and Council, dated the 22nd instant, in which they advised Mr. Morley's arrival there, from Broach, on the preceeding day, and enclosed a copy of a letter from him to the Chief with one from the Nawab to Mr. Morley.

1772 *Bombay, 30th October,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*Letter from Mr. Fletcher, assigning his reasons for voting for an expedition being sent against the Nawab of Broach.*

*Company's honour at stake* Our Hon'ble Masters having been pleased in their commands of the 1st of April to disapprove of our motives for undertaking the former expedition against Broach, I request the following reasons may stand upon record for my acquiescing in the present one; and whatever may be the event, I flatter myself they will appear sufficient to justify me for acting in seeming contradiction to their sentiments on the subject.

I will not here pretend to enter into a discussion of the motives, which first led this Board to attack the Nawab of Broach. Measures, pursued afterwards, sufficiently evince the desire this Board had to cultivate his friendship and to live on peaceable terms with him ; in consequence of which a treaty was entered into, which on our part has been strictly adhered to, but on that of the Nawab most shamefully infringed in every particular. Our Resident has been treated with the greatest contempt, and every mark of disrespect shown to the English flag, in so much that it appears to me totally inconsistent with the honour or interest of the Company longer to submit to such repeated insults, which must not only tend to lessen us greatly in the eyes of the neighbouring Powers, but is fraught with many ill-consequences too obvious to need being enumerated. The Hon'ble Company must necessarily have that confidence in us, to suppose we can only have their interest in view in an undertaking of this sort ; and however adverse they may be to hostile measures, I am firmly of opinion they never would approve of our tamely bearing the insults committed by the Nawab without showing a suitable resentment, merely because they had expressed these their sentiments. Circumstances may be such as to render it highly improper to be actuated implicitly

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thereby, of which we on the spot can alone be proper judges. This appears to me to be the case at present, and for that reason I gave my voice for the expedition being immediately set on foot.

*Bombay, 20th October*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*Letter from Mr. Tayler, assigning his reasons for voting for an expedition being sent against the Nawab of Broach.*

The resolution for the immediate chastisement of the Nawab of Broach for his late insolent and perfidious conduct having been determined solely by the casting vote of the Hon'ble the President, I shall here beg leave to insert the reasons that urged me to vote as I did in favour of it. *Tayler's reasons*

In the first place, his having broke through every part of the treaty, which he voluntarily came here and entered into[1] the 30th November, 1771. *Treaty*

Secondly the language held by the Hon'ble the Court of Directors in the 9th paragraph of their commands of the 30th June, 1769. Speaking of an insult that had been offered to this port by Vissaji Pant, the Paragraph is as follows, *viz.* "You will see by the whole tenor of our letters to you and the other Presidencies that we are rather jealous of the Maratha Power, yet we have sought to continue peace with them and to keep up a friendly footing; but, if they think fit to take a hostile part against us, to send you insulting messages, or to brave your ports with their grabs, it is time to take vigorous measures for preserving that respect which we have hitherto held on your side India. When you wrote your letter of the 13th December, giving an account of the Marathas fleet [*threatening*] the harbour and of the insolent answer of Vissaji Pant, you had ships in your harbour more than sufficient to have destroyed his fleet, or brought him to a more becoming and explicit declaration; and [*when*] Madhavrao informed you his design was to demand the chauth from the Nawab of Arcot, preserving at the same time the utmost goodwill towards the English, you should have told him that those two things were incompatible, that the Nawab of Arcot was, as he knew, in firm friendship and alliance with the English, and that any demand, made upon him at the head of army laying waste his country, would be answered by the English forces in all parts of India, who never would suffer people under their protection to be distressed and plundered under any pretence whatever; that accounts should be settled between their respective agents in the usual manner; and if anything was due from the Nawab of Arcot, your good offices would be employed in bringing the matter to an amicable conclusion. This sort of language with some vigorous preparations at the same time by sea and by land would have been more likely to preserve peace with the Marathas than the silent respect with which you seem to have received all their insults." *Company's views in 1769*

Our force was at that time in no shape equal, to what it is at present; if, therefore, they then expected we should have shown such resentment to the most formidable Power in Hindustan, what will

1 The Nawab came on his own account to Bombay. To what extent he willingly signed the treaty is a moot point.

they not say to our silently receiving the insults of the Nawab of Broach, whose whole force by the latest advice from Mr. Morley, dated the 18th instant, does not amount to two thousand men, and these disaffected to him from his withholding their pay, as were his subjects in general from his tyrannical and oppressive government?

Notwithstanding the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, on the 1st of April last, are pleased to disapprove our motives for this expedition, they dwell much on the discredit brought on their arms. Their disapprobation of our motives gives me much concern, but the circumstannce of the treaty, in my opinion, totally changes our situation; and were we to suffer the infringment of it to pass without immediate chastisement, we should heap discredit on discredit.

*Advantages* They are further pleased to say the enterprise afforded no probable prospect of advantage. Broach is the key to the rich kingdom of Gujarat, where most of our Europe investment is provided, and from whence all the best cotton is brought for the consumption of India and China. Behind Gujarat lie the extensive provinces of Ajmer and Jaisalmer, which formerly took up a large quantity of our woollens and other Europe commodities. By a letter from the late Chief of Surat, entered in our Diary under the 14th May, 1771, it appears that the agents of Fatesing whose capital is Baroda, about 45 miles distance inland from Broach, had offered to pay down 5 lakhs of Rupees and 125 thousand per annum, provided we would put their master in possession of it. By the same letter the bakhshi of Surat had offered three lakhs and 50,000 Rupees per annum. The Hon'ble the President, last council-day, produced a letter of a very late date from the present Chief of Surat, acquainting him that Anwer Khan had offered to pay down six lakhs. Mr. Morley in his letter of April, entered in our Diary under the 14th July last, advises that the Nawab's share of the revenues of Broach amounted to Rs. 2,95,000 per annum; under the 6th instant that he had received intelligence from the Banyas he had appointed our brokers that in their opinion the least amount the Nawab had in his treasury was 70 lakhs of Rupees.

Our becoming masters of Broach, should we not keep possession of it, may therefore be made a capital advantage of, in obtaining from Madhavrao[1] the territorial possessions recommended and expected by our Hon'ble Employers.

*Expenses small* As to the charge of this expedition: the provisions will not exceed Rupees 29,000; the freight of boats will amount to about Rs. 6,000, per month, the consumption of stores will, I firmly believe, be very small. The troops must be paid, whether here or at Broach; and the state of our treasury has enabled us to pay the sepoys, going on the expedition, to the end of this month, and to permit of Rupees 30,000 being embarked for the payment of the Europeans; and though our present balance may be but small, there is a certain prospect of its increasing very fast, from the late sale of vessels to the amount of Rupees 82,935.

1 The omission of Fatesing's claims would seem to suggest that the Bombay authorities hoped to put him off by coming to an agreement with the Poona Government.

| | Rs. |
|---|---|
| B/over .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 82,935 |
| Bengal goods .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3,30,000 |
| The intended sale of Europe goods the 2nd of next month, which may be expected to yield, *viz.* 1000 bales of broad cloth .. .. .. .. .. .. | 32,00,000 |
| 86 bales long ells. .. .. .. .. .. | 34,400 |
| 1626 lead. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 21,760 |
| 38 steel. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 760 |
| 6,582 copper plates. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 5,30,000 |
| 2,439 copper fine .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2,10,000 |
| 686 Japan copper .. .. .. .. . .. | 55,000 |
| Bills on Europe permitted to be drawn to the amount of | 4,00,000 |
| Rupees | 19,84,855 |

The Gentlemen of Bengal have also acquainted us, we may take every opportunity of drawing on them, as they will of remitting us, whatever further sums we may have occasion for. We have been advised by Mr. Brome that some money may be expected from the Rani in part of her debt.

*Conclusion* The honour and interest of our Employers are inseparable from the immediate carrying into execution our intentions against Broach. I am confident both will be acquired, and I am as confident that the loss of both must be the consequence of a delay.

*Bombay, October,* 1772 (1772 *P.D.* 62) 1772
*Translate of a letter from the Nawab of Broach, without date.*

*Desperate pleadings* I have received Your Honour's two letters: one on the 21st by Mr. Morley, and the other on the 23rd, instant by my returning pattemars, for which I was very glad. Before the receipt of your above letters in answer to mine, I failed not to persuade Mr. Morley, because he told only one word, saying I should pay him 2 lakhs of Rupees, and that he would then land at Broach. I did at the same time open the chests, and showed him the gold, silver, bills of exchange and ready cash, desiring him to remit the same to Bombay; and that he would land here, or else that he would keep it with him; saying I would take the whole back from him on paying him the money in two or three different payments in a few days, as my revenues would admit, but he would neither remit nor receive it. Had he remitted it to Your Honours, yourselves [*would*] have been satisfied therewith on your seeing the same· for it is the same as money. As I had full hopes in Your Honours' (General Wedderburn and Gentlemen of Council) friendship, I wrote you that I would send my trusty man with the chests of money for you; but you wrote me the same word, to pay ready money. I never failed to acquaint you. General Wedderburn & Council as also Nanabhoy of my circumstances, and that I was suffering the charges for these five years; all which you must remember; notwithstanding which, we had no rains this year, whereby the country is ruined. I acquainted you the whole of my case very fully, and which

you must have heard by other hands. Otherwise I am firm to my word, and I will by all means pay the Company's money without any difference. But notwithstanding my having such good intentions, Your Honour wrote me that I put off the payment, which is too far from your favours. Had I had such an intention to put off, why would I lay a tax on my subjects, brothers, ministers and people at this place, a thing which was never done at any time before, even in my ancestors' time. I did through my great endeavours collect as much as I could, and had lodged the same into the chests, not only to comply with my word, but also to please Your Honours. Had Mr. Morley sent my trusty man to Bombay with these things, and he himself landed here, I make no doubt but you would, upon seeing them, have ordered them to have been accepted; for the chests not only contained things of value, but also the bills and ready money. Should there have been any difference in the account or in the price of the above-mentioned gold and silver, I would have made the same good, the latter end of the season. I depend on your favour that, considering our well-known, hearty friendhisp established under the Hon'ble Company, [*you will*] write Mr. Morley to receive what things I have collected with great trouble, consisting of gold and silver, and to land himself here. I will pay him the money the latter end of the season, and receive of him the above-mentioned gold and silver. If the above things are not agreeable to you, what need have I to give them to you? As this is not the time to receive my revenue, I will pay Mr. Morley a balance the latter end of the season. Was I to coin this gold and silver in the mint, I should suffer a great loss, because it is not solely belonging to this sarkar. Your writing to Mr. Morley in my behalf I shall esteem it as a great favour done to me; but, if you will not, I must suffer the loss, coin the gold and silver in the mint, and pay Mr. Morley its produce and the balance the latter end of the season; all which you will mention to him. Your compliance with my request will increase our friendship.

1772 *Bombay, 2nd November,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*Instructions regarding the expedition against Broach.*

*Bombay orders* The instructions to Messrs Wedderburn and Watson acquainted them that the unwarrantable conduct of the Nawab of Broach in evading the treaty he had concluded with us and the gross insults he had offered to our Hon'ble Employers had determined us to procure effectual satisfaction, for which purpose a suitable military and marine force was now detached under their command, with which they were to proceed towards the town of Broach and use their utmost endeavours to become masters of it, of which they were to send us the earliest intelligence. Directed them to pay no regard to any offers or promises the Nawab might make; recommended a perfect harmony between the military and marine forces; and ordered them to communicate to us any offers which might be made to them by any of the neighbouring Powers for being put in possession of the town of Broach. We recommend to them to treat the inhabitants of the town and country with lenity, to afford protection to all who might desire it and, in case a Dutch flag should be flying at Broach, to pay as much regard to it as possible, and in general to avoid giving offence to the Marathas, or

any other Country Power, though, should they in any case interfere, they were to repel force by force. We directed them jointly to concert the necessary operations for effecting the service, but that the executive part was to be with each of them in their respective departments. That we had appointed Mr. James Commissary of Stores and Provisions and Mr. James Morley Judge, Advocate and Paymaster, to the latter of whom we now consign Rs. 30,000. We gave the necessary directions about plunder and booty and batta, gave them permission to keep a public table, and directed each of them to keep a separate Diary of their proceedings.[1]

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1 Published by G. W. Forrest, *Selections, Home Series*, II, 174.

## No. 4 CAPTURE OF BROACH (1772)

The following documents give a brief and complete account of the second expedition against Broach, which ended in the capture of the town.

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### DOCUMENTS

1772 *Sunday, 1st November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)
*Orders issued by John Watson, Superintendent of the Hon'ble Company's Marine, to Commodore Andrew Nesbit.*

*Departure* You are hereby ordered to weigh anchors, taking under your command the fleet destined for this expedition.

1772 *Sunday, 8th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)
*Arrival of the fleet at Surat.*

*Surat* Anchored this morning in Surat Road.

1772 *Monday, 9th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)
*Arrival of fleet at Broach Bar.*

*Broach* Anchored this afternoon off Broach Bar.

Embarked all the infantry from the Bombay Grab. *Eagle*, and expedition cruisers into the boats, and proceeded with general Wedderburn, &ca over Broach Bar this night.

1772 *Wednesday, 11th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)
*Troops landed near Broach.*

*Landing* Landed the troops about five or six miles below Broach town, and took possession of Broach Idrus[1] mosque in the evening, about one mile from the suburb without any opposition, where our troops remained encamped.

1772 *Thursday, 12th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)
*The Nawab sends a messenger.*

*Messenger* Ordered the *Greyhound* and the *Squirrel* to drop up above the town and there anchor; which they did without the least molestation from the fort. Muhammad Sharif was sent out by the Nawab, when we got off Mar-Marunga, to know the cause of our coming, and he said that the Nawab was ready to fulfil all engagements; but it plainly appearing that his views thereby were only to amuse us and thereby gain time, every possible dispatch was made for proceeding in our attack upon the place to-morrow morning. In the evening Muhammad Sharif returned to Broach.

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1 "Another Muhammadan building of some interest is the Idrus mosque. This building was raised over the tomb of an ancestor of Said Husain Idrus, C.S.I. of Surat." *Gaz. Bom. Pres*, II, 556.

*Friday*, 13*th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257) 1772
*Troops advance upon Broach.*

*Advance* At day light our troops began their march to attack the place in several divisions, and the cruisers began to fire upon the town. About nine o'clock, the *Triumph* prahm got up, and anchoring near the town played also against the enemies' towers. About ten o'clock our troops got entire possession of the suburb after a very warm contest, in which several of the military officers were desperately wounded, and some of the men.

*Saturday*, 14*th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257) 1772
*The attack on Broach.*

*Attack* Ordered the cruisers to drop nigher the town to batter the towers, on which they kept a heavy fire, and which was returned from the town. About 3/4 past six o'clock Brigadier-General Wedderburn was shot dead by a musket ball from the walls, as he was reconnoitring the place. At noon the cruisers were obliged to drop further down, they being too much exposed to a heavy fire from the town, and the gallivats having no cover for their people against the musketry of the enemy. The *Triumph* prahm in dropping down got ashore and was much exposed to the enemies' shot.

Ordered the Lieutenants in command of the gallivats to send on shore their prow guns with men to man them double and one hundred rounds of ammunition, and then to drop their vessels out of shot of the fort. Employed in erecting batteries to take off the enemies' defences.

*Sunday*, 15*th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257) 1772
*Colonels Robert Gordon and John Watson to William Hornby.*

*Summary of events* It is needless to inform you by what steps we got here, only that we landed the 11th instant, and took possession of Bawan Idrus mosque that evening. On Friday morning we attacked the suburbs on all sides, and carried them with little loss and without a halt, though they were entrenched and strongly barricaded: and we have reason to believe the enemy thought to have given our troops a check. The place was immediately closely invested. The division posted at the east gate was assaulted and drove in yesterday morning, but we have since retaken the post, and it has been again attacked this morning and the enemy repulsed; but we have not yet heard from Major Hassard, who was last appointed, and in command there. Our batteries are in great forwardness, and hope to open three 24-pounders this evening to make a breach and take off the defences. The *Fancy*, *Triumph* and the gallivats are the only vessels that have yet been able to come up near. They were employed in firing on the town, whilst the suburbs were attacked; and they have kept their stations ever since, using their guns and throwing shells at times; and although the whole fire of the town hath been upon them, they have not suffered so much as might be expected. The officers, both military and marine, have behaved with great spirit and resolution, and the greatest harmony and unanimity subsists amongst them, being emulous only in assisting each other on all occasions.

We are sorry to acquaint you that General Wedderburn was unfortunately killed yesterday morning by a small shot from the walls, as he was reconnoitring. This loss has given no check to our operations, as the greatest unanimity subsists between Colonel Gordon and Mr. Watson, as had been between the General and him; and we assure you of its continuation, as we have but one end and one point in view; and Colonel Gordon hopes the Governor and Council will be pleased to appoint him to the rank and privileges of the late Brigadier-General. The Colonel is indefatigable in his attention to the public service.

1772 *Sunday, 15th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)
*The Nawab's troops.*

*Sallies* Received advice from Major Hassard at the east gate that the enemy had sallied out three times on him that morning, and had been as often repulsed and drove back but with some loss on our side.

1772 *Monday, 16th November*, 1772 (1772 ,*Br. F.* 257)
*Bombardment of Broach.*

*Attack* This day opened three 24-pounders batteries against the S. W. part of the town, also one 18-pounder battery against the westernmost tower, and mounted some howitzers to throw shells into the town, which with the vessels kept up a constant fire upon the town. Major Hassard's post has been again attacked by the enemy, who were repulsed with some loss on both sides.

1772 *Tuesday, 17th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)
*Bombardment of Broach.*

*Attack* This day the batteries continued firing on the enemies' works and taking off their defences. The vessels also continued their fire upon the town. About one o'clock Ensign Graham with a small party of Grenadiers took possession of the lower tower by the phurja, but it being too much exposed to the enemy, he was obliged to evacuate it with only one person wounded.

*Raja's message* Received a letter from Raja Rangmal Bariah, a Koli Raja at Miyagam, which after compliments says that the Broach Nawab had sent to offer him an elephant and four villages, if he will assist the Nawab with two thousand men, to which he hath refused to do, and wishes success to the English.

1772 *Wednesday, 18th November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257)

*Assault* This afternoon at 1/4th before 4 o'clock began our assault upon the town, which was entered at two places by our Grenadiers commanded by Lieut.-Colonels Cockburn and Brewer, and got entire possession of it by sunset, the Nawab having fled out at the east side, as our troops entered the Broach breach.

*Colonels Robert Gordon and John Watson to William Hornby.*

*Broach captured* We have the pleasure of acquainting you that we began the assault upon the town of Broach about 4 o'clock this afternoon in two different places, commanded by Lieut.-Colonels Cockburn and Brewer; and two feints were made in different places the same time; and got possession about sunset with the loss only of Lieut. Royce and one

Grenadier killed; Capt. Hopkins and Lieut. Henry wounded, as we can yet learn, though the enemy were well barricaded and defended themselves from post to post. By the time our troops got possession, it was so dark that we cannot at present give any further account thereof; only that we learn the Nawab has fled out at the east side, the time our troops entered the town, and that Lallubhai is still in the place with the Nawab's women.

*The Dutch*

We cannot help acquainting you with the conduct and behaviour of the Dutch, which has been very insolent from the beginning; and we believe they have assisted the Nawab in the defence of the place, as they fired from the Dutch Factory upon our troops, when they passed near to it in pursuit of the enemy.

*Officers' gallantry*

We cannot sufficiently applaud the alacrity and spirit of every officer and private man from the beginning to this present time; and as the place was taken by storm, the property of the town rests with the captors, agreeable to the customs of war, the which being usual in these cases, we hope for your approbation and concurrence.

*Monday, 23rd November*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257) 1772

*British flag*

Issued the following Orders to Commodore Nesbit of the Bombay grab to send on shore a spare topmast with cross-trees and a spar to erect a flag staff in the town of Broach.

*Friday, 4th December*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257) 1772

*Plunder*

List of plunder taken out of sundry boats belonging to our fleet at Broach, 21st November, 1772, *viz.*

97 lbs. copperware large and small.
34 lbs. old silver, large and small.
1 pearl necklace of two strings.
1 small feeta[1] 5 chains to it set with diamonds.
1 large necklace set with rubies, pearls and emeralds.
2 gold bracelets set with rubies and emeralds.
1 jewel for the head, set with rubies, emeralds and pearls.
1 middle-size gold necklace rubies and pearl.
1 gold feeta set with rubies and pearls.
1 gold bracelet or bangle set with small rubies.
1 gold head-jewel set with rubies and pearl.
23 papers small silver buttons.
1 gold ear-ring set with red stones.
7 gold buttons set with red stones.
7 whole pieces of Dungaree and parcel of old clothes which was given to the people.

*Tuesday, 4th December*, 1772 (1772, *Br. F.* 257) 1772

*Interment of Brigadier-General Wedderburn.*

*General's burial*

Ordered Captain Armond of the *Fancy* to fire thirty-three minute guns to-morrow afternoon, to begin firing after the thirty-third gun is fired from the shore on the interment of the late Brigadier-General Wedderburn.

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1 A piece of lace-work.

## No. 5 DIVIDING THE SPOILS (1772—1773)

AFTER the English had captured Broach, it was brought home to them before long that they would not have their own way in appropriating the revenues of their newly acquired territories. The Nawab had been an easy foe to measure swords with, but Fatesing Gaikwad was made of different stuff. For a time the game of politics became of absorbing interest. The English thought of ousting Fatesing by making a treaty with the Poona Government; but this plan fell through; Fatesing was too powerful to be ignored, and the Bombay President and Council instructed their servants to settle matters peacefully with the Gaikwad. This was ultimately effected, and Fatesing succeeded in safeguarding the Gaikwad share in the Broach revenue.

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### DOCUMENTS

1772 *Bombay, 29th November, 1772* (1772 *P. D.* 62)
*Letter to the Committee at Broach.*

*Dividing the spoils* The Committee must be acquainted that the plunder and booty taken in the town shall be distributed agreeable to the Hon'ble Company's latest orders, as mentioned in their instructions; and Messrs James Morley and James Cheape are now appointed agents to take charge of the same; and in order that no mistake [*may arise*] as to what comes under the denomination of plunder and booty in the present instance, they must be informed that all public stores and provisions, all money, jewels and other effects belonging to the Nawab or any of his officers are to be considered as such; but the rest of the inhabitants, who were not in arms, are to be protected in their persons and property.

*The Dutch* As it appears that the Dutch have assisted the Nawab in the defence of the town, the Committee must send us every information regarding it, which they can procure.

*Various orders* The letter to the Committee at Broach expressed our satisfaction at the capture of that place, and directed them to acquaint us what number of men would in their opinion be sufficient to garrison it. We also apprised them of our having appointed Messrs. Morley and Cheape to take charge of all the plunder or booty which might be found there; giving the Committee directions on this head, agreeable to our directions in this day's Consultation; and directed to send us the best information they could procure by what means the Dutch assisted the Nawab in the defence of the town. In a postscript we mentioned our just having received their letter of the 22nd instant,

and expressed our surprise at their not having sent us a general return of the forces and a particular one of the killed and wounded.

The letter to Messrs Morley and Cheape acquainted them of our having appointed them to take charge of all the plunder and booty taken in Broach, and gave them directions agreeable to our minutes of that day's Consultation.

*Bombay, 28th November,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*Letter from the Committee at Broach to Bombay.*

*Events in Broach*

Per express pattemars, which came in this evening, was received a letter from the Committee at Broach, dated &ca, in which they owned receipt of our commands of the 14th instant and then proceeded to give us the necessary information of the several occurrences, which had happened there since the capture of the town, and the measures they had pursued in consequence of our orders, appointing them a Committee for conducting the affairs of the Hon'ble Company in the territories they had acquired from the success of the late expedition. They first communicated the steps they had taken for restoring tranquillity and establishing a good government in the town and its dependencies; and then observing that, as they had hitherto discovered no more than about one lakh of Rupees and some effects of but little value belonging to the Nawab and his adherents, they apprehended the greatest part of the enemy's treasure and effects must be secreted in different parts of the town. They had, therefore, issued a proclamation, denouncing severe penalties against any persons who should conceal any such treasure and effects and directing that all the officers or adherents of the late Nawab should present themselves before the Committee and take the oath of allegiance to the Hon'ble Company. Messrs Gordon and Watson then acquainted us that, as the affairs of government and the duties of the different departments would prevent their giving the necessary attention to the collecting and taking charge of the plunder and booty, the Committee had nominated Messrs Morley and Mackenzie to act therein in behalf of the Hon'ble Company; but Mr. Watson having dissented to the latter's appointment, his reasons for such dissent were specified as well as the Committee's, reason for nominating that gentleman. That on the application of the military and marine, they had permitted them to assist in collecting and taking inventories of the plunder and effects taken from the enemy, but had directed that Messrs Morley and Mackenzie should have the entire charge of them, after the whole was collected.

*Fatesing's troops*

The Committee then advised that, having received intelligence of a body of troops being encamped at a short distance from the town, which were supposed to belong to the late Nawab, who, they heard, was with them, and Colonel had immediately ordered a detachment of 1,000 men to march and dislodge them, in case they proved to be such as were reported. But Lt.-Colonel Brewer, who commanded, on his return informed them that, finding they were Maratha troops belonging to Fatesing, he had required them to remove from the Broach territories, and they had decamped accordingly.

*Fatesing's letters*

They enclosed a copy of a very insolent letter, they had received from Fatesing the day after they took the town, and of another they had received the 21st instant together with copy of their reply, and

a letter they had wrote the chief of Surat, and the papers therein referred to; and acquainted us that soon after the commencement of the siege of Broach they had received a polite letter from a Koli Raja,[1] to which they had returned a suitable answer.

*Other details* A report of the ordinance and military stores found in the town was enclosed; and they advised that on the approaching springs they should dispatch hither the Bombay grab and such other vessels as they could spare with the treasure belonging to the captors; and that the Colonel in a consultation had put the question whether the effects, which lately belonged to the country inhabitants, were become the property of the captors or not, being of opinion that according to the custom of war they were entitled to all effects whatever found in a town taken by storm. But the Committee at the same time had declared that he should submit his sentiments to the common practice in India and to our instructions on that subject. That, being in hopes by removing the greatest part of our troops from the town would have a considerable effect towards quieting the minds of the inhabitants, they had encamped near the walls on the outside, except a necessary number left within to garrison the town. They mentioned their having appointed Mr. Morley to be their secretary.

1772 *Bombay, 30th November,* 1772 (1772, *S. F.* 661)
*Bombay to William Andrew Price.*

*Keeping Broach* The forces we lately detached from hence against the town of Broach for chastising the Nawab for the insults he dared to offer to the Hon'ble Company, having become possessed of it and of the territories appertaining to it, we have judged it expedient for the present to keep possession of them, till we may be able to judge of the advantages which may be reaped therefrom, or to dispose of them in such a manner as may be for our Hon'ble Employers' interest; *Resident* and as it, therefore, for the present becomes necessary to provide for the proper government thereof, we have determined to establish a Resident and Factors at Broach for this purpose, subject to the orders and control of you, our Chief and Council at Surat. We have accordingly appointed Mr. James Morley Resident at Broach with Messrs. James Cheape and William Makon joint Factors for the carrying on our Hon'ble Employers' affairs at this new establishment. But, *W. A. Price* as the Chief, from his experience in matters of government and knowledge of the politics and language of the country, is a proper person to put the affairs at Broach upon a suitable footing, we, therefore, direct that as soon as possible after the receipt of this letter he repair thither for that purpose, leaving the charge of your factory with Mr. Robert Gambier and the other Factors; and during his residence at Broach the Resident and Factors are to give him every assistance in their power for the management of our Hon'ble Employers' concerns there.

1772 *Bombay, 3rd December,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*At a Consultation.*

*Skirmish with Fatesing* Per express pattemar was received a letter from the Committee at Broach, dated the 29th ultimo, in which they advised that they

1 The Raja of Miyagam; see letter from Broach to Bombay, 23rd Dec. 1772.

some days before received intelligence that Fatesing was assembling a large body of forces about 25 miles from that place, with which it was generally believed he intended to harass the country which the Hon'ble Company had acquired by the reduction of the Nawab of Broach; but the Committee for several considerations were little apprehensive that he would attempt to molest them. They then acquainted us that they were concerned to find themselves disappointed in their expectations, as Fatesing had not only offered them several insults, but had likewise proceeded to hostilities, as a body of his horse had advanced and fired on a detachment of our troops parked about two miles from the town, who in their own defence were under a necessity of returning the fire, which obliged them to retreat. That they had taken every necessary precaution for the security of the town, and should return a suitable answer to an imperious letter he had sent them, and remonstrating against the behaviour; and in order that the Hon'ble Company might receive their proportion of the Broach revenues they had ordered the patels of the different villages to assemble there, that they might give them the necessary orders; and as the Rajas of Jambusar and Amod annually paid the late Nawab a certain sum, the Committee had required them to pay the like sum annually to the Hon'ble Company. That they had also dispatched circular letter to the Country Powers, assuring them of their desire to continue on the most friendly terms, invited Jamiat Roy, who had formerly the management of the Broach revenues, to come hither, as he might be useful, and he had offered his services. *Revenue measures*

That, as they judged it sufficient to detain there only the *Fancy* ketch, four gallivats, ten transport boats, one of the six fishing boats, they had directed the superintendent to return hither all the other vessels belonging to the Hon'ble Company and to discharge the rest of the merchant boats and vessels. *Ships returned*

The Committee then advised that, having received repeated informations that a large quantity of effects were secreted in the Dutch Factory by some of the late Nawab's adherents, they had judged it incumbent on them to order a strict search to be made therein, the progress and result of which they recounted. *Dutch factory*

They complained of some encroachments made by the pandit of Anklesvar and mentioned that they had received a letter from the late Nawab, desiring to be restored to his government and making several promises in that case; in reply to which they should write him a suitable letter. *Nawab's request*

They enclosed sundry papers, and in a postcript mentioned that they had received intelligence from one of their own harkaras, who was sent to observe the motions of Fatesing, that he was advanced as far as Nan, about nine kos from thence, with about 1,700 foot, 1,000 horse, two elephants and some pieces of cannon; and that it was reported he was to be joined by Khanderao from Gujarat with about 8,000 men, and Chimnajipant from Dholka with about 2,000 horse and 3,000 foot. *Fatesing's troops*

1772 *Bombay, 7th December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*At a Consultation.*

*The Dutch* The behaviour of the Dutch Factors at Broach, as stated by the Committee, has been very unjustifiable; for it is evidently proved that they assisted the Nawab with arms or in the defence of the town, and endeavoured to secrete the arms and effects of the Nawab and his officers in their factory, and this at a time that their Resident repeatedly and upon his honour assured them that there were none, though on search they were actually found therein, when they declared that in this and every other part of their conduct they had acted by the orders of their Superiors at Surat; which behaviour is the more extraordinary, as the Committee in consequence of our directions, on the arrival of our forces before the town, addressed a letter to the Dutch, assuring them of safety and protection in their persons and property. Their conduct, however, we are of opinion, has been such that they can expect no establishment in the town, while in our possession. It is, therefore, resolved that the Dutch Directors and Council at Surat (to whose orders the Factors at Broach are subject) be required to withdraw from thence with all the effects of the Netherlands' Company, for doing which every necessary assistance must be given. A letter to the Dutch Director and Council must be prepared agreeable to the above, and stating our reasons for this resolution.

Messrs Draper and Fletcher dissent to the foregoing resolution, till by the answer from the Dutch it may [*appear*] whether they avow the conduct of their Factors at Broach.

1772 *Bombay, 11th December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*Letter from the Committee at Broach.*

*The late Nawab* Per express boat from Broach a letter from the Committee, dated the 5th instant, in which they advised that they heard the late Nawab continued at Dhaoon [Dewan],[1] whither he had fled when our troops entered Broach by storm; that he was in very miserable circumstances, entirely destitute of friends and even of subsistence, owing to his infamous conduct to all who had any connection with him while he was Nawab.

*Bombay, 11th December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*Letter from William A. Price, Chief of Surat.*

*Peace policy* Received per pattemars two letters from the Chief of Surat. The first was dated the 6th instant, in which he advised that he should set out for Broach on the 10th, and that he had been informed of Fatesing's conduct there. The Chief gave his opinion that the settling with this man was of great importance, that not having any quarrel with us he would of course expect the same share of the Broach revenues as he enjoyed in the late Nawab's time, the amount of which he should be able to ascertain with more exactness on his arrival at Broach; that, if matters were not amicably settled with Fatesing, he had it greatly in his power to prevent our recovering the revenues of Broach, in which its advantage chiefly consisted, unless indeed it should

1 The Nawab and three of his sons sought shelter with Jalam, the Koli Chief of Dewan on the Mahi, and here, before long, the Nawab died. *Gaz. Bom. Pres.* II, 171.

be our intention to come to an open rupture with him, which he did not suppose to be our intention, as in such case he apprehended our whole force must be kept there, or only a predatory war carried on to the ruin and desolation of the country. He, therefore, requested we would furnish him with orders and instructions how to act, as the harvest was then ready for reaping; and should the Marathas carry it off, he should find a great difficulty in recovering the Company's share from the desais and patels of the villages. That he could not think it was Fatesing's intentions to break with us, as he was sure it was not for his interest; and believed all he wanted was not to be a sufferer by Broach having fallen into our hands; and that for the present he had taken such steps with his agents at Surat as he hoped would be the means of his withdrawing his forces from the neighbourhood of Broach or at least prevent his giving our troops any molestation.

*Fatesing's request*

The other [*letter*] bore date the 7th instant, in which he enclosed a translation of a writing he had received that morning from Fatesing, and particularly described a place called Poor Wanee Puthan, which Fatesing wanted us to reduce for him, and for which service he offered to pay us two lakhs of Rupees in ready money and to assign over Rs. 20,000 per annum, on which proposal Mr. Price requested our direction.

*Bombay, 13th December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772

*At a Consultation.*

*Fatesing's claims*

Read also the advices from Mr. Price extracted above with a translate of Fatesing's conditional obligation referred in one of those letters as entered hereafter, on which the following remarks are made and resolutions taken.

It is by no means our intention to quarrel with Fatesing, on the reverse we wish to cultivate a good understanding with him; yet we deem it unreasonable that he should esteem himself entitled to so large a share of the revenues as that stated in the account which the Chief transmitted from Surat to the Select Committee under the name of a chauth, which ought to be a quarter part only; but as we know not how long he has enjoyed it upon the present footing, at what time any share was first claimed by Fatesing's predecessors, or what amount, the Chief and the Factors at Broach must, therefore, be directed to inquire into these particulars and to advise us accordingly.

*Compromise*

And as the harvest is now so near from the produce of which the revenues must be collected, we deem it necessary that matters for the present should be compromised in the most advantageous [*manner*] in their power, that the country may not be subject to the ravages of Fatesing's troops.

*Annual payment*

As it would certainly be most for our Hon'ble Employers' interest, (if means cannot be found to induce Fatesing to be content with an exact chauth) to settle with him for a certain sum annually to be paid him, so that the whole of the Broach revenues and its districts may be collected for the Company, the Chief and Factors must find a suitable opportunity to propose it, and advise us what sum in their opinion he may be induced to accept.

*Request rejected*

As we know not how far it may lead us into other measures, should we embrace Fatesing's proposals communicated to us by Mr. Price, and as we have not otherwise sufficient information on the sub-

ject, we must, therefore, from the state of the case as at present before us, decline entering into his views for an expedition against Poor Wanee Puttum. Beside, we know of no injury which the Khatis ever offered to our Hon'ble Employers or to those who trade with their pass and colours. The sum also which is proposed we esteem very inadequate to the assistance which is required and the advantages which Fatesing must reap from our success. Should it, however, be in Mr. Price's power to inform us of any further material particulars, which might induce us to think it for our Hon'ble Masters' interest to harken to this proposal, he must acquaint us with them.

*Broach, 13th December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Letter to Fatesing.*

*Remonstrances* For a series of time there has been a firm friendship between the Hon'ble Company and your family. We are desirous this may increase. Your letters are always full of the same assurances. We are, therefore, surprised that without any provocation your people should have come and fired upon our advanced posts; which made the returning it by our troops unavoidable, and in which skirmish five or six of your people lost their lives. This behaviour is very distant; for in friendship we are willing to believe that this could not have been by your orders but by the irregularity of your troops. We, therefore, are still inclined to friendship; and if your views are the same, it is highly proper you give speedy and effectual orders to your people not to be guilty of the like irregularities again, and that your army retire to a proper distance, as the times are very critical. If you have any proposals to make, it is necessary you depute a proper person to wait on us, when we shall appoint one on our side. If your designs are peaceful or otherwise, we are ready for both; and therefore we desire a plain and speedy answer. Some days since, you sent a letter by a chobdar, who, you acquainted us, would enter into a negotiation with us. As we could not esteem him in any shape a proper person to be employed in a business of such importance, we return him without an answer.

1772 *Broach, 14th December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Fatesing's answer.*

*Excuses and promises* Your agreeable letter I have received, and observed what as a friend you have wrote me [*that*] between my family and the Hon'ble Company there has been a friendship for many years more than words or writing can express. I have constantly given express orders to my people to be particularly cautious in not giving you offence. I am, therefore, surprised you can have cause to complain. In future I shall enforce these orders, and hope nothing of the kind will happen again; of this be satisfied. You have desired I would send a person to treat with you. At present I have no one proper for this purpose. I have, therefore, sent orders to Rudraji Bapu, now at Surat, to come here. On his arrival he will be dispatched to settle everything with you.

1772 *Bombay 14th December,* 1772 (1772, *P. D* 62)
*Letter from Broach.*

*Fatesing near Broach* Received per pattemars a letter from the Committee at Broach, dated the 8th instant, in which they advised that Fatesing's army,

commanded by himself in person, had advanced so near the town that their camp was plainly to be seen from the walls; and their force was said to consist of 4,000 horse and 1,500 foot, which was soon to be joined by considerable reinforcements. That, although he continued his professions of friendship, yet his approaching so near the town, and their posts had not the appearance of peace and might, they believed, be justly deemed an act of hostility, so that nothing but fear, want of force, or some very particular reason could justify them for suffering so large a body of forces to be collected so near to them; but they observed that they were totally ignorant on what ground they stood as well as of any negotiations which might be carrying on. That Fatesing had seized all the head patels of the villages, from which circumstance as well as his warlike preparations they apprehended he would hardly allow them to collect any part of the revenues, until the Hon'ble Company's and his respective claims were settled by treaty.

*Dutch factory* Our letter to Broach communicated our sentiments and signified our directions exactly agreeable to the minutes of our last consultation; adding that as the conduct of the Dutch Factors, as they had represented it, was highly unjustifiable, we should require the Dutch Director and Council to withdraw their Factory from Broach, as their conduct did not entitle them to expect an establishment there.

*Bombay, 15th December,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) · 1772
*Fatesing and Broach.*

*Fatesing near Broach* Received from the Committee at Broach per pattemar, dated the 9th, at night, in which they advised that Fatesing had advanced that day with his army within a short mile from their outpost to the eastward, commanded by Colonel Brewer, and that in the afternoon several bodies of their horse had surrounded that post; on which Colonel Brewer had drawn in his sentries and out-guards; and on the Marathas beginning to fire upon them, he had returned five shot from the field-pieces, which made them retire with precipitation, leaving a horse dead behind them.

*Broach, 15th December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662) 1772
*Fatesing's ambassador.*

*Rudraji's proposal* Rudraji came to the Nawab's garden this evening. Dhunjishaw was sent to him to sound his intentions, and acquainted us that all Rudraji proposed was the purchasing the place [*Broach*] of the Hon'ble Company, which, as Dhunjishaw had no power to treat of, Rudraji promised to come again in a day or two.

*Poona, 16th December,* 1772 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1772
*Fatesing and Broach.*

*Fatesing asks aid at Poona* Private advices, mentioning that Fatesing Gaikwad was hovering near Broach with a considerable army, and reported also in town he had wrote his vakil, Balaji Naik Beriah, to request assistance from hence. I immediately made all the enquiry possible to find out the truth; and from the best I can at present procure, find it is true, he has wrote his agent on this subject, also to Narayanrao, but as yet the letter to the latter is not delivered.[1]

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy at Poona*, 48.

1772 *Bombay, 16th December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*The spoils of Broach.*

*Gathering the fragments*

Received per pattemar a letter from Messrs Morley and Cheape, agents for taking care of the plunder taken at Broach, which bore date the 11th instant, in which they advised that, it being the general opinion there that a great part of the Nawab's treasure and effects were secreted in the town, they had offered a reward of 10 per cent. to any persons who should make discoveries, and that, being something at a loss in what manner to act with respect to Lallubhai, they had consulted the Committee upon it, who acquainted them that it appeared he was entirely attached to Fatesing and showed no desire to be of service to the Hon'ble Company. Messrs Morley and Cheape, therefore, proposed treating him as one of the late Nawab's adherents; and as there were many houses in town of considerable value belonging to the Nawab, &ca, they requested our orders regarding them.

1772 *Bombay, 18th December.* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*Fatesing and Broach.*

*Defensive policy*

This morning arrived express pattemars from Broach with a packet from Messrs Price and Gordon, dated the 13th instant, in which they advised that a large body of Maratha troops had again surrounded and fired on our post, and that on the 12th their whole camp, which had been considerably reinforced, encamped within 800 yards of it; in consequence of which the Colonel had represented to the Committee that he could not but consider them as enemies to the Hon'ble Company, and therefore wished to surprise and attack them in the night, urging several reasons for preferring this mode of attack as well as the bad effects the remaining inactive might have on our troops. But Mr. Watson being of opinion it would be most advisable to avoid coming to an engagement before Mr. Price's arrival, and in the meantime to collect our troops and prepare them to act as circumstances should require, this opinion was adopted after mature deliberation. On Mr. Price's arrival this subject was again debated and considered, where they unanimously agreed to remain on the defensive till further orders; having resolved to try the effect of negotiations they had wrote a suitable representation to Fatesing of his conduct and the behaviour of his troops. As their affairs were in so critical a situation, they had determined to detain all the troops there; and that, as most of the Hon'ble Company's vessels were returned, Mr. Watson now proceeded to the Presidency agreeable to our directions, and in future the Committee would be composed of Mr. Price and Colonel Gordon.

*Bombay's approval.*

*Bombay's approval*

Read the advices from Messrs Morley and Cheape as extracted above.

We approve of the reward they have offered for the discovery of any concealed effects, which did belong to any such; they must now be considered as part of the Hon'ble Company's estate. Such as are wanted for their service must be appropriated to their use, and the others rented out on their account.

*Bombay, 18th December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) **1772**
*How to deal with Fatesing.*

*Bombay views*

We flatter ourselves the directions contained in our letter of the 14th to the Committee would have been sufficient for the guidance of the Chief and Factors in the present conjuncture and have enabled them to accommodate matters with Fatesing in a manner creditable to our Hon'ble Employers. We still hope this will be the case, but the tenor of their advices, which were received this morning, renders it necessary we should explain our sentiments further than before appeared to be necessary.

*Defensive policy*

For, however we may wish to avoid a rupture with Fatesing, yet we do not desire to sacrifice the credit of our Employers to our pacific inclinations. The conduct of Fatesing, as the Committee have stated, it is not for their credit tacitly to submit to; should he, therefore, continue to act in that insolent manner, we permit them to act on the offensive against him, provided a rupture cannot be avoided upon decent terms. It must, however be strongly recommended to the Chief and Factors not to proceed to extremities till every conciliating means has first been tried for inducing him to withdraw his forces from the districts of Broach; for we think it would be improper to acquiesce in their continuance in the territories the Company are become possessed of in any greater number than may be necessary for collecting his share of the revenues. Upon the whole we shall much lament the necessity that may induce them to proceed to hostilities, though, should it be really necessary for our Hon'ble Employers' interest and for maintaining their credit amongst the Powers in that country, we must acquiesce, relying upon their prudence not rashly to enter into a war. We hope, however, the latitude given in our letter of the 14th will enable the Chief and Factors to settle with him to the mutual satisfaction of both the parties, when his forces will of course be withdrawn.

*Surprising conduct*

We cannot avoid here remarking that the behaviour of Fatesing is mysterious and surprising; for by a letter from the Chief of Surat, which is dated the 7th and was read here the 11th instant, he appears to be desirous of joining our forces on an expedition against the Kolis, and at the same time he himself at the head of his forces is insulting ours at Broach.

*Bombay's approval*

We approve the conduct the Committee have hitherto observed towards Fatesing, and we acquiesce in Col. Gordon's stay at Broach with the whole military force till circumstances may conveniently admit of his return.

*Broach, 18th December*, 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662) **1772**
*Interview with Rudraji.*

*Two proposals*

Rudraji being arrived at the late Nawab's garden, the Committee went out to meet him. After the usual compliments he was desired to inform us with the purpose of his coming. He acquainted us that for many years there had been a constant friendship between Damaji's family and the Hon'ble Company; that his Master, Fatesing, was desirous of continuing on the same friendly footing, and in order to strengthen it had sent him to make two proposals for our consideration.

The first was to relinquish the place to him upon an adequate consideration being made us. The other that we [*the English and Fatesing*] should respectively receive the several advantages both within and without the city, and in every other respect matters be fixed on the same footing as in the time of the late Nawab. That a proposition so reasonable, he concluded, we could not have any objection to, seeing his Master had not any quarrel or difference with us, or in any shape impeded the operations of the siege, though strongly solicited by the Nawab to assist him with a body of horse; which he could easily and speedily have done, but in regard to our friendship declined.

*Reply to proposals*

As to the first proposal, the Committee acquainted him they could not take upon themselves to make any reply, being unacquainted with our Superiors' intention in regard to the keeping or disposing of the place. That they would, nevertheless, forward any proposals he might have to make, reduced to writing under the seal of Fatesing. That with respect to the last, we were contented matters should go on in the same manner as in the time of the late Nawab, the Marathas receiving their usual share of the revenues both within and without, and the Hon'ble Company that called the Mogul's.[1] That for collecting out-revenue and securing the subjects from any violence or oppression, the several chaukis and thanas in the several villages and turnpikes should be placed on both sides as heretofore, and the Marathas [*to*] have an officer in the town and live in the same house, the same number of sepoys to attend him as was allowed in the time of the late Nawab, but the administration of the town-justice in all places where the late Nawab had executed it, as well as the royalty of the river to be vested entirely in the hands of the Hon'ble Company. Nor were the Marathas in any shape whatever to interfere herein. Rudraji then took his leave, acquainting us he would return to-morrow or next day with his Master's answer.

1772 *Poona, 19th December, 1772 (Mostyn's Diary)*
*Fatesing and Poona.*

*Govindrao favoured by Poona*

From what I can learn regarding Fatesing's applications for assistance from this Court, it is judged he will not succeed. His brother, Govindrao, who is now with Narayanrao, is by the Raja invested with the saropa of Senakhaskhel, that is, one of his ministers, which raises him above his brother. This Court has procured this for him, that, in case Fatesing proves at any time refractory, they have it in their power by assisting Govindrao, who has ever since his father's death, laid claim to the government, to bring the other to reason.[2]

1772 *Broach, 21st December, 1772* (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Interview with Rudraji.*

*Fatesing's request*

In the evening Rudraji waited on the Chief, Colonel Gordon being present, and acquainted them that his Master consented that everything relative to Broach and its dependencies should remain on its

1 *Svarajya* seems to have originally been the amount set apart for the Raja of Satara. *Moglai* was originally the share of the Moguls, which had become the private property of the Nawab. See *Gaz. Bar. State*, I, 454.

2 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 49.

former footing, as set forth under the 18th instant. That he had only one demand to make, which if admitted, the Maratha army should retire about ten miles from the town, there to remain until he should receive an answer from our Superiors regarding some proposals he had to make regarding Broach and the share of the revenues called the Mogul's being ceded to him.

Rudraji moreover agreed that Lallubhai should come to town and remain with us 48 hours for giving us the necessary information. We represented to him that Lallubhai being an inhabitant of this place, in case he desired our protection, we could not but grant it to him. To this he replied that, when matters were finally settled, we might in this respect act as we pleased; but having in the late troubles taken his Master's protection, he could not part with him [*Lallubhai*], unless we promised bona fide to send him back at the expiration of the above limited time; which for the purpose afore-mentioned (obtaining an account of the revenues) we were under a necessity of complying with. *Lallubhai*

He further informed us that Fatesing's demand was payment of a bond from the late Nawab, properly witnessed, and which he then produced, for Rs. 53,000 for the security of which he had an assignment of the Mogul's share of the villages. Rudraji, therefore, represented that, as this had now fallen into the hands of the Hon'ble Company, it was but reasonable we should make good this demand. This we absolutely refused and declared we would not in any shape whatever be responsible for the late Nawab's debts, who, was he on the spot, would probably have many demands on Fatesing. *Another request refused*

Rudraji then informed us that, if Broach and its territories with the ordinance found in the town were ceded to his Master, he would pay the Hon'ble Company six lakhs of Rupees; three in ready money and the remainder in two annual payments of one and a half lakhs each (for which shroffs in Surat should become security), together with an annual payment for ever of Rs. 60,000 to be made good to us either from Temba pargana, in which Surat Castle has a part, or out of Fatesing's share of the revenues in the city. After acquainting Rudraji we should communicate his proposals to our Superiors, he took his leave, promising to return in a day of two with Lallubhai. *Offer for Broach*

*Broach, 22nd December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662) 1772
*Interview with Rudraji.*

Rudraji waited on the Chief, Colonel Gordon being present, and whilst on his way to the Darbar, a party of about a hundred horses advanced to the suburbs plundering some washermen and Banyas' houses of some trifles. We strongly remonstrated to Rudraji against this breach of peace and friendship, observing it was in our power to have cut off the troops who have committed this outrage, but from the assurances he had given us that his Master was desirous of continuing on friendly terms with the Hon'ble Company we had permitted them to retire unmolested, depending that Fatesing would punish them properly to prevent the like again. Upon pressing Rudraji upon this subject he could not deny but that what had passed was in consequence of his Master's orders, who, he said, was dissatisfied that, although he had been here a long time, nothing had yet been settled with him. By *Unprovoked attack*

which he meant that we had not resolved whether we intended ceding Broach to him or not. To this we replied as before that it was a point which entirely rested with our Superiors, that Fatesing's plea for the conduct of his troops was highly ridiculous and improper, and that by detaining in his camp Lallubhai and all those who could give us any information concerning the revenues, he prevented us from being competent judges how far his Master's offers were adequate.

*Rudraji's promises and claims* To remove this impediment Rudraji promised to send immediately Jamiat Roy (whose father was formerly collector of revenues) together with Lallubhai's writers, and said that Lallubhai should come himself, but that Fatesing had observed some parts of his conduct extremely prejudicial to his (Fatesing's) interest. We then noticed to Rudraji we had information that his Master had taken upon him to settle with the desais and patels, without our participation, the collection from the villages for this year. He pretended this was customary in the time of the late Nawab. We told him we knew the contrary and would not submit to it; he then took leave, delivering the following letter from Fatesing to the Chief.

*Letter from Fatesing.*

*Friendly overtures* I received your friendly letter with one from the General of Bombay and am acquainted with the particulars. Four gentlemen, who were by mistake stopped by my horsemen, I have dispatched to you in a creditable manner with everything belonging to them. Whatever has been settled between us by Rudraji I confirm; of this I desire you will not entertain any mistrust, that our friendship daily increase.

1772 *Bombay, 22nd December,* 1772 (1772 *P. D. Let. to C. of Dir.* 19)
*President and Council to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

*Revenue of Broach* The revenue of the town and territories dependent upon it—by the best accounts we are yet able to procure—amounts to near seven lakhs annually, about a half of which was collected by the late Nawab, and the other by Fatesing, son of the late Damaji, who has aleady acquainted the gentlemen in command there that he expects to receive his proportion as heretofore, respecting which we had yet come to no determination; but we have resolved at present to keep the new conquest in our possession till we can judge of its exact value, and be thereby enabled to dispose of it in the most advantageous manner for your interest.

1772 *Broach, 23rd December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Letter to Bombay.*

We shall render to Your Honours a detail of what has passed here since the departure of Mr. Watson and our advices of the 13th instant.[1]

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1 The greater part of the letter consists of information already previously recorded; the last three paragraphs contain new information. The full letter is here printed, because it clearly points out the chronological sequence and the respective importance of the previous documents.

*Rudraji's proposals*

In consequence of our letter to Fatesing, mentioned in our said address, he informed us he had wrote to Rudraji, who was at Surat, to return from thence, and [*that*] on his arrival [*he*] would dispatch him to us to adjust his and the Hon'ble Company's respective share of the revenues both from the town and open country. Accordingly on the 18th Rudraji came to the late Nawab's garden, where the Committee went out to meet him, and desired he would acquaint them with the purpose of his coming; on which he said that for many years past there had been a constant friendship between Damaji's family and the Hon'ble Company, that his Master, Fatesing, was desirous the same should continue, and in order to strengthen it had sent him to make two proposals for our consideration: the first was to relinquish the place to him on his making us an adequate consideration, the other that we should respectively receive the same advantages both within and without the city, and in every other respect matters to be put into the same state as they were in the time of the late Nawab; that a proposition so reasonable as the latter, he concluded, we could have no objection to, seeing his Master had no quarrel or difference with us, or in any shape impeded the operations of the siege, though he was strongly solicited by the late Nawab to assist him with a body of horse; which he could easily and speedily have done, but declined it from a regard to our friendship.

*Reply to proposals*

Respecting the first proposal, we informed him we could not take upon ourselves to make any reply, being entirely ignorant whether our Superiors intended keeping or disposing of the place; but nevertheless we would forward to Your Honour, &ca any proposals he might have to make, reduced into writing under the seal of Fatesing. But as to the last, we were satisfied that matters should go on in the same manner for the future as in the time of the late Nawab, the Marathas receiving their usual share of the revenues both within and without the town, and the Hon'ble Company that called the Mogul's; that for collecting the out-revenues and securing the subjects from any violence or oppression the several chaukis and thanas in the villages and turnpikes should be placed on both sides as heretofore, and the Marathas have an officer in the town, who may live in the same house and have the same number of sepoys to attend him as were allowed by the late Nawab; but the administration of justice in town and in all places where the [*Nawab had*] executed it was well as the royalty of the river to be entirely in the hands of the Hon'ble Company. Nor should the Marathas in any shape interfere therein. Rudraji then took his leave, acquainting us he would return to-morrow or the next day with his Master's answer.

*Fatesing amenable*

The 19th and 20th being considered as unlucky days, our second interview with Rudraji was on the 21st, when he acquainted us that his Master consented that everything relative to Broach and its dependencies should remain on its former footing as above stated, and that he had only one demand to make, which if admitted, the Maratha army should retire about ten miles from the town, there to remain till we should receive an answer from Your Honour, etc. regarding some proposals he should make for Broach and the share of the revenues called the Mogul's being ceded to him.

*Lallubhai* Rudraji moreover agreed that Lallubhai should come to town and remain with us 48 hours in order to give us the necessary information regarding the revenues. We represented to him that Lallubhai being an inhabitant of that place, in case he desired our protection, we could not but grant it to him; to which Rudra replied that, when matters were finally settled, we might act regarding that as we thought proper; but having taken his Master's protection in the late troubles, he could not part with him, unless we promised bona fide to send him back at the expiration of the above limited time; which we were under a necessity of agreeing to for the fore-mentioned purpose.

*Another request* The demand Fatesing made was the payment of a bond from the late Nawab for 53,000 Rupees, for the security of which he had an assignment on the Mogul's share of the villages; and Rudraji represented that, as this has now fallen into our hands, it was but reasonable we should make good that demand. This we absolutely refused, and declared we would in no shape whatever be responsible for any debts of the late Nawab, who, was he on the spot, would probably have many demands on Fatesing. There this affair rests at present, and we hope he will not revive it.

*Fatesing's offer for Broach* The offers he makes for Broach and its territories being ceded to him with the ordinance found in the town are: to pay us six lakhs of Rupees, three of which to be ready money and the remainder in two annual payments of a lakh and a half each, for which shroffs in Surat are to be security, together with an annual payment for ever of 60,000 Rupees to be made good to us either from Temba pargana, in which Surat Castle has a part, or out of his share of the revenue from Surat city. After acquainting Rudraji we should communicate his proposals to our Superiors, he took his leave, promising to come again in a day or two with Lallubhai.

*Unprovoked attack* He returned accordingly yesterday afternoon, but to our surprise without bringing Lallubhai; and what was still more extraordinary, whilst on his way to the Darbar, a party of about two hundred Maratha horse advanced and robbed some of the town washermen and even entered the suburbs and plundered four Brahman houses, after which they retired. On Rudraji's arrival we strongly remonstrated against this breach of peace and friendship, and observed it was in our power to have cut off the troops who committed this outrage; but from the assurances he had given that Fatesing was desirous to continue on friendly terms with the Hon'ble Company, we permitted them to go away unmolested; but declared to him plainly that, should the like ever happen again, it would unavoidably occasion an open rupture.

*Broach asked for* On pressing Rudraji in this subject, he could not deny that what had passed was owing to his Master's orders, who, he said, was dissatisfied that, though he had been here for some time, nothing had yet been settled with him, by which he meant that he was still at an uncertainty whether we intended ceding Broach to him or not. Our reply to this was as before, that it rested with our Superiors.

*Cause of delay* That Fatesing's plea for the conduct of his troops was highly ridiculous and improper, and that by his retaining in his camp Lallubhai and all those who could give us the necessary information concerning the revenues, we were prevented from making ourselves compe-

tent judges whether his offers were adequate. Rudraji then promised to send one Jamiat Roy (whose father was formerly the collector of revenue at this place) together with Lallubhai's writers, and said that Lallubhai himself should come, but that Fatesing had discovered some part of his conduct extremely prejudicial to his interest.

*Rudraji's claim* We then observed to him we had information his Master had taken upon him to settle with the desais and patels without our participation regarding what should be collected from the villages the present year. This Rudraji pretended was customary in the time of the late Nawab, but we told him we knew to the contrary and would not submit to it.

*Fatesing's resolve* Fatesing now agrees to wait 12 or 15 days for an answer to his proposals with regard to putting him in possession of Broach. If it is not ceded to him, a rupture, we apprehend, must be the consequence, or at least he will prevent our having any communication with the country, in hopes by that means at length to induce us to comply with his desires.

*Situation at Broach* Such is the situation of affairs at present; and although the Marathas give us great assurances of being inclined to continue on friendly terms with us, we have great reason to doubt their sincerity, having just now received advice from their camp to be on our guard, for that their designs are evil. We are hourly exposed to insults, and our not resenting them discourages our troops and makes them believe the Marathas are formidable, and that we are afraid of them. We, therefore, beg in the most pressing manner that Your Honour, &ca will give us positive and speedy orders how we are to act, and whether, if Fatesing's troops should again insult us, we should not resent it in the best manner we are able for the Company's honour and the reputation of their arms. This we should not have failed to have done yesterday, had not Your Honour, &ca so strenuously enjoined us not only to avoid a quarrel with Fatesing, but likewise to cultivate his friendship.

*Maratha revenue* The enclosed anecdote[1] regarding Broach will point out to Your Honour, &ca at what time the Marathas first gained a footing in this country, and when it was first settled they should receive 6/10 and the Moguls 4/10 of the Broach revenues, which Your Honour, &ca will observe is now 34 years since.

*Anecdote regarding Broach* (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)

*Pilaji at the battle of Arras 1724* About fifty years since (Broach being then under the subah ship of Gujarat) one Shujaat Khan got the better of Hamid Khan and expelled him from the city of Ahmadabad. Hereupon he [*Hamid Khan*], being a relation of Nizam-ul-mulk, wrote to him for his orders how he was to act, whether he should remain in the neighbourhood of Ahmadabad with such forces as had continued firm to him (and from his situation was under no apprehension of an attack) or proceed to [*the*] Deccan. Nizam-ul-mulk directed him to remain where he was, and he would send a body of Marathas to join him, with orders, if Shujaat Khan fell into his hands, to cut him off. Shujaat Khan going a muluk-

1 Anecdote is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary "narrative of detached incident".

giri or collecting the tributes of the country, and being returned near to Ahmadabad, advice thereof was brought to Hamid Khan, who, with what people he had, made a forced march in the night, fell upon Shujaat Khan (who was killed in the action) and regained possession of Ahmadabad. Advices of this transaction being brought to Rustam Ali Khan, the Governor of Surat and younger brother to Shujaat Khan, he directly set out for Ahmadabad, and in his company Pilaji Jadav Gaikwad, Fatesing's grand-father. At a place called Adas they were met by a party of Marathas, [*who*] attacked Rustam Ali Khan, defeated and killed him.

*Pilaji's reward* Hamid Khan being thus firmly seated in the Government of Ahmadabad, and having no further occasion for the Marathas, composed of them different bodies, namely the Pawars, the Kantars and the above Pilaji, wanted to discharge them, but they insisted upon being satisfied for their services. Hamid Khan accordingly gave the two first, assignments on the lands of different countries, and to Pilaji an order on Broach for payment of about 3 or 4 lakhs. Pilaji hereupon assembled the landholders and desais of the different districts, demanding payment of this money in consequence of Hamid Khan's orders. In answer to which these people replied that, the country being ruined by wars, it was not in their power to comply with the Khan's orders. Pilaji then carried them prisoners to Songarh, his head-place, about fifty miles distance from Surat.

*Pilaji and Broach* At this time the Moguls esteeming their government well established kept only an officer of inferior rank with about 200 men at Broach for the collection of their revenue. Pilaji, taking advantage hereof, expelled the Mogul officer and people, and put in his own forces under the command of Tulaji Colbaine. This man remained in the place about eight or nine months; but a rumour prevailing that Pilaji was dead, he immediately set out for Songarh, leaving Broach in the hands of the Kasbatis (Muhammadan soldiers who serve any one for pay and are often security for the revenues arising from the land) with directions to them not to deliver it to any Maratha but himself. Upon Tulaji's arrival at Songarh he found Pilaji alive, who severely rebuked him for his conduct in quitting Broach, and ordered him to go back again; but the Kasbatis would not admit him. About this time Hamid Khan was removed by the King from Ahmadabad, and the command given to Sarbuland Khan, who appointed Abdullah Beg, Masud Khan's great grand-father, Governor of Broach, which the Kasbatis surrendered to him. The Marathas under Pilaji began then to be very troublesome, plundering and destroying the country. Abdullah Beg hereupon invited the Pawars to his assistance, promising them, if the joint forces expelled Pilaji, he would satisfy them handsomely for their trouble. The country continued in a state of confusion by both parties plundering the villages, &ca for about one year; when Sarbuland Khan being recalled from Ahmadabad, the Pawars retired, and Pilaji remained in this country. Shortly after Nizam-ul-mulk coming to a place called Haddanny about 80 kos from hence, he ordered Abdullah Beg to attend him, which he accordingly did, leaving the charge of this place with his relations. Upon Abdullah Beg's arrival at the Court of Nizam-ul-mulk, he in order to secure the quiet of

the country made up matters between Abdullah Beg and Pilaji. It was then first settled that the Broach revenues should be shared equally between them, and the Marathas have an officer in town with a proper number of men for collecting their share of its revenue.

*Damaji and Broach* Upon Nadir Shah's entering India and taking Delhi, the Mogul Power thereby struck, and the whole country thrown into confusion, the Marathas under Damaji (Pilaji being dead) taking advantage of the times, assembled a pretty numerous army and besieged Broach for about three months. When Nizam-ul-mulk, to put a final stop to those depredations, dispatched Daulah Khan to come to a final treaty with Damaji, when matters were accommodated, and an agreement entered into that for the future the Marathas should receive from the districts 6/10th and the government of Broach 4/10th. This is now about 34 years ago. Ever since which time the revenues have been collected in these proportions; and the Marathas have not given Broach any material disturbance, excepting when compelled to it by the conduct of the late Nawab.

*Broach, 23rd December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662) **1772**
*Letter to Bombay.*

*Reinforcements* We have already addressed Your Honour, &ca under this date, and as there is not any doubt with us that Fatesing has bad designs and in case of a rupture will arise, as his army [*is*] considerable, we leave it to your consideration whether we should not have a reinforcement, in case it is intended we should maintain the field, having now near 300 sick in the hospital. But, if it is meant we should take care of the defence of the place only, we have full, nay more than sufficient; but we shall not be able to recover any of the out-revenues.

*Country powers* We also request that, in case circumstances render it necessary, we may be empowered to make alliances with the Country Powers and engage such troops as may be thus proper to support and assist us. The Miyagam Raja[1] and the Cambay Nawab, we think, might be of great use to us.

*Revenue questions* The account sent to Your Honour, &ca by Mr. Price of the revenues of Broach was given him by a man who some years ago was employed in taking the account, since when we hear it is much diminished, and it is to be observed that the districts of Jambusar, Amod, Dehegebarh, Olpad, Anklesvar and Hansot belong entirely to Nanarao of Poona, Fatesing having no share therein, the Broach share thereof, stated annually at Rs. 48,000, being in the time of the late Nawab always collected by force. We think it proper to remark this circumstance, which, we apprehend, will still lessen the value of Broach, unless the matters [*are*] settled by Your Honour, &ca with Nanarao.

*Broach, 23rd December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662) **1772**
*Letter from Bombay.*

(*This letter has already been recorded, see entry: Bombay, 18th December,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) *under the marginal heading, Defensive policy.*)

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1 See entry; Bombay, 28th November, 1772, Letter from the Committee at Broach to Bombay, under the marginal heading, *Fatesing's and other letters.* See also IV Part, *Capture of Broach,* under date the 17th November, 1772.

1772 *Broach, 24th December,* 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Committee's decision.*

*Patience not weakness* Considering also the purport of our Superiors' commands regarding Fatesing, it is resolved at the next conference with his vakil to use every conciliating means to induce his Master to withdraw his troops to a proper distance. If he consents to, it will then come under our consideration what further measures to pursue for bringing affairs to a conclusion. He is also to be told that, if their troops should again commit any acts of hostility upon our posts or otherwise, it would be considered as a declaration of war.

Our present situation, in suffering the Maratha army to be encamped so near, we are sensible, is very disagreeable and improper; but, as our Superiors have been fully advised thereof as well as the insults offered to us by the Marathas in attacking our posts, and still recommend conciliating measures, and the Marathas having made some offers for purchasing the place, it is unanimously agreed that affairs shall remain in their present situation until we hear from our Superiors, unless the Marathas by their future conduct should compel us to act offensively. The late Committee informed the Board that they had given orders, should the Marathas again insult us, to fire upon them without ceremony.

1772 *Poona, 27th December,* 1772 (*Mostyn's Diary*)
*Fatesing and Poona.*

*Poona anxious to get Broach* I have been informed for a truth Fatesing had made application to this Court for assistance against us at Broach; as yet no answer has been given him, nor do I believe the Darbar will venture to assist him; the place is of much importance to this Court as well as to Fatesing; for by what I can learn, it is the key into the Gujarat country, from whence they both draw considerable revenues; therefore some overtures may be expected from them, provided Your Honour, &ca mean to part with the place.[1]

1772 *Bombay, 28th December,* 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62)
*The military position at Broach.*

*English force at Broach* They [*the Chief and Council at Broach*] had thought it necessary to collect the opinions of the principal officers in respect to the state of their force, and had accordingly called in Lieut.-Colonels Brewer and Cockburn, who concurred in opinion with Colonel Gordon that their present position was the most advantageous that could possibly be made both to act on the defensive and on the offensive, and [*they*] further offered as their sentiments that they could with their present force easily dislodge the Marathas from their nearest camp, but that an attempt upon their principal encampment might be attended with difficulty from it having a number of gullies and hollow ways in its front. They advised that they had indented to Surat for a quantity of artillery stores and had ordered the Commissary to lay in a stock of provisions sufficient till the end of March.

[1] Published by Gense Banarji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 53.

*Bombay, 28th December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 62) 1772
*Fatesing's offers.*

Read the letters received this morning from Broach, on which the following remarks are made and resolutions passed. *Offers inadequate*

The offers made by Fatesing for the cession to him of the town and territory of Broach are in our opinion very inadequate to their real value, and even fall far short of those made by him to Mr. Draper in the month of May, 1771, in case we had become possessed of them when our forces first went against the town; and he then proposed to pay five lacks of Rupees in specie and to assign over for the Hon'ble Company's annual revenue of one hundred and twenty five thousand Rupees. The proposal he now makes cannot, therefore, be accepted.[1]

At the same time we deem it very necessary matters should be accommodated for the present that the Hon'ble Company's share of the revenues for this year may be secured The Chief and Factors must, therefore, settle with him on the best terms in their power, without seeming to have any authority from us for doing it; and they can assign that as the reason why the treaty is to be considered in force for one year only. Upon this plan we hope it will be unnecessary to enter into any alliances with the neighbouring Powers; but should extremities oblige them to it, they must be very cautious that no stipulation be therein made which may involve our Hon'ble Employers in any expense or in future war; for, should he continue to insult them, they are to be guided by our sentiments contained in our letter of 18th instant. *The game of politics*

Ordered that 300 men to complete the third battalion of sepoys be held in readiness for proceeding to Broach, as that battalion is to be part of the garrison, and the like number must be returned as soon as the circumstances of affairs will admit of. *Troops*

*Broach, 28th December*, 1772 (1772-73, *S. F.* 662) 1772
*Letter from Fatesing.*

The Chief received a letter from Fatesing, requesting Dhunjishaw might be sent to him, as he wanted to converse with him on many points. *Fatesing's request*

*Broach, 29th December*, 1772 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662) 1772
*Letter to Fatesing.*

Wrote to Fatesing, acquainting him that, upon proper passports being sent for Dhunjishaw, he should go to his camp. *Request granted*

*Bombay, 31st December*, 1772 (1772, *P. D.* 662) 1772
*Letter to Poona.*

Signed a letter to the Resident at Poona and dispatched the same per sepoys, advising the offers made by Fatesing for the cession of the town and territory of Broach, in order that he might sound the sentiments of the Darbar on this head, and directing him to use the utmost caution in transacting this matter as set forth in our minutes of the 28th instant. *Poona sounded*

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1 See I Part, *First Expedition against Broach*, under date 9th May, 1771.

1772 *Bombay, 31st December, 1772 (Mostyn's Diary)*
*William Hornby to Thomas Mostyn.*

*Dealing with Poona*

Fatesing has lately offered for the cession of the town and territory of Broach the sum of 6 lakhs of Rupees three of which to be paid in ready money, and the remainder in two equal payments of a lakh and a half each, together with an annual sum of Rupees 60,000 for ever out of the share of the revenues of Surat city, or in such other manner as might be most acceptable; this offer we have rejected, deeming it very inadequate to the real value of our new acquisition. We communicate these particulars, that you may sound the sentiments of the Maratha Darbar respecting Broach, and that you may learn whether the cession to them of the town and territory belonging to it, added to what Hon'ble Employers have pointed out, may not be an inducement to them to come into their views and to make over in addition thereto the share they hold in the revenues of Surat and its districts. We recommend that you observe such caution in respect to this matter that the first overtures may be made by the Darbar, which you will not fail to acquaint us of as soon as possible, that we may send you the necessary directions; and as the town and territory of Broach must be a valuable acquisition to Narayanrao, so we hope, when a proper representation is made of it, that it will be an inducement to him to propose further advantages for our Hon'ble Employers than those they before expected.[1]

1772 *Bombay, 31st December, 1772 (1772, P. D. 62)*
*At a Consultation.*

*Mostyn's information*

Received per sepoys from Poona a letter from the Resident, dated the 27th instant, in which he owned receipt of our commands of the 16th and advised that he should not fail making the proper representation of the Anklesvar Pandit's conduct as soon as Narayanrao arrived. That he had been informed that Fatesing had made application to that Court for assistance against us at Broach, but that no answer had been returned; and Mr. Mostyn expressed his opinion that the Darbar would not venture to assist him, and observed that the place was of much importance to the Marathas as well as Fatesing, being the key into the Gujarat country, from which they both drew considerable revenues, and therefore some overtures might be expected from them, provided we meant to part with the place.

1772 *Broach, 31st December, 1772 (1772/73, S. F. 662)*
*Arrival of Fatesing's men.*

*Revenue account*

This morning Rudraji came from camp and brought Jamiat Roy and a writer of Lallubhai to give us an account of the parganas and revenues arising therefrom, and made an excuse for not bringing Lallubhai himself, urging his father being very ill prevented it. This is all an artifice; but, as Jamiat Roy can furnish the accounts wanted, no notice was taken of it.

*Chief's representations*

The Chief took this opportunity of representing to Rudraji in strong terms the impropriety of Fatesing's conduct, which was very inconsistent with that of a friend. His staying so near our advanced

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 64-65.

posts for so long a time, his stopping the communication between this place and Surat, &ca and many other parts of his behaviour gave us room to doubt the sincerity of his intention. That in order to remove this doubt and convince us his designs were friendly, the first step should be the withdrawing his troops to a proper distance, as had been before agreed on, the communication with Surat, &ca opened, and, in short, every obstacle to a free, amicable intercourse set aside; that otherwise it would be impossible for us to remain much longer in the present situation; that we were desirous of peace; but, if Fatesing by his imprudent conduct brought on a war, it might be attended with very serious consequences to him, many of the neighbouring Powers having offered us their friendship and alliance, which with our own force would soon deprive him of Baroda.

*Rudraji's reply*

To this Rudraji replied that, as matters were now in a fair way of accommodation and from Fatesing's being near us might be the sooner brought to a conclusion, he desired their camp might for a few days remain in their present place, promising that the communication between this place and Surat, &ca should be opened. Although there is little faith to be put in the Marathas, yet as our Superiors direct us to use every conciliating means with Fatesing and not rashly enter into a war, the Chief for these reasons agreed to Rudraji's proposals; and he returned to the Maratha camp.

*Poona, 4th January,* 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1773
*Fatesing and Broach.*

*Fatesing near Broach*

This evening the mukaddam of pattemars informed me he had learnt from two kasids, who arrived from Broach in ten days, that Fatesing was quartered with 6,000 men within three kos of our battery at Jodesser [*Jharesar*], and that all communications whatever was stopped between Surat and Broach.[1]

*Broach, 4th January,* 1773 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662) 1773
*Dhunjishaw's mission.*

*Instructions*

Fatesing having sent proper passports for Dhunjishaw, and Rudraji agreeing to remain in town as an hostage for his return, he set out for the Maratha camp. On his departure the chief directed him to endeavour to prevail on Fatesing to accept from the Hon'ble Company a certain annual sum for his share of the revenue within the town and without; which if accepted, their having a chauki in the place would of course be unnecessary.

*Fatesing amenable*

In the evening Dhunjishaw returned from the Maratha camp and informed the Chief that Fatesing agreed to and confirmed what Rudraji had settled, namely that the Hon'ble Company should receive the share of the revenues called the Mogul's and Fatesing that collected by the Marathas for a number of years past; in short, everything to be on the same footing as when the English took Broach. But with respect to his receiving an annual pecuniary consideration for his share of the revenues, he desired time to consider of it; and that he would give a final answer to Dhunjishaw when he returned, which, he desires, might be in a day or two.

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 62.

1773 *Broach, 6th January,* 1773 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Dhunjishaw's mission.*

*Fatesing's request* Dhunjishaw waited on Fatesing, agreeable to his invitation. In the evening he returned and informed the Chief that Fatesing desired him to acquaint him that with respect to the proposal for the Hon'ble Company paying him an annual pecuniary consideration for his share of the revenues, he had not the least doubt of the punctuality and sincerity of the English; but, as things had been conducted otherwise for a series of years both in the time of his father and grandfather, the making any alteration therein now would be highly disorderly. On this account, therefore, he hopes to be excused; and as matters were now amicably adjusted, he, in order to put the finishing stroke to them, was desirous of a meeting with the Chief in a tent to be pitched between the two camps. Rudraji returned with Dhunjishaw and made the same proposal.

1773 *Poona, 7th January,* 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*)
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

*Bargaining with Poona* On the 3rd [*January*] he [*Ramaji Chitnis*] came; Broach and the pretentions this Government had to all the country in the Deccan was the subject; much was said pro and con; but the whole, I could preceive, tended to find out if we would part with it. I accordingly told him that, if they wanted the place and would point what advantages would arise therefrom to the Hon'ble Company, I would advise my Superiors therewith. He said the Darbar would in a day or two talk with me on this topic.

1773 *Broach, 7th January,* 1773 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Arrangements for a meeting with Fatesing.*

*Meeting* The Chief settled with Rudraji that the Chief, Colonel Gordon and Mr. Morley would meet Fatesing in the manner he proposed; and in order to prevent any disorder and confusion each party should bring no more than 200 men.

1773 *Broach, 8th January,* 1773 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Proposed interview.*

*Meeting place* Captain McLellar and Rudraji marked the ground where the tents were to be pitched for the proposed interview, which was settled should be the 10th instant.

*Negotiations with Fatesing.*

*Summary of events* The Chief acquaints the Board that ever since our last address to the Hon'ble President and Council under the 5th instant, he has been negotiating with Fatesing in order to bring affairs to accommodation with him. For this purpose Dhunjishaw, at his (Fatesing's) request, had twice been sent out to his camp, and that Rudraji, his vakil had been frequently with the Chief to treat on this subject; and that at length it has been agreed that everything should remain on its former footing as advised to our Superiors under the 23rd ultimo, *viz.* that the English should receive the part of the revenues collected by

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona,* 66.

the late Nawab, and the Marathas continue to recover what was customary for them to collect; that this was the basis of the agreement; and in order to adjust finally all lesser points and establish affairs on a permanent footing Rudraji was to be left in town a week, or longer if necessary, for that purpose. That in order to put the finishing stroke to this agreement Fatesing had requested that the Chief would meet him in a tent pitched between the two camps, when a writing to the above effect would be reciprocally executed by both parties ; which the Chief had consented to; and to-morrow morning being pitched upon for this interview, the Chief proposes that Colonel Gordon and Mr. Morley should accompany him, and that Mr. Cheape shall be left in charge of the town, which is accordingly approved. The Chief further observes that upon Dhunjishaw's going to the Maratha camp he had orders from him to propose to Fatesing the receiving from the Hon'ble Company an annual pecuniary consideration in lieu of their share of the revenues; and that, if he accepted it, their having a chauthia in the town would be unnecessary; that to this Fatesing replied he had not the least doubt of the sincerity and punctuality of the English; but, as things had been conducted otherwise for so long a series of years in the time of his father and grandfather, his assenting to such a proposal would be highly discreditable to him in the eyes of the Country Powers, and that on this consideration he desired to be excused.

*Attack disavowed*

The Chief further informs the Board that in a discourse with Rudraji he had taken the opportunity to inform him of the insolence of some gallivats belonging to Bilimora in attacking one of the Hon'ble Company's cruisers; and that, if a stop was not put to those insolences in future, the Chief would be under the necessity of ordering those gallivats to be destroyed without any ceremony. In answer to which Rudraji told him he might act as he pleased; that the place was farmed out to Shivram Gopal, and that he employed these gallivats without his Master's approbation.

*One-year treaty*

With respect to our Superiors' commands of the 29th ultimo, received the 7th instant, directing us to enter into a treaty with Fatesing for one year only, by which means they hope it will [*not*] be necessary to form alliances with the neighbouring Country Powers, the Board observe that the agreement with Fatesing was too far advanced before receipt of those commands to admit of any innovation being made; and that, if any fresh difficulties had been started, it might have been the means of breaking off the treaty entirely, or at least of protacting it for such a length of time as to have prevented us from collecting the revenues of this year at least That as we expect everything will be now settled without forming any alliances with the Country Powers, we hope no inconvenience will arise from this unavoidable deviation from their orders.

*Presents*

Fatesing having expressed a strong desire to have one of the elephants presented him as a mark of credit and distinction, and as the same is as cheap a present as can be made him, it is agreed to, and the value put on him [*is*] rated at 6,000. Exclusive of this, some horses, kincobs and other articles will be unavoidably necessary to be presented to his relations, ministers and officers.

1773 *Broach, 12th January, 1773 (1772/73, S. F. 662)*
*Meeting with Fatesing.*

*Interview with Fatesing* This morning about nine o'clock the Chief, accompanied by Colonel Gordon and Mr. Morley, and escorted by 200 men proceeded to the tents in order to have an interview with Fatesing. About eleven he arrived with almost his whole army. But this did not in the least alarm us, the Colonel having made such a disposition of the troops that we could almost instantly be supported. After the usual compliments and many professions of friendship an agreement was mutually entered into and sealed with the seal of the Hon'ble Company and that of Fatesing, stipulating that everything should remain in every respect exactly as when the Hon'ble Company got possession of Broach, they receiving the Mogul's share of the revenues, and Fatesing the Marathas' share. He was very pressing with the Chief to enter into an alliance offensive and defensive; but, as this might have involved the Hon'ble Company in difficulties with respect to the Peshwa and other Country Powers, it was waved. After being presented with the elephant, and his officers with horses, kincobs, shawls, as particularised in the cash account, he returned to his camp.

*Agreement between William Andrew Price, Esqr., Chief for all affairs of the British nation, in behalf of the Hon'ble United English East India Company on the one part, and Fatesing Gaikwad on the other part.*

*Treaty with Fatesing 12-1-1773* The town of Broach, lately belonging to Masud Khan Nawab, having been conquered by the victorious arms of the Hon'ble Company, it is stipulated and agreed that everything shall remain on the footing it was at the time of the said conquest. The English and Fatesing, each, receiving their share of the revenues in the proportion they then stood, both within the town [*and the*] territory annexed thereto. In this there is not to be any difference; agreeable to the above everything is to continue. This is the agreement sealed by both the parties. The 12th day, January, 1773, is the 18th of Shawal in the 1186 year of Hijra.

1773 *Broach, 13th January, 1773 (1772/73, S. F. 662)*
*Letter to Bombay.*

*Interview with Fatesing* We paid our respects to Your Honour, &ca last under the 5th instant and then mentioned that affairs were in a fair way of being soon amicably settled with Fatesing. We are now to acquaint you that yesterday the Chief, accompanied by Colonel Gordon and Mr. Morley, had an interview with him at a tent pitched between the two camps.

*Treaty with Fatesing* And we have the pleasure to acquaint you that an agreement was mutually sealed by both the parties, specifying that matters should remain exactly in the same situation as in the time of the late Nawab, namely that the Hon'ble Company should receive the same share of the revenues as was collected by him [*the Nawab*] and Fatesing his proportion as formerly; and that in order to adjust every particular and settle affairs on a permanent footing, Rudraji Bapu, his vakil, is to come to town for five or six days or longer if necessary. We expect that the Maratha army will decamp in a few days, when we shall make the necessary arrangements for returning to the Presidency and

Surat, as the springs serve, the whole supernumerary troops not wanted for this garrison with the three vessels, freighted boats, &ca under convey of the *Revenge* and *Eagle*

*Surat*, 15*th January*, 1773 (1773, *S. F.* 663) 1773

*Letter from Surat to Bombay.*

*Peace with Fatesing*

We have the pleasure to acquaint you that Mr. Price had advised Mr. Gambier of his having settled a peace with Fatesing, who has declared to him his intention of decamping on Sunday or Monday next; and Mr. Price writes that he has already sent away part of his forces. We think it necessary just to mention this to you, though we make no doubt of your being by direct dispatches from Broach informed of all transactions there.

*Poona*, 16*th January*, 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1773

*Poona and Broach.*

*Poona anxious to get Broach*

The Chitnis this morning paid me a visit; and as he had been informed by the linguist of what had passed between Sakharam Bapu and me. I desired he would acquaint me with the Darbar's real intentions; for from the messages I had received from him I understood Narayanrao wanted Broach.[1] He replied it was true; and whatever Fatesing offered, he would give. I told him it was not clear if the Hon'ble Company would part with it at all. But he might be assured, if Fatesing offered what could be accepted, and once settled with us, Narayanrao would not get the place; for we never receded from our word; therefore, if this Court was really anxious about it, they had best declare themselves; for this shuffling behaviour was by no means a proper way for them to obtain their ends He said he would privately acquaint Narayanrao and would let me know his answer; I then asked him [*the Chitnis*] whether the Darbar, as Sakharam said, meant to write Fatesing to cease hostilities. He said the Darbar do intend to write, but Sakharam wished the town to remain in our hands and the country to be possessed by Fatesing. I replied, if Sakharam thought we should give up even an inch of the territories that belonged to the late Nawab when we took the city, he certainly would find himself much mistaken; and as to my writing my Superiors to cease quarrelling with Fatesing was needless; for, if he did not molest us, we should not meddle with him. Before he went away, I requested to know whether Ponderah &ca were actually to join Fatesing, and if they went with leave of this Darbar. He said those that were gone, were all servants of Fatesing's, and therefore wanted to leave from this Court. I told him it was impossible any people could go without leave; for, if, as they pretended, Fatesing was actually a servant of theirs, he could not order them away without their approbation; to this he made no reply, but soon after left me.[2]

1 The treaty of the 12th January, 1773, with Fatesing left the disposal of Broach an open question. But, as the treaty acknowledged Fatesing's share in the revenue, Broach could no longer be disposed of without taking into account Fatesing's claims.

2 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 73-74.

1773 *Bombay, 20th January,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Letter from Broach.*

*Bombay disappointed* Read likewise the advices from the Chief and Factors at Broach extracted above. We are much concerned that they have not been able to conclude matters with Fatesing on terms much more advantageous than has been done, though for the present we must acquiesce in it.

1773 *Broach, 21st January,* 1773 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Letter to Bombay.*

*Fatesing retires* We send this express to advise you that yesterday Fatesing broke up his camp and with his whole army retired towards Baroda.

1773 *Broach, 23rd January,* 1773 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662)
*Letter to Bombay.*

*Excuses* Enclosed is a translate of an agreement entered into with Fatesing in regard to his and the Hon'ble Company's share of the revenue of Broach and its territories. We wish we could have complied with your directions for confining the agreement for one year only, by which means you were in the hopes the forming of alliances with the Country Powers would [*not*] be necessary; but our agreement with Fatesing was too far advanced before the receipt of the said orders for us to make any innovation therein; for, if the fresh difficulties had been started, it would have alarmed Fatesing, and by giving him doubt of our sincerity might have caused the treaty to have been entirely broken off or protracted to such a length as might have prevented us from collecting the out-revenues for this year at least; and as we have accommodated matters without forming any alliances with the Country Powers, we hope no inconvenience will arise from this unavoidable deviation from your orders.

1773 *Poona, 28th January,* 1772 (*Mostyn's Diary*)
*Extract from a letter from Thomas Mostyn, British Envoy at Poona, to William Hornby, the President.*

*Poona wants Broach* He [*Ramaji Chitnis*] told me Narayanrao was desirous of Broach and was ready to pay our expenses or whatever Fatesing had offered. I replied, he before told me this, when I acquainted him, if Narayanrao waited until we had settled terms with Fatesing, he would never get it; since when, I had not heard a word about it; but now we had accommodated matters, his Master had opened his eyes and wanted us to give it up to him. He said it was owing to the hurry of business they had in hand and the preparations for the wedding prevented it. I told him I knew it was no such thing; that they with pleasure saw the dispute between Fatesing and us, and rejoiced to see us cutting one another's throats, that we might be weakened, and Fatesing more obedient; and that this was the true reason I had certain proof; for to my knowledge it was only two days ago that they wrote Fatesing he had acted very improperly in making peace with us, contrary to their advice and particularly as their servant in doing it without their consent or approbation, and even intimated they expected he would break it. He denied the Darbar's having wrote any such letter. I told him it might be probable the Darbar had not wrote, but

one of their ministers had, which was the same thing; for he would not have presumed to do it without their consent, and if this was the case, they had better be open and tell us at once they meant to break with us. He assured me it was not their intention to break down with us, but it was Narayanrao's request now I would write my Superiors and procure their answer. I did not venture to tell him plainly our wishes, knowing nothing can be accomplished while the Darbar is so much divided, and the Prince not his own master. However I told him I was clear the Company would not hear about the expenses for a place of that importance, and hinted an exchange as the most likely means to get it. But I would, agreeable to Narayanrao's request, write about it, though I believed it would be to little purpose.[1]

*Bombay, 28th January, 1773 (Mostyn's Diary)* 1773
*William Hornby to Thomas Mostyn.*

*Compromise with Fatesing*

As we have already advised you of the success of our arms against the town of Broach, we deem it also necessary to acquaint you for your information that Fatesing with his forces, who for some time had lain before the place, has at length decamped, the Chief and Factors having compromised matters with him; and by an agreement, which has been mutually signed, he is to receive the same share of the revenues as he enjoyed before we took the place.[2]

*Bombay, 2nd February,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63) 1773
*At a Consultation.*

*Bombay dissatisfied*

The conduct of the Chief and Factors regarding their agreement with Fatesing not to be commended, but acquiesced in for the present.

This agreement is so loosely drawn up, so very inconclusive and so liable in every respect to objection[3] that we must much discommend their conduct regarding it. Many disputes to making the collections of the revenues will probably arise now, of which [*we*] have endeavoured to guard against: as they, however, have concluded it, we must for the present acquiesce in it.

*Broach, 3rd February,* 1773 (1772/73, *S. F.* 662). 1773
*At a Consultation.*

*First difficulties*

Upon Fatesing breaking up his camp and retiring towards Baroda, it had been settled with him that Rudraji Bapu, his vakil, together with Lallubhai and Jamiat Roy should in two or three days return to town for adjusting the mode and proportions of collecting the revenues, etc. That Fatesing since his departure had repeatedly given the Chief the same assurances, but that those people were not arrived. That having heard the Marathas, when before the place, had collected from the districts for the expense of their army, 60,000 Rupees, and had moreover summoned the patels of the villages for collecting their share thereof, he had wrote in very strong terms to Rudraji, complaining on this account of irregularity and breach of friendship,

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona,* 86-87.
2 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona,* 92.
3 The apprehensions were well founded, as is evidenced by the subsequent events.

which, if not immediately put a stop to, might be attended with serious consequences. In answer to which Rudraji had given him the strongest assurances he had not meant to make any collection separate from us. That the money taken from the districts, when their army was before the place, would be accounted for in their shares; and that he had sent for the patels with no other view but to take the account from them. Nevertheless, as it is reported that [*some*] of the patels have been carried to a place called Padra, and small sums taken from them, the season elapsing fast, and Rudraji not yet returned, it is resolved the Collector [be] empowered (if he Rudraji does not arrive in four or five days) to summon the most considerable patels and commence the recovery of the Hon'ble Company's share of the pargana; and of this our resolution the Chief is desired to inform Rudraji, which, we judge, will be a means of hastening his coming to town, as we do not wish to precipitate matters, but that, on our first setting out, everything should be by mutual participation and agreement.

*Bombay, 9th February,* 1773 (1773 *P. D. Let. to C. of Dir,* 20)
*The President and Council of Bombay to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

*Broach affairs*

26 In our address of the 8th ultimo, we acquainted Your Honours that Fatesing and his forces then lay before the town of Broach; we also informed you of the offers which he had made for the entire cession of the town and territory, which we rejected as inadequate to the value of them; and we at the same time advised you that we flattered ourselves the directions we had given to your servants at Broach would enable them to settle with him amicably, so that his forces would shortly be withdrawn from before the town.

*Plan of a one-year treaty*

27 Your Honours will see our reasons at large from the directions we have from time to time given to your servants; and by the relation we received from Broach, showing the rise of the claim of Fatesing's predecessor to the share he demands in the Broach revenue, you will be acquainted with the grounds upon which we were induced to admit of it; and we the rather acquiesced therein, as we judged it not by any means for Your Honours' interest to enter into a war with him; and a war appeared to be inevitable, should we have refused to admit his claim. The harvest also was then upon the grounds, from which the revenues are made good; and had the country become the theatre of a war, the greatest part of it must inevitably have been destroyed; for these reasons, and because we earnestly wish as well as for your interest as because it is your orders to avoid hostile measures, we directed your servants to settle with him on the best terms in their power for the present, without seeming to have any authority from us to do; which they were to assign as the reason why the treaty was to be in force for one year only; for we had hopes upon this plan to have it in our power to embrace the first favourable opportunity of adjusting matters upon more advantageous terms than seemed likely then to be the case. Our minutes of consultation under the 28th of December will particularly explain the same to Your Honours, and the relation above-mentioned is entered under that date,

*Treaty with Fatesing*

28 Directions agreeable to the above were sent to the Chief under the 29th of December which was the day after the receipt of their ad-

vices, upon which we had come to these resolutions. In a letter received from them dated the 20th ultimo, they acquaint us that the Chief had an interview with Fatesing, and that an agreement had been mutually signed, specifying that matters were to remain exactly in the same situation as in the time of the late Nawab, namely that the Hon'ble Company should receive the same share of the revenues as was collected by the Nawab and Fatesing his proportion as formerly.

29 On the 28th ultimo we received a translate of this agreement; and they then for the first time acquainted us that they wished they would have complied with our directions for confining the agreement to one year; but that, when our orders arrived, it was too far advanced upon the present plan for them even to propose any deviation, as they expressed their apprehension that such a proposal might have alarmed Fatesing, and have caused the treaty, as they term it, to be entirely broken off. *Broach excuses*

30 A copy of the translate of this paper is enclosed under No. 58, on which we esteem it necessary to remark that it appears very liable to objection; for it is so closely drawn up, and is so totally inconclusive that future disputes may very probably arise. We, however, for the present must acquiesce in it. Fatesing has broken up his camp and retired toward Baroda, his capital; and it thereby becoming unnecessary that any greater part of the force, which was sent against the place, should remain, than what had been recommended by the Committee as a proper garrison for its defence, it has accordingly been returned hither with Colonel Gordon, to whom the command of the forces has devolved by the death of the late Brigadier-General : and we have admitted him to a seat at our Board on military matters, agreeable to what we esteemed to be your Honours' intentions in such like cases. *Treaty accepted*

32 No general account of the plunder and booty taken in the town has yet been received. The sum found in specie amounts to about Rupees 1,20,000, and the agents, Messrs Morley and Cheape, whom we had appointed for collecting the whole, have sent us upon the *Revenge* 7 chests containing pieces of fine goods, dresses, and some jewels, which we shall shortly dispose of at outcry. A part of the plunder has been already sold at Broach, but yet we have not received the particulars of it. The public stores such as gun-powder, shot, etc. taken in the place, are very inconsiderable. Messrs Gordon and Wats in their letter dated the 18th of November proposed, as the place was taken by storm, that the property of the town should rest in the captors; as they represented to be in such case usual. As we could not, however, on Your Honours' account acquiesce in this, we therefore, acquainted them that it should be distributed agreeable to your latest orders on the subject, as mentioned in their instructions dated the 1st of November; and we then explained to them what was to be considered as plunder, and gave particular and express directions for the protection of all persons not found in arms against us, as Your Honours will see noticed in our minutes under the 27th of November as well as in our letter of that date to the Committee: and should you have any directions to give upon this subject, in consequence of the Committee's expectations, different from your last orders respecting plunder and booty, we shall exactly obey them on their being signified to us. *Distribution of plunder*

*Revenue* 34 While we are treating upon matters respecting Broach, we esteem it necessary just to observe that in our address of the 2nd of December we informed you that the annual revenues of the conquered town and country amounted to about 7 lakhs of Rupees between Your Honours and Fatesing. This account was received from Mr. Price, while at Surat. But in a letter, dated the 27th of December, signed by himself and Colonel Gordon at Broach, they advise that from the best account they could then procure the Hon'ble Company's and Fatesing's shares together would not exceed three lakhs of Rupees this season, on account of the scarcity of rain that had fallen during the last monsoon. We cannot account for this extraordinary difference; and as it appears that a great part of the revenue arises from various imports not at all dependent on the rain, we, therefore, flatter ourselves that this last account will be found erroneous.

*Cambay, 10th February,* 1773, (1773 *S. F.* 663)
*John Torlesse to the Chief at Surat.*

*Fatesing threatens Cambay* The Marathas are within one kos from us (on this side of Nisshaw) and to this moment have not sent a man to the Nawab to declare their reasons for commencing hostilities. They burn and plunder all the villages belonging to Cambay and give out that they are writing for the rest of their people and their artillery coming up to lay close siege, and that they are determined to carry the place.

Our Nawab is much frightened and with reason, as he has discharged almost all his troops and is apparently in great want of cash. He sits upon one of his bastions and scarcely knows what he says or does.

The people in town are also much alarmed, and every one says that, if Fatesing is really serious, Cambay must fall. Their army consists at present of about 6,000 horse and about 500 foot, and is daily increasing. They have also about 2,000 freebooters in their camp, who have no other pay than the plunder of the places they may take, and who have been very mischievous in destroying even the very women and children of the villages they have burnt and plundered within these three days.

*Reinforcements* As this is the case, I must beg leave to request you will send me a guard of about 150 men to protect the factory, Company's money, cloth investments and arrangers [?] as likewise myself and people under our protection, also a proper quantity of ammunition and stores proper for the detachment; for, although the Marathas may not openly pretend to have a right to destroy or plunder our factory, yet their army, when they enter the town, will no doubt lay their hands on everything they can find and [*will*] hardly be restrained, unless they are repelled.

*Distress* The brokers intend sending away all their family to Surat as soon as possible and remaining only here themselves. It is impossible to describe the exquisite distress of the poor wretches, whose villages have just been plundered by the Marathas; the poor creatures with their wives and children lie without the town-wall with the earth for their bed and the open sky their covering, half dead with fear and hunger, and the poor people in this unfortunate town do not look much better.

*Surat*, 21*st February*, 1773 (1773 *S. F.* 663) 1773
*Letter from Surat to Bombay.*

*Fatesing threatens Cambay*

By a letter the Chief has received from the Resident of Cambay, we are informed that Fatesing is within a kos of that place, burning and plundering the villages belonging to it without signifying to the Nawab any reason whatever for this act of hostility. But from report he, the Resident, learns Fatesing is only waiting for his artillery and a reinforcement of troops to lay close siege to the town; and as he is very apprehensive it may fall, has requested a reinforcement from us to protect the Honble Company's factory and effects. We have, therefore, determined to send him a detachment of thirty sepoys with their officers, as soon as the springs will admit, to secure our Hon'ble Masters' property at that place; which we think will be sufficient.

The Chief will write a suitable letter to Fatesing on this account.

*Surat*, 23*rd February*, 1773 (1773 *S. F.* 663) 1773
*At a Consultation.*

*Rudraji's terms*

Read a letter from the Resident and Factors at Broach, with the extract from their diary, advising that Rudraji was at Broach, but had absolutely refused permitting of Lallubhai's[1] coming there without a bandari was first given that he should be returned to Fatesing at any time he should require; and that, notwithstanding Rudraji's assurances, the people under his direction had obliged some of the patels of the Broach parganas to go to Padra, were endeavouring to assemble the others in the same place in order to oblige them to pay what they were indebted to the Government for the produce of their lands. In answer to which the Resident had represented to Rudraji the impropriety of his behaviour, &ca as particularly advised in the above-mentioned papers entered under this date.

*Rudraji's letter*

The Chief then lays before the Board, as entered hereafter, translate of a letter he received from Rudraji, noting the conference he had with the Resident and the reasons which put it out of his power to comply with his desires. Nevertheless that he had offered him that Lallubhai should remain in Broach for four months for certain, on the bandari being given him to the fore-mentioned purport, of which, it is remarked, the gentlemen at Broach have not made any mention; and Rudraji further writes he hopes this measure will be consented to.

*Surat board's decision*

All which being seriously taken into consideration, the Board are of opinion that, as Lallubhai had formally taken the protection of Fatesing and never absolutely received that of the Hon'ble Company he is certainly to be considered as a subject of his; and that his permitting him, therefore, to come in to give us an account of the revenues of Broach is to be looked on as a mark of friendship: and as Rudraji agrees that Lallubhai shall stay for certain four months in Broach, for the purpose required of settling the collections of revenues, [*this*] will be in great measure answered; and on his return the Resident and Factors say the collection of those revenues from the pargana depends; therefore we cannot see any ill consequences can arise from giving Rudraji the bandari he desires, excepting that Lallubhai from being

1 Lallubhai's coming to Broach to assist in the revenue settlement is first mentioned on the 21st December, 1772. See also 31st December, 1772; 3rd February, 1772.

the person chiefly employed in the collection of the revenues may, when sent for by Fatesing, be so much engaged in accounts with our Hon'ble Masters, as to render his presence of consequence to us ; but this we think may easily be avoided by a very small sum only being permitted to remain in his hands and the accounts with him regularly kept up.

The Board accordingly resolve that one [*bandari*] agreeable to that following this Consultation be sent to the gentlemen at Broach to be delivered to him; and this, we hope, will remove every difficulty and inconvenience.

*Translate of a letter from Rudraji Bapu, received the 22nd February, 1773.*

*Rudraji's complaints*

At your pressing influence for my speedily coming to Broach I settled with Karsondas, Desai of Baroda and brought Lallubhai and Jamiat Roy with me. Upon my leaving Fatesing he directed me to require security for Lallubhai and a bandari under the Company's seal to be sent to him. On this account I was detained seven days at Baroda, but at your influence I in haste came to Pandrah; there, hearing you were gone to Surat, I sent to Dhunjishaw to come to me; to which he replied: you come to Broach. I accordingly came to Broach and had a meeting with Dhunjishaw, to whom I acquainted all particulars, who waited on Mr. Morley and told him my desire for the bandari. Mr Morley would not accept it. Upon this I went myself to Mr. Morley and told him it was with the greatest difficulty I had prevailed on Fatesing to permit Lallubhai to come with me, and then on condition that Karsondas, Desai of Baroda, should be security for him, and that I would obtain a bandari under the Company's seal; which I was bound to Fatesing ; on these terms I had the Row's liberty to bring him with me to settle the sums that were to be received from the parganas, when I found Mr. Morley would not attend to what I proposed. I was then under a necessity of agreeing that Lallubhai and Jamiat Roy should stay at Broach four months for settling everything in regard to the parganas and recovering the money from thence, and then Lallubhai should be sent to Fatesing. This proposal Mr. Morley also would not accept and plainly told me that a place could not be maintained. This is not right. When Fatesing was before Broach and you in the place, there was little respect of matters being accommodated. But having an eye to your friendship, affairs were settled; and now to make a difference about a trifle is not right.

*Rudraji's proposal*

For this reason I have sent a fresh draught of a bandari which, I request, you will approve of and honour it with the Company's seal, and likewise write to Fatesing that on account of friendship you had granted this bandari, that this bandari and Karsondas [*as*] security may both go to Fatesing, that I may then bring Lallubhai and Jamiat Roy into town, and the collection from the parganas be provided in.

*Translate of the bandari prepared by Rudraji.*

*Rudraji's bandari*

Fatesing having sent Lallubhai Bhookhandas Majmudar, along with Rudraji to settle the revenues from the parganas belonging to Broach, if therefore, Fatesing should at any time want the said Lal-

lubhai to be sent to him with Fatesing's pandit at Broach, he is to be sent to him. In this there is to be no delay or impediment. For this the Company give their bandari, and should Lallubhai after his coming into town make any difficulty about returning to Fatesing, the Company are to oblige him to go.

*Translate of the bandari sent to Rudraji regarding Lallubhai.*

Fatesing having sent Lallubhai to Broach with Rudraji to settle everything regarding the parganas belonging to Broach, and having applied for a writing under the Company's seal that Lallubhai shall be sent to Fatesing when he wants him, in consideration of the friendship subsisting between him and the Hon'ble Company, a writing under the said seal is passed that at the expiration of four months Lallubhai shall, if Fatesing then desires it, be bona fide sent to him.

*Surat, 24th February,* 1773 (1773, *S. F.* 663) 1773

*Letter from Surat to Broach.*

*Rudraji's terms accepted*

We are to acquaint you that, as Lallubhai has formally taken the protection of Fatesing, he certainly must be considered as one of his subjects, never having absolutely received that of the Hon'ble Company. His being permitted, therefore, to come in to give us an account of the revenues belonging to Broach must be considered as a mark of friendship; and as we seem to think it will be out of your power to collect any part of the revenue without his assistance, and Rudraji has wrote to the Chief that Lallubhai shall have permission to come to Broach and remain for four months certain for settling the affairs of the pargana on a bandari being given, if after the expiration of that time he shall at any time be sent to Fatesing, when he desires it, we find ourselves under a necessity of giving them the bandari requested by Rudraji, which the Chief has accordingly forwarded to him, which, we hope, will remove every difficulty and inconvenience; the only one that can, we apprehend, arise is that Lallubhai from being the person chiefly employed in the collection of the revenues may, when sent for by Fatesing, be so much engaged in accounts with our Hon'ble Employers, as to make his presence of consequence to us. But this, we think, may easily be avoided by a very small sum only being kept in his hands, and the accounts with him constantly kept up.

*Cambay, 26th Febuary,* 1773 (1773, *S. F.* 663) 1773

*John Torlesse, to the Chief at Surat.*

*Danger at Cambay*

The detachment of thirty sepoys I have landed, but earnestly request you will please to order me at least twenty more; for, although Fatesing in consequence of the Chief's request may not disturb or lay hands on the factory in case the town should fall, yet as he has not the chief command, and the looters or freebooters of which there are upwards of 3,000 now in the Maratha camp, who are under no one's command will undoubtedly make a trial of what they can do for the first three or four hours, when thirty men will be too small a number to withstand them or take care of all parts of the house and compound at once, and fifty might repel them with a probality of success. You are, however, the best judges whether it will be worth while running any risk of the Company's factory effects, &ca here for the saving so

small an expense which an addition of twenty sepoys will be for a short time only, and which, if you will indulge me with, I shall be much obliged to you for; and you may depend upon it, I shall not keep them a moment longer than really and absolutely necessary.

I have not detained the armed boat, as it would prevent the trade from proceeding and your receiving some goods of the investment, nor would she have been of any other material service than the use of her detachment.

*Fatesing's share in the fight* Gunaji Appaji, a Brahman and subahdar of Gujarat, is the person who carried on the war with this Nawab by orders from Poona; and Fatesing is only an auxiliary. They have not yet drawn nearer than within one mile of the walls, and pretend to be treating with this Nawab, whilst their army is daily increasing. Thus much may be pronounced that, if the Gaikwads are hearty in the cause, the place must assuredly fall; but, if this Nawab can find means to buy them off, he may stand a very good chance of saving it. Khanderao has not yet joined the army, as he is at variance with his nephew, Fatesing, but it is given out in the Maratha camp that orders are coming from Poona for him to assist Gunaji Appaji in his operations against Cambay.

1773 *Bombay, 26th February,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Letter from Broach.*

*Lallubhai* Lallubhai has shown ever since we have been in possession of Broach a much stronger attachment to Fatesing than to the Hon'ble Company, though he has been repeatedly invited to return. It is, therefore, agreed that directions be sent for confiscating all the houses and effects of Lallubhai in Broach or its districts, in like manner as those of the Nawab's other adherents.

1773 *Bombay, 1st March,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Fatesing threatens Cambay* The Chief and Council advised that the Resident at Cambay has acquainted the Chief that Fatesing was within a kos of that place, burning and plundering the villages, without assigning the Nawab any reason for these acts of hostility; and it was reported that Fatesing was only waiting for his artillery and a reinforcement of troops to lay close siege to the town; in which case the Resident was apprehensive it might fall; and, therefore requested a reinforcement from thence to protect the Hon'ble Company's factory and effects; which the Chief and Council intended complying with by sending him a detachment of thirty sepoys with their officers.

1773 *Cambay, 3rd March,* 1773 (1773, *S. F.* 663)
*John Torlesse, to the Chief at Surat.*

*Cambay saved* The purport of this is chiefly to advise you that the Maratha army decamped yesterday, this Nawab having found means to gain Fatesing to his party, and which obliged Gunaji Appaji to settle matters for the present at least in no very advantageous manner. He has, however, done this pargana upwards of one lakh of Rupees worth

of damage, and gone with a resolution to carry his plan for taking Cambay yet into execution, as soon as his abilities will permit.

Fatesing and his army are said to be going against Nadrad, where his uncle Khanderao, resides, who has also made great hostile preparations, and it is thought they will not settle their disputes amicably.

*Bombay, 3rd March,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 14)
*At a Committee.*

The President acquaints the Committee that he has desired this meeting, purposely to lay before it a letter he has received from the Resident at Cambay, since the Council of this day broke up, which is now read; wherein the Resident gives his opinion of the critical situation of the Nawab's affairs and recounts the ravages committed by Fatesing and his army in the neighbourhood of the town; the situation of the Nawab, who is an old ally of the Hon'ble Company being considered together with his letter to the President upon the subject, this day laid before the Board and entered into their diary. *Fatesing threatens Cambay*

We are unanimously of opinion the supply of stores, it was resolved this day in council should be sent, is as large as his situation requires; especially as the Nawab in his letter to the President does not request any immediate assistance. It is, however, agreed that the stores be sent to Cambay with all possible expedition to be delivered to the Resident for the Nawab; and the former must be apprised of our intentions by express pattemars with directions to inform the Nawab thereof, but to take care at the same time that the Marathas obtain no intelligence of the assistance we send; and we hope the Nawab, being apprised of our intentions, will exert himself so as to hold out till the stores are received there. *English help*

As it appears from the Resident's advices that the Nawab has no persons in the town capable of managing his artillery, it is further agreed to send a few of our European gunners and a few artillery lascars.

*Bombay, 3rd March,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63) 1773
*Letter from the Nawab of Cambay.*

Read a letter from the Nawab of Cambay to the President, as entered hereafter, mentioning the present critical situation of his affairs by Fatesing and his army being before the town. The Board are unanimously of opinion that it is much for our Hon'ble Employers' real interest to support the Nawab, particularly since we have possession of Broach; and it is also observed that it is in some measure incumbent on us so to do from the readiness he showed to assist us when our forces were before the town, for which the Chief and Council have strongly recommended him to us. It is, therefore, agreed in his present exigency to send him a supply of such stores as we have reason to expect will be most serviceable to him; and it is accordingly agreed that the following stores be shipped off as soon as possible, which are to be delivered to the Resident at Cambay, every necessary precaution being used that the Marathas obtain no intelligence of it, *viz.* 10 six-pounder guns, 2,000 shot, 50 barrels of gunpowder, 100 grape-shot, 1 ton of lead. *Helping Cambay*

1773 *Bombay, 3rd March*, 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Translate of a letter from Momin Khan Bahadur, the Nawab of Cambay, without date and received the 22nd February*, 1773.

*Momin Khan's help* I had an intention to wait upon you and to inform you all the history regarding the above-mentioned post of Tulaji and my loss; but William Andrew Price, Esqr. sent a gallivat in the meantime, desiring I would go to him directly by her; and as he had a dispute with Fatesing Gaikwad at that time, and as I profess myself the Hon'ble Company's friend and well-wisher, I thought proper to go and join him, and did directly go to Broach. But before my arrival there, he had settled the above dispute, otherwise I would not have failed to assist him.

*Fatesing's anger* Fatesing Gaikwad is displeased at me on account of my going to Broach at the calling of Mr. Price, and intends quarrelling with me. He has joined to Appaji Gunaji, a nawab of the Gujarat subah, now at Ahmadabad from the Peshwa, and they have come very near, and will engage shortly. I will, thank God! defend myself for two months; but, if they shall remain for any time longer, I will in such case make my request to Your Honour for assistance, hoping you will grant me the same.

1773 *Bombay, 3rd March*, 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 14)
*Letter from Bombay to John Torlesse, Resident at Cambay.*

*Stores sent to Cambay* The President has communicated to us the purport of your letter to him, as also of one he has received from the Nawab, and it has been determined [*to send*] him such stores as from your letter we conclude to be most necessary; which will be accordingly shipped off with the utmost expedition; and we have no doubt but they will arrive in time to be of effectual use; for the Nawab does not paint his situation to be so very critical as it would appear to be from your letter. You are to acquaint the Nawab of our intention, enjoining him at the same time to keep it inviolably secret.

1773 *Surat, 7th March*, 1773 (1773, *S. F.* 663)
*At a Consultation.*

*Lallubhai* The Chief then acquaints us that by a private letter from the Resident he is informed that Rudraji is actually in Broach with Jamiat Roy and Lallubhai, and we, therefore, hope that by proper management every obstacle will be removed towards settling the collection of the pargana revenue in an easy equitable manner to the satisfaction of both parties.

1772 *Surat, 8th March*, 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 14)
*Letter from W. A. Price, Chief of Surat, to the President.*

*Proposal of Nawab of Cambay* When I was at Broach, the Nawab of Cambay made me some offers for purchasing the place, a translate whereof is enclosed. Upon my representing to him that security would be required for the payment of so large a sum, he replied that, when he returned to Cambay, he would hit upon expedients for satisfying me in this particular. But having heard nothing from him on the subject, owing I imagine to the difficulties he has been involved in with the Marathas, whose army being now decamped, I shall remind him of his promise. In the interim

I think it proper to forward his proposals to Your Honour, etc; and which I should have done before, had I not been in expectation of hearing from him on the subject of the security. At the same time I am pretty certain no person will be bound for him a Rupee; and believe the offer he has made was more through ostentation and to show his consequence than with any hopes of succeeding.

*Translate of a writing from the Nawab of Cambay, proposing to purchase Broach of the Hon'ble Company.*

I, Momin Khan, Nawab of Cambay, have made the following proposals to William Andrew Price, Esqr. for the town of Broach and its territories being delivered to me. *Proposal of Nawab of Cambay*

Upon the fort of Broach being delivered to me in the same manner the English took it, and such part of the revenues, as they have received, accounted for with me, I am content to pay the English Company nine lakhs of Rupees at the following stated payments. In confirmation whereof I have affixed my seal and delivered this writing to the said William Andrew Price, Esqr.

Four months after the place is delivered into my possession I agree to pay three lakhs of Rupees.

In one year after two lakhs of Rupees more.

At the expiration of another year two lakhs of Rupees more, and in one year after two lakhs more; so that the whole nine lakhs shall be cleared in three years and nine months.

*Surat*, 11*th March*, 1773 (1773, *S. F.* 663) 1773
*Letter from Broach to Surat.*

The 7th instant we received two papers from Rudraji, one wrote in the Persian, and the other in the Marathi language; translates of these (which, on account of the Gentoo holidays, could not be got ready before yesterday evening) are now transmitted to you; and we shall endeavour to settle with him regarding every article of them not yet determined on, in the best manner in our power. *Two memorandums*

*Poona*, 16*th March*, 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1773
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

They [*Haripant and Ramaji Chitnis*] desired to know my answer to their offers for Broach. I replied, as they had offered no more than what Fatesing had, and which had been rejected by Your Honour, &ca, what answer could they expect? They said where States were in amity with each other, trifles with respect to interest should be overlooked. I told them if they were trifles, why should they desire us to give them up, having an equal right to expect friendship from them.[1] *Poona wants Broach*

*Surat*, 14*th March*, 1773 (1773, *P.D.* 14) 1773
*William Price to the President.*

When I was at Broach Lallubhai informed me that both Ali Nawaz Khan and Anwer Ali Khan were desirous of purchasing Broach from the Hon'ble Company; that being at that time obliged to attend Fatesing's army, he could not be more particular, but would on his *Surat offers for Broach*

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 124.

return from Broach acquaint me with their offer; and that, whatever might be agreed on, he would become security for the payment. I have wrote to him, as soon as he has finished with Mr. Morley what regards the collection of the revenue from the parganas, to come to me, to confer on, and settle this business, which will be the easier and speedier done, as both the above persons are now here.

1773 *Bombay, 22nd March,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Fatesing's demands.*

*Fatesing's demands* Read two papers of memorandums of demands made by Rudraji in behalf of Fatesing as entered hereafter.

1773 *Bombay, 23rd March,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Broach made dependent on Bombay.*

*Broach subject to Bombay* Affairs at Broach appearing from the advices before the Board to be in so confused and critical a state, the President observed he esteemed it highly necessary that a Member of the Board should proceed thither for presiding in the management of the Hon'ble Company's interests in Broach and its dependencies; and he accordingly proposed the same to the Board; in which they unanimously concurred, and resolved that it should in future be a chiefship subject only to the orders and control of the Presidency and perfectly independent of the city and Council at Surat.

1773 *Bombay, 23rd March,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Fatesing's demand.*

*Fatesing's demands* First memorandum of demands made by Rudraji in behalf of Fatesing.

Memorandum of sundries necessary to be mentioned, relative to the affairs of Raosahib Subahdar, in Broach and its parganas. Relative to the town, *viz.*

1st We must be allowed to have the Pandit's house, his stable and a building on the right hand side of my Darbar, which for a long time belonged to us and was taken by the Nawab with our[1] leave. There is a shed also near the river, which belongs to us and we desire may be restored.

2nd Whatever fines may be levied by the faujdar shall be equally divided between us, and whenever it may be necessary to send for any one, in consequence of a complaint lodged against him, it must be done by mutual consent, and people belonging to us as well as you must be employed therein, neither of us alone shall send people for such purposes, and no decision of a cause shall be kept secret.

3rd Money collected at the phurja, mirbar, nakas, ghats and ath gav vagaire[2] shall be equally divided every night.

4th All fines levied in the parganas shall be equally divided, and the thanadars of the two sarkars shall act jointly. Should any Grassia, guilty of a misdemeanor, be carried to one of the thanas or brought to town, the affair shall be examined into and decided by the two sarkars jointly.

1 Perhaps the passage should read *without leave.*
2 These names stand respectively for . the sea custom-house, the harbour-master's office, posts, landing places for boats, eight villages.

5th The mint to be equally shared between us, and the chest in which the money stamps are kept shall be sealed by us both; no business to be done there, unless people belonging to both of us are present.

6th The Kotwali Jharesar gate and Mojampor thana to be equally divided, and people belonging to both sarkars shall be at each of those places and nothing to be done at any of them without both our consents.

7th We shall have people at Kaul chauki[1] and the tree, in the same manner as you have at the river-side, to collect duties there as usual, and we may have our people at Bholau village if we choose it, and both our thanadars must go to and come from that side of the river at the same time.

8th The collections at Mandvi, Bhagakot, Jharesar, Bhadbut and Sakarpor gates to be equally divided between the two sarkars.

9th The collections at nakas, gullamandwi,[2] Umjid Baug, Kotwali chauki and Mojampor to be equally shared, and the people belonging to both of us shall sit there together, and what they receive be equally divided.

10th At the two gates there shall be a general order at all times to admit our foot-sepoys not exceeding 25 in a body, or horsemen not more than 10 together, all Brahmans and pandits without any application to you, but should more want to come in at one time, your leave shall be asked, except for Brahmans, who must never be stopped. However, on further consideration, we shall be satisfied that 10 foot-sepoys or 5 horsemen at a time shall come in or go out by my leave only.

11th Whatever pandit may reside here, he shall have 500 foot-sepoys and 100 horsemen, or at least 460 foot-sepoys and 40 horsemen, who may come in and go out with the pandit's leave only. They will be wanted for the following services, *viz.*

| | |
|---|---|
| maljapti and havaldary[3] | 175 sepoys, |
| 8 thanas | 150 sepoys, |
| town and phurja | 185 sepoys and 40 horsemen. |

12th No boats to be employed on the river but by our joint permission; any of our people, goods, pandits or horsemen, coming to that phurja with our dustuks, shall pass without asking your permission and just as they please.

13th Any goods belonging to our sarkar of one or two thousand Rupees worth, that may be sent from, or come to the town, or passing at any place, shall on no account to be stopped.

14th Should any Grassia fly to town for protection, in consequence of any misdemeanor he may have elsewhere committed, protection cannot be allowed him but by our mutual consent, or should any Grassia who has robbed or injured any places belonging to us or the Peshwa apply to you for protection, he shall not be allowed to come into town, at least without a parwanah under both our seals.

15th My mutasaddi, karkun, sepoys, their families or any other of our people residing here must never in any shape be molested,

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1 Post for giving permits.

2 Nakas: exports ; gullamandwi: octroi on grain.

3 Maljapti: attachment of property ; havaldary: a charge for watch and ward.

nor prevented passing or repassing at the gates. God forbid that any disagreement shall happen between the two sarkars; but should it ever be the case, none of our people are to be hindered from going away when they choose it. This we must be assured of.

16th You shall never molest any of the Peshwa's places, nor raise any disputes with their people; and whatever was usually paid by any of them to the Moguls, that only you shall demand.

17th Whatever was customary in the Moguls' time respecting tailors, bricklayers and carpenters, we shall continue to practise. Relative to the parganas, *viz.*

1st Of the following taxes we shall receive 6/10 and you 4/10, *viz.* every article of the jamabandi

gada vera [*tax on carts*].
karkun patti [*levy for clerks*]
darbar khurch [*office expenses*]
khot vera [*assessment to make up deficit*]
dasara patti [*levy for dasara*] of which we usually receive a trifle more.

2nd The following are to be equally divided, *viz.*
sukhdi vera, kamai vera, vejeat, thandari, havaldary and maljapti.[1]

3rd The produce of the undermentioned belong entirely to us, *viz.* khai vera [*levy for the moat*]
dhaman vera tanksal [*tax on blacksmiths and mint*]
sadir varid [*fees from people coming and going by foot-tracks*].

4th Of the following, each of us shall receive an equal share the whole amounting to about 15,000 Rupees, *viz.* ghaun vera, kurby vera, sootar vera, chamda vera, and raza vera[2].

5th The jamabandi of the Surat villages shall be settled at our cutcherry, and the proportion thereof which belongs to each of us shall be settled at your cutcherry; the money to be collected by each sarkar separately and the pargana business to go on as usual. Either of us may at any time send for the patels as formerly.

6th. Our people and those belonging to you at the thanas shall not disagree. Pipalia thana belonged wholly to the Moguls, and Padra thana belongs entirely to our sarkar, the other thanas we shall share in equally, and at these your people and those belonging to us shall sit at one place and they shall act jointly in levying fines, collecting money and receiving their usual sukhdi.

7th The notes, sent to the parganas for permitting goods to be removed or taken away, shall be under both our seals. Havaldary and maljapti sepoys shall not be sent by either of us alone, and they shall act jointly when employed.

8th Nimaksar[3] near kadodras we shall each share in equally with the other.

The foregoing is a true translate of a paper received from Rudraji, wrote in the Persian language, with Fatesing's seal affixed thereto.

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1 These names stand respectively for : levy for perquisites, levy on incomes, cash assessment, levy for thana, a charge for watch and ward, attachment of property.

2 These names stand respectively for : tax on wheat, tax on fodder, tax on yarn, tax on leather, fee for giving permission to build.

3 Saltpans receipt. All the explanations either as footnotes or between square brackets were supplied by Baroda.



SAYAJIRAO I

Second memorandum or demands made by Rudraji in behalf of Fatesing. *Second memorandum*

Memorandum of sundries relative to the affairs of sarkar of Sayajirao Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur at Broach, dated the 7th March, 1773.

1st That from the day of the English took possession of Broach until the agreement entered into with Fatesing by the English we incurred an additional expense of 12,000 Rupees, the half of which is to be repaid us by the Hon'ble Company.

2nd That an agreement was made with the Hon'ble Company's seal affixed thereto that affairs should go on as in the Nawab's time.

3rd That Mr. Price passed a bandari under the Company's seal that Lallubhai should be sent to us after the month called Test (May) next.

4th That, should we send for both Jamiat Roy Desai and Lallubhai, the English will have no objection to send them back.

5th That our former privileges at the phurja and gates be allowed.

6th That any of the late Nawab's relations, connections, attendants, &ca, who may be in the town, be sent out of it

7th That, should any effects or anything else of the Nawab's or any of his relations or attendants be found here, they must be equally divided between us, that we retain all the money we have hitherto taken in the villages, and the English retain all the plunder they have hitherto found in Broach.

8th That having agreed, when we came into Broach, that the Haji Imani gate should be opened, it must be done accordingly, which will be a convenience to the inhabitants in the town as well as to us.

9th That the Nawab having erected a building on a piece of ground belonging to us, which he promised to restore, we must have it accordingly.

10th That there were many sheds belonging to [*us*] near the town, which must be permitted to be rebuilt.

11th That the Company have agreed, whatever was customary in the Mogul's time shall be practised in future; and that Lallubhai and whoever may be our gumashta or pandit here shall not be detained whenever they choose to leave the town.

12th That the power of examining into the produce of the lands in the parganas rests entirely with us; we shall alone determine what every village shall pay, agreeable to which you are to receive your proportion as usual.

13th That whatever fines be levied in the town phurja or parganas shall be equally divided between us without either party endeavouring to deceive the other.

14th That, should any persons inform you of any malpractices committed by us, he is not to be believed; but in such a case we shall meet together to examine into the same; on our part we agree to act in like manner respecting your people.

15th Should we want any artificers that are inhabitants of Broach, we may send for them agreeable to the practice in the Nawab's time.

16th That no patel or other inhabitants of the villages shall be sent for but by a note sealed by us both; and no fine shall be levied, whether in town or parganas, but by an order from us both; nor shall any one be apprehended by people belonging to either of us alone.

17th That we shall keep some of our people at the Jharesar gate and at the kotwal chabutra near the Katarpur gate.

18th That we may have people at the Umjid Baug as usual.

19th That our Bhawani (or pagod) [*goddess*] has been carried from Sunai to Surat, from whence it must be returned to us.

20th That orders be given at the gates to permit from ten to fifty sepoys or five horsemen together to pass in and out at any time; and that, when they come near either of the gates, a Maratha chobdar will go and bring them in; but not more than the above number at any one time, unless a fresh order be obtained.

21st Account of the troops for my government, *viz.*
for the service of the parganas, hawaldary and maljapti: 175 men,
for the thanas including that of Padra: 100 men,
for the town: 150 footmen and 40 horsemen,
for the phurja: 35 footmen; being in all 500 men to reside here.

The above-mentioned twenty one articles you are to agree to.

*Bombay, 29th March,* 1773 (1773. *P. D.* 63)
*At a Consultation.*

*Discontent* It is with unfeigned concern we find by the letters from Surat of the 6th instant that affairs at Broach are in so confused and critical a situation, as well as to observe that the same is originally owing to the very vague treaty the Chief entered into with Fatesing. We strongly apprehended some suchlike bad consequences would ensue from it, as we advised the Chief and Council at Broach as soon as we were informed it was concluded. The affairs of our Hon'ble Employers from his conduct seem now to be reduced to the disagreeable alternative either to oblige us to come to an open rupture with Fatesing and the Marathas, or else to hold our new acquisitions upon terms highly discreditable to our Hon'ble Masters. The Chief,[1] while at Broach, had it much in his power to have settled affairs upon a creditable and advantageous footing. He had a large army flushed with conquest to add weight to his negotiations with the Marathas; and he might then have clearly defined and adjusted upon a permanent basis their just rights in the town and districts as well as those of our Hon'ble Employers, and have settled everything with credit to them and to the satisfaction of all concerned.[2]

The demands delivered by Rudraji in behalf of Fatesing in the papers now before us would most probably then have never been thought of. They are highly insolent and so totally inconsistent with the nature of our government and even the safety of the town that, the consequences that may follow be what they may, we cannot think of

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1 The Chief at Surat, W. A. Price.

2 It is true that the Bombay Council never approved of the treaty with Fatesing, and their criticism was as outspoken as it was comprehensive (2-2-1773). Nevertheless they were to a large extent responsible for the advantageous terms which Fatesing had managed to secure; for their directions reached the Broach factors too late (21-2-1773). Moreover they had too frequently insisted on the necessity of avoiding a conflict with Fatesing (13-12-1773, 18-12-1772); and it is but natural that the Chief and Factors at Broach should have interpreted the Bombay orders as they did (24-12-1772).

acquiescing in one of them. It is, therefore, determined to reject them all as totally inadmissible. The town must be considered entirely as an English government, and no armed men belonging to the Marathas permitted to reside therein or to do duty at any of the gates, though we allow of a proper person from them with a necessary number of people in their behalf to live in Broach for the purpose of settling and receiving their just proportions of the revenue.

*Blame* The Resident [*James Morley*] and Factors even for receiving these proposals are highly blamable; for they are such as ought to have been instantly rejected; but the seeming indifference with which they are transmitted by the Chief and Council at Surat is still more deserving of censure.

The conduct of the Resident and Factors in tamely submitting to the settling of the jamabandi or the revenue of the parganas in the manner it appears they did, we severely condemn; and we positively disavow the act. We also as highly disapprove of the conduct of the Chief and Council at Surat in acquiescing in this measure. The reason they assign for it, namely because the Resident and Factors at Broach had agreed to it without their concurrence, is very unsatisfactory. The latter ought not to have come to any determination on such a point without the permission of the Chief and Council, their immediate superiors. But on their being advised of it, it became their duty to have put an effectual stop to the execution of a measure so disgraceful to the Hon'ble Company; which from their vicinity to Broach it was much in their power to have done.

*W. A. Price blamed* We cannot avoid here observing that the most material part of the business upon which we deputed Mr. Price, the Chief, to proceed to Broach was to make himself precisely acquainted with the nature of the revenue we had acquired for the Company in every branch, and exactly to have ascertained the shares taken by the late Nawab and the Marathas, the mode in which it was adjusted, and the method afterwards pursued to collect it. This was his particular duty and his immediate province, while he resided at Broach; and we cannot avoid expressing our astonishment at finding by the letter from Surat of the 16th that he should have neglected it, notwithstanding in the same letter he acknowledges that he received different accounts of it, while he was upon the spot. Duty to his employers, therefore, certainly ought to have led him to have investigated the matter and to have settled the same in such a manner with the Marathas as not to have left an opening with Fatesing on that head.

*Measures to be taken* The only mode of collecting the revenues of the parganas which we esteem eligible is by visiting the different villages and settling upon the spot at a proper time the sum annually to be paid by each as proposed by the Resident and Factors, and that the Company be answerable to Fatesing or [*to*] the pandit Rudraji for the share of the revenues due to Fatesing's sarkar, in like manner, as it is said, Lallubhai was in the time of the last Nawab. Any difference touching the adjustment of the jamabandi is to be settled with Fatesing's agents at the English Darbar.

Resolved that the mode of settling and collecting the revenues now agreed upon be positively pursued, notwithstanding any remonstrances whatever of Rudraji against it; and it is also further resolved

that, if necessary, our forces there be employed in support of those our positive orders.

*More blame* The Chief and Council at Surat have acted very improperly by postponing the execution of our orders regarding the revenues due from Jambusar. They ought to have been immediately executed, and they must be renewed to the Chief now proceeding to Broach; for, as the last agreement between the late Nawab and the pandit of Jambusar was of five years' standing, we shall not acquiesce in receiving on account the Hon'ble Company a less sum than the Nawab during that space collected from it.

*Lallubhai* We agree with the Chief and Council in opinion that Lallubhai might be very useful, if means could be found to render him totally independent of Fatesing; but so long as he is under the influence of the Marathas (which he must be in his present situation with respect to them) we think no dependence can well be put in him or in any account he may give regarding the revenue; and therefore, unless he can be freed from all engagements he is under to them, he must not be relied on. We, therefore, disapprove and highly condemn the conduct of the Chief and Council in giving the bandari as a measure not creditable to the Company to give; and no good consequences under these circumstances can result from their having procured by it Lallubhai's return for a short time to Broach. We at present permit the execution of our orders for the confiscation of Lallubhai's effects being deferred till further information can be received respecting him from the Chief now proceeding thither.

1773 *Bombay, 1st April,* 1773 (Mostyn's Diary)
*Letter from William Hornby, the President, to Thomas Mostyn, British envoy at Poona.*

*Bombay bargains with Poona* As the Darbar appears from your advices to be very desirous of acquiring possession of the town and the territory of Broach, you must, after recapitulating the great advantages that will accrue to the Marathas from having it in their possession, desire to know (on the subject being again mentioned to you) what equivalent possession they would give that may be equally beneficial to the Company, should we be induced to part with it; for we have no intention on any account whatever of accepting a pecuniary consideration. Such an opportunity might be a very proper one for informing them what particular possessions would be most acceptable. But of this you, who are on the spot, must be the proper judge, after duly weighing your instructions and the commands of the Hon'ble Company on this subject.[1]

1773 *Bombay, 12th April,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Letter to Poona.*

*Chief at Broach* Signed a letter to the Resident at the Darbar and dispatched the same per sepoys, in which we acquainted him of our having established a chiefship at Broach and our appointment of Mr. Shaw as Chief.

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1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona,* 133.

*Bombay, 20th April*, 1773 (1773, *P. D. Let. to C. of Dir.* 20) **1773**
*President and Council of Bombay to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

39 Your servants at Broach, shortly after the place fell into our hands, represented to us that the Nawab of Cambay had shown a particular attachment to your interest and actually came to Broach, while Mr. Price was there, to offer his services. As at that time Fatesing with his army was near the town, they strongly recommended him to us for this behaviour. The conduct the Nawab observed, we have reason to fear, brought upon him the resentment of Fatesing, who shortly after appeared with his army near Cambay, plundering and burning everything near it. Of this we were advised from Surat, and the Nawab also acquainted the President of it in a letter entered in our diary under the 3rd of March. But the Resident represented the situation of the Nawab's affairs to be still more alarming. When understanding that he was in want of almost all kinds of stores for the defence of the town, we esteemed it in some measure incumbent on us to afford him some assistance in this exigency; and therefore we immediately sent to the Resident for the Nawab 10 six-pounder guns, 2,000 shot and other stores in proportion, as minuted in Consultation under the 3rd of March. We had the pleasure, however, to find that the Nawab had found means of pacifying Fatesing before they arrived, who was in consequence decamped with his army. But private advices from the Resident mention that the Nawab is still under some apprehensions that Fatesing will return; and therefore has requested that the stores may be kept there for his use.

***Help to Nawab of Cambay***

*Surat, 23rd April*, 1773 (1773, *S. & P. D.* 14) **1773**
*W. A Price to the President.*

I forward this to give cover to translate of a letter from Fatesing to me, just now received. The application he makes for assistance is on account of a misunderstanding that has lately happened between him and his uncle Khanderao. There has been a skirmish amongst their troops, in which those of Fatesing were worsted, and one or two of his principal officers killed. Should Your Honour, etc. think it expedient to give him the succour he desires, I imagine something advantageous might be done in regard to Broach.

***Fatesing's request for help***

*Translate of a letter from Fatesing to the Chief of Surat.*

When I had an interview with you at Jharesar, you brought with you some guns for saluting. The like ten guns with 2,000 iron shot fit for them, and good powder, on the receipt of this, I beg you will send me. As money will be wanting for the purchasing of the shot and powder, you will apply for it to Rudraji Pandit, Jamadar Pandit [*and*] Bhara Dewanji, who have orders to satisfy you. Also 200 young and brave Europeans I desire may be sent me. The amount of their monthly charge, after being settled, may be forwarded to me, and it would be discharged according to your direction. If the guns, shot and powder, with the 200 men arrive soon, it shall afford me great pleasure; if in about a week, they will be more acceptable.

***Men and munition***

The President directed the secretary to send round to the other Members of the Committee the above letter and paper with the following letter.

***President's inquiry***

*George Skipp to the Members of the Council, dated 28th April, 1773.*

*Members' views* I am directed by the Hon'ble the President to forward you the accompanying letter from W. Andrew Price, Esqr., Chief of Surat, with the translate of one from Fatesing to the Chief. By these letters you will be acquainted of the assistance Fatesing has requested. The Hon'ble the President is of opinion that it would be very improper to comply with Fatesing's request, and he desires you will please to signify whether you concur with him, or what may be your opinions upon this subject.

*Reply* The foregoing was returned with the opinions of the Members as follows:

I concur in opinion with the Hon'ble the President, Daniel Draper, John Watson, Nathanael Stackhouse, William Tayler.

1773 *Bombay, 30th April,* 1773 (1773, *P. D. Let. to C. of Dir,* 20)
*The President and Council of Bombay to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors.*

*Broach revenue* By advices just received from your servants at Broach we are given to understand that there is a good prospect that in about 6 weeks the collection of the pargana or revenue from the villages will be completed, and a part of it had already been recovered, as would a further sum in very few days. They reckon that the Company's share alone of this part of the revenue will amount to about one lakh and fifty thousand Rupees for the present season.

1773 *Bombay, 4th May,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63)
*Letter from Broach.*

*Delay at Broach* Came to hand per pattemar from Broach a letter from the Chief and Factors, dated the 30th ultimo, in which they advised the arrival of the Chief there on the 27th, and that Fatesing was then encamped at Keora about five miles from Muxudavad[1] having lately made a peace with his uncle, Khanderao, and, as they were informed, on advantageous terms; that, as the Pandit Rudraji was not then returned from Surat, whither he had gone on a visit to Mr. Price, they should be under a necessity of deferring all proceedings in consequence of our orders until his arrival, when their utmost endeavours should be exerted to put the Hon'ble Company's affairs there on a respectable footing.[2]

1773 *Poona, 6th May,* 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*)
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

*Bargaining for Broach* They [*Haripant and Ramaji Chitnis*] now come again to their offers for Broach, which, I plainly told them, we could not think of accepting or of any money at all; and should we be induced to part with a place of that consequence both to them and us, it was needless for me to point out there was but one method besides, that might possibly, out of the regard we had to their friendship, bring us to give it up to them They replied they supposed that was an exchange of territory; I said it could be no other, and with what particular places they

1 Mursidabad, a few miles to the North of Broach.

2 This refers to the orders sent from Bombay on the 29th March, 1773; see entry of that date under the marginal headings *Measures to be taken* and *Lallubhai*

were well-acquainted with. Here they dropped this subject, and I judged it prudent not to renew it; for, had I done it, they might imagine we wanted to get rid of the place, which would most probably retard their making such offers as might be acceptable to Your Honour &ca.

On the 27th I waited on Haripant, when he recapitulated the whole of the above conversation, and desired I would explain to him what particular places would most likely induce Your Honour, &ca to an exchange, as he did not understand it in the general terms I mentioned. Though I am convinced he must be perfectly well acquainted with our wishes, yet as I found he chose they should be particularized, I told him there was Salsette, Karanja, Bassein and the lands about Surat; and as I had now, conformable to his request, opened myself to him, desired he would also be candid and tell me what offers they would make in case we should be brought to part with the place in question. This he seemed to think extraordinary, and evaded giving me an answer by turning the conversation to another subject; but, before I took leave, he told me he should acquaint Narayanrao with what had passed, and hinted that he would send for me to the Darbar, and talk to me about it, however I have not since heard ought relative thereto.[1]

*Bombay, 15th May,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63) 1773
*Letter from Broach.*

*Hopeful outlook*

The Chief and Council then advised that Rudraji had come into the town in a manner precisely conformable to the plan we had laid down, that is without a single sepoy or armed attendant or any insignia of government. The Chief and Council very particularly set forth the methods which had been pursued to induce Rudraji to submit to this measure, which had been effected by the arguments made use of by the Chief and by his resolute and steady conduct, and acquainted us that the Chief had assured them that he expected in like manner to accommodate every other matter with Rudraji in the manner directed by us.

*Bombay, 29th May,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 63) 1773
*Letter from Broach.*

*Jamabandi*

The letter from Broach was dated the 25th instant, in which the Chief and Factors owned receipt of our commands of the 13th, in which they acquainted us that the Chief had prevailed on Rudraji to attend with his people at the English Darbar, not only to fix the jamabandi of the remaining 14 villages that was to be settled, but also to revise the former jamabandi which had been settled at his house; and that accordingly on the 21st they had all attended; and this new jamabandi which was then fixed and the revisal of the former one began, in which they should proceed with all possible expedition; and they expressed their hopes that this precedent would effectually prevent the very idea being even again entertained by the Marathas of fixing the jamabandi at their house. The collection of the revenues was then going on again, and they hoped to make us a large remittance very shortly.

1 Published by Gense- Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona,* 155-156.

*Collection of revenue* The Chief and Factors also advised that the Amod and Jambusar revenues were mostly received, and the balance well secured by the merchants' and shroffs' security; but to effect this, they had been obliged to send out a strong detachment to Amod under the command of Colonel Brewer, who marched thither on the night of the 20th with such expedition and secrecy that he took them unawares and secured the pandit with several of the principal desais and patels without offering the least injury to any of the other inhabitants. That the pandit, &ca had acquiesced in paying the charges of the party and the revenues in full, and had delivered some money and bills with shroffs' and merchants' security for the residue. That this little expedition with some remonstrances from the Chief had so alarmed the Jambusar pandit that he settled matters immediately to their satisfaction; and had produced a very happy effect on all the petty tributaries around, who most of them had sent in either money or bills for the amount of their annual payment.

1773 *Bombay, 28th August*, 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64)
*Letter from Surat.*

*Chauthias* The Chief and Factors advised that Myral Pandit, and his brother, Shivram Gopal, were appointed Fatesing's chauthias in the room of Rudraji; at which the Chief and Factors expressed great satisfaction; *Expedition against Kolis* and proceeded to acquaint us that a considerable number of Kolis, subject to one Jalam Jalia, in the neighbourhood of Jambusar, had lately made an irruption into the Broach pargana; but on a detachment being ordered out against them, they had instantly retired with the utmost precipitation to their own country about 30 kos distant from Broach. They added that an illegitimate son of the late Nawab was with this party, and [*they*] requested our permission to march a strong detachment into this Jalam Jalia's country to root him out of it at once; the facility of effecting which, they pointed out, together with the good effect it may have in proving the neighbouring Powers, some of whom had offered their assistance in this service and the Nawab of Cambay also had made a voluntary offer of joining them with his forces.

*Rumours* That it was confidently said, this irruption had been made with the advice and consent of Fatesing's ministers, as by some idle stories propagated in the country Fatesing's people actually believed we intended to attack Baroda this season; and notwithstanding the Chief's endeavours to discountenance this report, they still believed an additional force would soon be sent from hence for that purpose.

1773 *Poona, 10th September, 1773* (*Mostyn's Diary*)
*Raghoba's proposals.*

*Raghoba's proposals for Broach* This morning I was visited by the Chitnis who acquainted me Raghoba had sent him to inform me that he had made inquiry into what had been done regarding Broach, and that he was willing to give six lakhs, the sum before offered by the Darbar for that place.

In reply I acquainted the Chitnis I thought I had given a very sufficient and plain answer, when he and Haripant had talked to me

[1] Jalam was the Koli Raja to whom the Nawab of Broach fled after his defeat by the English (*Gaz. Bom. Pres.* II, 471)

on that subject, by telling them my Superiors were resolved not to part with the place in question for any pecuniary consideration whatever, and could not now help admiring their again offering what had been refused in so peremptory a manner.

*Bombay, 17th September,* 1773 (1773, *S. & P. D.* 14) 1773
*At a Committee.*

*Stores for Cambay*

The President lays before the Committee a translate of a letter from the Nawab of Cambay, as entered hereafter, requesting he may be permitted to keep the stores sent to his assistance in the month of March last, on paying the amount of them, which is unanimously agreed to in consideration that the Nawab has ever shown a steady inclination to support and assist the Company, so far as it has at any time been in his power, and because we are sensible that he has real occasion for them. The gentlemen at Surat must, therefore, be directed to order the Resident to deliver these stores to the Nawab, and an account must be transmitted of their cost, adding thereto the same profit as was formerly put on those supplied Haidar Ali.

*Translate of letter from Momin Khan Bahadur, Nawab of Cambay, without date, received the 4th September,* 1773.

*Request for guns*

For a long time I have not had the pleasure to receive a letter from Your Honour; therefore beg that you will always favour me with your friendly letters, as it will afford me the greatest pleasure to hear of your welfare. I return Your Honour many thanks for your very kind favour in sparing me the guns, etc. in my fort as a deposit, because there is no room in your Factory to keep them, and as Your Honour has not mentioned to me the price thereof, I beg that you will do it now, and order Mr. John Torlesse to deliver them over to me, as I am an old and firm friend to the Hon'ble Company as well as to Your Honour.

*Ready to assist*

I always cultivate the same good friendship with Mr. Shaw at Broach, and correspond with him by letters. Mumtaz Khan, son to the deceased Masud Khan, had been near Broach with a party of Kolis belonging to Dewan to trouble that country· and William Shaw, Esqr. wrote me that he intends punishing him, desiring I would be ready to join the Company's people at a proper time. I wrote him for answer that I was ready with 500 sepoys, reserving a proper number to guard my fort, because I have a dispute with the Marathas; and that I will join him on his advising me; that I have an enmity with Mumtaz Khan, and will, therefore, serve him well to revenge him. All which I doubt not but Mr. Shaw may have wrote to you, and I take the liberty to mention the same to Your Honour.

*Gaikwad activities*

It is plain that the Maratha is an enemy to the Company, and now I am informed that Sayaji Gaikwad is enlisting a number of sepoys at Baroda. Fatesing, who was at Patan, did dispatch Appaji with 500 horse to Baroda, and he himself returned to Ahmadabad, where he met one Basulma, his servant, with 1,000 men, and will go to Baroda himself therewith: all which I take the liberty to mention to Your Honour, as I did to Mr. Shaw. I doubt not but Your Honour procures all the news, and as I am your true friend, will do the same if you will write me.

*Mumtaz Khan* Mumtaz Khan, who has raised disturbances against Broach, confederating with the Kolis of Dewan, indeed deserves a punishment; and I had wrote to Mr. Shaw before that he should not let any body belonging to him to pass in Broach; and do hereby advise you not to let pass anybody belonging to Masud Khan, be it sepoys, men, or women in Broach. After this do as you please. I have wrote you as an hearty friend, begging you will send me an answer particularly. Your Honour will hear the rest from Mr. John Torlesse.

*Need of men* At the time of necessity we shall not get good men; for they will enter into the service of the Marathas. I have given an encouragement to some persons; if you will order me, I will gather good men; as to myself I am ready to serve the Company, at any time and place, with 500 men, as mentioned above.

1773 *Bombay, 18th September,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64)
*William Shaw to Colonel John Brewer in command of the troops at Broach, entered under date 26th October*

*Padra to be occupied* Having received intelligence that a body of Kolis are arrived near the Broach pargana and that they intend making an attempt on Padra, you are hereby directed to send out a party of observation consisting of 150 men to remain at that place and to prevent any body of men, whether armed or otherwise, from entering the town.

1773 *Broach, 19th September,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64)
*John Brewer in command of the troops at Broach to Mr. Shaw, Chief at Broach, entered under date 26th October.*

*Garrison at Padra in danger* I cannot help expressing to you the anxiety I am under at the contents of a letter I have received from Captain Mc. Kenney, He dated his letter [*from*] Padra; from which I conclude he is actually in Padra; and [*he*] says "the place is strong and in good order, considering it as an Indian fortification;" should it be really so, I think it my duty to represent to you that, should Fatesing send a strong detachment, which it may be expected he will do, the small party will be in danger of being cut off, more particularly as it is furnished with so small a stock of provisions and ammunition.

1773 *Broach, 19th September,* 1733 (1732, *P. D.* 64)
*William Shaw to John Brewer, entered under date 26th October.*

*No danger* You need not be under the least apprehensions for Captain Mc. Kenney, as he has received orders to leave Padra and proceed to another village.

1773 *Bombay, 21st September,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64)
*Letter from Broach, entered under date 26th October.*

*Dewan raja's plans* Received per pattemars from Broach a letter from the Chief and Factors, dated the 13th instant, in which they advised that it was rumoured that Jalam Jalia of Dewan was again preparing to make an irruption into the Broach parganas, and that the late Nawab's son, who had assumed the title of Nawab, had collected together several of his father's adherents, being supported in this expense by Fatesing The Chief and Factors remarked that in the grain and cotton season

these people would probably be very troublesome, unless previously collected; and [*they*] acquainted us that the Cambay Nawab had lately wrote the Chief that he is ready to join us at a day's warning, who, they supposed, would be very alert on this occasion, as he has been for some time at variance with the Dewan Raja, particularly if his country, which is contiguous to Cambay, and yielded a revenue of about Rs. 25,000 or Rs. 30,000 per annum, was given up to the Nawab on easy terms.

*Bombay, 28th September,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64) 1773
*Letter from Broach.*

The Chief and Factors advised that early in the morning of the 24th the Dewan Kolis to the number of several thousands made a very desperate attempt on that place, and actually reared 25 scaling ladders, against the town-wall and one of the towers; but on the alarm being given, they were fired at briskly from the works, which caused them to retreat, leaving four killed close under the walls. *Attack on Broach*

They mentioned that the Chief had undoubted intelligence that these irruptions of the Kolis were by the consent and instigation of Fatesing, and that the young pretender, the Nawab's son, had sent his brother to Baroda as a pledge of his fidelity under the care of Sharif-ud-din amongst the Kolis entertained for the late enterprise, who were permitted to assemble in the Baroda parganas, where they had several meetings with Fatesing's ministers; of which matters the Chief had written to Fatesing, complaining of this breach of friendship. *Fatesing's doing*

They also advised that just before this irruption of the Kolis one of Fatesing's principal sardars with upward of one hundred horse had entered Padra, a walled Broach village in the midst of our parganas, the thanadari of which belonged to Fatesing; where they remained lame spectators of their flight when pursued by our horse, though applied to by the Chief for their assistance; and the Chief and Factors requested our instructions how to act in case these horse should remain in the pargana, or any additional force be sent to Padra. *Unfriendly attitude*

*Broach 22nd September,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64)
*John Brewer to William Shaw, entered under date 26th October.*

Last night I received a letter from Captain McKenney, wherein he informs me that Fatesing had sent some horsemen to enquire the strength of his detachment, and that he was informed that Appaji had left Baroda with an army of considerable force on his way to Padra. Should Fatesing be disposed to resent the detachment having possessed themselves of Padra, I think it too inconsiderable a force not to be in the greatest danger to be cut off. It would be highly imprudent, considering the frequent intimations which the Chief has mentioned to have received of a design to surprise the garrison, to make a sufficient detachment to bring Captain Mc Kenney off, especially as his letter is dated from a place not less than 22 miles distant. I conceived it a duty incumbent on me to mention these particulars to the Board, as the loss or defeat of that detachment would probably impress a very unfavourable opinion among the country people of the courage and the conduct of our troops, while the lower class of these (which let me ob- *Padra garrison*

serve are nearly the whole) might be induced to consider the enemy into a favourable light; which circumstances (exclusive of the disgrace they would reflect on the Company), there is the greatest reason to apprehend, would be attended with very essential detriment to their affairs, should it hereafter be necessary to proceed to hostilities against Fatesing. I would, therefore, beg leave to recommend, should there be occasion to keep out so small a detachment, that it be drawn near the garrison, so that we may be able to support and protect it. I have already addressed the Chief on this subject under the 19th instant; yet as it appears to me a matter of the utmost importance, I cannot avoid communicating my sentiments to the Board, that they may appear upon record for my future justification.

1773 *Poona, 29th September*, 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*)
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing proposes alliance*

Some days ago Fatesing's vakil, Shivram Jivaji, waited on me in behalf of his Master, who, he says, is apprehensive Raghoba will endeavour to place Govindrao, his brother, in his government. He is, therefore, desirous of entering into an alliance with the Hon'ble Company, but to be valid only on condition Raghoba should take such a step; for he did not otherwise mean to break with the Peshwa. He proposes that the Hon'ble Company and his Master jointly take the whole of the Gujarat country (the revenues of which, including Surat, amount to about eighty lakhs of Rupees annually, and which is nearly divided between this Government and him) and the share possessed by the Marathas for ever to devolve to the Hon'ble Company, except the following places: Ahmadabad, the capital, and the half of Petlad pargana; also that Broach be delivered up to his Master, it being in the share belonging to him; and each pay their own troops. I at once told him I thought these proposals by no means equal, as they were binding to us and leaving Fatesing to act as might suit his convenience; and should Your Honour, &ca be even inclined to an alliance with his Master, you would undoubtedly expect very different terms before any treaty could be concluded. Though these offers are by no means advantageous or equivalent to the risk of a rupture with this Government, yet as the vakil earnestly requested me to write you and obtain your answer, I think it my duty to acquaint your thereof.[1]

1773 *Bombay, 5th October*, 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64)
*At a Consultation.*

*Bombay orders*

They must by no means permit any greater number of armed men, belonging to Fatesing or others, to enter any of our parganas or the town of Padra than was customary in the time of the Moguls or consistent with the terms of the treaty with Fatesing; but, as we are not desirous of coming to hostilities with him, we approve of the Chief's having wrote him a letter on the occasion of his sending a number of armed horsemen to Padra; and we hope it will have a proper effect by inducing him to withdraw them.

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 241.

*Bombay, 12th October,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64) 1773
*Letter from Broach.*

The letter from Broach was dated the 3rd instant, in which the Chief and Factors advise that the Kolis with several Sindhis and Arabs were again assembling under the banner of the Nawab's illegitimate son at a place in the Baroda pargana called Wallum about 3 kos distant from Baroda, and that on the 3rd instant they had attacked and plundered one of their villages. *Kolis attack*

That Fatesing's people were still at Padra, and were very troublesome to the villages around, notwithstanding the Chief's frequent representations. *Fatesing's people*

*Bombay, 18th October,* 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1773
*William Hornby to Thomas Mostyn.*

We entirely agree with you in opinion that the proposals made by the agent of Fatesing are totally inadmissible; should he, however, hereafter make other offers, you of course will acquaint us with them.[1] *Proposals rejected*

*Poona, 25th October,* 1773 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1773
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

I am sorry to inform you letters were yesterday received here by Balaji Naik Beriah from Fatesing's Diwan, which mention that his Master, joined by his uncle, Khanderao, and the Banbee, a Koli Raja, are marched against Broach at the head of 7,000 horse and 12,000 foot.[1] *Fatesing and Broach*

*Bombay, 2nd November,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64) 1773
*Letter from Broach.*

The letter from Broach bore date the 20th ultimo, in which the Chief and Factors acquainted us that they could not return any of the sepoys of the 3rd battalion by the *Eagle*, as they had not quite 600 men in garrison fit for duty when the seasonable relief by her arrived, owing to the number of sick, and their having sent out Major Hassard on the 14th with a very respectable detachment to repulse a formidable body of Arabs, Sindhis, &ca, who had made a fresh irruption into their parganas, and even approached within eight or ten miles of Broach. But on information of the intended force coming against them, they retreated to a village called Socra, in the Baroda parganas, where Major Hassard came up with them in the night; but on the first attack they fled with precipitation, leaving behind them some horses and a part of their baggage, besides five prisoners; and it was reported by the country people that the enemy had 11 killed and 27 wounded. *Peace disturbed*

The Chief and Factors enclosed several papers tending to prove that Fatesing underhand gave encouragement to the Nawab's son to make these incursions. *Fatesing*

*Bombay, 9th November,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64) 1773
*At a Consultation.*

Read the translate of a letter from Fatesing to the President, as entered hereafter; upon which reference is had to the orders given *Fatesing's territory*

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 249-250.
2 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 253.

to the Chief and Factors at Broach relative to the conduct they were to pursue towards Fatesing; and these orders being now again considered with the letter before us, resolved that they be directed from this time forward by no means to permit any part of our forces to molest Fatesing's territories without our previous consent and permission, as it does not suit the interest of our Hon'ble Employers to come to a rupture with him; but they must adhere to the terms of the treaty, and as far as in their power avoid giving him any cause of disgust.

1773 *Bombay, 9th November,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64)
*Translation of a letter from Fatesing Gaikwad, without date, received the 7th November,* 1773.

*Treaty broken by Shaw* A treaty was some time ago made with Mr. Price, regarding the affairs of the town of Broach; they by agreeing to carry on the same, conformable to what we did in the Mogul's time; and as long as Mr. Price was there, the above agreements were observed; all which he must have informed Your Honour, since which Mr. Shaw came to Broach. Lallubhai, a majmudar of that place, is a litigious man, and owes to my sarkar accounts for 20 years. Mr. Price did, therefore, execute a security bond to me under the Company's seal to make him appear whenever I may want him for this sarkar's business; but now he does not come out, and by uniting with Mr. Shaw gets him to use me ill through persuasions. I had a thana built in the boom from formerly, which he got pulled down, and got my officer turned out of the town, and does not let him interfere into the affairs. He, Lallubhai, has removed his family from the town and remained there alone, and has confederated with the Kolis privately. He has kept the Mogul's son[1] among them (the Kolis) with an intention to replace him in the government [*of Broach*] by using any means. The Kolis are, therefore, fighting with the town, whereby the whole town is ruined. Your Honour is very easy looking upon him (Lallu) as a trusty man and well-wisher to the Company; but he is waiting for the opportunity and makes my bad name. Your Honour is a wise man and very well knows that I have made no fault, nor will commit any; for I wish not, thank God! neither will I go against my agreements; for my sarkar wants nothing. Thoug I am not weak, but ready with my forces, yet considering out friendship I have not till this day sent my cavalry and troops against Broach. Mr. Shaw's misbehaviour to me has been so much that he sent 1,500 sepoys and Baldars to pull down this sarkar's thana at Padra in my jurisdiction, where, as my officer, Appaji Pandit, who was coming from a long way, heard this news and marched directly with cavalry to Padra, and assisted that place. He could not get Mr. Shaw's troops in his hands, because they ran away to town, so that the above-mentioned thana was preserved to me. Mr. Shaw and the said-litigious man, Lallu, don't care that our friendship and old custom should be continued. I am, therefore, obliged to enlist an army. I am truly inclined to cultivate our friendship and to act nothing against the same; but, if I shall be obliged to act to the contrary, I can't help it. [*I*] have, therefore, sent my trusty man, Baburao Hari Pandit, to Your Honour, by whose verbal information Your Honour will hear all; and you will,

1 Mumtaz Khan, son of the Nawab of Broach.

considering our friendship, settle about the government, both within and without the town as also inthe parganas, agreeable to our treaty, and write to Mr. Shaw to go on agreeable to the old custom. Hon'ble Sir, it is necessary that our friendship should be cultivated by all means, by which the country will be increased, the subjects be easy, and we shall have a profit thereby. Your Honour will always favour me with your friendly letters and commands, as it will afford me great pleasure to execute them.

*Bombay, 30th November*, 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64) 1773
*Letter from Broach.*

*Peace with Fatesing*

Arrived a pattemar from Broach with a letter from the Chief and Factors, dated the 23rd instant, which, they advised, was dispatched to communicate the pleasing intelligence that everything was settled with Fatesing for the present, agreeable to their wishes, as we might observe by copy of a letter which they enclosed, received that morning from him to the Chief. They further acquainted us that on Fatesing's arrival, a few days before, alone at his own parganas about eight or ten miles distant from their borders, the Chief had sent to remonstrate with him respecting his horsemen at Padra, in consequence of which he sent two persons to converse with the Chief on that subject, who had convinced them of the steadiness and utility of the Hon'ble Company's friendship, how much his ministers had been to blame in his absence, and how careful the Chief and Factors had been in conducting themselves agreeable to the true intent and meaning of the treaty. That the Nawab's son with several hundred men had been hovering between their and the Baroda borders, under pretence of going to visit Fatesing, and had given one or two of their villages some trouble, which Fatesing had engaged to resent.

*Bombay, 7th December*, 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64) 1773
*Translate of a letter from Fatesing Gaikwad to the Chief of Broach, received the 23rd November*, 1773, *and dated the 7th of Ramzan, or 22nd November.*

*Professions of friendship*

Your letter, full of friendly terms and expressive of the cleanness of your heart, I have received; and all that you mentioned personally to Gopalrao and Balavant munshi (my people) I have understood from them; with all which I am more pleased than I can express by my pen. By their discourse, which is all consistent and of the same colour, I find that you have in no respect acted contrary to our friendship, but that my ministers and servants have acted amiss and contrary to rule. For my own part I remain steady to my first engagement, and I expect you will be equally steady to it on the Company's account; and thus all evil-speakers' mouths will be shut: and who will have the assurance to mention anything tending to a breach between us? And from this day forward, whatever necessary business may come between us, we will write freely to each other about it; and thus all lying mouths will be stopped. Agreeable to the speech of my afore-said agents (Gopalrao and Balavant), I have sent a strict order to my Jamadar at Padra that in no respect he give any trouble to the Broach parganas. In regard to Mumtaz Khan, the late Nawab's son, who has been at Sarbhon in the Broach pargana and given them trouble there, hav-

ing taken 250 Rupees from the patels, I have wrote him a letter desiring that on receipt of it he will instantly retire to Dewan, otherwise I shall send a detachment against him. In respect to the chauthia for your place, I am considering it; and be assured I will very shortly send him. As you remain thus in your friendly intentions and in your word, I also will be firm to mine; and Shankar Mull and I will quickly return to you; and I hope always to receive your friendly letters, that I may be content and glad. What need I say more?

1773 *Bombay, 7th December,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64).

*Copy of a translate of a letter to the Chief from Shankar Mull, a person whom he sent to Fatesing's camp in company with Fatesing's agents, Gopalrao and Balavant.*

*Friendly feelings* The arrival of your order to me and what I wrote you by your harkara are known to you. Agreeable thereto in the morning I went to the other side of the river to meet Fatesing and his diwan, and spoke to them in such manner, high and low, as was proper, and would be pleasing to men of sense. I read my letter; and the letter enclosed for him I also delivered to him He said some time after [*that*] now friendship was apparent on both sides, and that he was perfectly satisfied, and all unfriendly doubts we might have entertained of each other were removed; and as to the coming of the late Nawab's son, it was without his knowledge or consent. To this Antaji Diwan replied, saying I know that Rudraji and he (the Nawab's son) heretofore entered into a bad and treacherous agreement together; and Said Sharifudin is now present. After Rudraji came this way with his party according to the compact formerly subsisting between those two by means of the Said, Rudraji wrote him (the Nawab's son) to come; he may, therefore, in consequence of this be come; but now that Rudraji's intentions are thrown aside, and that his party are discharged and disbanded, as the Nawab's son came in confidence of, and dependent on, Rudraji's word, he will of himself of course retire. I then replied, as matters are thus, it is consistent with friendship that you sent a letter and harkara to him, desiring that he will not remain in the Broach parganas, but return to his place (meaning Dewan), and 250 Rupees he took from Sarbhon must be returned, as all now is peace and quiet; and that whatever had been before in agitation must be now dropped; and that, if he did not retire on this advice, a detachment would be sent against him. To this purpose accordingly a letter was wrote and dispatched before me, and a very friendly obliging and pleasing answer to your letter I have got, and now enclose and send it by this horseman. I think, good Sir. everything by your good fortune is done agreeable to your wishes; and when I was taking leave, I told Fatesing I should directly dispatch this letter, and would write you that I would very soon follow with the chauthia. He answered, "Be sure you write so, there is no difference." At this time Appaji Pandit came in; and in the presence I called out aloud that from the trouble given by his horse at Padra many villagers had fled and were still fleeing. He answered with civility that, 4,000 Rupees would be duly credited on account, and that from this day forward no further trouble should be given to any one, and that to the Nawab's son he sent some horse desiring he would retire, else he would plunder him.

On every side I hear such matters, thanks to God !. What was needful I have here represented ; and whatever new may occur I will write you. If I should stay a day or two longer, it is no matter, everything shall be properly and permanently settled; and I will bring with me the chauthia. Any further orders shall be obeyed. This horseman (Parshuram) I dispatch at three o'clock, that he may arrive quickly.

*Bombay, 24th December,* 1773 (1773, *P. D.* 64) *1773*
*Letter from Broach.*

The letter from Broach was dated the 14th instant, in which the Chief and Factors acquainted us that, as Fatesing had come a little way within the borders of their parganas, they had thought it prudent to detain the expedition and sepoys a few days; but, as he had then appointed a chauthia, whom they hourly expected, and had marched nearly half his troops into the Gaikwad country, everything bore so peaceable an aspect that they now returned the expedition with 200 sepoys and seven Europeans, being all that vessel could receive on board; and they had also embarked 100 on the *Greyhounds* gallivat, promising to send down the remainder by the first opportunity and to write again more fully by a pattemar in a day or two. *Peace restored*

# II The Gaikwad Contest

## No. 1. FAMILY FEUD

### (January- 1774 -September)

GOVINDRAO took up arms against Fatesing. The situation in the initial stage of the conflict was as follows: Fatesing was in possession, which being nine points of the law, gave him a considerable advantage; besides which, he held Baroda, which his presence in Gujarat at the time of his father's death had enabled him to lay hold of without striking a blow, and which he never subsequently abandoned. As regards Govindrao, his prosepects of success depended mainly on Raghoba's support; but this support proved so effective that Govindrao got decidedly the better of his opponent. Even after the ministerial party at Poona had joined Fatesing, the opinion obtained in Gujarat that Govindrao must eventually prevail.

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### DOCUMENTS

1772 *Poona, 17th Jamadi-al-akhir, Arabic year* 1173 (*Aitchison, VI, App. IV*) *Translation of Articles of Agreement between Madhavrao the Peshwa and Sayajirao Gaikwad.*
*Memorandum: Sayajirao Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur, Arabic year* 1173, (*A. D.* 1772)[1]

*Articles of treaty* ARTICLE 1: The allowances fixed in the time of Damaji Bawa (now in paradise) for Fatesingrao, Govindrao, Manajirao Gaikwads and my other relations, great and small, shall be maintained; but as I have heavy contributions to pay to the sarkar, I shall reduce their allowance in due proportion until the contributions are discharged. Their complaints on this account are not to be attended to by the sarkar; when my debts are paid, their old allowances will be restored.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: It is an affair with your relations, therefore satisfy them as you can, without minding a lakh or Rupees 50,000 more or less. If you cannot satisfy them, the above stipulation will be conformed to. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 2: I shall in all respects conform to your pleasure, do you in all respects bestow your unfeigned friendship on me and protect me and my government. If I should be molested by any

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1 This treaty is here printed because it clearly shows the important part which outside interference played in the Gaikwad contest.



GOVINDRAO

foreign force, you are to send me assistance and protect me. My relations are to receive their allowances and serve my government. You must carry through the protection of me, which you have undertaken.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: If you will serve the sarkar with fidelity without looking to any other quarter, you shall be assisted against foreign force, sincerely befriended in all other respects. According to this it is agreed.

ARTICLE 3: I have had heavy payments to make to the sarkar. I therefore beg that you will have the kindness to execuse my service for next year. You were good enough to promise me this formerly; let the troops be excused accordingly.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: You demand to be excused service on account of heavy payments, you shall therefore be excused in 1175; or if there be urgent occasion that year, you must come according to agreement, and you shall in that case be excused in 1176. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 4: I have many pecuniary disputes and demands to settle, which I shall proceed to enforce; the people will then complain to the sarkar, you must not attend to them, but send them to me.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: No complaints against your enforcing your just demands will be attended to. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 5: Let Khanderao Gaikwad enjoy his old allowances settled by my father (now in paradise), and let him serve my government; let him account to me for the districts of which he is entrusted with the collections. Hereafter let him give up those districts, and enjoying his own allowance serve the State.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: Proceed as may have been settled by Damajirao, do not vary from it. If you have entrusted the collections of any districts to him, you may manage about them as you please. No complaints will be attended to, and obedience will be enjoined. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 6: Do not summon me to the presence for two years, for my territory is in disorder and requires to be settled, which cannot be done without punishing the turbulent zamindars and cantoning in that quarter. Therefore forbid my coming to the Deccan for two years.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: Come to the presence at the end of the year, then such orders as may be expedient will be issued. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 7: In my share of Gujarat, there are unsubdued places belonging to the Moguls and others. I shall arrange and by sending some money shall reduce them. Let the sarkar advance no claim to them.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: If you settle the districts of your own share, the sarkar will advance no claim. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 8: His Highness the Bhau advanced some money to me as a loan while on the expedition to Hindustan; this and old arrears and other trifling items that stood against me in the official papers were execused by the agreement of 1169. Let that be confirmed.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: The former release is confirmed. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 9: The administration of the city of Ahmadabad is equally divided; let both parties manage the collections with the parti-

cipation of my officer according to former treaties: this was agreed to in 1163 and 1164 and confirmed in 1169. Let it be observed.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: The above engagements are now confirmed. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 10: My private estates, in villages, and saranjam villages were granted to me in the time of His Highness Nanasaheb by His Highness Dadasaheb. They were confirmed to me by Your Highness in 1169. Let those grants be observed.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: The above grants are now confirmed.

ARTICLE 11: On the Peshwa's part. It was formerly settled that half of the new mahals taken by Damaji Gaikwad should be given to the sarkar, in concert with whom the gross collections should be ascertained and two papers drawn up, each containing a list of half the mahals of these divisions; the sarkar was to take one and to have possession from the year 1170 The arrears of the revenue of the said half of the mahals up to the end of 1169 was excused to you. To the above effect was settled in one of the Articles of the former Agreement, but this article has never been acted on. Last year one lakh of Rupees was taken from you on the general account, and this year you have agreed to pay Rupees 25,000 therefore next year, when Fatesingrao Gaikwad comes, this matter shall be discussed, and whatever is settled then shall be acted on.

ARTICLE 12: On the Peshwa's part. No more complaints are to reach the sarkar from the Dabadhi's wife on account of the Dabadhe's estates, which were entrusted to you.

ARTICLE 13: On the Peshwa's part. You have settled to pay Gopal Naik Tambikar's debt by instalments; the payments must positively be made as they fall due. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 14: On the Peshwa's part. Let the tribute for this year amounting to Rupees 7,79,000 be paid by instalments. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 15: By the Gaikwad. If Fatesingrao, Govindrao Gaikwad, Manaji Gaikwad and Murarji Gaikwad act with due regard to me, it is well; but, if they should become disaffected and should stand up to oppose me, I shall punish them as my own people; if any of them should complain to the sarkar and tempt it with bribes, the sarkar must not take their part; and if without appealing to the sarkar they create disturbances, the sarkar shall afford me assistance to punish them and, without being reduced by consideration of profit or loss, it will give them their own allowance and make them serve my government as before. It must not support them.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: If you observe your agreements with your relations, and they notwithstanding behave ill to you, or endeavour to stir up troubles in your State, you may punish them; and if you cannot do it yourself and want aid from the sarkar, you shall be assisted. I will not give way to the temptations they hold out According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 16: When I am occupied by any important affair in my own dominions and shall send any other person to serve, you must be content with his service and show favour to him.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: When any important affair in your own country renders it actually impossible for you to attend the service of the presence, you will send Govindrao Gaikwad to serve with your contingent.

ARTICLE 17: On account of heavy payments it is agreed that my old creditors, my farmers of the revenue, who are guaranteed by the Peshwa, and all my other creditors shall forbear to claim their moneys for five years.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: The bankers whose debts, I have guaranteed are to be paid from this year upwards according to their instalments so far as to be paid off within four years, and their bonds made over to the sarkar: when the guaranteed debts are paid, the old debts are to be paid at the rate of two lakhs a year.

ARTICLE 18: You are not to attend to my relations, servants, or agents who may bring forward complaints against me, but to make over my own (people) to me.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: According to the above shall be done. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 19: Let Govindrao take what His Highness settled for him last year and serve my State. Let him deduct from the sum settled the revenue of the villages of Padra, which is in his possession, and balance; or if that is not agreeable to him, let him give up the village, and I will pay him the whole sum settled in money.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: It was settled that the above named should receive two lakhs a year including Padra, and let the abovenamed serve the presence. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 20: Fatesingrao Gaikwad is to administer the whole State, and all to obey his orders and serve the state as he shall direct.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: According to the above be it agreed.

ARTICLE 21: An allowance of Rupees 9,000 is assigned to me from the sarkar; let it be given to any person to whom I shall assign it.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: It cannot be.

ARTICLE 22: Half of the port of Surat belongs to the sarkar and half to me for one year; half of what remains, after deducting Rupees 10,000, was given. It was formerly agreed that in the years 3 and 4 the Rupees 10,000 should also be divided, let that be conformed to.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: It was formerly agreed to; half the collections are to be yours and half mine. According to this be it agreed.

ARTICLE 23: The arrears of the revenue collected from Teladi and other mahals from 1164 were excused me in 1170; let that release be adhered to.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: It was formerly settled that you should be excused from 1164. According to that let it be agreed.

ARTICLE 24: The following mahals were formerly taken from me. Visanpur, Maroli Galha, Teladi, Mohuva, Waghoray [?], and Satragam; these seven mahals were taken by the sarkar and restored to me in 1163; what I then gave as Darbar khurch was annexed to the sarkar, namely pargana Satragam, the village of Dabhole (pargana Teladi), Pasray (in ditto), Pasray (in pargana Maroli). All, besides that one pargana and three villages, were restored to me. All this was agreed in 1169, let it be observed.

PESHWA'S ANSWER: It is now confirmed.

ARTICLE 25: By the Peshwa. Every year to serve at the presence with 3,000 horse and 4,000 in time of war. One person of the Gaikwad family to remain in winter quarter with the troops, if it is necessary.

ARTICLE 26: By the Peshwa. Money is owed (to the sarkar) by Bookhun Hurry Dhut on account of the Seringapatam assignment. If you owe him any money, you are to pay it to the sarkar.

ARTICLE 27: By the Peshwa. Govindrao's allowance:

| | | Rs. |
|---|---|---|
| For 1172 .. .. .. .. .. .. | | 2,00,000 |
| For 1173 .. .. .. .. .. .. | | 2,00,000 |
| | Total | 4,00,000 |
| Deduct by the statement of the Gaikwad's Ministers: | Rs. | Rs. |
| For Padra .. .. .. .. | 1,00,000 | |
| For clothes furnished through Gopal Naik Tambikar. .. .. .. .. | 25,000 | |
| | | 1,25,000 |
| | Balance .. | 2,75,000 |
| To be paid in Asvin Sudh .. .. .. .. | | 1,00,000 |
| In the end of Magh .. .. .. .. .. | | 50,000 |
| In the end of the year .. .. .. .. .. | | 1,25,000 |

The whole 2,75,000 to be certainly paid as above.

ARTICLE 28: Receipts for the payment of some of the varats (drafts) on you between the years 1163 and 1166 have not yet been furnished; they must be furnished.

17th Jamadi al-akhir, 1173, at Poona.

PESHWA'S RATIFICATION: According to these 27 Articles be it agreed.

1774 *Poona, 2nd January, 1774 (Mostyn's Diary)*
*Govindrao Gaikwad near Poona.*

*Govindrao* Having got notice that Govindrao Gaikwad ws arrived at hisa house at Dewry, sent a man to gain certain intelligence and learn, if possible, what force he has.[1]

1774 *Poona, 3rd January, 1774 (Mostyn's Diary)*
*Govindrao s designs.*

*Govindrao and Fatesing* This morning the person dispatched to Dewry returned. Govindrao is there and intends setting out as to-day for Gujarat. He has about 500 horse with him and is raising more, but much distressed for cash. He learns that Raghoba has assisted him with some guns, and orders Trimbakrao Mama to supply him with 2,000 men; has also given him recommendatory letters to the English. From others I learned Govindrao's officer, Thoband, is marching along the banks of the Gunga towards Nasik, and his effort is intended against Songarh.[1]

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 297.

*Poona, 3rd January*, 1774 (*Mostyn' Diary*) 1774
*Thomas Mostyn to William Shaw.*

*Govindrao and Raghoba*

This is purposely to acquaint you of Raghoba's having lately invested Govindrao Gaikwad with the saropa of senakhaskhel and the subahship of Gujarat, instead of his brother, Fatesing; and I hear, [*Raghoba*] has also given him letters to the English, and supplied him with about 2,000 men and some guns.

Govindrao is now at Dewry, ten kos from Poona, from whence he means to set out this day towards Gujarat. His troops are in all about three thousand and, I am told, marching along the banks of the Gunga under his officer Thobandji, which they will be able to do but slowly owing to the want of cash.

It is reported that Fatesing has stopped the pass of the Ghats leading to Songarh fort; which, if true, will give Govindrao some trouble; and it is said he means to make his first attempt against that place.[1]

*Broach, 22nd January*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Rival armies*

Some forces of Fatesing, about 2,500 it is said, have within these few days, passed the river from Koral, his own government, towards Songarh, and there is a report, that part of Govindrao's forces, are arrived within two days' march of that place; but of this there are no certain advices.

*Fatesing's request*

The Chief acquaints us that Fatesing's chauthia had this day applied to him for any quantity of gunpowder he could spare for his Master's use, to which we all agreed an evasive answer should be given, wishing to remain perfectly neutral until we receive Your Honour &ca's commands in answer to our address of the 12th instant.

*Bombay, 22nd January*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*Bombay to Broach, entered on the 13th February*, 1774.

*Sitting on the fence*

We can give you no precise directions for the conduct you are to observe in respect to the dispute that is likely to commence between the two brothers, Fatesing and Govindrao. The grand object you are constantly to have in view is the speedy and effectual recovery of the Hon'ble Company's full share of the Broach revenues without having recourse to hostilities with either party.

*Broach, 29th January*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*At a Consultation.*

*Pargana invaded*

The Chief acquaints the Board he has received information by a letter from our thanadar at Shuklatirth that a part of Fatesing's forces are arrived at that place, and are throwing up entrenchments to protect the pass of the river there, which, he observes, must be very prejudicial to that and the contiguous villages, and that it must materially affect the revenue, should our parganas become the seat of war. As the pass at Shuklatirth is the only part of the river fordable within our parganas, the Board take into consideration what measures are to be pursued to prevent, as much as possible, any bad effects from

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 297 298.

this step of Fatesing; but, as from the late representation of the Commanding Officer of our forces we find the present state of the garrison will not admit of our detaching a sufficient force to prevent our pargana being thus infested, it is agreed that the Chief by a proper remonstrance to Fatesing endeavour to induce him. If he does not comply, he will be deemed answerable for any bad consequences that may ensue to the Company's revenue from his thus subjecting the parganas to the incursions of his opponents by taking post within our districts.

1774 *Broach, 31st January,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*At a Consultation.*

*Pargana invaded* The Chief acquaints the Board he has received certain intelligences that Govindrao is arrived at Valachha about ten kos distant from hence with a large body of horse and foot, and that it was currently reported in his camp his intention was to march this morning, towards the Narbada, where by the way of Sumaraze[?] or Anklesvar, the passes from which are in our parganas, and the latter immediately under the fire of our guns. The Board, therefore, taking this into consideration, are unanimously of opinion it would be highly improper to permit any armed force to pass under the reach of our cannon; and in order to prevent as much as possible any evil consequences to our parganas, the Chief will write a civil letter to Govindrao, desiring (as the Company are on terms of perfect amity with his patron Raghoba) that he will not conduct himself so as to occasion a breach of that neutrality which we are determined to maintain, by passing at any of the ghats belonging to our parganas, which might make them the theatre of war, and must be equally prejudicial to the English and Gaikwad Governments; and the custom-master is directed in consequence to secure all the passage boats and others on this side the river, and not to permit more than one at a time to remain on the other side for the accommodation of passengers.

1774 *Broach, 2nd February,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*At a Consultation.*

*Govindrao's requests* The Chief lays before the Board two letters he has received from Govindrao: the first merely to advise of his arrival in these parts, the other requesting assistance of men, arms and ammunition, and desiring that no collection may be permitted on the part of Fatesing from the Broach parganas. In answer to which the Chief will write him that, as we have no orders from Bombay on the subject, we cannot pretend to interfere in the disputes between him and his brother.

*Fatesing in villages* The Chief lays before the Board a number of complaints he has received of Fatesing's people committing great depredations in our villages in small parties. Resolved, therefore, that only twenty five horsemen and as many peons be sent to Amod, and that the rest be employed in affording such protection to our own villages as may be in their power.

1774 *Broach, 2nd February,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Pargana invaded* The intelligence of our last of Govindrao being arrived near Songarh with his forces proved true; and by speedy marches, meeting

with no opposition, he is now encamped near the banks of this river about fifteen miles above Broach ; and Fatesing himself yesterday came to Shuklatirth, a principal village within the borders of the Broach parganas, where he is throwing up entrenchments to oppose his brother's passing the river there, as that place can with ease be forded. On the first of Fatesing's people coming into our parganas some days ago, the Chief wrote a very civil letter to him, desiring he would order his people from the Broach territories, as their remaining in them might probably make it the theatre of war, and his troops remaining there must infallibly ruin that part of the country, this being the harvest season. He has not yet returned any answer, though the Chief two days past wrote him a second letter on the occasion [*of*] having received intelligence that all the villagers are deserting the place on account of the force Fatesing's people use, who rob and plunder them of their harvest, and even wantonly cut down the corn and tobacco fields to clear the ground, and mix [*them*] with the earth they [*are*] digging up for entrenchments; and his horsemen are dispersed over the greatest part of the parganas to forage and seize the labourers as picorees [*Pindharis?*] and their implements of husbandry for entrenching; and this scene of confusion increases daily, which must greatly injure the parganas. The Chief on this occasion consulted the Commanding-Officer to know, if even small encampments could not be made a little way out of town which might have a good effect by controlling in some respect Fatesing's small parties from plundering our villages; but he still persisting that he could not with any safety make the least detachment from the present garrison (a return of which is enclosed), we are under the necessity [*of*] sitting tame spectators of those evils. We have sent our small body of horse, however, to range in the interior part of the parganas and protect the villages there, as far as in them lies, from the incursions of small parties; but Fatesing has a number of Kolis in his army (which at present, it is said, amounts to from eight to ten thousand), and they are more troublesome and dangerous to the villagers even than the horse.

*Govindrao's situation*

Govindrao's forces amount, by the best calculation our harkaras can make, to about fifteen thousand, twelve thousand of which are horse, and the rest foot. He has yet but a small train of artillery, only five guns, and those not more than four-pounders, and little ammunition; but his people give out that he has forty pieces of cannon with ammunition; and four thousand foot arrived near Songarh from Poona, which he may daily expect to join him, as he has taken in that fortress and all the country hitherwards, and has left his own people in all the parganas as he passed along. The Chief has just received two letters from him : the one merely complimentary to acquaint him of his arrival in this country, the other to desire an assistance of men artillery and ammunition. On which a Council was called, and it was resolved after due deliberation that the Chief should write him we could not interfere in the present disputes, without orders from the Presidency.

*Broach, 7th February*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774

*At a Consultation.*

*Fatesing's proposals*

Read a letter from Fatesing to the Chief, in answer to one wrote him respecting his troops entering the Broach parganas, in which he

offers to withdraw all his forces, provided the Hon'ble Company will defend the different passes of the river. He at the same time sent Ranmalji Baria, Raja of Miyagaum, to the Chief to desire assistance of men and ammunition as an ally of the Company, to whom the Chief give a civil reception, but replied (as was previously determined by the Board) that we could not interfere in those matters without orders from Bombay.

*Govindrao's request* The Chief acquaints the Board he has received another letter from Govindrao the same purport as that read in Council the 2nd instant, desiring assistance of men and artillery, which he has replied to in the manner, when agreed that we could not interfere in the disputes between him and his brother without orders from the Presidency.

*Fatesing's chauthia* Fatesing's chauthia, Bhulabhai, having received positive orders from his Master to repair to his camp, the Chief (as was agreed on last council-day when this circumstance was mentioned) has prevailed on him to remain here for some time, in which he the more readily acquiesced as his relation, Untaji, Fatesing's late diwan, is at present in disgrace.

1774 *Broach, 11th February,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*At a Consultation.*

*Fatesing defeated* The Chief informs the Board he has received certain intelligence from different harkaras of Fatesing being defeated in an engagement between his and Govindrao's forces, in the Rajpipla country opposite our village of Shuklatirth; that he made his escape, it is not known whither, with only a small body of horse, leaving behind all his tents, baggage, etc., and that a considerable number of his Arab and Sindh gun-men, having made a stand after his flight, and made terms for themselves, and are since entertained in the service of Govindrao.

*Govindrao's chauthia* The Chief observes he understands several people are actually soliciting to be appointed Govindrao's chauthia at this place; and no orders having yet been received from Bombay on the subject, he lays this matter before the Board for their determination how to act in this conjuncture, who unanimously concur with him in opinion that, should any agent arrive from Govindrao, he should be received with civility, and that, to gain time, any proposals he may make, to take into consideration; by which time it is hoped, the necessary directions for our conduct will be received from Bombay.

1774 *Broach, 11th February,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing defeated* The Chief acquaints us he yesterday sent an express to the Hon'ble the President advising him that on the preceding evening Govindrao had gained a decisive victory over Fatesing's forces, in the Rajpipla country, on the other side of this river, about fifteen miles distant; and that Fatesing was actually fled, having recrossed the river with only a small body of horse; and left his tents baggage, military chest, etc. to the enemy; but whither he retired, we have not yet learnt. A considerable number of Fatesing's gun-men made terms with Govind rao, who, we are informed, has actually entertained them in his service. The Chief has had several harkaras from the place of battle, who report the numbers killed at between four and five hundred. The

engagement lasted from between one and two in the afternoon till near sunset, and Govindrao by the last accounts still continued contiguous to the place of battle, which lies opposite a part of our district called Shuklatirth.

*Pargana invaded*

We as yet know not whether he intends crossing the river there, or in the Koral pargana, which belongs to the Gaikwads; but Khanderao, Governor of Nadiad, who is uncle to both, is now encamped at Shuklatirth in our pargana with about three thousand to three thousand five hundred men, where he arrived after the battle. He came to endeavour [*to make*] an amicable accommodation between them, being sent for by Fatesing for that purpose, but arrived too late. His troops have been troublesome to some of our village people in foraging at free cost and otherwise; but the Chief has written him on the occasion, which, we hope, will put a stop to it. Govindrao's people also burnt a small village of ours, on the opposite side of the river and plundered some grain, sugar-cane and jaggery from others; but, on the Chief's writing him on the subject, he has given particular orders to his people not to be further troublesome to the Broach villages. In the Rajpipla country, where he is encamped, he has burnt and plundered villages almost daily, being at professed variance with the Raja.

*Bombay, 14th February,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P.D.* 15*A*) 1774
*At a Consultation.*

*Recovery of Surat parganas*

Upon consideration of the present situation of affairs in the Maratha country we are of opinion it is not only the most proper juncture that can offer for our attempting an enterprise against the Marathas, but also for the Nawab of Surat to endeavour the recovery from them of the parganas formerly annexed to his office, as particularly mentioned in the statement sent down in the month of May, 1772, which, we think, he might easily effect with a small assistance from us of men and stores. Such an acquisition would be of the utmost importance not only to the Nawab, but also to the Hon'ble Company, as the revenues of these parganas are very considerable, and the Nawab for our assistance would doubtless readily agree to divide them with the Company. This scheme should, therefore, be pursued, provided we come to a resolution of acting against that Power.

*Poona, 21st February,* 1774 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1774

*Fatesing defeated*

Letters received last night from Gujarat, bring intelligence that Fatesing and Govindrao have had a battle, in which the former was defeated and fled with a few horse, leaving his baggage to his brother.[1]

*Bombay, 10th February,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*Bombay to Broach.*

*Sitting on the fence*

We have already acquainted you that we wish to remain perfectly neutral, in the dispute subsisting between Fatesing and Govindrao, and you are to conduct yourselves accordingly. Should the latter send a chauthia to Broach, he is not to be admitted, unless Govindrao should become master of the countries dependent on the Gaikwad Government, in which he will be entitled to the same share of the re-

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona,* 385.

venues of the town and parganas of Broach, as that Government has hitherto enjoyed. You are, therefore, in such case to admit a chauthia on the part of Govindrao, on his making application for that purpose, in the like manner as Fatesing's chauthia was before admitted; though, as in case of the event of Govindrao's attaining the Gaikwad government, it may be necessary to enter into some treaty with him, we shall then rely on your endeavours, if possible, to put the division of the Broach revenues upon a more advantageous footing for the Company than they are at present.

1774 *Broach, 22nd February,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*At a Consultation.*

*Broach and Govindrao*

The Chief acquaints the Board he has received letters from Govindrao and Fatesing, both advising of their intentions to send chauthias hither, and observes, as the person proposed by Fatesing is Rudraji, from whom we have already experienced so much trouble, and respecting whom we have written so much to the Governor and Council, and they have expressed their satisfaction at our endeavouring to avoid receiving him, he thinks it would be highly improper at this time of confusion to acquiesce in his appointment, and therefore proposes writing to Fatesing in the same manner he did on a former occasion in this respect, acquainting him how disagreeable it would be to have a man of Rudraji's disposition to manage his concerns at this place, particularly at this juncture; and besides, as the Hon'ble the President and Council have directed us in their last commands of the 10th instant to endeavour to enter into a treaty with Govindrao, whereby the affairs of our Employers may be put on a more advantageous footing than by that at present subsisting with Fatesing, and as from every appearance and the best intelligence he can possibly procure it seems almost certain Govindrao will shortly be at the head of the Gaikwad Government, and which Fatesing's chauthia, now here, has repeatedly declared to the Chief, he is, therefore, of opinion it would be extremely impolitic to give him such real cause of disgust as to admit a pandit of Fatesing's at the time he proposes sending one, particularly as Govindrao is in possession of all the open country contiguous to this, and has an army so much superior in the field, and might by such a step be induced to send a force into our parganas that would be very destructive to them and discreditable to us, and likewise because the Chief has this intelligence, that Sayaji, who is in possession of Baroda (Fatesing being only in the suburb) has had a meeting with Khanderao, whence it is expected that Govindrao will effect every purpose without further bloodshed. The Chief further observes he should be very tenacious of offending Govindrao from his very friendly behaviour, since the Chief wrote him on some of his people burning one of our villages, as well as his not crossing the ford in our parganas, but passing that in the Koral province. For the reasons urged by the Chief, the Board are unanimously of opinion that the proposed letter should be written to Fatesing as a means of evading any determined answer; and as a reply may be expected to this letter in the course of six days, this matter will then be taken into further consideration.

*Broach*, 1*st March*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*At a Consultation.*

Intelligence being this instant received by one of our horsemen from Padra that a party of Govindrao's forces (who have been for some time hovering on the borders of our parganas) this morning drove out Fatesing's people from Padra and took possession of that place, agreed that the Chief write a proper letter to the commander of this party to prevent their molesting any of the Broach villages. *Capture of Padra*

The Chief acquaints the Board he has neither received any answer to his letter to Fatesing, nor heard anything from Rudraji, or anyone in his behalf; and further observes that Govindrao's government is acknowledged, and his agents received in all the contiguous Gaikwad parganas, and that Fatesing's jurisdiction is at present confined to Baroda, in so much that Bhullabhai, who was chauthia here on the part of Fatesing, has accepted the governmentof the Koral pargana from Govindrao. *Govindrao's success*

*Broach*, 15*th March*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*At a Consultation*

Fatesing's late chauthia, Bhullabhai, having been appointed by Govindrao to the management of the Coral government, this morning waited on the Chief to acquaint him of it in form, and to request his permission to proceed accordingly and take charge of this government. As Bhullabhai has thus accepted Govindrao's employ, and is no longer anywise concerned in the Broach revenues, and as we find it absolutely necessary to have a chauthia from either Fatesing or Govindrao, the patels and zamindars refusing to obey any notes for the collections unless under the joint seals of both sarkars, it is, therefore, resolved to dispatch a letter to Bombay, explaining this matter, and to entreat the express directions of the Hon'ble the President and Council how to conduct ourselves in this conjuncture. *Instructions*

*Broach*, 18*th March*, 1774 (1774. *Br F.* 260) 1774
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

We formerly advised Your Honour, &ca that Govindrao, after gaining a complete victory over Fatesing, proposed crossing this river, which he accordingly soon after did; but, in consequence of what the Chief wrote him, he did not come near our parganas, but passed up the river and crossed into the Koral parganas appertaining to Baroda, and from thence by slow marches proceeded without any interruption to Baroda, whither Fatesing, after collecting together as many of his scattered forces as he could had retired; and Khanderao, their uncle, whom we mentioned to be encamped above Shuklatirth in our parganas, followed to Baroda in order to accommodate matters if possible between the two brothers without further bloodshed, and the Chief hears that he and Appaji Gunnesh, Governor of Gujarat for the Peshwa, are still endeavouring to effect this, proposing that Fatesing should retire to Patan, a country beyond Gujarat belonging to the Gaikwads, worth between three and four lakhs of Rupees annually. To this Fatesing wants, it is said, either some addition or an annual allowance added. He remains within the walls, and Govindrao and Khanderao are encamped within a mile of the town of Baroda. *Situation of affairs*

Govindrao has appointed pandits to the Koral, Sinor, etc., parganas contiguous to this place, and his people are in possession of all the Baroda country; as the Chief is informed, the town alone being in Fatesing's power.

*Fatesing's chauthia*

Some time after Fatesing's returning to Baroda he sent harkaras to the Chief with a letter advising that he had taken away the chauthiaship of this place from Bhullabhai and appointed Rudraji in his room; and Govindrao at the same time wrote the Chief he had appointed Shivram Gopal his chauthia at this place. Thus situated, as we were desirous of temporising in hopes of matters being finally settled between the contending parties, the Chief, therefore, wrote Fatesing that he was most surprised at his nominating Rudraji to be our chauthia, who, he himself had written the Chief, should never again be sent hither, as he was disagreeable from his former conduct and late attempt to join the Nawab's son and the Kolis to distress our parganas, for which purpose, as we formerly advised Your Honour &ca, he had actually enlisted a number of troops. To this letter the Chief has yet received no answer, and therefore supposes Fatesing finds himself engaged to attempt sending any chauthia hither, as neither he nor his people are able to stir out of the town without being attacked by Govindrao's forces, with whom, the Chief is informed, they had two skirmishes some days past ; one on an attempt they made to pass into the Baroda parganas to make their collection, which are now entirely in Govindrao's power, another to bring in some cattle belonging to the Baroda inhabitants; on both which occasions Fatesing people were drove back.

*Govindrao's chauthia*

Govindrao, since his appointing a chauthia here, sent a party of horse and foot between 400 and 500, who since hovered on the borders of our parganas, and have at length taken Padra from Fatesing's people, and made the heads of them prisoners there, where Shivram Gopal, his chauthia, now remains, and exercises all the powers Fatesing's people formerly did in these parganas; and the Chief daily expects that he will demand entrance here.

*Instructions*

Matters being thus critically situated, Govindrao in possession of the open country, and Fatesing pent up in Baroda, we must beg the most particular instructions, whom we are to acknowledge.

*Govindrao's success*

It seems to be the general opinion that Govindrao, supported as he is by the Poona Government, and with an army much superior consisting of near 20,000 men, must succeed, particularly as he is in possession of the open country. Yet your orders of the 10th and 28th ultimo are not precise. As you direct us, in case Govindrao should become possessor of the whole country to acknowledge him, now though he has all the open country on this side, and although Appaji Ganesh, Governor of Gujarat, by orders from Poona has turned all Fatesing's people out of those districts depending on him, and has given assistance of men, &ca to Govindrao, yet as the town of Baroda, Patan, and many other distant places are still in Fatesing's hands, we must entreat your immediate and precise orders, which of them we are to acknowledge, as from present appearances it seems this war will not quickly have an end. It is to be observed that Govindrao's people being in actual possession of Padra, which is in the midst of

our parganas, if he is not acknowledged, will doubtless impede our collection of the revenues, and possibly may send a force to collect them himself, as he is doing in all the countries arround us. On the other hand Fatesing has displaced Bhullabhai from his chauthiaship here, who has now accepted of Govindrao's service, and actually received his commission of being pandit of the Coral Government, and totally given up Fatesing's employ. Thus critically situated, we once more request your full and explicit orders ether to acknowledge one or the other, without which it is not possible to collect the revenues.

*Broach*, 31*st March*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*Translate of a letter from Shivram Gopal, Govindrao's chauthia at Padra, to the Chief.*

It is now many days I have been here as chauthia, but you have not received me into town, neither has the collection from the parganas been set about. Therefore my Master, Govindrao Gaikwad, called me to him, being much displeased. I went to him, and he was very angry with me and directed me by forcible way to carry on this business. I, however, informed him good fashion more than I can write, all which Ramji Raghunathji, whom I now send to you, will inform you; then you will know all. Heretofore, when my karkuns and people were with you, you showed them great favour; therefore I spoke few good words to Master on the occasion and quieted him; but, if you do not receive me now into town and carry on the business of the collection, I cannot answer for the consequences. Your friendship and my Master's cannot continue. You are a sensible man and know, if my Master gives me an order to act, I must obey him and cannot refuse to do it. Your friendship and mine is great; therefore I write you thus plainly. You will consider well and act as you think proper. What can I say more?

*Govindrao's chauthia*

*Broach resolution.*

Resolved not to return any positive answer to Shivram Gopal, until we receive the commands of our Superiors in reply to our letter of the 18th instant, which we are in hourly expectation of; and it is agreed immediately to address the President and Council once again, setting forth the situation of affairs here, and desiring their orders to act in concert with either Govindrao or Fatesing, observing to them that Govindrao being in possession of all the countries around us, and having a large army to maintain in a camp so near us, being between this and Baroda, it is to be apprehended, if we do not join with him in the collection, that he may, agreeable to what his chauthia has already informed the Chief, send a party into the parganas to collect by force; and that it be also noticed to our Superiors that, although Fatesing has not either a man in the Broach districts, or can render any assistance towards the collection of the resources, yet by virtue of the treaty subsisting with the Hon'ble Company, should the event of the war prove favourable to him, he may esteem himself entitled to, and possibly demand from us the Gaikwad share of the revenues; and that for these reasons was cannot venture to act in this matter without their positive and express directions.

*Broach resolution*

*Fatesing's letter.*

*Fatesing's chauthia* Read a letter from Fatesing to the Chief, apologising for his appointing Rudraji his chauthia, and acquainting him he had sent full powers to Lallubhai, who, however, has mentioned to the Chief that, as Govindrao has a considerable force in the parganas, and Fatesing none, it is impossible for him to interfere in this matter.

1774 *Bombay, 1st April,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*Bombay to Broach.*

*Bombay orders* As the contest for the Gaikwad government between the two brothers, Fatesing and Govindrao, remains still undecided, we would wish to avoid receiving into Broach a chauthia from either party, provided the Hon'ble Company's share of the revenues for this year could be secured without it; but, as you represent, that it is impossible to begin the collections, except in conjunction with a chauthia from that Government, we direct, therefore, that you admit a chauthia from that party which appears to you to be the strongest and most likely to afford effectual assistance in the business of the collections, which must be begun as soon as possible; and we shall rely on your completing the same with the utmost expedition.

1774 *Broach, 2nd April,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

*Govindrao displeased* Our respects were dated the 25th, and this we dispatch by the *Greyhound* gallivat. which is now fit for sea, purposely to acquaint Your Honour &ca that Govindrao's chauthia, Shivram Gopal, (who is the same person that was in the beginning of this year appointed chauthia here by Fatesing and has now entered Govindrao's service) has sent one of his principal people from Padra to the Chief to inform him that his Master, Govindrao, was much displeased we had not yet called him into town, nor consulted him on the pargana business; that he had, therefore, lately sent for him to camp and severely reprimanded him for not begining the collection himself, directing him to take an additional body of horse 2,000 with him, and immediately set about the same; but that, as he and his brother, Aditram pandit, had received much favour and civility from the Chief, when they formerly came here on Fatesing's appointment, he had done all in his power to pacify Govindrao, and had so far succeeded as to prevent immediate disturbance; that for the present he quieted his Master with assurances that the English were very well inclined to him, and therefore did not doubt we would immediately agree to act in concert with him and begin the collection. He further directed his agent in confidence to acquaint the Chief Govindrao was of a very warm temper, and had some ill-inclined people about him, who would not fail to advise him to take some hasty disagreeable step either to plunder or forcibly collect the revenues of those parganas, if we did not acquiesce. He, therefore, with the most friendly intention communicated to him those his fears, hoping thereby to avoid the evil consequences, and that we would agree to act in concert with him and set about the collection of the revenues, as the parganas must greatly suffer in many respects by any longer delay. He also wrote a letter to the Chief on the subject at the same time, copy and translate of which go enclosed for Your Honour, &ca's observation.

On the 18th ultimo and in many former letters we wrote Your Honour, etc, fully on this subject, acquainting you of the necessity there was for our acknowledging or acting in concert with one or other of the competitors; for we then mentioned to you that without consequences, which might lead to a rupture, we could not proceed alone in the collection of the revenues, nor would the zamindars or patels obey any orders either for settling the produce of their harvest or paying the revenues, until they had permits for this purpose delivered to them, sealed by both sarkars, that is by us and the Gaikwad. Besides, it has been the rule of the Gaikwad, as well as we, to keep guards at every village in the parganas to prevent as much as possible the embezzlements of the patels until these orders are sealed and delivered. Thus Your Honour, etc will perceive we can do nothing towards the collection without the concurrence of the Gaikwads, and Govindrao has at present the whole Gaikwad power in these parganas, his chauthia at Padra and his guards at all our villages, who seized and drove out all Fatesing's people from the parganas; of all which and our disagreeable situation in general we very fully advised you under the 18th ultimo. and with the utmost impatience expect your answer and explicit orders on the whole, being greatly apprehensive from the badness of the season and general confusion of the country around, owing to the war between the two brothers, that the Hon'ble Company, will be great sufferers in their share of the revenues, unless we have your immediate orders to take effectual measures to secure the same; and here we must observe that Govindrao, being in possession of the open country all around us and having a large army to maintain, is camped so near, being between this and Baroda, it is to be apprehended, if we do not join with him in the collections, that he may, agreeably to what his chauthia has already informed the Chief, send an additional party into these parganas to collect it by force. On the other hand, though Fatesing has not a man in the Baroda districts, yet he, in virtue of the treaty with us, may (should matters in the end turn out favourable to him) esteem himself entitled to the Gaikwad share of the Broach revenues and possibly demand it of us. He has lately written the Chief a letter excusing his having appointed Rudraji his chauthia here, and desiring Lallubhai may act as the Gaikwad vakil for the present; but Lallubhai very justly observes it is utterly impossible for him to act, Govindrao having a strong force in Padra and these parganas, and Fatesing not a single man either to protect his right or proceed in the collection. *Instructions*

*Broach, 6th April,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 1774) 1774
*At a Consultation.*

Reperused our Superiors' commands of the 1st instant, received last night; and taking into consideration the most eligible means of securing the Honble Company's share of the Broach revenues for this year, we are of opinion, from the present situation of affairs here as fully represented in our address of the 2nd instant, that there is no alternative but to act in concert with Govindrao's chauthia; but, that this measure may be as little disgustful as possible to Fatesing, the Chief will endeavour to prevail on Shivram Gopal, to remain himself at Padra and send to town a person whom he can confide in with his *Govindrao's chauthia*

seals in order to proceed in the business. It is resolved, however, should this application prove ineffectual, that the chauthia himself be admitted rather than by delay to risk any part of the revenue.

1774 *Bombay, 13th April,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15 *A*)
*Bombay to the Company.*

*Ministers' revolt* In that address [*that of the 12th January,* 1774] you were acquainted Raghoba had taken such umbrage at some proceedings of the Nawab Muhommad Ali Khan that we had great reason to believe he intended to march his forces into the Carnatic; further advices from Poona confirmed us in this opinion; and we have no doubt but that the Carnatic would before this have become the theatre of a war, had it not been for the step taken by the late ministry at Poona, who, being disgusted with Raghoba's proceedings, at length threw off the mask and entered openly into designs against him, the particulars of which are contained in a letter from Mr. Mostyn entered in our diary under the 1st February.[1]

*Raghoba's victory* The subsequent correspondence of this gentleman, entered also in our diary, will fully inform you of the particular steps that have hitherto been pursued by each party. Raghoba has been obliged to return towards Poona with such part of the army as he thought he could best rely on. He was after some time encountered on his march by the forces of the ministry, when a battle ensued, in which he obtained a signal victory and even made prisoner the general of the rebel army what may be the consequence of this victory, we are yet uninformed of, but shall not fail in due time to advise you of the necessary particulars.

*Raghoba's request* Just as we were closing this address we received a letter from Mr. Mostyn, entered in our diary now transmitted, containing some proposals from Raghoba for our assisting him with money and forces. With money it is totally out of our power to assist, but we have directed your Resident to acquaint Raghoba's agent that we may be induced to spare him a body of forces, provided we can adjust with him to our satisfaction such preliminaries as are necessary to be stipulated for the Company's advantage, that he will send a sum of money to put our forces in motion, and point out the means by which they may join his army with safety, and that he may send a person with proper powers hither.

*Company's interests* What may be the event of this matter, it is yet out of our power to form any judgment; but we beg leave to assure you that we shall pursue no measures, in consequence of this application, but what appear plainly to us to be for the interest of the Company to adopt.

1774 *Bombay, 13th April,* 1774 (1774, *P. D. Let to Court of Dir.* 21)
*Bombay to the Court of Directors.*

*Raghoba and Govindrao* The country around Broach is at present in no very tranquil situation, though the Company's possessions are entirely unmolested. Fatesing, son of Damaji, who has long been at the head of the Gai-

1 The war between Raghoba and the Poona ministers is treated in detail in *The Third English Embassy at Poona* published by J. H. Gense and D. R. Banaji. Incidentally the war proved a turning point in the contest between Govindrao and Fatesing; for Fatesing threw in his lot against Raghoba with the ministers. From this moment the Gaikwad contest partly faded into the background

kwad government and as such shared with the late Nawab and since with the Company in the revenues of the Broach pargana, had a brother at Poona, named Govindrao. Raghoba, shortly before he departed from his capital, invested Govindrao with the government his brother Fatesing enjoyed, and what was more material, gave him a body of forces to support his claim. With these, Govindrao marched into that country, a battle ensued between the armies of the two brothers, in which Govindrao was victorious, who has since made himself master of almost all the country formerly possessed by Fatesing, except the capital named Baroda.

*Orders to Broach*

Affairs being in this situation, your servants at Broach wrote us for orders touching the conduct they were to observe; for as the, time for collecting the revenues was arrived, and as it was always done in conjunction with a chauthia or collector from the Gaikwad Government, and as they apprehended one would be appointed by both parties, they requested to know which they should receive, and which reject. We have in consequence directed them, as they represent a chauthia is absolutely requisite to be received before the collections can be begun, that they receive one from that party who appears most likely to prevail, though, as the contest is still continued and may continue for some time, it was our wish to recover your revenues without having anything to do with either party; but this, they represent, without coming to a rupture with both, is impossible.

*Broach, 20th April,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*At a Consultation.*

*Jambusar captured*

The Chief informs the Board he has received intelligences that Govindrao has sent a party of about a thousand horse and foot, who have taken possession of Jambusar, from whence the pandit is fled, making very little resistance; and that the Hon'ble Company's agent at Amod has written him it is hourly expected Govindrao will also send a force thither.

*Bombay, 7th May,* 1774 (1774, *P. D. Let. to Court of Dir.* 21) 1774
*Bombay to the Court of Directors.*

*Carnatic*

Our last letter by this channel [*via Basra*] which was on the 28th of October, advised you of the accession of Raghoba to the supreme power of the Marathas and of the means by which he obtained that dignity; shortly after which he took the field with a considerable army and marched against the Nizam. They at length met and a battle ensued, in which the forces of the Nizam gained the advantage.[1] A treaty was, however, shortly after concluded more to the advantage of the Marathas than the Moguls; and Raghoba then bent his march towards the Carnatic, intending, as it was said, not only to oblige the Nawab Muhammud Ali to satisfy him for a long arrear of chauth, but also to account for his conduct in making war on the Raja of Tanjore.

*Ministers' revolt*

Had Raghoba been able to pursue his intentions, it is highly probable the Carnatic would some time since have been the theatre

1 The Bombay Government relied on the erroneous information sent by Thomas Mostyn, their ambassador at Poona. See *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 285, note 1, and Appendix No. 37.

of an expensive war; and your servants at Madras in conjunction with the Nawab had collected a considerable body of forces to oppose the Marathas; but, fortunately for the Company and for Muhammad Ali, Raghoba was obliged to drop these designs just as he was on the point of carrying them into execution, owing to his late ministers that remained at Poona, who being dissatisfied not only at Raghoba's proceedings since he came to the government, but also at the means by which he obtained it, that they at length, when he was at a great distance, declared openly against him in favour of the widow of the late Narayanrao, who was left with child; and they lodged her, as well as all the treasures they could collect in a place of security, and raised a large body of forces; which obliged Raghoba to return from the confines of the Carnatic towards the heart of the empire.

*Raghoba's victory* The two armies lately met when Raghoba obtained a signal victory over the forces of the ministers whose general he took prisoner, and he is since dead of his wounds.

*Raghoba's situation* Notwithstanding this advantage Raghoba's situation seems very precarious; he has very little money, and he seems to doubt the fidelity of his forces. He is obliged to raise heavy contributions, whereever he marches in his own country to support his army, while the remains of that of the ministers is recruited by the forces of the Nizam and Mudaji Bhonsla, who have entered into an alliance against Raghoba, and are well paid for so doing by the ministers, who have very large treasures at their command. By this means they are jointly enabled to follow Raghoba, who at present appears to keep at a distance from them.

*Cause of delay* Were the Nizam and Bhonsla hearty in the cause they have embraced, it is probable Raghoba would be soon overthrown; but the advantages they reap from the alliance are too considerable for them to wish, or endeavour to bring matters to a speedy issue; and therefore it is at present quite uncertain, not only what may be the event, but also whether the present contest will be decided for a considerable time.

1774 *Poona, 7th May, 1774 (Mostyn's Diary)*
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba deserted* This is principally to inform you that the greatest part of Raghoba's forces have left him; some of whom joined the ministerial army, and others have retired into sundry places. He himself by a letter in eight days from Burhanpur, after having lodged most of his baggage in that city, has advanced 12 kos on the other side with about 7000 horse who still adhere to him. But what his future intentions are, is not yet known. Mudaji Bhonsla, who has been with Raghoba ever since he took the field, has now also left him and, it is said, means to retire into his own country. The Nizam, Sabaji Bhonsla and Hari Pant are above 20 or 30 kos on this side Burhanpur; and whether they will now pursue Raghoba or return this way is uncertain.[1]

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 351.

*Broach*, *19th May*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

Matters between Fatesing and Govindrao, continued much in the same manner, the former in possession of Baroda, and the latter of the open country. It is said their friends are still attempting to accommodate matters between them, and that some overtures have likely been made by Fatesing, but nothing certain has transpired respecting the terms proposed.

*Gaikwad contest*

*Poona*, *28th May*, 1774 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1774
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

This is principally to advise you that Raghoba is safely arrived at Indore, where Tukaji Holkar and Mahadji Sindia have promised him assistance, and in consequence have blocked the passes of the ghats to stop the progress of the imperial army, and have wrote to Hari Pant that, if he advanced into their country, they will from that moment treat him as an enemy.[1]

*Raghoba at Indore*

*Broach*, *4th June*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*At a Consultation.*

Read a letter from Fatesing to the Chief, as entered hereafter, desiring that no part of the pargana revenue may be paid to Govindrao's chauthia, for that in such a case he shall expect to have it again made good to him. The Chief will write him in answer thereto that we had long waited in vain for his sending a chauthia, and on that account had refused receiving any one from Govindrao, who, at length having drove his (Fatesing's) people from Padra, sent a chauthia to collect the Gaikwad share of the revenues, when we could not do less than collect those of the Hon'ble Company.

*Placating Fatesing*

*Broach*, *4th June*. 1774 (1774 *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*Translate of a letter from Fatesing to the Chief.*

In conformity to our agreement Govindrao's chauthia should not be entertained, nor permitted to recover a pice from the parganas; yet now Shivram Gopal, his chauthia, is receiving the revenues, and his monolydars [*mamlatdars*] are deeply engaged in recovering them from the parganas; which greatly surprises me. I, therefore, acquaint you it is necessary you should not give him a single amount thereof. In this be careful, for at least I will take this pargana money, and the ryots (subjects) will be ruined, and moreover our friendship will not continue. Consider well of this, looking to futurity, and act accordingly.

*Fatesing's threats*

*Broach*, *10th June*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

Govindrao still continues before Baroda and in possession of the open country, but has hitherto made no further effect against the place, and Fatesing is equally inactive within. The late change of affairs at Poona by Raghoba's flight may occasion a great alteration in Fatesing's favour, if Raghoba is not quickly and powerfully supported by Tukoji Holkar, with whom, the Chief hears, he has at present refuge

*Gaikwad contest*

1 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 353.

at Indore; and it is said both he and Mahadji Sindia (the Maratha Chief who governs Ujjain, a contiguous province) promises to espouse his cause. The near approach of the rain seems also against Govindrao, yet, as the soil round Baroda is sandy, it is thought [*he*] may remain in his present situation without suffering much from the monsoon if he erect sheds for his camp, who are but ill supplied with tents. The Chief has received a letter from Fatesing expressing his great dissatisfaction at our acting in concert with his brother's chauthia, Lakshman Gopal, and that he should expect his share of the revenue. Translate thereof goes enclosed for Your Honour &ca's observation. The Chief has written him in answer that we had long waited in vain for his sending a chauthia, and on that account had long refused receiving any one from Govindrao, who at length forcibly drove his (Fatesing's) people out of Padra, the Gaikwad stronghold in our parganas; and that on his sending a chauthia hither, who began to collect the Gaikwad share of the revenues, we could not do less than collect those of the Hon'ble Company.

*Orders expected* This answer has been given him for the present, and we beg Your Honour &ca's orders how to answer him, and in general how we are to act in future, should he again repeat this demand, which is no more than what we advised Your Honour &ca, under the 2nd April last, might be expected.

1774 *Bombay, 21st June,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*Bombay to Broach.*

*Sitting on the fence* Uncertain as we must be of the event of the present war between the two brothers, Fatesing and Govindrao, it is out of our power to give you any precise orders for your conduct, in case the former should regain the countries he was long possessed of. We must, therefore, rely upon you to act in such manner as may be most conducive to the interest of the Company, and direct only for the present that you duly advise us of every material alteration that may happen in the affairs of either parties.

1774 *Broach, 24th July,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260)
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest* The war between the two brothers, Fatesing and Govindrao, is not likely to come to an end. The harkara the Chief has last returned from Baroda brings an account of a trifling skirmish between two small detachments of theirs, in which not more than fifteen or twenty people were killed and wounded on both sides; and this is the only movement that has lately been made by either parties.

*Raghoba at Indore* Raghoba still remains about a day's march from Indore, as the Chief is informed, where Tukoji Holkar supplies him and his troops with all necessaries, and proposes, it is said, to join him with a considerable force in the beginning of the season, unless means can be found to accommodate matters between him and the Poona ministers. There is another report (which however wants confirmation) that Raghoba has imprisoned Mahadji Sindia on suspicion of his treating secretly with the ministers.

*Broach, 8th August*, 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) **1774**
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

**Baroda invested**

The Chief had yesterday harkaras from Govindrao's camp before Baroda, who report that provisions are grown scarce and dear in the town, owing to its being more closely invested of late by Govindrao's army; on account of which and of Fatesing's plundering the inhabitants unmercifully, many of them had deserted the town and fled to the camp.

*Broach, 31st August*, 1774. (1774, *Br. F.* 260) **1774**
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

**Govindrao's prospects**

By harkaras lately arrived from Baroda the Chief is informed that things remain much in the same situation between Fatesing and Govindrao, as when we last addressed you, though in general it is conjectured by the country people that Govindrao must prevail, as all the open country is in his hands and consequently the collection of the revenues.

## No. 2 BRITISH ALLIANCE

### (September 1774-March 1775)

WHEN Raghoba realised that the ministerial party was too strong for him to cope with single-handed, he appealed to the Company for armed assistance. This step brought about a radical change in the issues at stake in the Gaikwad contest; for Fatesing was the Ministers' ally, and Govindrao had thrown in his lot with Raghoba. The negotiations which followed are a most striking instance of the way in which the game of politics is played. The English were out to drive a hard bargain. Making capital out of Raghoba's dire need, they gradually prevailed on him to make concessions of pargana revenues the magnitude of which will for ever remain a matter for wonder and surprise, and can only be explained by Raghoba's eagerness to defeat his enemies at any cost. Moreover Raghoba not only signed away his own revenues, he also promised to secure for the English the revenues of Broach, which were the Gaikwad's. A fairly adequate idea of the thoroughness with which the bargain was made may be gathered from the fact that the final draft of the treaty of Surat was the fifth attempt at coming to a settlement, four other drafts having previously been rejected by the Bombay Government as unsatisfactory. The course of the negotiations did not run with uniform smoothness; for the arrival of the ministerial army in Gujarat proved a disturbing factor, as Govindrao, Raghoba's ally, soon realised. Fatesing succeeded in retrieving his losses, whilst Govindrao saw himself deprived of the fruit of his previous victories and also shared in the crushing defeat Raghoba suffered on the 17th February, 1775, at Vasad on the banks of the Mahi. If the servants of the Company had not been confirmed optimists, the treaty of Surat would never have been signed. But they made light of this untoward event and had their own way.

## DOCUMENTS

*Bombay, 6th September*, 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*) 1774
*Letter from Robert Gambier at Surat.*

*Narotamdas*

I now write and despatch this letter by express pattemars to acquaint you of some proposals made me lately by one Narotamdas, an agent of Raghoba's. This man was once in the Company's service as amildar of Anklesvar, and afterwards for some years in that of the Marathas as chauthia here; since that time he has resided some years in Poona, where he was much considered and trusted by Raghoba. About four months ago he came from Poona to Surat, where he has since lived as a private person. He says that he is well known to Mr. Mostyn, between whom and Raghoba he was for some time negotiating an agreement for our espousing Raghoba's cause[1] and assisting him with troops, etc; but that, before this business could be brought to maturity, Raghoba was obliged to leave Poona; which put an entire stop to it, as he has since had no opportunity of carrying on any intercourse or correspondence with Mr. Mostyn.

*Raghoba's request*

Narotamdas has shown me a letter he has very lately received from Raghoba, which directs him to apply to the English Chief here, and endeavour to conclude the negotiation he began with Mr. Mostyn at Poona. The purport of the treaty Raghoba wants to enter into with the Company is for them to furnish a sufficient force to carry him to Poona and establish him in the government there; and in consideration of this assistance he will defray all the charges of the expedition, and make very considerable grants to the Company, and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance you shall choose. If you approve of this business and will furnish me with the terms on which you will enter into the treaty, Narotamdas will immediately go to Raghoba, and finally adjust the whole, and return directly to this place with full powers to settle everything; and if you choose it, he will carry with him any person you please on the part of the Hon'ble Company or go alone, as you shall think fit.

*The two armies*

Raghoba is at present at a place called Indore, which is about 12 days' journey from hence. Narotamdas says he has with him about 25,000 horse and 5,000 foot of his own, and about ten thousand horse and foot belonging to Malharrao Holkar [*Malharrao's son, Tukoji*] and the same number of Sindia's; and that the Poona army, sent against him, is about 40,000 strong, and from 30 to 40 kos from him; and that his intention is to avoid coming to any action till after the rains.

*The Chief's advice*

I told Narotamdas that, if we did assist him, it would be necessary for our forces to join his, before he enemy could attack either separately, and that for that purpose Raghoba must contrive to come to some place where ours could easily effect a junction. He said that Raghoba would come within a few days' march of Surat and on the way to Poona for which place he would choose to proceed immediately as our forces joined him. I also observed to Narotamdas that a treaty of this nature had been often in agitation between the English and the Maratha Governments; that [*the*] mere appearance of such an agreement had often answered all the purposes of the Marathas by intimidat-

1 See *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 343, 348.

ing their enemies, who had immediately accommodated matters on their own terms, and then the Marathas had left the Company in the lurch; that this must be provided against on the present occasion; and if any treaty took place, the terms stipulated in favour of the Company must be solemnly engaged to be exactly observed, though Raghoba even should succeed in his design without using our forces or assistance, as we would be always ready to perform our part of the engagement, and it would entirely rest with him to use our assistance or not, as his occasions should require; and consequently, as the Hon'ble Company were ready to do their part, they would be fully entitled to all the stipulations in their favour. Narotamdas agreed that what I said was very reasonable, and should be made an express article of the treaty.

*Narotamdas* This Narotamdas is a man of very fair character and remarkable both for his abilities and steadiness to his engagements and will, I believe, be able to conclude the treaty he has proposed, if it meets with your approbation and that of Your Select Committee or Council.

*Instructions asked* Narotamdas mentioned to me something about the ceding of Salsette. That point, I suppose, would be easily agreed to as well as the increase of the revenues of this place and Broach. He was very earnest with me to know what force we would send, and what would be the monthly expense of it; but of this I told him I could give him no information till I had your answer. If, therefore, you mean to have the negotiation carried on, it will be necessary to give me full information both as to these particulars and all others, which you may want to be discussed with Raghoba; for the clearer and more precise every stipulation is made, so much the more likely [*is it*] to be carried into execution with ease and satisfaction to all parties. If this treaty can be concluded, the sooner Narotamdas is furnished with the necessary information as to the terms of it, the better, in order that he may without loss of time proceed to Raghoba, discuss and settle every article with him, and return here with proper and full power to put the finishing hand to it. If it is in your power to assist Raghoba, the present juncture appears to me a very favourable one for procuring the Hon'ble Company very great and lasting advantages, and such as will make their principal settlements on this coast profitable instead of losing ones to them.

1774 *Bombay, 6th September,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*At a Committee.*

*Bombay decision* It is unanimously resolved to assist Raghoba with a body of forces consisting of European infantry and sepoys with a proper field-train of artillery, amounting in the whole to about 2,500 men.

1774 *Bombay, 7th September,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

*Bombay resolve* The President having communicated to us your letter acquainting him of the proposals made you by one Narotamdas, an agent of Raghoba, for the assistance of a body of the Company's forces for the re-establishment of his affairs, we have given it every consideration that was requisite, and take this early opportunity of communicating

to you our determination thereon, of which you are directly to advise Narotamdas; for, should Raghoba close with the terms on which we have resolved to afford him assistance, it will be necessary for his benefit to bring the matter to as speedy an issue as possible.

And first it is proper you should know that it will be impossible for us to put a body of forces in motion without a considerable sum of money being previously deposited, not only for defraying the expenses incident to the occasion, but also to insure the Company from any loss. We shall, therefore, positively insist on at least 15, but if possible, 20 lakhs of Rupees being deposited, before our forces quit this island. *Bombay terms*

We shall also require that Salsette, Bassein and the small islands adjacent to Bombay, with the Maratha share of the revenues formerly annexed to the Castle and the town of Surat together with their share of the revenues of Broach, shall be made over to the Hon'ble Company for ever by the securest grants.

Raghoba must also stipulate, in case of this treaty taking place, that he will as far as in his power prevent the tranquility of the Company's possessions in Bengal from being disturbed, and that he will not make war on Muhammad Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic, so long as the Nawab adheres to the last agreement entered into between them.

If those proposals for the benefit of our Hon'ble Employers are settled and ratified to our satisfaction, and in particular that the sum above-mentioned be previously paid down, or at least the greatest part, and the most ample security given for the remainder, we then [*propose*] immediately to assist Raghoba with a body of forces consisting of European infantry and sepoys, with a proper field-train of artillery, amounting in the whole to about 2,500 men, which shall march from Surat to join his army, provided he will come with the forces under his command so near to that city that a junction may be effected without danger and without much difficulty.

The expenses of such a body of forces, including batta to the officers, provisions to the people, and carriage of the baggage and the field equipage, will not be less than one lakh of rupees per month, which will be accounted for out of the sum deposited: and we have no doubt but that our forces, in conjunction with his own, will easily carry him back to Poona, and effectually restore him to his government of the Maratha Empire.

It is necessary to acquaint you that the strictest secrecy is requisite to be observed in this.

As soon as it may be in your power to form a judgment upon what may be the issue of the negotiation we expect you advise us.

*Broach, 24th September*, 1774, (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*At a Consultation.*

The Chief acquaints the Board that the Gaikwad chauthia yesterday paid him a visit and proposed, as it had been usual in the time of the Moguls, at the time of Diwali, being the commencement of the year, a vera should be laid on the villages of 20,000 to 40,000 Rupees, in part of the revenue of the ensuing year. As it has been customary therefore, and we are much in want of money for our current expenses, *Chauthia's proposal*

we are of opinion that such a collection as the villages can bear, should be laid on and levied without loss of time.

1774 *Broach, 24th September,* 1774, (1774, *Br. F.* 1774)
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest* The Chief has lately received accounts from Baroda that Fatesing, distrustful of two principal ministers, has seized and imprisoned them and plundered their houses. Govindrao's forces still remain inactive before the place, so that it is yet quite uncertain how long affairs may continue in this unsettled state, though the country in general seems to conclude Fatesing must give up at last, unless he is powerfully assisted from Poona.

1774 *Surat,* 11*th October,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Narotamdas informed* Your commands of the 7th ultimo did not reach me till the 19th following, when I immediately sent for Narotamdas and communicated to him such parts of them as it was necessary he should know. On the 29th, before which, as he was ill, the weather very bad, and he had some particular business as chauthia to settle here, I could not get them [*the commands*] away. He set out for Raghoba's camp, which is in the neighbourhood of Burhanpur; he carried with him from me a suitable letter to Raghoba, and himself took down in writing the several stipulations Your Honour, etc. have particularized to me. I hope soon to hear from Narotamdas of his arrival with Raghoba, and that the business is in a fair way, and I shall then again address you.

*Financial difficulties* I will now take the liberty to give you in brief my sentiments on the several articles you have pointed out as necessary to form the basis of the treaty with Raghoba. The great sum of money, you insist should be deposited, is a very difficult stipulation; for, though I think Raghoba may be well inclined to accept our assistance on very advantageous terms to the Hon'ble Company, yet I believe that his finances are at present in such a situation as to put it out of his power to command any great sum of ready money; for no shroffs in his present unsettled circumstances will assist him, if they can possibly avoid it. This, therefore, appears to me an article which Raghoba will of necessity much object to; and yet I think a way [*may*] be found out to obviate this difficulty, if the treaty succeeds in other respects. In respect to the territories to be ceded, it will be necessary that they should be exactly particularised, the names of the small islands adjacent to Bombay mentioned, and the limits of Salsette and Bassein ascertained.

*Castle revenue* As to the Maratha share of the revenues formerly annexed to the Castle [*of Surat*], it is necessary to observe that all the encroachments and conquests the Marathas have made, have been from the Nawab's possessions in right of the city of Surat; as the Castle, I believe, never had any revenues annexed to it more than what we, as possessors of it, now enjoy; and as to what formerly belonged to the Government of the town of Surat, it will be extremely difficult to ascertain it, and the very discussion of the demands will be attended with much altercation and confusion, and after all be liable to the Nawab's claim, who certainly has the sole right to them. I am, therefore, of opinion that it would be much better to stipulate for a certain annual

sum, in lieu of all these claims, to be made good by the cession to the Hon'ble Company of some parganas[1] in the neighbourhood of Surat, the revenue from which might of course be easily collected.

*Gaikwad revenue* In regard to the share of the Marathas enjoy of this town's revenues, it is to be remarked that this is divided between the Poona Government and that of the Gaikwad's or Damaji's family, who have their chauthias here for the recovery of their separate proportions; and I am afraid that Raghoba will scruple much to interfere in the possessions of the Gaikwads or to stipulate for the giving up anything that does not absolutely belong to his own government; and this, I am apprehensive, will be the case as to Marathas' share in the Broach revenues, which entirely belong to Damaji's family. The Marathas are very tenacious to their rights in Surat, and rather than cede them would, I believe, give up double the amount elsewhere; and on the whole I do not know whether it is not for the interest of this Government and the good of the town that they should have a share in its revenues and have some of the principal people resident in town. All the other stipulations in respect to Bengal, Madras, &ca will, I dare say, meet with little or no objection.

*Raghoba's army* Raghoba is still encamped about 12 kos on the side of Buranpur, which city lies about 130 kos from Surat. He has with him, I hear, about 30,000 horse chiefly belonging to the Sindians and Malharrao Holkar's son.

*Danger ahead* In respect to the success of this negotiation, what I am most apprehensive of, is that the brothers at Poona will in consequence of their getting intelligence of Raghoba's being in treaty with the English clap up a peace with him on any terms, and before matters can be settled, render our assistance unnecessary to him. Your Honour, etc. best knows the means to be used to prevent this.

*Broach, 17th October,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest* No material alteration has happened in the situation of affairs between Govindrao and Fatesing since our last address of the 7th, except a trifling skirmish some days past, in which our harkara, lately arrived from camp, mentions Fatesing having taken a small party of Govindrao's horsemen that were out foraging to the number of about sixty. Much seems to depend on the event of Raghoba's success at Poona or the reverse.

*Poona, 28th October,* 1774 (*Mostyn's Diary*) 1774
*Thomas Mostyn to William Hornby.*

*Govindrao* From the most authentic intelligence I can procure, Govindrao has promised Raghoba 10,000 men.[2]

*Surat, 9th November,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D* 15*A*) 1774
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba's terms* Narotamdas is returned from Raghoba, but so ill that I have not yet seen him, as he cannot quit his cot. He has, however, sent

1 Robert Gambier was the originator of the pargana revenue system on the West Coast. It enabled the Company to reap where they had not sown, paved the way to annexation, and entailed hardly any expenses.
2 Published by Gense-Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 368.

me a paper from Raghoba in answer to the proposals I made. In this Raghoba agrees to give up, and [*to*] cause Damaji's family to do so, too, all their share in the Broach parganas as also in the parganas of Amod and Dussom Gain [*Dasgaon* ?]. The revenues of the two places will amount, as I am informed, to about one lakh and a half or two lakhs per annum; and those of Broach, I mean the Maratha share, to be about three lakhs and a half, so that in all the revenues of these three places will amount to about 5 lakhs per annum; but he absolutely refuses to give up Salsette and Bassein, alleging that he considers and values those countries more than any other; as to the islands near Bombay, not knowing their names, he says he cannot return any answer. In respect to Surat, he declares that he will not give up the chauth or town revenues, but will, as soon as his business is settled by our means, cause us to be put in possession of whatever formerly belonged to the Castle. He agrees to pay immediately at Bombay as a deposit six lakhs of Rupees, and to allow one lakh and a half per month for all charges whatever of our forces. But then he desires we may sent one thousand Europeans and two thousand sepoys with 15 guns and all the necessary stores and ammunition. He says, if the charges of our forces exceed the lakh and a half per month, he will pay the exceeding; and if they amount to less, receive the balance from us. But I fancy he would willingly agree, and it would be better for us to accept the lakh and a half per month in full of all demands and to render no accounts to him. He earnestly desires the forces may join him as soon as possible, and expects them in the month of Kartik or this month. He says he cannot come himself nearer this way to meet our forces, as by so doing he would hazard much and lose a great deal of ground, which, on his way back to Poona, might cost much trouble to recover; but that he will send a very large body of horse to join our forces within two or three day's journey of Surat and to accompany them to the place where he is. As to the stipulations in respect to Madras and Bengal, he accepts them. Such is the purport of what he offers, which I don't suppose you will accept; and have wrote him accordingly that, without Salsette and Bassein or some very full equivalent, I am sure that nothing can be done; and as no time is to be lost, have desired his final determination This letter will go to-day by pattemars express, who have engaged to reach him in 5 days, so that I may expect his answer in about twenty.

1774 *Surat, 9th November,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.*115*A*)
*Robert Gambier to Raghoba.*

*Wheedling* I have had the honour to receive your letter by harkaras, and by Narotamdas the paper you sent in answer to my proposal; and I am extremely sorry to find your offers fall so very short of my expectations. This way your business cannot be done. I wish much to do you service; and for your good, and for the good of my Masters, and for my own credit, I heartily desire to conclude the business [*which*] I at your desire began; for you will please to remember that Norotamdas by your order sought me, and made these proposals when I thought of no such thing. I then took much pains with the Governor of Bombay to make him give his ear to what you desired; and now that I have

brought him on the way, you do not answer properly what I expected. My heart is towards you; and therefore I once more write in hopes that you will consider well and give me such assurance as may enable me to conclude your business; but, if you cannot, then youi plain answer will put an end to all this affair at once. The mind of the Governor is much on Salsette and Bassein, not so much for their value, but because they are near to Bombay and convenient for us to have; and without you will give these places to the Hon'ble Company, I think the Hon'ble the Governor will not be pleased to agree to what you want. You say you cannot give these, and yet you offer nothing in their room. I do not know that the Governor will accept any other places in the room of Salsette and Bassein. I am afraid he will not; but still, if you will agree to give up to the Hon'ble Company your revenues of Olpad, Hansot and Anklesvar, I will try all I can to get them accepted. What you offer as to Broach, Amod, Dusson Gain (*Dasgaon*) is well; but this is little to what I asked, and what the great things, you expect from our side, deserve. As to our forces, they are ready; and was the agreement once settled, would join you in 15 days, and very soon effectually do your service; but I cannot prevail on the Governor to let them move, till everything is settled to his perfect satisfaction. I send, therefore, this letter to you by pattemars, express—for Narotamdas is too sick to come to you again—to know from you your last resolutions, that I may acquaint the Governor; and I once more plainly tell you that, unless you will agree to give up Salsette and Bassein and to settle some good revenues for Surat Castle, the business cannot be done. The money, too, of 6 lakhs, you have offered to pay, is not near sufficient. Now then, if your mind is really bent on finishing this business, do not lose any time; but under your own hand and seal send me immediately the assurances I want as to Salsette and Bassein and the revenues for Surat; and then, as soon as the money is paid in Bombay, four days after, our forces will set out and soon join you and, as your servants, very soon with the blessing of God carry you to Poona and make you absolute master of the Maratha Empire. You are at such a distance from me that to write backwards and forwards loses much time; therefore I much wish you would send your good and trusty man to me with full powers to settle everything. Be so good as to consider well what I now write, and return me soon as full and plain answer, that one way or the other the business may be concluded; believe me, for I tell you the truth, that without Salsette and Bassein or some places equal to them, your business cannot be done. In answer to this I expect your last determination and offers, and then the Governor will determine to accept or refuse.

*Bombay, 10th November*, 1774 (1774, *P. D. Lst. to Court of Dir.* 21) 1774
*Bombay to the Court of Directors.*

57. In our address of the 7th May, Your Honours were fully informed with the then situation of the intestine divisions of the Marathas. *Gaikwad contest*
Little alteration has since happened owing to the rainy season, but the armies of the two contending Powers will now again shortly take the field; for we do not hear that during this long interval any effectual steps have been pursued to bring matters to an accommodation.

کتب خانہ جامعہ ملیہ اسلامیہ
جامعہ نگر (دہلی)

1774 *Bombay, 10th November, 1774 (1774, S &. P. D. 15A)*
*Bombay to the Company.*

*Fresh proposals* Our last address from this department, under date the 13th April, acquainted Your Honours that some proposals have been made us on the part of Raghoba for the assistance of a body of the Company's forces against the ministerial party at Poona; and we at the same time informed you of the terms on which we might esteem it for the interest of the Company to give him the desired assistance; but, as it was most material that we should receive a sum of money in deposit as well, to ensure our Hon'ble Employers for any loss, and as it afterwards appeared that Raghoba was then unable to furnish it, the matter at that time dropped, but has since been again resumed, through an agent of Raghoba to Mr. Gambier at Surat.

*Bombay decision* The particulars of his proposals are contained in Mr. Gambier's letter to the President, entered in our diary under the 6th September, when we were unanimously of opinion after mature deliberation on the subject that material advantages might be gained for our Employers by embracing Raghoba's cause; and we accordingly resolved so to do, provided the several stipulations which we esteemed requisite to be made for the Company were previously settled to our satisfaction. Our minutes of the 6th September in our diary, now transmitted, will fully apprise Your Honours of everything requisite for your information on this head.

*Reply awaited* We accordingly made the necessary communication to Mr. Gambier, and Raghoba's agent is in consequence set out from Surat to acquaint his Master of the terms on which our assistance may be obtained. A long time has since elapsed, but we have yet heard nothing further on the subject.

1774 *Bombay, 18th November, 1774 (1774, S. & P. D. 15A)*
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

*Bombay terms* It is not for the interest of our Hon'ble Employers to recede from any of the demands contained in our letter to you of the 7th September. We shall, therefore, continue to adhere to the whole of them, except what regards the sum to be deposited; and as this was never meant to be converted to the Company's use, but was intended only to secure the reimbursement of the expenses that would be incurred by the forces to be sent to Raghoba's assistance, we therefore acquiesce in lessening the amount of the sum to be so deposited; and if the other points are settled to our satisfaction, we may be induced to accept of 6 lakhs of Rupees on this account, provided sufficient shroff-security is given for whatever expense may be incurred above that sum.

*The Chief's error* In your letter dated the 11th ultimo you mention that you believe no revenue was ever annexed to the Castle of Surat more than the Company, as possessors of it, now enjoy; in which you are quite mistaken, as the contrary appears to be the case by a letter we received from the late Mr. Price, a copy of which we enclose for your information; and as you seem to think it will be extremely difficult to ascertain the revenue that formerly belonged to the Government of Surat, we enclose a particular account of it, showing likewise the manner in which it is at present divided.

*Surat, 21st November, 1774 (1774, S. & P. D. 15A)* 1774
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

A translate of the proposed treaty, he [*Raghoba*] has sent me, is enclosed, by which Your Honour, etc. will please to observe that, though he refuses to cede Salsette and Bassein, he has offered to give up to the Hon'ble Company in lieu of them the chauth of Surat, the revenues of Amod, Desbarah, Olpad and any other pargana to the amount of a lakh of Rupees, making in all eight lakhs of Rupees per annum, which with the Broach revenue, he has also agreed to cede, will amount in all to upwards of eleven lakhs a year; and all these parganas are situated in the neighbourhood of Surat and Broach, and lie most conveniently for the easy recovery of the revenue. He offers to deposit six lakhs of Rupees, which I really believe is as great a sum as he can possibly raise at present. You will observe that he wants 1,000 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys; but, if this number exactly cannot be furnished, I do not imagine it will be difficult to settle the matter with him for three or four hundred less; and I also believe that, if Your Honour, etc. choose, he may be prevailed upon to stipulate to give the lakh and a half per month in full of all charges and expenses whatever of the forces, without our being obliged to render him any accounts. He agrees to settle the Castle revenue as it was in former days; but, as I cannot find that the Sidis ever possessed a greater revenue than the Hon'ble Company now enjoy as possessors of the Castle, this article, I think, had better be entirely left out, and a certain annual sum, suppose from 50 to 1,00,000 Rupees, demanded in lieu, which, I think, he will consent to give. As to the chauth of Surat, he refuses to give it, and it is not a matter of much importance; for its amount annually is only 35,000 Rupees. In respect to the islands adjacent to Bombay he says he can give us no answer, as he knows not what they are; but, if they are not any strongholds, nor have any fortifications on them, I believe he will not scruple to cede them; so that the only material difference between the terms you directed me to ask and those he has consented to, is the making a less deposit than required—which in his present circumstances he could not avoid--and the not giving up Salsette and Bassein, in lieu of which he has offered other places to the yearly amount of eight lakhs of Rupees, which, I have been informed, far exceeds the revenue of both Salsette and Bassein. If Your Honour, etc. approve it, I would stipulate for, besides the deposit of six lakhs of Rupees, the monthly regular payment of 50,000 Rupees for the troops, and at the expiration of every six months, as long as they are with him, a fresh advance of six lakhs more. In his treaty he says that all these places shall be delivered up, as soon as his business is finished, but this seems much too uncertain a term; and therefore it should instead be stipulated that the places in question should be delivered up to the Hon'ble Company, either whenever he is put in possession of Poona, or on a certain fixed time, suppose two or three months after the junction of our troops with his.

***Proposed treaty explained***

***Draft of a treaty proposed between the Hon'ble Company and Raghoba.***

Treaty between Raghoba and the Hon'ble Company, made by Raghoba, the 12th Ramazan or 19th November, 1774. As the Hon'ble Company is ready to assist and help Raghoba to punish his enemies,

***First draft of treaty***

for this reason Raghoba has consented to the proposals made by the means of Narotamdas Kisondas as follows:

Narotamdas has acquainted me that my business will be carried on with a strong force and guns, which are to continue with me until the conclusion of my business; the forces are to be seven hundred Europeans and eighteen hundred black sepoys, in all two thousand five hundred people, together with ten guns with all necessaries; for which expenses and charges will be wanted every month, 1,50,000 Rupees; agreeable thereto the amount of fifteen (15) lakhs of Rupees is to be paid beforehand, and should not the charges amount to the above-mentioned 1,50,000 Rupees, the batta is to be returned—which being duly considered, it is answered:

That Raghoba wants that the Hon'ble Company should assist him and come without fail by the end of Kartik or the end of the month of November with one thousand Europeans and two thousand black sepoys, with (15) fifteen guns with all proper necessaries; and to put this into readiness he has ordered Narotamdas to pay at present six (6) lakhs of Rupees, for which purpose he has given the same Narotamdas the collection and management of the countries from Hotry to Barnedow [?], and for the charges and expenses of the above-mentioned has agreed to pay the sum of 1,50,000 Rupees per month, and agreeable thereto bis sum of 1,50,000 Rupees per month shall be paid during the whole time this force shall continue with me; and if out of these six (6) lakhs of Rupees there should remain any balance due to me, Raghoba, it must be paid by you; or, if according to the agreement any batta should become due from me to you, it shall be paid by me punctually.

It is desired that I should give up to the Hon'ble Company Salsette and Bassein, and four small islands round Bombay, also the chauth of Surat, and the revenues of the Castle, as they were in the time of the Sidis under the Government of the Gaikwad, which since our Government, it is said, have been stopped.

The countries which you have asked of me, it is not agreeable to me to give up; but I have agreed, after having well considered, to give up other places in their stead. I will give up the parganas of Broach, Amod, Desbarah, Olpad, Hansot and any other place or village you shall choose amongst the 28 parganas belonging to Surat (worth a lakh of Rupees), which is to be given up without any doubt after the conclusion of my business, and also the revenues of Surat Castle shall be made good as they were formerly in the time of the Sidis under the Government of the Gaikwad, after this affair has been duly enquired into.

It is desired that Muhammad Ali Khan of Arcot, and the Government of Bengal shall not be troubled unjustly by me; but, should they not comply and give execution to the agreements lately made between me and them, in that case I may proceed with them as is proper.

Whatever may be the agreement between my Government and them, they must accordingly go on, and they must not use, as they have hitherto done, their forces to the prejudice of my Government, and then they will not unjustly meet with any trouble from it.

The friendship between us, both parties, must be continued forever, and there must not be on any account any difference made in this our agreement.

Your enemies I shall consider as mine, and mine you must consider as yours; and so with plain hearts between us, both parties, the friendship must be carried on without making any difference; and this our agreement must be punctually complied with in its due time, and further you must on no account show any affection or friendship to my enemies, nor assist them.

These articles, being in all five, I will observe and strictly comply with, and the Hon'ble Company must likewise do so on their part, and in them on no account must be made any difference.

*Bombay, 26th November,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*) 1774
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

***Bassein*** In deference to the opinion of our Honourable Employers, who have frequently expressed their desire of being in possession of Salsette and Bassein, we wish Raghoba was less adverse to the ceding of these places; however, as it appears that insisting on them at present will probably put a stop to this negotiation, we have agreed to wave for the present making any further demand respecting them.

***Proposed terms*** That you may clearly and fully understand, without further reference to us, the whole of our demands, we have thrown them into the form of a treaty, which we now enclose; and provided Raghoba will on his part properly authorise a person to execute the same and to perform the matters which are to be done immediately, such as payment of the six lakhs of Rupees and security for the monthly payment of one lakh and a half of Rupees for the expenses of our forces, we then hereby fully and amply authorise and empower you to accede to the treaty on the part of the Hon'ble Company and to fix their seal to it; and upon your advising us of this event, and that the money is deposited, we shall speedily take effectual means for performing our part of the engagement.

***Treaty explained*** By the treaty enclosed you will find we have insisted on the Peshwa share of the revenues of the parganas formerly annexed to the city of Surat. This, you will perceive by the statement sent you, enclosed in our last letter, will amount to about 12½ lakhs per annum. The revenues formerly annexed to the Castle we estimate at about three lakhs agreeable to Mr. Price's letter; and the share of the Gaikwads in Broach is also about 3 lakhs, making in the whole about 18 lakhs and ¾ of Rupees per annum.

***Query*** In your letter before us you observe that Raghoba's offers amount to eight lakhs of Rupees yearly. We direct that you particularly explain from what places this revenue is to arise, and the annual amount of each.

***Second draft of treaty*** *Articles of agreement between the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor of Bombay and its dependencies &ca on the part of the Hon'ble the United English East India Company and Raghoba &ca on the other, 1774 or..Gentoo style.*

*1st* The treaty concluded between this Government of Bombay and Bajirao Pandit Pradhan, or first minister of the Sau Raja, dated

July 1739, or 1140 of the Gentoo style, and that concluded on the part of this Government with Balaji Bajirao Pandit Pradhan, dated the 12th October, 1756, or of the Gentoos 17th of Muharram, 1170, are hereby ratified and confirmed in their full extent according to the true intent and meaning of them, in the same full and ample manner and in the same light in which they have been hitherto ever understood.

*2nd* All other agreements subsisting between this Government and that of the Marathas are hereby ratified and confirmed, and after the re-establishment of Raghoba in the government of the Marathas peace and tranquillity shall subsist uninterrupted between the Hon'ble Company and the Maratha Government.

*3rd* Raghoba on his part engages never to assist the enemies of the Hon'ble Company against the Company in any part of their dominions, and the Governor and Council of Bombay engage never to assist the enemies of Raghoba.

*4th* The Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay, in behalf of the Hon'ble Company and in consideration of the grants and cessions made by Raghoba to the Company, do hereby engage and agree, as soon as possible and without any loss of time after these articles are fully ratified, confirmed and executed on the part of Raghoba, to send a body of the Hon'ble Company's forces properly provided with stores and ammunition and with a field-train of artillery, to join his army and to act in conjunction with his forces against his enemies, the ministry at Poona. In the said body of forces shall be included not less than 700 Europeans, and the whole shall not be less in number than 2,500 men.

*5th* In consideration of such effectual assistance on the part of the Hon'ble Company, Raghoba does hereby engage on his part to make over to the Hon'ble Company forever the undermentioned places, and he does accordingly by these presents make over the same to them in the most full and ample manner, and these presents are to be considered as the most secure grant or cession of them until more effectual deeds may be executed.

*6th* The share collected by the Poona Government of the whole thirty parganas and four kasbahs, formerly annexed to the Governor of the city of Surat, is hereby ceded to the Hon'ble English Company on the part of Raghoba forever, [*over*] which the Company are to exercise from henceforward every right and authority and to receive every revenue arising herefrom in the same full and ample manner as enjoyed hitherto by the Poona Government. The names of these parganas and kasbahs, which are from this moment ceded forever to the Hon'ble Company, so far as the Poona Government ever enjoyed them, are as follows:

Ulpar [*Olpad*], Occlaseer [*Anklesvar*], Hassotte [*Hansot*], Bussroyah [*Vasrai*], Turgaseer [*Tadkeshvar*], Ghulah [*Galha*], Chorassy [*Chorasi*], Bullaseer [*Balesar*], Comraez [*Kamrej*], Teemba [*Temba*], Verraw [*Vyara*] & Surranram [*Saranjam*], Cunode [*Kadod*], Vussawpore [*Bisanpur*], Untoppore [*Antapore*], Kirkaw [*Khadke*], Punchamoley [*Panchmouli*], Boaney [*Bohari*], Wallaw [*Walod*], Unnowoul [*Anaval*], Mowah [*Mahuva*], Supah [*Supa*], Gundaire [*Gandevi*], Parchole [*Parchol*], Chickly [*Chikhli*], Versaul [*Valsad*], Purnella [*Parnera*], Monroley [*Maroli*], Tillary [*Teladi*], Settergoon [*Satragam*], Surboam

[*Sarbhon*]. Four kasbahs are: Burraon [*Variav*], Nowsary [*Navsari*], Bondaley [*Bardoli*], Moolah [*Motah*].

*7th* Raghoba does also hereby firmly engage to cede, and does hereby cede to the Hon'ble Company forever, with all the revenue which the Poona Government did recover therefrom, the four following places, which were formerly belonging to the Governor of the Castle of Surat *viz.* Ullaseer [*Anklesvar*], Teembah [*Temba*], Barraw [*Variav*] & Vessaw [*Vissow*].

*8th* Raghoba does further hereby engage immediately to procure a grant to the Hon'ble Company forever all the revenues collected by the Gaikwads from the town and parganas of Broach, and does also make over for the future every revenue that the Poona Government may have enjoyed in that district.

*9th* Raghoba does also engage to cede to the Hon'ble Company, and does hereby cede to them all the islands adjacent to Bombay (Salsette & Bassein excepted) their names are as follows: Great and little Carranja [*Karanja*], Elephanta & Canary [*Kenery*].

*10th* In case of opposition from any person or persons whatever to the Hon'ble Company taking possession of the revenues and places hereby firmly and effectually ceded to them, Raghoba does engage to pay the expense that will be incurred by gaining possession, and does engage to use effectual means to put them in possession as well as to secure them in the quiet possession of the whole of the revenues and places now ceded to them.

*11th* Raghoba does hereby further engage directly to deposit with the Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay the sum of six lakhs of Rupees, which will be accounted for at the expiration of the service which is now to be performed against his enemies at Poona; and he does further engage, monthly, and every month, to pay the sum of one lakh and a half of Rupees, to commence the day the forces leave Bombay, which sum of one lakh and a half of Rupees per month, the Hon'ble the President and Council hereby agree to accept for the charges and expenses of the forces with which they engage to assist him.

*12th* Raghoba does hereby agree immediately to give such shroff-securities for the monthly payment of the one lakh and a half of Rupees as to the Governor and Council may seem sufficient.

*13th* Raghoba does engage never to molest the dominions of the Company in Bengal, nor to make war on the Carnatic so long as Muhammad Ali, the Nawab, adheres to the treaty subsisting between the two Governments.

*14th* In case the Company's or any other merchants' vessels, great or small, shall be shipwrecked on any part of the sea-coast within the jurisdiction of the Marathas, every assistance shall be given by the inhabitants to save as much as possible, and the whole that may be saved shall be restored to the owners, they paying all reasonable expenses.

*15th* Immediately after the ratification of the foregoing articles, and after the said sum of six lakhs of Rupees is deposited in Bombay or Surat, and security given for the monthly payment of one lakh and a half of Rupees for so long as the Company's forces may continue with Ragboba, the Governor and Council engage that the Company's

forces, as above, shall with the utmost expedition set out from Surat to join his army; and they trust by the blessing of the Almighty they will quickly overcome all his enemies at Poona and re-establish him in the government of the Maratha Empire.

The foregoing articles being agreed to by me, and accepted in behalf of the Hon'ble the President, &ca of Bombay, I do in confirmation thereof affix to these presents the seal of the Hon'ble the United English East India Company, and do attest the same with my own proper name in Surat, the day and year above written.

1774 *Bombay, 1st December, 1774* (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*Bombay to the Company.*

*Raghoba's request* By our address of the 10th ultimo, a duplicate of which is enclosed, we informed you of the proposals that had been made to us by Raghoba, through Mr. Gambier at Surat, for the assistance of a body of the Company's forces against his enemies, the ministerial party at Poona, in order to re-establish him in the government of the Maratha Empire.

We also communicated our resolution to assist him, provided such matters were settled to our satisfaction, as we judged necessary to stipulate with him, in order that, should a treaty take place, it might turn out truly beneficial to the Hon'ble Company.

*Proposed treaty* We have since received two letters from Mr. Gambier on the subject, entered in our diary under 17th and 25th ultimo, the last of which was accompanied by the translate of a treaty proposed by Raghoba, wherein, though his offers fall far short of our demands, he nevertheless proposed to cede a territory to the Company near Surat, that according to Mr. Gambier's account would produce an annual revenue of about eight lakhs of Rupees, which added to the Gaikwad's share of the revenues from the town and parganas of Broach, being near three lakhs, which he also offered, made in the whole about eleven lakhs of Rupees per annum. He likewise proposed to deposit 6 lakhs of Rupees in money, and to give security for the payment of half a lakh monthly for six months, which was to be considered as the expenses of our forces for that term, which he proposed should be reckoned at $1\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of Rupees per month without frurther account; and provided they continued with him longer than six months, he then proposed to make another advance of six lakhs and to continue paying $\frac{1}{2}$ a lakh monthly as before; but he refused to cede the island of Salsette or Bassein, which we demanded among other articles for the assistance we were to afford him.

*Bombay comment* Our remarks on these letters from Mr. Gambier are fully stated, in our minutes of the 17th & 25th ultimo, and though we have by no means agreed to the terms of the treaty as proposed by Raghoba, we have nevertheless been induced to recede in some degree from our first demands as well in respect to the sum to be previously deposited as in regard to the cession of the island of Salsette and of Bassein.

As to the deposit, our demand was for fifteen lakhs of Rupees or 20, if possible, as security for the expenses of our forces and to ensure the Company from any loss; Raghoba has tendered six; and as Mr Gambier has represented that he believes it to be out of Raghoba's power in his present situation to offer more, and as ample security must

be given for the payment monthly of the 1½ lakh for the expenses of your forces, we have been induced so far to reduce our demand in this particular.

Raghoba also is very averse to the cession of Salsette and Bassein, in so much that insisting on these places might probably have caused an entire stop to be put to the pending negotiation. In deference to the opinion of Your Honours, we much wished that he could have been prevailed upon to grant them to the Honble Company, but we were at the same time of opinion that it was by no means for their interest to run the risk of oversetting the whole on that account, as much more material advantages might be gained elsewhere; and we therefore determined to wave making any further demands for those places till a more favourable opportunity. These are the only points in which we have any way receded from our first demands.

The following are therefore the terms on which we have at present offered to afford him (Raghoba) the Company's assistance: ***Bombay terms***

That the Poona share of the revenues, formerly annexed to the Government of Surat from 30 parganas and 4 kasbahs, amounting according to the late Mr. Price's statement, entered in our diary under the month of May 1772, to about 12 lakhs and a half per annum, be given up forever.

That the Gaikwad share of the Broach revenues with any revenues collected by the Poona Government from the Broach town and parganas, amounting to about three lakhs per annum, be also ceded forever to the Company.

And that the revenue, now possessed by the Poona Government which belonged to the Castle Governor of Surat at the time the Moguls were in the fulness of their power, be also made over to the Hon'ble Company, amounting to about three lakhs of Rupees.

The whole of the foregoing amounts to about eighteen lakhs and a half of Rupees annually, which, we have insisted, shall be ceded to us forever. There are also some other articles of our demands, all which are specified in the sketch of the treaty we have drawn up and forwarded to Mr. Gambier, as entered under the 26th ultimo. That, in case Raghoba should embrace our offers, no time may be lost in entering into the treaty into the necessary engagements on that account, Mr. Gambier is accordingly empowered to enter into a treaty on the terms therein set down.

Should we obtain the whole for the Company, that is inserted in this draft for a treaty, or even should we be obliged to recede in some degree from the largeness of our present demands, we must think we shall merit Your Honour's full approbation of our proceedings, as the advantages that the Company will reap therefrom will be considerable and lasting; and we think that with the body of forces we propose sending to the assistance of Raghoba, there can be little doubt of his obtaining the full possession of the government of the Maratha Empire.

1774 *Surat, 6th December, 1774* (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Two changes in treaty* It is with great satisfaction I inform you shat I have this day settled with Narotamdas, on the part of Raghoba, the proposed treaty, agreeable to the terms you pointed out, with only two deviations; both which, I flatter myself, you will approve. The first, because it appears evidently for the interest of the Hon'ble Company that this alteration should be made; and the other, because, the present circumstances of Raghoba considered, it is impossible for him to give the shroff-security you want. The deviations I have made are the stipulating for certain parganas and districts to be ceded entirely to the Hon'ble Company to the amount of the same revenue or more, considering some errors of Mr. Price's calculation, than what you wanted to enjoy by participation of thirty parganas and four kasbahs, which, you say, were formerly the right of this city's Government. For in your commands of the 26th you advise me that your demands in all amount to about eighteen and a half lakhs of Rupees yearly revenue; and to this, or a greater amount, are the revenues of the districts I have agreed for, which lie close to Surat or Broach, and of course will be recovered with much less expense and difficulty than the other revenues could form such a variety of places, situated so differently, and whose government would be in the hands of the Marathas. The accompanying paper will show you the revenue of each place, amounting in all to the annual value of Rupees eighteen lakhs, twenty-five thousand (18,25,000); and as to the other deviation, it is only in respect to the shroff-security required, which it is, I am sure, absolutely impossible for Raghoba in his present circumstances to comply with; and I have therefore changed this stipulation to what you will observe in a copy of the intended treaty, which accompanies this, and which I propose with your permission executing on the part of the Hon'ble company as soon as the sufficient person, fully and properly authorised on the part of Raghoba, executes the counterpart; and for those powers Raghoba will be immediately wrote to by Narotamdas, who expects to receive them in seven days.

*Present to Narotamdas* In order to bring this treaty so well to bear, I have been obliged to promise Narotamdas a very large gratuity, and to engage that on its full completion the Hon'ble Company will make him a present of a jagir of fifty thousand Rupees (50,000) per annum, which with his consent I have added to the lakh of Rupees per annum stipulated to be ceded from any districts we choose in the neighbourhood of Surat or Broach, so that the Hon'ble Company will by this present be no real losers. And this, I hope, you will approve and authorise me to confirm, as I assure you I found it was impossible without it to procure such advantageous terms for the Hon'ble Company.

*Govindrao's troops* A very large body of horse is come from Govindrao to assist Narotamdas in the recovery of revenues round Surat for Raghoba. And I have reason to believe he will in the term of 15 or 20 days at furthest complete the payment of the six lakhs, and that Raghoba will before that give the stipulated orders for the payment of a lakh

1 A jagir with an annual revenue of 50,000 Rupees, amounts to a capital of 10,00,000, at the rate of 5 per cent.

and a half per month; and I therefore hope Your Honour, &ca will accordingly hold the forces in readiness to be embarked at a speedy warning, as Raghoba is of course very impatient for their joining him, and the season advances apace. He is now within 80 kos of Surat, and will come nearer, whenever he is informed our forces have left Bombay.

To this treaty I should think it necessary to add an article stipulating the time when the Hon'ble Company are to commence their right to the revenues of the several districts and parganas ceded to them, which, I suppose, should be from the time Raghoba gets possession of Poona. And in this I request your orders. ***Clause to be added***

*Articles of agreement between the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor of Bombay and its dependencies &ca on the part of the Honble the United English East India Company and Raghoba &ca, on 1774 or..of the Gentoo style.*

*1st* The Treaty concluded between this Government of Bombay and Bajirao Pandit Pradhan, or first minister of the Serene Sau Raja, dated July, 1739, or 1140 of the Gentoo style, and that concluded on the part of this Government with Balaji Bajirao Pandit Pradhan, dated the 12th October, 1756, or of the Gentoo style 17th Muharram 1170, are hereby ratified and confirmed in their full extent according to the true intent and meaning of them, in the same full and ample manner and in the same light in which they have been hitherto understood. ***Third draft of treaty***

*2nd* All other agreements subsisting between this Government and that of the Marathas are hereby ratified and confirmed, and after the re-establishment of Raghoba in the government of the Marathas peace and tranquillity shall subsist uninterrupted between the Hon'ble Company and the Maratha Government.

*3rd* Raghoba on his part engages never to assist the enemies of the Hon'ble Company against the Company in any part of their dominions, and the Governor and Council of Bombay engage never to assist the enemies of Raghoba.

*4th* The Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay, in behalf of the Hon'ble Company and in consideration of the grants and cessions undermentioned made by Raghoba to the Company, do hereby engage and agree, as soon as possible and without any loss of time, after these articles are fully ratified, confirmed and executed on the part of Raghoba, to send a body of the Hon'ble Company's forces, properly provided with stores and ammunition and with a field-train of artillery, to join his army and to act in conjunction with his forces against his enemies, the ministry at Poona. In the said body of forces shall be included not less than 700 Europeans, and the whole shall not be less in number than 2,500 men.

5th In consideration of such effectual assistance Raghoba does hereby engage on his part to make over to the Hon'ble Company forever the undermentioned places, and he does accordingly by these presents make over the same to them in the most full and ample manner; and these presents are to be considered as the most secure grant or cession of them until more effectual deeds may be executed; which shall be, as soon as ever he is put in possession of Poona.

*6th* The names of the parganas and the kasbahs which Raghoba, as above recited, stipulates and agrees to cede to the Hon'ble Company, and which by this treaty are from this moment given up and ceded for ever in the most ample form and manner to the Hon'ble Company, their heirs and successors, are the following:

| | |
|---|---|
| Olpad and its dependencies, | Balesar and its dependencies |
| Hansot ,, | Temba ,, |
| Amod ,, | Variav ,, |
| Desbarah ,, | Vissow ,, |
| Jambusar ,, | |

Besides these districts, revenues to the amount of one and a half lakhs of Rupees to be taken from any of the districts or villages adjacent to Surat or Broach, which the Hon'ble Company may choose.

The whole and entire revenue of all the above parganas and kasbahs with that of the villages and districts thereunto belonging with the absolute property of governing them, as now enjoyed by Raghoba or Damaji's family, called the Gaikwads, is by these presents in the most full and ample manner ceded to the Hon'ble Company.

*7th* Raghoba does also hereby cede to the Hon'ble Company forever, with all the revenue which the Poonah Government did receive therefrom, the four following places which were formerly belonging to the Governor of the Castle of Surat, viz. Ullaseer [*Anklesvar*], Teembah [*Temba*], Barrow [*Variav*] & Vessaw [*Vissow*].

*8th* Raghoba does further hereby engage immediately to procure a grant to the Hon'ble Company forever of all the revenues hereto collected by the Gaikwads from the town and parganas of Broach, and does also make over for the future every revenue that the Poona Government may have enjoyed in that district.

*9th* Raghoba does also engage to cede to the Hon'ble Company, and does hereby cede to them all the islands adjacent to Bombay (Salsette and Bassein excepted). Their names are as follows: Great and little Carranja [*Karanja*] Elephanta, and Canary [*Kenery*].

*10th* In case of opposition from any person or persons whatever to the Hon'ble Company's taking possession of the revenues and places hereby firmly and effectually ceded to them, Raghoba does engage to pay the expense that will be incurred by gaining possession, and to use effectual means to put them in possession as well as to secure them in the quiet possession of the whole of the revenues and places now ceded to them.

*11th* Raghoba does hereby further engage directly to deposit with the Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay the sum of 6 lakhs of Rupees, which will be accounted for at the expiration of the service which is now to be performed against his enemies at Poona; he does further engage, monthly, and every month to pay the sum of one lakh and a half of Rupees, to commence the day the forces leave Bombay; which sum of one lakh and a half of Rupees per month, the Hon'ble the President and Council hereby agree to accept for the charges and expenses of the forces with which they engage to assist him.

*12th* Whereas the Hon'ble the Governor and Council of Bombay have demanded that Raghoba should immediately give such shroff-security for the monthly payment of one lakh and a half of Rupees as to them may seem sufficient, and to this he is most willing to agree, but that the present situation of his affairs puts it absolutely out of his power to prevail on any sufficiently responsible shroffs to stand as such security; it is, therefore, hereby stipulated and agreed that Raghoba shall, as soon as he can, give this said shroff-security; and in the meantime shall give to the Hon'ble the Governor & Council or the agents such assignments on his revenues arising from the parganas in the neighbourhood of Surat or Broach, or to his chauthias of either or both of the said places, for the recovery of, and monthly payment into, the Hon'ble Company's treasury at Surat or Bombay of the above mentioned sum of one lakh and a half of Rupees per month, as may be satisfactory to the said Hon'ble Governor and Council.
*13th* Raghoba does engage never to molest the dominions of the Company in Bengal, nor to make war in the Carnatic so long as Mahammad Ali, the Nawab, adheres to the treaty subsisting between the two Governments.
*14th* In case the Company's or any other merchants' vessels, great or small, shall be shipwrecked on any part of the sea-coast within the jurisdiction of the Marathas, every assistance shall be given by the inhabitants to save as much as possible, and the whole that shall be saved shall be restored to the owners, they paying all reasonable expenses.
*15th* That immediately after the ratification of the foregoing articles, and after the said sum of 6 lakhs of Rupees is deposited in Bombay or Surat, and security given for the monthly payment of one lakh and a half of Rupees so long as the Company's forces remain in his service, the Company's forces shall with the utmost expedition set out from Surat to join his army; and they trust that by the blessing of the Almighty they will quickly overcome all his enemies at Poona and establish him in the government of the Maratha Empire.

*Account: annual revenues of the several districts to be ceded by Raghoba to the Hon'ble Company:*

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Broach with the pargana revenues & those of the town the Gaikwads share .. .. .. | Rs. | 3,50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Amod with its districts .. .. .. .. | ,, | 1,50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Desbarah do .. .. .. .. | ,, | 50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Jambusar do .. .. .. .. | ,, | 4,00,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Olpad do .. .. .. .. | ,, | 3,50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Hansot do .. .. .. .. | ,, | 1,25,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Temba, Balesar, Variav and Vissow as estimated by Mr. Price .. .. .. .. .. | ,, | 3,00,000 | 0 | 0 |
| To be ceded from any other parganas near Surat or Broach, which the Company shall choose | ,, | 1,50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| | Rs. | 18,75,000 | 0 | 0 |
| Deduct to be given to Narotamdas per agreement | ,, | 50,000 | 0 | 0 |
| | Rs. | 18,25,000 | 0 | 0 |

1774 *Bombay, 11th December, 1774* (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

*Instructions* We have duly received your letters of the 6th instant with the copy of the treaty you had adjusted with the agent from Raghoba and the account of the annual revenue of the several districts, proposed by the treaty to be ceded to the Hon'ble Company; to all which we shall now reply and communicate to you such directions as are necessary to be given in consequence of them.

*Gaikwad's consent* The reasons, urged by you for stipulating for the cession of the parganas you have done in preference to those pointed out by us, appear very just; and we should, therefore, have readily concurred in that alteration, were we fully convinced that Raghoba was authorized to make them over to the Hon'ble Company; but for the greatest part the revenue stipulated by the [*articles*] you sent us really belongs to the Gaikwad or Damaji's family, and not to the Poona Government: consequently it is not in Raghoba's power to make his grant of it effectual to the Company, unless the Gaikwads join in the treaty and give up their share of the revenue of the places in question by some valid instrument or sanad. Should we accept them without this previous precaution, we may be duped, and the Company in the end [*may*] be involved in a war to obtain the possession of them.

Thus, though we much prefer the present plan, we are obliged to direct that you do not execute the treaty in that manner, unless Raghoba previously obtains by a valid instrument the full consent of Damaji's family to give up forever their claim to all the share of the revenues they have hitherto collected from these several places.

You must be sensible, unless this precaution is made use of, that Raghoba's grant alone will be very insufficient to procure to the Company the possession of what he has offered to cede to them; and should he not be able to procure the consent of Damaji's family, you must then frame the treaty agreeable to the draft transmitted with our letter of the 26th ultimo, by which a cession is to be made of the Poona share of the revenues of the parganas and kasbahs formerly annexed to the town-Governor of Surat, as expressed in the 6th article.

*Shroff-security* We have very attentively considered what you have wrote us respecting the inability of Raghoba to give the shroff-security we demanded for the monthly payment of one and half a lakhs of Rupees so long as our forces continue in his service; and we cannot think it is so impossible for him really to find such security as has been represented to you, if Narotamdas did his utmost to obtain it. We wish this obstacle was removed, as we are apprehensive that by accepting any other than shroff-security the Company may be involved in difficulties to obtain the regular payments. However, as you have found out this man's price, we hope on your insisting on shroff-security, that he, for his own sake, will find some means to obtain it.

If, however, after all your endeavours you find that shroff-security really cannot be obtained, and Damaji's family do consent to give up their right to the places now offered by Raghoba to be ceded to the Company, we then may be induced to accept an assignment for the monthly payment of 1½ lakhs of Rupees on the other revenues of

the Poona Government near to Surat, which are not included in the grant to the Company; but, if on the contrary the Gaikwads refuse to give up their share in the revenues of the places now offered by Raghoba, and that it be in such case stipulated that the Poona share of the revenues of the 30 parganas and 4 kasbahs be made over to the Company, how will Raghoba then be able to make an assignment on any of the Poonah revenues near Surat or Broach, as we understand the revenues of 30 parganas and kasbahs are almost the whole the Poona Government recover from any territory near Surat or Broach. We must, therefore, in such a case absolutely insist on the shroff-security, before we enter upon service with him, that there must not remain even the shadow of a doubt regarding it.

We remark that the 5th article of the treaty, you have sent us, concludes with the following words "Until more effectual deeds may be executed; which shall be, as soon as he is put in possession of Poona." This part we deem highly improper to be inserted; for it must at all events be fully and clearly expressed in the treaty that the Company shall be considered as the sole proprietors of the several parganas to be ceded to them, from the moment the treaty may be executed, from which time the revenues of the places to be ceded shall be considered as the Company's; and the necessary sanads must absolutely be delivered on the part of Raghoba at the very time the treaty is executed, that is, it must not be executed by you without they are delivered to you. *Objection to 5th article*

The other articles of the treaty, being agreeable to the draft we transmitted with our letter of the 26th ultimo, are proper; and provided you can settle with Raghoba's agent to frame the several articles as agreeable to what we have mentioned above, and that the several matters to be directly executed are fully performed agreeable to the manner we have pointed out, you are then to execute the same on the part of the Company and to send us instant advice of it. *Approval*

Send hither a particular account showing the shares of the Peshwa Government and of the Gaikwad's respectively in the parganas offered to be ceded to us by the treaty that accompanied your letter. *Query*

You are now to communicate to Raghoba's agent for the information of his Master our designs regarding Salsette in the manner, pointed out by our letter of the 29th. *Salsette*

*Surat*, 13*th December*, 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*) 1774
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

A man, that I before advised you I had despatched to Raghoba to get certain information how matters stood, is returned and brings intelligence much to my satisfaction. He had many personal conferences with Raghoba himself, who, he says, places perfect confidence in Narotamdas, and will certainly abide by whatever he conditions. He says that Raghoba has with him about 50,000 horse and foot. *Raghoba's situation*

I have some small hopes of yet being able to get Salsette and Bassein in lieu of the several places ceded for the amount of 12½ lakhs of Rupees, I mean Jambusar, Amod, Desbarah, Olpad, Hansot; and the lakh and a half stipulated to be ceded from any other parganas the *Salsette Bassein*

Company may choose. Of this I have only a faint hope, but request as soon as possible to be informed whether I am to prefer Salsette and Bassein to all those places, and include them, if I can, in the treaty *No delay* with Narotamdas. As no time is to be lost, I shall certainly do so, if I receive not your answer before I conclude the treaty, which now must be soon, as Narotamdas has, I believe, received his full powers from Raghoba. Narotamdas is now at Anklesvar, recovering money to pay the six lakhs. Orders are come from Raghoba for carts, and bullocks, and all other assistance; and I dare say that anything that remains here to be done, will be settled in 10 or 15 days, so that I sincerely hope the forces will all be kept ready to move from Bombay at a very short warning; for depend upon it that delays are dangerous and may overset all that I have done. I hope, therefore, soon to hear all on your part is ready.

1774 *Bombay, 14th December,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

*Salsette Bassein* The President has communicated to us that part of your letter to him, dated the 10th instant, wherein you speak of your proceedings in respect to the negotiation you are at present engaged in by our directions and instructions with an agent from Raghoba in behalf of his Master.

By this we understand that you have, as you say, some faint hopes of being able to get Salsette and Bassein, in lieu of Jambusar, Amod, Debarah, Olpad, Hansot and the other places to the amount of 12½ lakhs of Rupees per annum, which were stipulated to be ceded to the Hon'ble Company, You request our directions whether Salsette and Bassein are to be preferred to all these places above-mentioned (whose annual revenues according to your own account is twelve and half lakhs of Rupees) if you receive not our answer before you conclude the treaty.

To this we reply that, as the revenues of Salsette and Bassein are by no means adequate to the revenues of the places above-mentioned, nor do even amount per annum by several lakhs of Rupees to so much as the revenues of the places which you signify your intention to relinquish, and moreover, as you have no authority from us to take the step you say you propose doing, we shall, therefore, certainly highly disapprove your conduct, should you inconsiderately conclude the treaty on those terms.

*Bombay proposal* But, as we still earnestly wish in deference to the opinion of our Hon'ble Employers to have Salsette and Bassein in our possession, whose annual revenue, according to the best accounts we can procure, amount to about 7,30,000 Rupees per annum, we, therefore, acquaint you that we will readily relinquish so many of the parganas, as you informed us Raghoba has tendered to us, to that annual amount or even something more; but we will by no means consent to give up a revenue of 12½ lakhs per annum for Salsette and Bassein, which do not annually exceed 7 lakhs and 30,000 Rupees. However, if you can induce Raghoba through his agent to agree to cede the following places, we shall then have reason to approve your proceedings.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bassein with all its districts included under the subahdari of Bassein .. .. .. .. .. | Rs. | 4,00,000 |
| Salsette and all the other islands adjacent to Bombay, the names of which have been inserted in our former letters .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 3,30,000 |
| | | 7,30,000 |
| Our estimate of these two places is nearly the same as yours in your letter of the 21st November, wherein you propose other places to the amount of eight lakhs in lieu of both. | | |
| Temba, Balesar Variav and Vissow as formerly appertaining to the Castle Broach .. .. .. | Rs. | 3,00,000 |
| The Gaikwad share of the Broach revenue about .. | „ | 3,50,000 |
| Olpad .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 3,50,000 |
| Amod .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 1,50,000 |
| | Rs. | 18,80,000 |

We enjoin you to exert yourself to prevail with Raghoba's agent to acquiesce in these stipulations in behalf of his Master, which we deem much more advantageous than any other that have been proposed. If, therefore, you can procure his consent, and you are satisfied that he is duly authorised on the part of his Master to execute a treaty on these terms, we then empower you to conclude it in this manner, provided all the other articles are the same as we have before directed.

Should it not be in your power to settle it on the terms above mentioned, you are then to act agreeable to the directions contained in our letter to you of the 11th instant.

Our forces are already gone against the fort of Thana, which, we make no doubt, will be reduced in a few days, and in consequence the whole island of Salsette. We have nevertheless included that island in the above, and shall be satisfied in receiving a grant of it from Raghoba.

*Broach, 19th December,* 1774 (1774, *Br. F.* 260) 1774
*The Chief and Council to William Hornby.*

*Reinforcements needed*

Here we think it our duty to remark to Your Honour, &ca that from this time to the month of March, whilst the harvest is on foot in the field (on the security of which the revenues of the season entirely depend) it is of the last importance to the Hon'ble Company's interest, in the present unsettled state of the countries around us, that they should have a respectable force at this place, such as may enable us to protect and defend the parganas on any emergency; which, we beg leave to offer it as our opinion, is the more requisite at this juncture, when large bodies of men, independent of each other, as they belong some to the Poona and some to the Gaikwad Government, are constantly in motion, and may most probably attempt passing through our parganas. At present the Chief has certain intelligence that Gopal Naik, one of the Poona ministers' partisans, with a body of five thousand horse has already crossed the Surat river and is in full march this way to assist Fatesing; and it is further currently reported in town

Raghoba has sent a considerable body of horse to Govindrao's assistance, who may be also soon expected on the banks of this river. Affairs [*being*] in this situation, we think it probable the dispute between Fatesing and Govindrao will soon come to an issue, at which time the troops of one or the other party will be disbanded and without a head; and there is no knowing what bodies of men in such a situation may do. We, therefore, have thought it our duty, to give our opinion on those matters to Your Honour, etc. and represent the necessity of a reinforcement, submitting to your judgment in what number, and whence to supply them. We shall only further add that any troops, which you may deem proper to spare us for the present, can be returned again in the month of May without any expense in the cotton boats; which will prevent the trouble even of sending vessels for them.

*Movements of troops* Raghoba lately sent orders to Narotamdas, who is the Maratha chauthia at Surat, to take possession of the province of Olpad, Anklesvar, Hansot and Desbarah and, it is also said, of Jambusar and Amod, all which were in the hands of people attached to the ministers' party at Poona. He accordingly some days ago took forcible possession of his former parganas; and when he proposed proceeding further, the news arrived of this body of men coming to Fatesing's assistance; on which his people have vacated Anklesvar, as it is supposed they soon will Hansot and Olpad.

*Reinforcements* In this state of confusion is everything in all the contiguous countries. We cannot, therefore, avoid again expressing our wishes that Your Honour, etc. will give us some temporary assistance, the very appearance of which will serve to keep all those people in awe and prevent any depredation being committed in our districts, or the attempt of either parties to pass through them, which would frighten the subjects from attending to the business of their harvest, and greatly prejudice the revenues at this critical season. Averse as we are to every increase of expenses at this settlement, we should not be thus urgent on the present occasion, had we not, on the most mature deliberation, been perfectly convinced that the only way to secure the harvest and preserve peace in our districts and respect among our neighbours in these troublesome times is to have the means in our power of sending out a respectable detachment to protect the parganas in case of necessity.

1774 *Bombay, 27th December,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*Letter from Robert Gambier at Surat.*

*Narotamdas* The Poona forces attacked Narotamdas in his castle, which through the treachery of his jamadars was given up; and he and his brother were taken prisoners and carried to their headquarters at Mowah [*Mahuva*]. It is said they use them very cruelly; but, as he has some relations among the principal Grassias, who are a set of people, whose resentment is much dreaded by all the country people, I am in hopes his escape will somehow be effected.

*Various rumours* As to Raghoba, I have yet no certain news, as neither of the Brahmans or the pattemars I sent, are returned; the whole country between Surat and Raghoba is beset and closely guarded by the Poona people, so that any intercourse is very difficult; but still I hope the

Brahmans have at least found their way and will return soon with good news, when Narotamdas's absence, if he returns not, will be of no consequence. A report now prevails that Holkar's mother, who has always patronized Raghoba, is dead and has left him the guardianship of her children and great treasures, and on that account he is gone in such a hurry to where she died. A few days will clear up much. The Marathas in our vicinity have as yet shown no hostile behaviour towards the city and do not oppress the country people. A large force, detached by Govindrao to fight these, is, it is said, arrived in the neighbourhood of Broach. If Raghoba can but come back and return near Surat, I dare say I shall be able to settle everything to your wish; but, if he is really run away, all is over, for the present at least.

*Bombay, 30th December,* 1774 (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*) **1774**
*At a Council.*

The President communicated the following extract of a letter he had just received from the Chief of Surat.

Narotamdas still continues a prisoner at the same place, where the Marathas also remain encamped; Sayaji, Fatesing's eldest brother, who some time ago came down near Broach with a small guard to perform some religious ceremonies, yesterday had a friendly meeting with them and was received with great respect. In regard to Raghoba I have no news yet that can be depended on; reports are very various, and daily some one prevailing. Yesterday two of his men, who came here some time ago to Narotamdas, set out on their return to endeavour to find him out wherever he is. With them I had much discourse and said everything that was necessary for settling our business, which, I make no doubt, will yet end successfully, if Raghoba's affairs are not from some cursed stroke of chance rendered quite desperate. ***Rumours***

*In a postscript to the same letter.*

A harkara, which Narotamdas a good while ago dispatched to Raghoba, is this instant returned, but brings no letters. He says Raghoba, having noticed that some treachery was intended him by Holkar and the Sindians, precipitately withdrew his own forces from them and marched off towards Delhi. This harkara was dispatched by him from a place called Indore, which is only about 300 kos from Delhi; that he told him that he should give him no letter, as the roads were so unsafe; but ordered him to tell Narotamdas that he was obliged to go on particular business to Delhi, from whence he should return in a month and a half or two months, and therefore to go on with and keep the great business ready, which he had commanded him; for that he might be sure of his being very soon back to finish it. As Raghoba has a brother who is a great officer in Shuja-ud-daulah's service, I conceive some good hopes that he may soon return into this country with both money and men, and then our treaty be most successfully concluded. The harkara says that Raghoba has with him about 12,000 horse and is going as fast as he possibly can towards Delhi, where he may be probably arrived by this time. I have examined him myself; he seems an intelligent man, and as he has been some years in the service of Narotamdas, I think what he says may be depended on. ***Raghoba to Delhi***

1774 *Bombay, 31st December, 1774* (1774, *S. & P. D.* 15*A*)
*Extract from letter to Warren Hastings.*

*Regulating Act* At the time we first entered in this negotiation, we had not heard that the Gentlemen, who have arrived from England, had even left it. We, therefore, were not at all restricted by law at that time from entering into any engagements we judged beneficial to our Hon'ble Employers, to whom we have fully explained ourselves on the subject, and whose orders only we were pursuing by the measures we have adopted. Besides, if this treaty takes place, we shall obtain such a revenue for the Hon'ble Company as will enable this Presidency to supply itself and consequently relieve you from the burthen of furnishing us annually with the large sum we shall otherwise indispensably require; and therefore [*we*] doubt not but that it must be approved by the Company and by you, Gentlemen; for it is most probable, should this opportunity escape us, that such another will never offer again; and as it would have endangered the whole, had we put a stop to the treaty (after we received intelligence of your arrival) till your concurrence was obtained, we therefore flatter ourselves we shall be fully justified in your opinions for continuing the negotiation as well as for concluding it, which we purpose to take the first opportunity in our power of doing it.[1]

1775 *Surat, 3rd January,* 1775 (1775. *S. & P. D.* 16 *A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Letter to Raghoba* I had certain advices this morning of Raghoba having come back, and that he had, with about 10,000 horses and 400 musket-men, joined Govindrao at Baroda. It seems he gave his pursuers the slip at Indore. I have already dispatched some trusty men with letters to him at Baroda to acquaint him of what has happened at Salsette and your intentions therein; and desired him, as Narotamdas is still a prisoner, to send a confidential person to me with full powers to conclude one way or other with me the business that has been so long in hand. This, I dare say, he will very soon do, and I shall be able to settle everything as you wish, except as to money matters and shroff-security, which, I am afraid, will prove obstacles that cannot be got over.

*Need of assistance* The [*present*] seems a very critical time; if our forces soon join Raghoba, I think he will be able to make head against his enemies and soon retrieve his affairs, but, if he is left unsupported a little time longer, his enemies will pour in on all sides and soon overwhelm him. As soon as the Poona ministers find [*that he has*] come this way, they will certainly order all their forces, who are in pursuit of him up country, to join and attack him where he is; and though he and Govindrao have such a force with them as with other assistance would enable

1 The letter to Warren Hastings has been published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, 204-208. It contains a full summary of the negotiations with Raghoba, and incidentally mentions Raghoba's flight, after a great part of his forces had left him and joined the ministerial army. (See *The Third English Embassy to Poona*, 351-353) This little detail proved the beginning of the undoing of the Bombay scheme to help Raghoba; for Warren Hastings seems to have been so impressed by Raghoba's flight that he conceived an ineradicable distrust against the man.

him to overcome all his enemies, yet [*left*] to themselves, unprotected by us, they will, I am afraid, prove far unequal to the business. No time is then to be lost; a decisive [*step*] is immediately to be taken, and Raghoba at all events effectually supported or at once given up, and some other plan pursued.

I dare say he will cede Salsette and Bassein and the islands adjacent to Bombay as also the Broach parganas, and give you such other parganas in the neighbourhood of Surat and Broach [*as*] immediately belong to the Peshwa, and will make all the cession together amount to eighteen lakhs of Rupees. *Concessions*

But whether he will find six lakhs to deposit and any kind of security I am doubtful of. Monthly payment of one lakh and fifty thousand Rupees appear to me most difficult and uncertain. No great advantages in [*this*] world can be procured without risking something very common to obtain them; and just such is the present case. I pretend not to know how matters stand between you and the Poona ministry; judge how easy it may be hereafter to reconcile them to the measure you have lately pursued. But it is most certain that with the assistance of one side or the other, a Maratha war will prove [*inevitable*]. *Money difficulties*

I consider the writing you [*the same*] as addressing the Select Committee, as you will occasionally lay before them whatever parts of my letter you may think necessary; and I request to be soon favoured with your sentiments and directions about the conclusion of this business one way or the other with Raghoba. *Select Committee*

It is said that the Poona ministers are in treaty with the Nizam for his support and assistance, but that nothing yet is concluded, as he demands a cession of four principal castles and towns with all their revenues, which they are not inclined to give up, though the pattemars, who came from inland, have mentioned that there is a large body of the Nizam's and Poona horse encamped about three hundred kos from thence. *Nizam Ali*

Narotamdas continues a prisoner at Variav. They sent him to [*the*] castle, but the commanding officer refused to receive him. Some of the Poona horse, going into a district held for Raghoba, where there was a small fort in possession of his people, have been very roughly handled and beat away by Raghoba's people with a considerable loss, since which they have been very quiet. *Narotamdas*

*Broach, 6th January,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) **1775**
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

By harkara from Baroda the Chief has certain intelligence of Raghoba having joined Govindrao's army there with the few troops who followed his fortune, when he lately fled from Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji Sindia, having well justified suspicions, some say, certainty, of their intentions to seize and deliver him (Raghoba) up to the Poona ministers. This will probably give a great turn to affairs in these parts, as his junction with, and avowed patronage of, Govindrao, will doubtless be of the last importance, and give him a decided superiority. *Govindrao's prospects*

Raghoba's force is said to be about 18 to 26 thousand horse, which joined to Govindrao's army, consisting of about an equal number of horse and eight or ten thousand foot, will in all make a formidable *Raghoba's forces*

armament; and it is reported that Raghoba expects eight or ten thousand foot to follow him, who were not able to keep up with him in the very quick march of his horse, as he came on with great expedition by forced marches. Ahmadabad and all the contiguous country, the Chief is advised, have already acknowledged Raghoba, and doubtless all the Governments in this quarter, depending on Poona, will soon follow the example or fly.

1775 *Broach, 6th January, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)*
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Govindrao's proposals*

In consequence of some propositions that have been lately made me on the part of Govindrao I think it my duty to trouble your Hon'ble Committee with the present address, leaving to your superior judgment what degree of attention should be paid thereto in the present situation of affairs.

You have been acquainted in the public advices from this settlement, on the first breaking out of the present war between the two brothers, Govindrao and Fatesing, that several applications had been made by both parties for assistance from hence of men and artillery; and the negative then given thereto, on account the strict neutrality we were directed to observe, has for a long time prevented the repetition of any such applications. However the late separation of Daulatrao's troops from Govindrao's army and the near approach of the 5,000 horse sent by the Poona ministers to Fatesing's aid, having given rise to a conversation between Lallubhai and the Maratha chauthia and some other of Govindrao's people, then here, respecting the situation of their Master's affairs, the pandit asked Lallubhai if some lucrative proposals made to the English would not induce them to take an active part. Lallubhai evaded the question, but reported the circumstance to me, when I directed him, as from himself, to take some occasion to sound the pandit at a distance and as if by accident if he had orders to make any propositions on this head. The pandit acknowledged he had authority from Gonvindrao to offer all the town revenues and customs to the Hon'ble Company, if we would join him with a sufficient number of troops and artillery to enable him to reduce Baroda. To this Lallubhai answered he was convinced no such propositions would be listened to; but that, if a cession of all the Gaikwad rights and its parganas was offered, it might possibly merit some attention; and here the matter ended at that time. But a few days ago the chauthia sent again for Lallubhai and spoke more seriously to him on the occasion, acquainting him he had a letter from Govindrao on the subject, which mentioned that he was willing to acquiesce in the terms Lallubhai had mentioned of ceding the Broach parganas entirely to the Hon'ble Company on being put in possession of Baroda; and the chauthia yesterday came on a visit to me at the Darbar and took occasion to mention the same, adding that his Master would write to me more fully on the subject, and proposed sending a sealed writing to the above purpose. Of which I, therefore, take this opportunity to acquaint Your Honour, &ca; and I request your immediate directions how to act in such case; and in the interim I shall endeavour to amuse them under various pretexts, until I can receive your commands on this head.

Raghoba has sent a vakil on some business to our chauthia here, who assures me there is a treaty lately entered into between Raghoba and the Hon'ble Company, and that for our countenance and an aid of 2,500 men to reinstate him in the Poona Government he has agreed to cede Salsette and Bassein to us. Should this be matter of fact (and which indeed is in general reported to be the case as well here as at Surat), it will be very essential that Govindrao should be enabled to join his force in the general cause, which he cannot be expected to do until Baroda is reduced; and this will probably be a work of time even with Raghoba's assistance, as they have neither artillery or engineers; and though Baroda is not very strong, yet without those nothing can be done. But with Govindrao's army to assist, [*it*] is the opinion of our best officers here, who have a pretty good account of the strength of the place, that 800 or 1,000 regular troops and a proper train of artillery would reduce it in few days; and in this case he (Govindrao) would readily aid his patron, Raghoba, with all his force, which with the succours he can draw from the Gujarat country would make a formidable army, if aided by us with a train of artillery, and enable Raghoba once again to take the field and make head against the ministers' party. ***Baroda to be captured***

*Surat, 9th January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) **1775**
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

Harkaras have arrived to me from Raghoba since he arrived at Baroda. He writes in good spirits and seems very desirous to conclude the treaty; and I have written him to send another vakil. He does not seem to like our taking Salsette, but at the same time writes of it in such a manner as shows it will not occasion any serious difference between us. He has with him of his own forces about 30,000 horse and foot, and it is said that numbers daily join him. Where he now is, it will be most convenient for our forces to join his; and if once I know what are absolutely the ultimate terms the treaty may be concluded on, I would set heartily [*to work*] and get all soon concluded one way or the other. I repeat that all seems to me to be very easy, but the money business and security, which appear to be at this juncture almost unsurmountable difficulties, if you are determined to insist on them; it surely will be a great pity that such important business should be spoiled on this account. ***Raghoba amenable***

*Broach, 11th January,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) **1775**
*At a Consultation.*

The Chief acquaints the Board he has received a letter from Fatesing, informing him that a body of sixty thousand men are arrived to his assistance from Poona, and that Raghoba and Govindrao had retreated with their whole force beyond the river Mahi, being closely pursued by a considerable body of the ministerial army; for the particulars of which he refers him to Ragoji Jivaji by whom he sent the letter. ***Fatesing's boast***

*Surat, 13th January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 61*A*) **1775**
*Robert Gambier to the Bombay Committee.*

Enclosed is a paper particularising the property the Peshwa and the Gaikwad Governments have respectively in the several places proposed to be ceded to the Company. ***Ownership defined***

*A list of the parganas proposed to be ceded to the Company, specifying to whom the revenues at present belong.*

Broach: all the Maratha share of its revenues solely belongs to the Gaikwads.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amod: | With its districts entirely to the Peshwa Government. | | | |
| Desbarah: | Do. | Do. | Do. | |
| Jambusar: | Do. | Do. | Do. | |
| Olpad: | Do. | Do. | Do. | |

Temba, Balesar, Variav and Vissow belong entirely to the Gaikwads.

1775 *Surat, 13th January, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)*
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba's agents* Two days ago two Brahmans came to me from him as his agents. These Brahmans from Raghoba appear by their credentials to be persons in whom he confides; for they are fully informed of all that was transacted between me and Narotamdas and have brought with them both my and Narotamdas's letters to Raghoba and copy of the agreement he consented to enter into, and in short seem perfect masters of the whole business from first to last. One of them seems clever and to have been often employed on similar occasions. He is wellknown to our Nawab and his family, who were acquainted with him when they with Miah Achind were at Poona. The difficulties just now lie where I foresaw they would.

*Money* Money is the grand obstacle, but I have plainly and positively assured them that nothing can be done without it, and that the stipulated six lakhs must be deposited, and the monthly payment of 1,50,000 Rupees put on a sure footing, before we shall look on the treaty as concluded; and in consequence they have wrote what they judged necessary to their Master, and to-day I shall dispatch their letters with mine by express harkaras, which for the sake of safety and expedition I shall send by an armed boat to Jambusar, from whence it is only twenty kos to Baroda.

*Raghoba eager to treat* The Brahmans seem to think that Raghoba will now to the utmost exert himself to furnish the money, and somehow or other contrive to deposit the six lakhs, and give orders on the parganas in the neighbourhood of Surat and Broach for the recovery of sufficient sums to insure the payment punctually of the monthly stipend, about which, as Raghoba is now circumstanced, it is absolute brick without strawwork to ask for shroff-security; and I am at the same time very confident that, when once all other matters are settled, our forces joined to his, and they begin to co-operate successfully, that all difficulties as to the payment of the monthly sum will cease.

*Pargana security* The Select Committee in their last letter were pleased to ask me from what parganas moneys were to be collected for the payment of this monthly stipend, when by the treaty in question so many parganas are to be ceded to the Hon'ble Company. To this I answer that there are full sufficient to answer both purposes; for, admitting that Raghoba consents to give up Salsette and Bassein, which, I suppose, he now will without hesitation, the revenues of those two districts

amount by the account you have sent me to 7½ lakhs, and the Maratha share of the revenues of Broach to three more, making in all ten and a half lakhs; so that to complete the amount of eighteen lakhs and a half, which on the plan I transmitted and you approved, provided the proper sanads could be obtained from Damaji's family, there will remain only eight lakhs, which three or four parganas alone, suppose Olpad, Hansot, and Desbarah, will furnish; and then, both in the neighbourhood of Surat and Broach, many very rich parganas will remain belonging to the Peshwa and particularly Jambusar, Anklesvar, Balesar, Kamrej, Chorasi, Gandevi, Supa, Parchol, &ca; some of which belong entirely to the Peshwa, and in all he has the most considerable share of their revenues.

*Gaikwads consent*

As Raghoba is now situated with both Govindrao and Fatesing, between whom it is said he will soon make up matters and establish peace, it will be no difficult matter for him to obtain their consent with the proper sanads for the ceding any share they enjoy in any of the districts Raghoba makes over to the Company, so that it rests with you to determine what parganas or districts you will give the preference to, either in the neighbourhood of this place [*Surat*] or Broach · but for my own part I would choose such as immediately belong to Raghoba and above all Jambusar as a sea port and market which will in our hands prove very beneficial. Jambusar belongs entirely to the Peshwa, and its annual revenues amount to upwards of Rs. 4,00,000. Olpad belongs entire to him also, and its revenues amount to .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Rs. 3,50,000

7,50,000

in all seven and a half lakhs, and then either Amod or Hansot, both which also belong to him, and the revenues of each exceed a lakh, will complete the amount as follows, *viz.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Salsette | Rs. | 3,50,000 |
| Bassein & its dependencies | „ | 4,00,000 |
| Broach „ „ | „ | 3,00,000 |
| Olpad | „ | 3,50,000 |
| Hansot or Amod | „ | 1,50,000 |
| Jambusar | „ | 4,00,000 |
| | Rs. | 19,50,000 |

which exceed the proposed amount to be ceded by one lakh and a half.

*Money*

Affairs being thus circumstanced, it is highly necessary for me to find as soon as possible on what ground I tread, and what is your real meaning as to this treaty. If your serious determination is to conclude this treaty with Raghoba, what now remains to prevent it? I see nothing but the payment of the six lakhs and the putting on the best footing, it will admit of, the payment of the lakh and an half per month. As to the first, I think it may be effected at least in great part; and as to the monthly stipend, I cannot think it possible, as affairs are circumstanced, to get any other security than what I have mentioned of orders on the parganas.

*Awaiting orders* It remains then with you and the Select Committee to finally determine whether, [*on*] the terms I can settle it, you will enter into the treaty or not, and give me your final orders accordingly; but all such orders should give some discretional latitude, as it may be impossible to settle to the very letter of what you prescribe; and yet with a little deviation and change matters may on the whole be settled to your wish as fully and advantageous as if the very letter of your terms was complied with. Let me beg then that you will lay before the Select Committee whatever part [*of*] what I write you think proper, and that you will soon honour me with full, explicit and final orders and powers. I now address the Select Committee, but have not written them so fully as I have to you, Sir; and therefore if any thing requires explanation to them, I beg you will do it for me. If they prefer still the places mentioned to me in [*their*] orders of the 11th ultimo to those immediately belonging to the Peshwa which I have pointed out, I think he will readily give them up and be able to obtain from Damaji's sons their acquiescence and consent as to their share; but, should he not, I wish to be empowered to settle one way or the other, as I may best be able.

*Danger of delay* It is reported that Sakharam Bapu is coming this way with a very large force from Poona in order to attack Raghoba, before he [*Raghoba*] can sufficiently strengthen himself. If this is true, and Sakharam Bapu can contrive to attack or get near Raghoba before we join him, all once more will be reduced to extremity. I repeat, therefore, that no time is to be lost, and that the most trifling delay or procrastination is at this juncture highly dangerous. Something in such a game as this must be risked. Raghoba, I believe, means very honestly and will do all he can to satisfy you; but, if you mean to insist on impossibilities, it is better at once to declare off and honestly say that you cannot. If, therefore, you really mean to settle with him, lose no time, but at once trust me with a discretional power to settle the best terms I can, and without delay send your forces to his help, and thereby prevent what otherwise will certainly happen, I mean his ruin and the uniting of all his enemies against us. Consider well what I write, and once for all set me at a certainty.

I just hear that Narotamdas is by Fatesing's order sent up to Baroda. If this is true, he will soon gain his liberty; at which I shall rejoice.

1775 *Bombay, 19th January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*At a Committee.*

*Council to decide* Read the advices from the Chief of Surat and the extracts of his letters to the President, as entered above, relative to the negotiation pending with Raghoba or Raghunathrao Peshwa. As this negotiation draws near to a crisis, and it becomes necessary now finally to determine whether with any, and what force Raghoba shall be assisted, and as the Hon'ble Company were pleased to order at the time this Commitee was instituted, that no treaty should be concluded without the approbation of the Council at large, with whom, they observe, the supreme military power is vested, it is, therefore, unanimously agreed to lay the whole of our proceedings on this subject before them,

and those members who are not of the Committee are accordingly now summoned to attend us in Council.

*Bombay, 19th January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) **1775**
*At a Consultation.*

The President acquaints the Board that the intention of their *Council* being summoned is purposely to lay before them the Committee's proceedings relative to a most important negotiation that has been for sometime pending with Raghoba, the Peshwa or Supreme Governor in the Maratha Empire; and he explains to them that this negotiation was first set on foot in consequence of some overtures made by the agents of Raghoba to the Chief of Surat for the assistance of a body of the Company's forces to act in conjunction with his army against his enemies, the ministerial party; for he observes that the Board must be well acquainted that the Empire of the Marathas has been for sometime past torn in pieces by a civil war, Raghoba endeavouring to support himself in the government, and his late ministers endeavouring to confer it on another. The President then goes on to observe that in all human probability the party whose cause the Company may espouse must overcome the other, that no offers have been made by the ministerial party, whereas the offers of Raghoba were at first considerable and during the course of the Committee's negotiation with him have been very considerably increased, in so much that he now offers the Company for their assistance, besides their expenses in assisting him, to cede countries to them forever, which are most conveniently situated, whose annual revenue will amount to about nineteen lakhs of Rupees, which is an object of vast importance, more especially as it may enable this Presidency to support itself without being under the necessity of drawing annually such large supplies from Bengal, as it otherwise must continue to do.

The President, having thus opened to the Board the subject, *Decision* now submitted to their consideration all the letters and papers relative *put off* thereto from the first commencement of this negotiation were distinctly read through by the Secretary for the information of those members who are not of the Committee; and the whole having been discussed, it was thought necessary to defer coming to any determination for two or three days, that those members may have time maturely to digest this subject, who are now only acquainted with it: agreed therefore, that we now adjourn, that the letters and papers which have not been read be sent to Messrs Fletcher and Garden for their perusal and consideration; and the commanding-officer must be ordered to deliver in a return of all the forces under this Presidency against our next meeting.

*Brouch, 22nd January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D* 16*A*) **1775**
*William Shaw to William Hornby* [*entered in the diary on the* 16*th February,* 1775].

The enclosed is a copy of a letter I addressed Your Honour &ca *Govindrao's* the 6th instant on the subject of Govindrao's proposal to me respect- *set-back* ing the cession of the Gaikwad rights in Broach and its parganas to the Hon'ble Company on certain terms. Since then his affairs have taken a wonderful turn; for as Haripant Phadke, Tukoji Holkar and

Mahadji Sindia were sent by the ministerial party to pursue Raghoba with a command of about 60,000 horse, on their near approach to Baroda, Govindrao has raised the siege of that place; and both he and Raghoba have retired before the ministerial army; and yesterday I received letters from Fatesing to acquaint me of the same, and that Raghoba and Govindrao had actually fled and crossed the River Mahi; and the harkaras, who brought the advices, report that the ministerial party and Fatesing were preparing to pursue them when they left Baroda. Thus the arrival of Raghoba, which was looked upon as a circumstance much in Govindrao's favour, has entirely ruined his affairs and been the cause of his losing all the progress he had made these ten months past, and prevents his recovering [*the*] greatest part of the revenues from the Gaikwad's parganas of which he has been thus long in possession.

*Raghoba's request* Some days previous to this affair Raghunathrao dispatched one Lakhsman Pandit, a person of consequence, from camp to me, purposely to request assistance of ammunition and artillery. I treated him with all possible civility, but acquainted him I could not interfere without orders from Bombay. This person assured me his Master had been long in treaty with the Hon'ble Company, and that he had entered into engagements amongst other matters to give up to them the island of Salsette; and as Bassein had been demanded, [*he*] said he would induce his Master to give up that also, provided he was soon supplied with the men and artillery agreed on. I still gave him for answer that I could say nothing without orders from Bombay, whither I promised him to write on the subject and let him know Your Honour &ca's answer. Whilst he was yet with me, intelligence arrived of the near approach of the ministerial army,when he proceeded with all expedition to join his Master. Raghoba's people in government at Jambusar, Amod, Desbarah &ca, after plundering those places of all they could, vacated them and followed their Master also.

*Fatesing's success* It has been my constant study, in the midst of all this confusion and changes of government in the countries around, to keep on good terms with all parties, and so far I have so happily succeeded hitherto that we have not met with the least disturbance from any of the contending Powers; and as matters have turned out, it is fortunate that I have always kept up a friendly correspondence with Fatesing, from whom I every day expect to hear of his having made appointment of a chauthia here. His brother, Sayaji, with the assistance of the 5,000 horse, formerly mentioned to be sent by the ministerial party to Fatesing's assistance, has already taken in most of the parganas between this and Songarh.

1775 *Bombay. 22nd January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*At a Consultation.*

*Force to be sent* After the most serious consideration and discussion......we are unanimously of opinion that a considerable body of men can now be spared. As an object of such advantage is to be gained for our Hon'ble Employers, and as we have every reason to conclude that our own levies, which are now going on fast, will in a few months be completed; and as we also expect a strong reinforcement from Madras,

we may complete the number to 2,500 men in a short time, as was at first intended by the Committee; resolved,[1] therefore, unanimously that it will be much for our Hon'ble Employers' interest to assist Raghoba.

Read the letter from the Chief of Broach as entered under the 12th instant,[2] who must be acquainted in reply that we have at present a much more important negotiation in hand, and therefore, even if Fatesing and Govindrao are not yet reconciled, it is not in our power to hearken to proposals from either party. *Reply to Broach*

Mr. Gambier must be ordered to acquaint the Chief of Broach and to send him a copy of the treaty with Raghoba so soon as ever it may be executed. *Broach*

Mr. Garden acquaints the Board that, though he has entirely concurred in the measures now resolved on, yet he esteems it necessary to explain his reasons for so doing, which he shall accordingly deliver in writing. *Garden's remark*

*Bombay, 23rd January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

At the time we wrote you that, provided every other matter was adjusted to our satisfaction, that we would assist Raghoba with a body of two thousand five hundred men, we had not even an idea of taking Salsette, and therefore we could at that time have spared such a force; but, as a considerable number of men are obliged to be left in garrison at Thana and the other posts on Salsette, it has for the present put it out of our power to furnish so large a number as we before proposed for the assistance of Raghoba, though we are still equally earnest upon this point; and therefore, provided Raghoba will deposit the six lakhs of Rupees, without which nothing can be done, that he will grant all the necessary and proper sanads making over the territories forever, which are to be ceded to the Company in the manner we before pointed out, whose annual revenue must amount to Rupees 18,50,000, and that he will give the best security in his power for the payment of 1½ lakhs of Rupees per month, or at least such a proportion as the force we may now send will bear to that sum, and provided also that he will execute and ratify all the other articles required of him by the draft of the treaty in your possession, we do then agree immediately to send a body of forces consisting of 500 Europeans and 900 or 1,000 sepoys, including their officers with a proper field train of artillery, making in the whole upwards of 1,500 men; and as we expect our levies will soon be completed, we have no doubt but that we shall after be able to increase the forces now to be sent to the number first proposed. *Bombay terms*

From the whole tenor of our correspondence with you, you may perceive that we only wish to have those parganas which are most conveniently situated for us and are nearest to Surat and Broach, and such

1 When this resolution was taken, the Bombay authorities did not know of the formidable ministerial army sent against Raghoba, as mentioned in the previous letter, which reached Bombay about the 16th February. Had they known it, they might have hesitated to join Raghoba.

2 See letter dated Broach, 6th January, 1775.

as Raghoba has the best right to grant, taking at the same time as little as possible from the Gaikwads; we therefore readily concur with you in opinion that Jambusar will be much more advantageous to the Company than Balesar, Variav, Vissow and Temba. Provided, therefore, the amount of the annual revenue to be ceded for the Company will amount to full 18 lakhs and a half of Rupees per annum, we leave it to you to fix finally from whence it is to arise, relying upon you to pitch on those places that may be most convenient for the Company. If possible, Salsette and Bassein are to be included in the grant, but to be estimated at no more than seven and a half lakhs of Rupees per annum, their real value. If these places cannot be obtained, which are objects of much consequence and strongly recommended by the Company, then the whole must be made good by a territory near to Surat and Broach.

We have now sufficiently explained to you our sentiments on the subject and, therefore, empower you to conclude the treaty, which we recommend to you to do with the utmost expedition, on the advice of which event our troops shall directly proceed.

1775 *Bombay, 23rd January,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Hornby to William Shaw.*

*Govindrao's request*

We have duly received your letter of the 6th instant, advising us of the offers that have been made by Govindrao for assistance of troops and artillery for enabling him to reduce Baroda.

Our intelligence from another quarter gives us room to believe that Govindrao and his brother, Fatesing, may shortly be reconciled. Be that however as it may, we have at present a much more important object in view therefore it is not in our power to embrace the proposals that have been made you. Consequently you must return such an answer as will prevent Govindrao from taking any umbrage at our denial, but at the same time leave him no reason to expect that we shall assist him.

1775 *Bombay, 23rd January,* 1775(1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Robert Garden's minute.*

*Note of warning*

Though so favourable an opportunity of increasing the Company's revenues on this side of India, and thereby enabling this settlement to support itself without foreign assistance, will scarcely again present itself, I should nevertheless have been doubtful as to the legality of the measures we are about to adopt, had not the step already taken with regard to Salsette rendered a passive behaviour highly dangerous. All circumstances considered, I am firmly of opinion that no safe alternative is left us, but that we should instantly take a decisive part in the present contest and support Raghoba to the utmost of our power, though. had we not brought ourselves into this dilemma by the reduction of Salsette, I should have thought it incumbent on us to have obtained the concurrence of the Governor General and Council,[1] previous to entering into any treaty or alliance whatever with any of the Country Powers.

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1 Robert Garden seems to have been the only one to have thought of the Governor-General on this occasion.

*Broach*, 29*th January*, 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) 1775
*At a Consultation.*

*Fatesing's chauthia*

The Chief acquaints the Board that Kessoo Pandit, having been appointed by Fatesing to the chauthiaship of this pargana, has sent a message to the pandit's agent at Padra, demanding possession of the several thanas in like manner as his Master's thanas are established in all the parganas from the river Mahi to Songarh; that Kessoo Jivaji, who commands the party, has written to Lallubhai that he has letters from Fatesing to the Chief, which he requests permission to bring to town. The Chief further observes, that Ragu Jivaji, an agent from Fatesing, waited on him this morning to mention the above particulars, and at the same time acquainted him that his Master's orders to Kessoo Pandit were not to commit any depredations in the pargana if he was peaceably admitted; but observed that a considerable body were at hand to reinforce this party. As Fatesing has now again obtained possession of all the Gaikwad territories around us, and our Superiors on a similar occasion last year directed us to admit a chauthia from Govindrao if he became possessed of the countries dependent on the Gaikwad Government, it is resolved to permit Fatesing's agent to come to town.

*Surat*, 1*st February*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba's jewels*

Raghoba's agents here have lately received letters from their Master, in which he writes them that it is impossible for him to find cash to make the deposit of six lakhs of Rupees or indeed to make any deposit in cash, so much is he at present pushed for money by his own troops, and so unable in his present circumstances to raise any, or at most more than will satisfy his forces and keep them from deserting; but that he is willing to deposit jewels to the amount of the six lakhs or to give his adopted son as hostage for the payment of them, and will immediately send and deliver either to the Hon'ble Company's Resident at Cambay, from which place he is now about twenty kos, and with which he can more easily carry on a communication; and as to the other articles, he has given full powers to his agents here to settle with me.

*Abridged treaty*

I have accordingly drawn out an abridgement of the treaty, which with your approbation, if this affair of the deposit can be got over, I propose concluding with him, and which his agents here, on behalf of their Master, signed and engaged to get ratified, as soon as I please, in the fullest manner by their Master, and translate of which I enclose. By this you will observe that an annual revenue of upwards of 18¼ lakhs of Rupees is secured to the Company; Salsette and Bassein ceded to them, and the remaining revenue to be collected only from three places, viz. Jambusar, Olpad and Anklesvar, all which are situated most conveniently in the neighbourhood of Surat and Broach, and all immediately belong to the Peshwa; and that all the other articles of the treaty, you sent me, are fully provided for, and four places ceded *pro tempore* to the Hon'ble Company for the security of the monthly stipend, till Raghoba's circumstances will allow him to give other more satisfactory security.

*Gambier's pleading*

As I am well convinced [*of his*] total incapacity at present to procure cash, and [*am*] firmly of opinion that in a very little time after our forces have joined him his affairs will take such a favourable turn as to enable him with great ease to satisfy every pecuniary engagement, I hope Your Honour, &ca will consent to accept the deposit in jewels or the pledge of his adopted son, and allow me immediately to conclude the treaty agreeable to the enclosed draught, and consequently let your forces enter on the proposed expedition as soon as possible. The junction of our forces with his will be easily effected from Cambay, where Raghoba proposes a large body of horse shall join them, and when they will be immediately furnished with all the carts, bullocks, etc. they can want; and if our forces set out in gallivats or boats at a proper time of the springs, which should be from hence the twelfth day of the moon, they will with great safety reach Cambay in two or three days. It now rests with Your Honour, etc. finally to determine whether to accept or not the treaty on the terms proposed, which I believe are the best at present procureable. For, as I before said I do not think Raghoba can raise cash at present; but [*as*] shows his offer to pledge his jewels or his adopted son, I believe him perfectly honest in his intentions and earnest to give you satisfaction in every point in his power. To avoid losing any time, in case you should approve the treaty in its present form, Raghoba's agents will immediately write to their Master to prepare and send to Cambay jewels to the amount of six lakhs of Rupees; and I intend to write to our Resident there to receive and securely keep whatever such may be tendered to him, so that, if Your Honour, &ca, approve this treaty, immediately as I am acquainted with your determination, I shall have nothing to do but get the treaty, which I have already regularly drawn out, formally executed by Raghoba, and the proper sanads for the places ceded; and of course the sooner then our forces join him the better: and should you refuse to accept the deposit of jewels, and therefore disapprove the treaty, I shall accordingly acquaint Raghoba, and whatever jewels have been deposited must be returned him.

Raghoba has lately had two or three engagements with the Poona forces, in which he has been very successful; and I am credibly informed [*he*] has had a very considerable offer made him on the part of the Poona ministers for accommodating matters, which hitherto he has refused through an earnest hope, I suppose, of being able by our assistance to gain the whole empire. But should any further delays happen, he may despair of our joining him, and it seems not improbable that he in such case may be induced to conclude a treaty with his enemies on the best terms he can, and content himself with a large share of the Maratha government rather than hazard the loss of the whole.

Should you assist Raghoba, the greater the number of forces you send, it will be much the more agreeable to him and particularly the larger the train of artillery, as Raghoba seems to place a particular and just confidence in our artillery.

I request a most speedy answer to this.

*The abridgement of the proposed treaty is as follows:*

Articles of agreement and treaty made between Robert Gambier Esq. of Surat on the part of the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esqr., President and Governor, etc. Council of Bombay in behalf of the Hon'ble United English East India Company on the one part and Ramchandra Narayan and Appaji Ramchandra on the part and in behalf of their Master Raghunathrao Bajirao Peshwa on the other part, this 6th day of February, 1775. *Fourth draft of treaty*

*1st* All treaties of peace and agreement hitherto concluded between the English Governor of Bombay and the Maratha Government are hereby ratified and confirmed, and Raghunathrao will not assist the Hon'ble Company's enemies; nor they, his.

*2nd* The Hon'ble the Governor and Council of Bombay engage to assist Raghoba with a strong body of forces with proper guns and warlike stores. The forces to consist of seven or eight hundred Europeans and 1,700 sepoys and lascars and other men belonging to the camp to the amount of in all three thousand men ; but at present of these only five hundred Europeans and one thousand sepoys with a sufficient number of lascars etc. will be sent; and the rest, if wanted, afterwards.

*3rd* Raghoba engages to pay in full for the charges and expenses of the above-mentioned forces one hundred and fifty thousand Rupees per month for the above-mentioned three thousand men, and so in proportion for any force that is sent. He engages to pay this stipend monthly, and as security for it to make over to the Hon'ble Company, till his affairs enable him to give more ample security, the revenue of the following parganas:

Anklesvar, that is the remaining [*part*] belonging to him after deducting what is hereafter by these presents ceded to the Hon'ble Company, Amod and its districts, Hansot and its districts, Versaul [*Valsad*] and its district; but the revenue of these places are to belong to the Hon'ble Company no longer [*than*] till what is due for the monthly stipend, on which account they are mortgaged, is made good to them.

*4th* Raghoba engages to make over to the Hon'ble Company for ever the undermentioned places: Bassein and its dependencies, Salsette, the whole island of, with all its revenues, Jambusar and its dependencies, Olpad and its dependencies, and from the revenues of Anklesvar the annual sum of seventy-five thousand Rupees to be paid by Raghoba's agent or pandit.

*5th* Raghoba also engages to procure to the Hon'ble Company from the Gaikwads a grant for ever of all the revenues collected hitherto by them from the town and pargana of Broach.

*6th* He also cedes for ever to the Hon'ble Company the four following islands adjacent to Bombay, great and little Karanja, Kennery and Elephanta.

*7th* He agrees to deposit jewels to the amount of 6 lakhs of Rupees, which he engages to redeem in cash as soon as possible The deposit of six lakhs or their value to remain in the Hon'ble Company's possession till the expiration of the service now to be performed, when [*the deposit*] is to be accounted for with Raghoba.

*8th* He engages not to molest the dominions of the Hon'ble Company in Bengal, nor to make war on the Nawab of Arcot so long as he adheres to the treaties now subsisting between the two Governments.

*9th* All the places ceded to the Hon'ble Company are so from the day of Raghoba's signing this treaty, or our forces joining; and from that day this treaty is in every respect to be in full force and virtue, just as if the intended service was fully performed, whether he makes peace with his enemies or not.

Account of places to be ceded by Raghoba to the Hon'ble Company with the computed value of their annual revenues.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bassein & Salsette .. .. .. .. .. .. | Rs. | 7,50,000 |
| Broach .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 3,50,000 |
| Jambusar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 4,00,000 |
| Olpad .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 3,50,000 |
| Anklesvar, a part only amounting to .. .. .. | „ | 75,000 |
| | Rs. | 19,25,000 |

1775 *Bombay, 12th February,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16 *A*)
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

*New treaty* The paper, you enclosed us as an abridgement of the treaty, was rather imperfectly done, and therefore we have drawn up a treaty, which we now enclose; and as it contains our full sense and meaning as to every point in question, we shall, therefore, rely on your procuring the execution of the treaty on the part of Raghoba in the manner therein laid down, and the necessary ratification by him with the sanads, which he is in consequence to deliver, for the several places to be ceded forever, also for those to be made over for a time to the Hon'ble Company; all which you are to take care [*that they*] are drawn out in such a full and explicit a manner as to admit of no dispute in time to come.

*Jewels accepted* You will observe by the treaty, which is now enclosed, that we have agreed to accept jewels as a deposit instead of six lakhs of Rupees in money; but this is only intended in case you still find that money is not to be got in whole or in part; for that will be infinitely more acceptable than jewels; if, however, jewels only are procurable, you are then to take care that they are of the full value of six lakhs, by having some persons skilled in these matters to examine them; it is more proper they should be received or at least transmitted to Surat, as it may be too great a risk their remaining at Cambay. You are, therefore, to act accordingly; and if in addition to six lakhs of Rupees in jewels you can also get his adopted son as an hostage, it will be more satisfactory, otherwise we must accept the jewels only, provided they are of the full value.

*Number of troops* By the abridgement of the treaty you enclosed we observe you had inserted that the force to be sent to Raghoba was to be 3,000 men, including lascars, etc. This is a number that we never intended, nor was even ever mentioned before, the number of 2,500 being the utmost we ever proposed, and in this light you appear till now always to have considered it. You, therefore, ought to have assigned the reasons for this deviation in your letter enclosing this abridgement if it was really necessary; and this was the more requisite, because this al-

teration, was it to stand, would considerably lessen the sum to be paid the Company for the forces that are to be sent to Raghoba's assistance. However we have rectified this in the treaty we now enclose, and what is therein inserted in respect to number is all that we can agree to.

*Other directions* We do not mean by the treaty enclosed to tie you down to the exact letter of it, if any difficulty of no great consequence arises respecting it; but we absolutely expect that no material alteration be made in it.

Acquaint us when it is necessary for us to transmit a ratification of the treaty signed by us, and it shall be done accordingly.

The forces we shall send upon this service will consist of eighty European artillery, 350 European infantry, sepoys 800, lascars 160, which with their officers, and non-commissioned officers will more than complete the number of 1,500 men. We shall also send a proper and complete train of artillery and stores Such part of this force as goes from hence shall set out so as to arrive at the bar of Surat in time for the new moon springs.

These forces are to be commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Keating.

*Note in the Diary.*

The rough draft of the treaty intended to be entered into with Raghunathrao, mentioned to be enclosed in the above letter, is not inserted in this place, as it will be entered at length when returned from Surat and ratified by the Board.

*Broach*, 12*th February*, 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) 1775
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Baroda relieved* On the 21st ultimo the Chief laid before us letters he had received from Fatesing, acquainting him that on the approach of a large force belonging to the ministerial party at Poona, consisting of about sixty thousand horse, commanded by Haripant Phadke, Tukoji Holkar and Mahadji Sindia, Govindrao had raised the siege of Baroda, and together with Raghoba and Khanderao had precipitately fled, and were actually crossed the river Mahi in the Dewan Koli country with all their army; on which and other necessary intelligence the Chief then addressed the Select Committee.

*Skirmish* The ministerial army, being joined by Fatesing with about seven thousand of his people, immediately followed them; and part of their army, attempting to cross the river Mahi in order to pursue them, were set upon by some of Raghoba's party and obliged to retire with some loss. The numbers have been variously reported, but the Chief's harkaras, who were on the spot, mention that about 250 of the ministerial army were killed, and as many wounded and by the best intelligence he has received both parties have since continued pretty quiet, though the ministerial army has removed from the situation they were at first posted in, a little way more distant from the Mahi, and Fatesing at once returned into Baroda for a day or two, but has again joined Haripant Phadke. It is said that Holkar and Sindia are attempting to bring about a treaty, and for that purpose have had several meetings with some of Raghoba's people, but nothing certain has yet transpired.

*Fatesing active* Fatesing, however, has taken advantage of the times, and immediately, on Govindrao's raising the siege, dispatched different bodies of horse and foot to every part of the Gaikwad government, of which he is now in possession from the banks of the river Mahi to the pass of the ghats at Songarh, where his brother, Sayaji, is at present in command with a considerable force.

*Fatesing's chauthia* Fatesing lately sent a party of horse and foot into this pargana under the command of one Kessoo Pandit, whom he appointed his chauthia here, to whom Govindrao's people gave up the command at Padra and all through our districts. Fatesing at the same time wrote a civil letter to the Chief, acquainting him of this, and upon our taking into consideration Your Honour &ca's orders of last season on a similar change, when Govindrao possessed himself of all the Gaikwad country around us, we judged it expedient and proper, for the same reasons, to admit Fatesing's chauthia into town, more particularly as there is a treaty subsisting between him and the Hon'ble Company, which Govindrao had not to plead in his favour; of this step, therefore, we doubt not Your Honour &ca's approbation, and the more so as the ministerial army is at present so near us, and in Fatesing's interest, who conjointly command all the country around us, where Govindrao has not a single village; besides that a concurrence and friendly intercourse with Fatesing will, we hope, be the means of preventing the ministerial army from attempting any hostilities in our pargana in this critical season of the harvest, which otherwise (from the terms we are on with them respecting Salsette) might be expected.

1775 *Broach, 12th February,* 1725 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Govindrao* Should Govindrao take any further notice of the proposal he made me, which I scarce imagine he will from the present situation of his affairs, I will [*give*] him such an answer as you direct.

*Raghoba* Nothing particular has yet occurred but what is mentioned in the public advices by this opportunity, except that I received a letter two days past from Raghoba, wherein he greatly exaggerates the trivial advantage gained over the ministerial party, mentioned in the general letter of this date, and is very importunate to know if I have any and what advices from Your Honour &ca respecting the assistance of men and artillery he is in hopes to receive.

1775 *Bombay, 16th February,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Bombay to the Company.*

*Negotiations with Raghoba* Our said address of the 1st December also fully apprised you of the negotiation then pending with Raghoba, and we shall inform you of the several steps that have been taken since that time by the first sea conveyance, judging it here proper only to inform you that it is now very nearly brought to the issue we have so long been endeavouring at, except in regard to the single point of the deposit, which was to have been six lakhs of Rupees in money; but, as it has been since found in the present situation of Raghoba's affairs totally impossible for him to do this, we have, therefore, agreed to accept from him an offer of jewels to the amount, till his affairs will enable him to redeem them;

The certain advantages to Your Honours by this treaty taking place is that the following territories are made over to you forever from the moment it is signed, whose annual revenues amount to 19 lakhs and 25,000 Rupees, *viz.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Salsette and Bassein with their dependencies and the other adjacent islands .. .. .. | Rs. | 7,50,000 p.annum |
| Broach, the Gaikwad's share .. .. .. | ,, | 3,50,000 ,, |
| Jambusar and its dependencies .. .. .. | ,, | 4,00,000 ,, |
| Olpad and its dependencies .. .. .. | ,, | 3,50,000 ,, |
| And the Company are to be paid annually from the pargana of Anklesvar .. .. .. .. | ,, | 75,000 ,, |
| | ,, | 19,25,000 ,, |

Of the foregoing you will observe that Salsette, Bassein and their dependencies are most conveniently situated to this place, Broach; Jambusar and Olpad lay as convenient to Surat and to the possessions you already hold at Broach; these are consequently the countries that must be most beneficial to the Company.

A treaty has been sent to Surat to be executed, and the forces, with which Raghoba is at present to be assisted, are to consist of the following number, *viz.* 80 artillery with a proper train and stores, 350 European infantry, 800 sepoys and 160 lascars; these with their proper commissioned and non-commissioned officers will amount to upwards of 1,500 men.

It was at first proposed to assist Raghoba with 2,500 men; but the numbers required to garrison Salsette, &ca have put it for the present out of our power to send so large a force; and Raghoba has consented to accept the force above-mentioned without making any other alteration in the terms of the treaty, except in respect to the sum which was to be paid monthly for our expenses. This was to have been 1,50,000 Rupees; but it is now to bear the same proportion to that sum as this force bears to that with which it was at first intended to assist him. The remainder of the troops will be sent, if required, when we receive the reinforcement we have written for to Madras.

No material alteration is made in the treaty except the foregoing; but it is enlarged and explained more fully and beneficially for your interest even than the former one, of which a copy was sent in our diary by the *Thames;* this treaty was forwarded to Surat on the 12th instant; and as we have every reason to conclude from Mr. Gambier's advices that it will be immediately accepted by Raghoba, who is now near to Cambay, and that the necessary sanads will then be given for the territories to be ceded to the Company. The forces, therefore, that are to go from hence, will set out in a very few days under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating.

*Cambay, 16th February,* 1775. (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) **1775**
*Charles Warre Malet to Robert Gambier.*

Yesterday three chiefs, two named Appaji Pant and one Bhaiji Pant arrived with about 300 horsemen. This morning they waited on the Nawab and afterwards came to the Factory, where we have been till this moment examining the jewellery they have brought with them. ***Jewels received***

1775 *Bombay, 17th February,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)

*Troops start* The forces proceeding to Surat under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Keating were embarked this morning, the Europeans on board the ship *Calcutta*, and the sepoys and lascars with the stores on board fourteen shibars and twelve fishing boats, when the *Calcutta* weighed and sailed with these vessels under her convoy.

1775 *Bombay, 17th February,* 1775, (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

*Directions* Though the treaty with Raghoba is not absolutely concluded by any advices we have yet received from Surat, yet we have every reason to suppose from the directions we have lately sent to the Chief that it must be executed before you arrive at the Bar; of this Mr. Gambier will advise you. In case it is not finished, you are to proceed no further than Surat; but should it be executed, as we must believe it will, you are to proceed to such port or place as the Chief may advise you to do, in consequence of what may have been agreed on between him and the agents of Raghoba for most easily effecting a junction with Raghoba and his army, taking under your command such part of the force now at Surat as the Chief and Council may order to obey you, and pursuing the most eligible means with the advice of the Chief for joining the detachment that will be sent from the garrison of Broach.

A proper field train of artillery and the necessary stores are sent from hence, the accounts of which the Commissary is to be furnished with.

It is our wish, and we believe it is Raghoba's intention to proceed to Poona, so soon as he is joined by our forces. You are, therefore, to urge him to this step, if from circumstances you find it consistent; and could he gain any immediate and material advantage over the adverse army by our assistance, it will tend most effectually to disperse his adversaries and to bring over to his party many who, we have reason to believe, at present are afraid to declare in his favour.

1775 *Cambay, 18th February,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Charles Warre Malet to Robert Gambier.*

*Raghoba's defeat and flight* This morning news arrived that the ministerial army had yesterday about 3 o'clock P. M. crossed the Mahi [*at Vasad*], when Raghoba's army dispersed and fled. On this the Nawab, who was advanced to meet Raghoba, returned to town. Shortly after about 9 o'clock this morning, Raghoba himself with about 1,000 horsemen reached this place, and solicited the Nawab's permission to enter Cambay, but received for answer that, should he be admitted, the whole force of the ministerial army would be directed against Cambay, and that Raghoba might himself judge how little able he was to oppose their force; on which he begged to embark immediately from hence for Surat. This likewise the Nawab opposed, alleging that the vengeance of the ministers would fall on him equally for promoting his escape as receiving and giving him immediate protection. Thus every hope of escape from the Nawab's assistance being at an end, he applied to me as a servant of the Hon'ble Company, urged his friendship with my Masters and the treaty which he was at this time engaged [*in*], and concluded

by saying that life and safety depended on me alone. Judging, therefore, from the treaty now on foot that I should do my Hon'ble Masters an acceptable piece of service by promoting his safe arrival at any of our settlements, and concluding that the jewellery in my hands would amply repay any present expense he may bring on the Company, [I] have requested him to proceed to Bhavnagar, whither I have promised to send a boat to receive him. He is in consequence set out from hence on his way to that place, and to-morrow the boat will sail. My ignorance of the particular terms and of the progress of the negotiation, which my Masters are at present engaged in with Raghoba, and of the terms on which assistance may be expected from Surat, prevented my pressing the Nawab either to receive him or to permit his embarkation from hence. If happily my proceedings are approved, by sending immediately, if this does not arrive too late, to the Bhavnagar Raja or any officers of our vessels there, you may promote the unfortunate Raghoba's speedy and safe passage to Surat. Fearful of erring, I have not written to the Raja of Bhavnagar, but have sent Jamsedji Edulji, one of our brokers, to accompany Raghoba and to speak to the Raja, if necessary, in a recommendatory manner to promote his embarkation, and shall write in the same manner to any officer of gallivats that may be there to give immediate convoy, if it can be done without material prejudice to our Hon'ble Masters. Jamsedji Edulji, the broker whom I have ordered to attend Raghoba to Surat, has desired me to request you will dispatch him as soon as possible to this place, and I take the liberty of adding that, as he is now forced to Surat by urgent business of the Company, and supplies his boat with the utmost readiness in our service, my hopes that you will take care he shall be reimbursed his own and his boat's charges. As my keeping the jewellery received from Raghoba's agents may induce the leaders of the ministerial army to bend their course hither, by which means the safety of the town and it may be endangered, I shall dispatch it without contradictory orders arrived by the returning vessels of these springs.

*Surat, 19th February, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)*
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.* **1775**

I now write to advise you that last night I received a letter from Mr. Malet at Cambay, an extract of which accompanies this, enclosing a letter from Raghoba, who earnestly presses for the junction of our troops, which, I hope, will go to Cambay the next springs. The pledge of jewels being made and sanads granted, nothing remains on the part of Raghoba to be done but to sign the treaty, which he will do whenever it is sent to him. It is unnecessary for me to observe that any further delay will probably put an end to the treaty; and therefore, if you intend to enter into it, I hope it soon will happen; should you not be able to send all the intended forces, &ca to Cambay these springs, a part of them going there will be of singular service by removing all Raghoba's doubts and thoroughly satisfying him of our intention to join him, and by these means the treaty will be made binding. ***Danger of delay***

Enclosed is a copy of Mr. Malet's valuation of the jewellery.

1775 *Broach, 19th February,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing's success* These circumstances [*the weakness of the garrison at Broach*] we have thought it more particularly our duty to represent at this time from the late great change in the Maratha affairs in these parts, where the Poona ministerial party have gained a very considerable victory over Raghoba and Govindrao, who are fled different ways, the particulars of which the Chief has already fully acquainted the Select Committee of. Fatesing and the ministerial army have since fallen upon Khanderao's country, and report says have entirely taken it in. Govindrao and he are retired to a stronghold called Kapadvanj near Ahmadabad, and Raghoba to Surat; at least this is the best intelligence the Chief has been able to procure.

1775 *Surat,* 21*st February,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.16A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Cause of defeat* Late last night I received by express pattemar a letter from Mr. Malet, an extract of which accompanies this, which will inform you of the bad news of the defection of Raghoba's troops and his flight in consequence. Mr. Malet gives no particulars; but by what I can gather from the pattemars it appears to me that the defection was only amongst some of Raghoba's own troops and particularly five thousand Arabs, which he lately took into his own service from Govindrao, from whom very large arrears were due to them, which Raghoba engaged to pay; but not being able to comply with his promise, they, it seems, have since been bought by the leaders of the Poona army.

*Raghoba's allies* It also appears to me that Govindrao and Khanderao with all their forces still stand their ground and are faithful to Raghoba, but at the time the Poona army crossed the river, were encamped at some distance; and yet why Raghoba did not rather take refuge in their camp than run away to Cambay, I cannot at present account for.

*Friendly assistance* Immediately on the receipt of Mr. Malet's letter I dispatched two armed boats with an intelligent person to Bhavnagar in order to afford Raghoba all possible assistance for remaining there in security or coming here, and by those boats I sent a letter to the same purpose to the commanding officer of our two gallivats, which went last springs with the convoy to the northward. I also by pattemars express wrote Mr. Malet to direct him to afford Raghoba every assistance in his power and to send the jewellery here as soon as he possibly could with safety, and acquainted him that I should these springs for that purpose send a gallivat or armed boat or two, but directed him not to wait for them, if he could find out any means of forwarding the jewels hither; and as it is now essentially necessary to know as soon as possible the reasons of Raghoba's flight and an exact state of his present circumstances, I propose sending Mr. Torlesse to Bhavnagar to confer with Raghoba and obtain all necessary intelligence, which when I receive, I shall immediately communicate to Your Honour, &ca.

*Gambier's scheme* The best scheme which appears to me now, provided Raghoba's affairs are not desperate, that Govindrao and Khanderao are still on his side, and that through them and other means he can soon reassemble a large body of men, which I believe he will easily do, if once it is

publicly known that we espouse his cause, I say that in such case, the best scheme appears to be for Raghoba to go to Cambay, and the forces Your Honour, etc. intend to supply him also to be sent thither, and for him to collect his scattered forces and then proceed against the enemy. Cambay by its situation is by much the most convenient for him to collect his scattered forces at, or to assemble others, and also for Govindrao and Khanderao to rejoin him, as all these would find the greatest difficulty in passing the Poona forces, as they are now situated, and getting down to Broach, Jambusar, or any other place on the sea coast; and besides, the Cambay Nawab can, if he chooses it, which of course he will do when ordered by Your Honour, etc., even materially assist Raghoba in collecting forces: and Cambay, notwithstanding the Nawab's assertion to Raghoba in excuse for not admitting him, has nothing to fear from the Poona army, and particularly not, if a body of our forces is sent there; which, if what I now propose is approved by Your Honour, etc. it will be necessary to do as soon as possilbe. Mr. Torlesse informs me that at the present season there is no danger to be apprehended from the rapidity of the tides, and that for two or three springs to come boats may with the greatest safety carry our troops to Cambay. By the *Stafford*, which ship will be returned to you in a day or two, I hope to be able to write you more fully respecting Raghoba's situation and circumstances. Should he come to Surat, I shall receive him as a friend and ally of the Hon'ble Company, and afford him all the protection in my power, and immediately acquaint you of it; and I beg to be soon favoured with any further orders and instructions you may, from what has happened, think it necessary to give me.

*Defeat explained*

At present it appears to me that the accident, that has lately happened, has entirely happened from Raghoba's camp being much straightened for provisions, and his troops, from that cause and large arrears due to them, much discontented, without any certain hopes of soon being relieved from their distress by our joining him; and I think that this disaster may be remedied without much difficulty, as I dare say he will soon be able to collect a sufficient body to take the field and act successfully when joined by ours. However the intelligence a few days will bring, will set matters at a greater certainty.

*Broach, 24th February, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)* 1775
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba's defeat*

I have certain intelligence that the ministerial army and Fatesing having crossed the river Mahi in three different divisions, late on the afternoon of the 17th, fell suddenly and unexpectedly on Raghoba's army and gained a signal victory over him; that Raghoba with a small body of horse fled towards Cambay and then proceeded on towards Bhavnagar; and that Govindrao and Khanderao fled towards Ahmadabad; their reports vary greatly in respect to the numbers slain and wounded, but all agree that the loss was considerable and from 4 to 7,000; that Fatesing had taken twelve accoutred elephants, two standards and many suits of colours and jinjals on camels; that Manaji Phakray, one of Raghoba's principal officers, is dangerously wounded, some say, dead; and Sakharam Hari is also wounded, but escaped; several officers of note are taken prisoners, and among others Babarao

Patankar, Ganesh Vithal, Ragoo Vithal and Narayanrao Govind. Most, if not all the guns and ammunition, palanquins, tents and other valuable effects of Raghoba are fallen into his enemies' hands, it is said. Two of these harkaras, after taking the particular news of the field, followed Raghoba's track to Cambay, and there heard of his having proceeded on to Bhavnagar or Gogo, where it was publicly said he was to embark for Surat. A party from the ministerial army was sent after him, and another in pursuit of Govindrao and Khanderao, and Fatesing immediately proceeded to Nadiad (which is Khanderao's capital) to reduce that and the contiguous country. This news has been variously reported here a day or two past; but I did not choose to send such intelligence, until I was well and authentically assured of it, having several harkaras abroad, purposely to bring any material information, as it may be of consequence that the intelligence can be depended on.

Fatesing has gained great reputation by this action as well with the ministerial party as through all the country, the conducting the enterprise being entirely his, which he managed, it is said, with great secrecy and generalship. He and his people, being long accustomed to all the passes, crossed the river Mahi at two places, not suspected by the adverse party; and whilst with one body, part of the ministerial army made a feint to ford it at the place where I had the honour to inform you they were heretofore repelled, two other parties of theirs and Fatesing crossed it, one above, and the other below Raghoba; and thus, whilst he was attempting to repel the party at the common pass, they came and hemmed him in unexpectedly and suddenly from both quarters, and a total rout ensued.

*Letters from Fatesing* I have received two very civil letters lately from Fatesing, one to thank us for the admission of his chauthia and another desiring us to proceed in the collection of the revenues with all haste, as he is much in want of money, and I every moment expect letters from him in consequence of his late success

1775 *Bombay, 25th February,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby (written from Dumas).*

*Raghoba's flight* Agreeable to the tenor of Mr. Malet's letter, Raghoba made the best of his way to Bhavnagar and arrived there safely. He found Captain Field, who assisted him, in consequence of Mr. Malet's letter, to embark himself and people, and he arrived here safely the 23rd. For the present he is lodged at Dumas and accommodated in the yacht under the protection of our armed boats and a detachment of Bombay sepoys; and whenever it may be necessary, and a proper place found for his accommodation, he will be received into town. His arrival here and putting himself under the Hon'ble Company's protection will subject them to an expense which I shall turn as small as possible. I write this from Dumas, where I came this morning to have a meeting with him; and after a long conference I cannot find anything to advise Your Honour, etc. of with certainty further than that he has fled more, I believe, through apprehension of defection of his party than through any certainty of its having happened. By his account it seems that a large party of the ministerial army attacked his immediate forces,

*Cause of flight*

who made a very brave resistance; but on his observing that the Arabs, which composed a great part of Govindrao's, remained entirely inactive; and knowing that Khanderao's camp was at too great a distance for his forces to afford him any immediate succour, he was so much apprehensive of being surrounded and taken that he thought it most advisable to fly and made the best of his way to Cambay, where being refused admittance, he proceeded to Bhavnagar; and there, as I have before said, he embarked for Surat. Since he parted from his forces, he can give no account of their proceedings nor of those of Govindrao and Fatesing; and being from his great fatigue and the hardships he has suffered a good deal disordered, he has earnestly begged me to give him a few days to recollect himself and consult with his principal officers, before he gives me any scheme of his future proceedings; and to this I have [*consented*] of mere necessity; and therefore, till I receive his answer, I cannot write Your Honour, &ca so fully as I could wish, but will do it as soon as ever he will enable me.

In a letter received last night Mr. Malet writes that report prevails at Cambay of Gopalrao being arrived with a large army on the banks of the Mahi to assist Raghoba. This Gopalrao is a near relation of Raghoba and has long been in the service of Shuja-ud-daula, an officer of consequence. *Gopalrao*

He further advises that part of Raghoba's defeated forces daily arrive at Cambay in search of their Master, but knows nothing of the ministerial army, or Khanderao, or Govindrao. He writes me that he has received from Raghoba's pandits the sanads for the several places, for which as well as the jewels I shall these springs dispatch a gallivat and armed boat. *Other news*

*Broach, 27th February,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

The accompanying is a copy of what I sent off two days ago via Surat; since then I have harkaras come in from Kapadvanj, an almost inaccessible fortress, where Govindrao and Khanderao retired after the late defeat with such few of their followers as they could collect together; it is about 20 kos distant from Ahmadabad. They were followed thither by the greatest part of the ministerial army, who in attempting to approach the fort lost near a thousand horse, the surrounding ground being entirely broken up into hollow ways by the rains, the fort being on an eminence. On the approach of the army they let some enter those hollow ways, and then the Kolis and gun-men belonging to Govindrao fell upon them, and the horse being thus embarrassed met with the above loss. The ministerial army then retired to a place about fifteen kos distant, called Momadavad, where the harkaras left them. Fatesing, after having reduced Nadiad and all the contiguous country, joined them, and there the greatest part of their united forces now remain. *Poona army*

I have this day seen letters from Fatesing's Diwan to our chauthia here, wherein he says, Fatesing having acquired great credit with the ministerial army by the late victory, they had at his desire altered a resolution they had taken of sending a party of horse into the Broach parganas; which is one of the good effects at present resulting from our *Fatesing friendly*

being on friendly terms with him. Our harkaras report that a party of horse [*has*] gone from the army to lay Cambay under contribution, and that several parties of the dispersed troops belonging to Raghoba and Govindrao repair to the latter at Kapadvanj daily, but most are dispersed, and some have taken Fatesing's service.

1775 *Surat, 3rd March,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba at Surat* I last addressed Your Honour, &ca by the *Stafford*, and the day she sailed I brought Raghoba to town, as he was very urgent to come. He is at present lodged in Chellabi's garden and with large tents pitched near it. I have made it as convenient as I could to himself and people; but, after the necessary ceremonials have passed between him and the Nawab, he seems to intend to remove to the Nawab's garden in the suburb called Mahomed Kabaus; though from this, if I can, I shall dissuade him, both because he is much safer here, and at the same time much more conveniently situated for transacting business with me and the Colonel. I am obliged to allow himself and all his people provisions; for I have been told by all I have consulted—and I have talked on the subject with very many—that not to do it would be an affront from the Hon'ble Company; and that it is also very necessary that in the name of the Hon'ble Company a handsome present should be made him; and on this I request your directions.

*Raghoba's army* Since Raghoba came to town some more of his people to the number of two or three hundred are come to him, and he has received some letters from his principal officers, who, he says, have assembled his own scattered forces to the number of eight or 10,000 at a place called Kapadvanj, situated about 25 kos from Cambay, where they are waiting for his orders, and that Govindrao and Khanderao, with their troops to the number of 25,000 more, have possessed themselves of a stronghold at a little distance from the others, and are ready also to join Raghoba again, whenever he chooses it, so that he seems to be very confident of being soon able to collect a considerable body of men; but in order to be at a certainty he has dispatched some Brahmans and harkaras with his letters by the way of Cambay, whither they proceeded by sea the beginning of these springs in the gallivat, which together with an armed boat I sent with Captain Field to bring down the jewels and sanads. Raghoba expected his messengers to return in a few days, and then to be able to say with certainty what forces he can collect and at what place, and will of course then take the proper measures with the Colonel for setting out and effecting a junction as speedily and conveniently as may be. In respect to the ministerial army, I know little of it. Part is said to have come to Bhavnagar to look after Raghoba, and part to have gone in pursuit of Govindrao and Khanderao.

The taking possession as soon as possible, after Raghoba takes the field, of the places ceded to the Hon'ble Company seems a point of great importance; and I therefore request you will please to give the necessary orders regarding it.

*Surat, 3rd March,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Troops at Surat*

I have the honour to acquaint you that the troops, etc. under my command arrived at the Bar the 27th ultimo. The troops are landed and are placed in the Sarai. The boats with the stores and ammunition are all up the river.

*Meeting Raghoba*

On the first instant I was introduced to Raghoba. He appeared to me a man of sound judgment and clear conceptions. From the intelligence he has received at different times from his army he seems, with our assistance, to be confident of accomplishing his wishes; and should a full confirmation arrive of the situation of his army, I purpose proceeding to Cambay at the proper season; which measure will the soonest effect the desired junction and, I trust, be attended with every advantage. I cannot but consider the event as most fortunate that has thus thrown Raghoba so entirely into our hands and reduced him in a great degree to a dependence upon the assistance of the Company; of this he is fully sensible and esteems himself bound to render the Hon'ble Company every advantage in his power.

*Surat, 4th March,* 1775. (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba's defeat*

I have the honour to acquaint you that the troops and stores under my command arrived in the road of Surat at eleven o'clock the night of the 27th ultimo without any accident, except the loss of a fishing boat, but no people. The morning of the 28th I proceeded to town, where I was informed by Mr. Gambier of the defeat and retreat of the Peshwa Raghoba, and yesterday I was introduced to him. He appears a man of sound judgment, quick and clear conceptions. The better to enable me to lay before Your Honour a true state of his present situation and my opinion thereof I have inquired of him, also [*of*] the most intelligent of his people, respecting the late engagement and its subsequent consequences. The information received is as follows.

*Raghoba explains*

On the 17th instant the army under the ministers, Haripant Phadke, Mahadji Sindia and Tukoji Holkar crossed the Mahi at Sanwali pargana, about thirty-five kos from Cambay, and did attack the army of Raghoba, which then consisted of about thirty-five thousand (35,000) horse and foot. The army commanded by Haripant Phadke, etc. consisted of about 42,000 horse. The engagement commenced about noon and ended about eight in the evening. The loss of the action to Raghoba was occasioned by the disaffection of a body of 12,000 Arabs, who refused to engage on account of large arrears of pay being due to them, so that he was left to withstand the whole ministerial force with a very inferior one. After sustaining the loss of about three or four hundred men, Raghoba was obliged to retreat towards Cambay, which place he reached at 3 o'clock next day and proceeded immediately for Bhavnagar, where he arrived the same night with about seven hundred horsemen, seven elephants and a few camels. So great was his haste to proceed to Surat to take the protection of the Company that he embarked without making any esteem of the horses, etc. They were turned loose, and he, his adopted son and about nine hundred of his followers proceeded to this place.

*Raghoba's allies* The chief officers of Raghoba's army are, Appaji Mahadev, Sadashiva Ramchandra, Sakharam Hari, ministers; Govindrao Gaikwad and Khanderao Gaikwad, from whom he has heard to the following purport.

"We are much surprised to find that, after our having fought so well with the army of Haripant Phadke, you are missing, nor do we know where to send to you, this going as chance may direct. However we have now collected all our forces, amounting to about 16, 000, mostly horse, also our ammunition at the fort of Kapadvanj, which is about 50 kos from Cambay, and there shall remain until we receive your orders."

*Raghoba's reply* Raghoba has returned answers to these advices to this purport. "The reason," says he, "of my being obliged to retreat was owing to Haripant Phadke having made the attack with 25,000 men on the centre, where I was with little more than 4,000 men, being deserted by the Arabs who drew off and refused to fight. Thus situated and finding the whole push of Haripant's troops was against my person, I went to Cambay, from thence to Bhavnagar, and there took shipping to Surat, where I arrived safe after many troubles, which have been made up for in a great degree by the kind reception I met with from my good friends, the English. The Governor and Council of Bombay have sent me a good force and all kinds of guns and ammunition, so that I only wait to hear from you what place you think most proper to join my forces to the English; and when that is once accomplished, my affairs will soon be in proper condition. I wait to have your speedy answer to this great business and very much wish it may come soon."

*Keating explains* The above, Hon'ble Sir, I believe is a genuine account; since which, he (Raghoba) has received many advices that serve to confirm his army being collected to the number of twenty thousand under the command of the above-mentioned officers; also that all his baggage, etc. supposed to be lost are actually safe. From the above circumstances, together with the many conversations I have had with his people, I draw the following conclusions: that the ministers, finding the treaty between the Hon'ble Company and Raghoba upon the eve of ratification, determined, if possible, to strike a grand stroke and demolish Raghoba, before a junction of our forces could take place. Thus resolved, they sent emissaries among the Arabs, on whom Raghoba placed his greatest dependence; by some bribes and large promises they were prevailed upon to stand neutral. The ministerial party assured of this, crossed the river and made their grand attack on that part where Raghoba's quarters were, and the Arabs [*were*] posted. As soon as they refused to engage, Raghoba concluded himself betrayed and was confirmed therein by the ministerial army pushing particularly for the part he was posted in. Filled with these sentiments, he retired. Some people there are who say that Raghoba suspected a general defection of his officers, but I do not believe a word of it. Since his being here, he expressed the fullest confidence in Govindrao and Khanderao, also in his ministers; and the result proves he was not deceived. They are staunch to him, nor doubt I of their pursuing every measure to effect a speedy junction with us.

But I think it will be absolutely necessary for our forces to proceed to Cambay. I do not think the danger attending this measure great. It very frequently happened, as I am well informed, that fifty boats have proceeded to Cambay without sustaining any damage; if then so large a number of merchant boats, who have no respect to a general safety, can do so, it is very reasonable to suppose it may be done by us who can procure pilots and be assisted by a regular plan of proceeding. Should we even land at Jambusar, the river Mahi must be crossed before we join Raghoba's forces. This measure, I am assured, will be attended with equal, if not more danger than landing at Cambay, and ten times the trouble. As to the collected forces now at Kapadvanj, I think they cannot move towards Broach; indeed I am of opinion it would be greatest imprudence to attempt it. Their present post is a good one, their numbers much inferior, and thus situated it is not for them to risk anything before we join them. All matters considered, I am clearly of opinion, granting we receive a full confirmation of the situation of the army of Raghoba under Govindrao and Khanderao, we should re-embark our force and sail from hence for Cambay on the 13th day of this present moon, which is the most proper time as I am informed. Mr. Gambier has this instant received a letter from Mr. Malet, dated the 2nd instant, which confirms me in the propriety of landing at Cambay.[1] *Cambay proposal*

*Surat, 6th March,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) **1775**

*Articles of agreement and treaty between the Hon'ble William Hornby, Esq., President and Governor &ca Council of Bombay and of all its dependencies on the part and [in] behalf of the Hon'ble United English East India Company on the one[1] part and Raghunathrao Balaji Peshwa on the other part, dated the sixth day[2] of March in the year of our Lord* 1775, *or the third day of the month of Muharram and year of the Hijra* 1189 *Muhammadan style, or the day of the month and year* 1800 *of the Gentoo style.*

*Article 1st* The Treaty concluded between the Government of Bombay and Bajirao Pandit Pradhan or first minister of his Serene Highness the Shahu Raja, dated July, 1739 or 1140 of the Muhammadan style, and that concluded on the part of this Government with Balaji Bajirao Pradhan, dated 12th, October 1756 or of the Muhammadan style the 17th of Muharram, 1170, are hereby ratified and confirmed in their full and true intent and meaning of them, in the same full and ample manner and in the same light in which they have hitherto been understood. *Final draft of treaty*

*Article 2nd* All other agreements subsisting between this Government of Bombay and that of the Marathas are hereby ratified and confirmed, and after the re-establishment of Raghoba in the government of the Maratha dominions, peace and tranquillity shall subsist uninterrupted between this Government in behalf of the Hon'ble Company and the Maratha Government.

1 Published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, 217-219.

2 The treaty was signed on the 7th March, 1775; see letter of the 9th March, 1775.

*Article 3rd* Raghoba on his part and on the part of the Maratha Government engages from this day forward never on any pretence or in any manner to assist the enemies of the Hon'ble Company in any part whatever of their dominions in India, and the Hon'ble the Governor and Council of Bombay in like manner engage never to assist the enemies of Raghoba.

*Article 4th* The Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay, in behalf of the Hon'ble Company and in consideration of the undermentioned grants and cessions made by Raghoba to the Company, do hereby engage and agree, so soon as possible after these articles of agreement and treaty are fully ratified and confirmed on the part of Raghoba, to assist him with a strong body of forces, with proper guns and warlike stores and a field-train of artillery, which are to join his army and act in conjunction with the forces against the ministerial party; in the said body of forces shall be included not less than seven hundred Europeans, and the whole shall not be less in number than two thousand five hundred men; but at present only five hundred Europeans and one thousand sepoys and lascars with a proper and effectual number of guns will be sent, and the rest, if wanted, afterwards.

*Article 5th* In consideration of such effectual assistance on the part of the Hon'ble Company, Raghoba, as Peshwa and as Supreme Governor in the whole Maratha Empire, does hereby engage on his part to cede and make over to the Hon'ble Company for ever the undermentioned places and territories; and he does accordingly by these presents make over the same to them in the most full, ample and effectual manner; and he does by these presents deliver the necessary sanads granting in the fullest manner all the present and future full right and title of the Maratha Government to them; and in case of the loss at any time of the sanads now delivered, these presents are at all times to be considered as such and of full and equal validity with any sanad whatever : *Bassein* and the whole of its dependencies in its fullest extent, and all rents, and revenues thereto belonging, together with the fort or forts and every belonging to the Poona Government in it or them ; *Salsette,* the whole and entire island with all the revenues of the different places annexed to it as collected by Anandrao and Ramajipant; *Jambusar and Olpad,* with the whole of their dependencies in their full extent, together with everything belonging to the Poona Government in those parganas; the following islands adjacent to Bombay with every thing belonging to the Poona Government therein, viz. *Karanja, Kenery, Elephanta and Hog Island.*

*Article 6th* Raghoba also engages immediately to procure from the Gaikwads a grant to the Hon'ble Company forever with all the necessary sanads of their share in the revenue collected by the Gaikwads in the town and parganas of Broach.

*Article 7th* The Hon'ble Company are to be considered as the sole lords and proprietors, from the day of signing this treaty, of all and every of the places ceded by the two last articles, in the like manner as the Poona Government or the Gaikwad Government were before considered, and are accordingly from this day forward to exercise every right and authority in those places and to receive every revenue which the Poona Government or the Gaikwad before exercised.

*Article 8th* Raghoba also engages faithfully to make good to the Company for ever, the sum of 75,000, seventy-five thousand, Rupees annually from his share of the revenues of Anklesvar, which sum is to be paid by his Pandit in two different payments at stated periods.

*Article 9th* Raghoba engages to pay in full for the charges and expenses of the body of forces with which he is to be assisted, consisting of two thousand five hundred men with guns and ammunition, the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand Rupees every month, which the Governor and the Council agree to accept without further account, and is to commence the day the forces leave Bombay; [*but if*] the whole number of forces will not first proceed, he is only to pay a proportionable monthly sum, till the whole force, if necessary, may be sent to join him. He engages to pay the stipend monthly; and as security for the same, till his affairs will enable him to furnish money, which he promises to do as soon as possible, he assigns by these presents the revenues of the following places, *viz. Anklesvar*, his remaining share, after deducting what is before by these presents ceded to the Hon'ble Company, *Amod* and all its districts, *Hansot* and all its districts, *Valsad* and all its districts. But, as it has been declared that the revenues of these places belong to the Hon'ble Company no longer than till the amount of the monthly stipend, that may be due for the expenses of the Company's forces, is fully discharged, when all further demands on these four places are to cease, and in this light the Hon'ble the Governor and Council declare they accept these four parganas.

*Article 10th* As it has been mutually agreed during the course of this negotiation that the sum of six lakhs of Rupees should be deposited by Raghoba with the agents of the Hon'ble Company to be accounted for at the expiration of the service intended to be performed against his enemies, the ministerial party, and Raghoba finding it at this time totally impossible for him to raise the sum to be deposited, though still equally willing to do it, was it in his power, the contracting parties have mutually agreed to settle this point as follows: That Raghoba shall immediately deposit with the Company's agents at Surat to the full value of six lakhs of Rupees in jewels, to remain in the Hon'ble Company's possession till redeemed, which must be done as soon as Raghoba's affairs will possibly admit—all this Raghoba faithfully engages to perform and the Hon'ble Company to accept.

*Article 11th* In case of opposition from any person or persons whatever to the Company's taking possession of all or any of the places hereby firmly and effectually ceded to them, Raghoba does engage to pay the expense that will be incurred by their gaining possession, to use effectual means to put them in possession, as well as to secure for them for ever the quiet possession of all the revenues and places now ceded to the Hon'ble Company.

*Article 12th* Should Raghoba make peace with his enemies, the ministers, he firmly and faithfully engages that the English East India Company shall be considered in it to their satisfaction.

*Article 13th* Raghoba does also engage never to molest the dominions of the Hon'ble Company in Bengal. He further engages

not to make war or commit any depredations in the Carnatic so long as the last treaty subsisting between the two Governments is adhered to by the Nawab.

*Article* 14*th* In case it should happen (which God forbid) that any of the Company's ships or vessels, or the ships, vessels or boats of those trading under their protection should be shipwrecked on any part of the Maratha coast, every assistance shall be given by the Government and inhabitants to save as much as possible, and the whole that may be saved shall be returned, all reasonable expenses being paid by the owners.

*Article* 15*th* All the places ceded for ever to the Hon'ble Company by this treaty are to be considered as their sole right and property from the day this treaty is signed; and this treaty from that day is to be considered in full force, just as if the expected services were fully accomplished, whether Raghoba shall make peace with his enemies or not.

*Article* 16*th* Immediately after the ratification of the aforegoing articles, and after the jewels to the full amount of six lakhs of Rupees are deposited, and the security above-mentioned given for the payment of the monthly expenses of the forces so long as they continue with Raghoba and till their return, all in the manner abovementioned, the Governor and the Council engage that the Company's forces, agreeable to what is mentioned in the body of this treaty, shall proceed from Bombay to join the army of Raghoba; and they trust by the blessing of God Almighty that they will quickly overcome his enemies, the ministerial party, and establish him at Poona in the government of the Maratha Empire.

The foregoing articles having been agreed to by the Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay, who have empowered me to accept the same in their behalf, I do in confirmation thereof affix the seal of the same Hon'ble Company and sign my own proper name thereto in Surat, the day and year above written, and I do engage to procure a ratification of this treaty under the seal of the Hon'ble Company and under the hands and seals of the Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay within thirty days from this date.

1775 *Bombay 7th March,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*At a Consultation.*

*Time limit* Provided the treaty is not executed and every other particular of our latest orders relative thereto exactly complied with, the forces are to proceed no further; but on the contrary should all these matters be exactly settled with Raghoba in a satisfactory way as particularised in our latest letters, and if they find from the best intelligence the Chief can procure that Raghoba's army is reassembled so as to afford a probable prospect, when joined by our forces, of re-establishing Raghoba's affairs, the Chief and Council must then order the forces to proceed to Cambay or to such other convenient port on the coast as may be agreed on for effecting a junction with the Peshwa's army, carefully observing to direct the commanding officer not to march from the port where he may land for seeking out Raghoba's army, but to wait 10

or 15 days till he may be joined by those forces. When a junction is once effected the commanding officer must proceed agreeable to the instructions he has received from us; should there be no probability of a junction in the time limited as above, our forces must return to Surat, there to wait our further orders.

*Bombay, 8th March,* 1775, (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

We have long been waiting to learn from you or your Board whether the treaty is really executed. In this respect both you and they have been remiss, as we are yet totally in the dark as to this point; and we are also at a loss to know if it is executed, why it has not been ratified and confirmed by Raghoba since he arrived at Surat, and why that ratification was not sent us on the Calcutta. We expect that you explain yourself fully on these points. ***Bombay impatient***

*Surat, 9th March,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16) 1775
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

The 7th at night Raghoba himself signed and fully executed the treaty and delivered it to me with his own hands, and I gave him on the part of the Hon'ble Company a counterpart, an exact copy of which is enclosed. ***Sanads***

LIST OF SANADS.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Sanads for Bassein | | 1 | Sanad for Elephanta | |
| 2 | ,, ,, Salsette | | 1 | ,, ,, Kenery | |
| 1 | Sanad ,, Olpad | | 1 | ,, ,, Balesar | |
| 1 | ,, ,, Jambusar | | 2 | Sanads ,, Anklesvar | |
| 1 | ,, ,, Broach | | 1 | Sanad ,, Hansot | |
| 1 | ,, ,, Karanja | | 2 | Sanads ,, Amod | |
| 8 | Sanads | | 8 | Sanads | = 16 Sanads |

*Translation of five sanads from Raghoba for Bassein, Salsette, Olpad, Jambusar and Broach : all included under No.* 1.

I, Raghunathrao Bajirao, having sent for a force from the Company for my assistance in consequence of which I have discharged the former government from the above parganas and delivered the said governments to the English Company, therefore you are hereby ordered to pay great submission and obedience and give over the charge to the English Company, dated the 11th Zilhijjah, 1165.

*Translation of five sanads from Raghoba for Bassein, Salsette, Karanja, Elephanta and Kenery ; all included under No.* 2.

Raghunath Bajirao Pradhan acquaints you that the castles of all these places having been given to the Company, you are, therefore, to deliver them the charge thereof and obtain a receipt thereof from them, dated the 11th Zilhijjah, 1165

*Translation of five sanads from Raghoba for Anklesvar, Hansot, Balesar and Amod, all included under No.* 3.

Know ye that I, Ragunathrao Bajirao Pradhan, for, and in, consideration of the forces the Company have given me for my assis-

tance, I have agreed to pay them 1,50,000 Rupees every month; you are, therefore, to pay them the revenues of your place and take the receipt for what you may pay them, and the same is to continue till their demand is discharged—dated as the above.

(a) *Translation of a Sanad from Raghoba for Anklesvar; included under No. 4.*

That Raghunathrao Bajirao doth command you to pay out of the revenues of your place the sum of 75,000 Rupees to the English Company annually, which is for the assistance they have given me, dated the 11th Zilhijjah, 1165.

*Translation of a sanad from Raghoba for Amod; included under No. 5.*

That I, Raghunathrao Bajirao Pandit Pradhan, do command you to pay the revenues of your place to the English Company, being on account my agreement to pay them monthly for the assistance they have given me, which is to continue till the whole of their demand is paid, and till which time your place is mortgaged to them, dated the 11th Zilhijjah, 1165.

1775 *Bombay, 12th March, 1775, (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)*
*Treaty with Raghoba.*

*Treaty signed* This evening arrived an express boat from Surat with a letter from the Chief accompanied by a translation of the treaty executed between the Hon'ble Company and Raghunathrao Peshwa with a list of the sanads and translations of them.

1775 *Bombay, 16th March, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)*
*Ratification of the treaty with Raghoba.*

*Bombay signs treaty* We, the President and Council of Bombay afore-said, having empowered Mr. Robert Gambier to execute a treaty with Raghunath Balaji Bajirao Peshwa in our behalf on account of the Hon'ble Company of the foregoing tenor, which he has accordingly done on the date above-mentioned, and the same having been signed to, ratified and confirmed by Raghunathrao Balaji Peshwa, and whereas by the last article it is covenanted and agreed that a ratification of the said treaty shall be transmitted by us under the seal of the Hon'ble Company and under our proper hands and seals within one month from the above date, these, therefore, are to certify that we hereby ratify and confirm the foregoing treaty in all and every part. In testimony whereof we have caused the seal of the aforesaid Hon'ble Company to be hereunto affixed and do now sign the same with our hands and affix our proper seals thereto this 16th March, 1775.

1775 *Surat, 13th March, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)*
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba's army* This I forward by an express boat which the Colonel dispatches to you, advising of Raghoba's setting out with our forces for Cambay. As the Brahmans he dispatched are not yet returned, he apprehends they must have fallen into the enemies' hands, or some accident have happened to them.

He has, however, received letters from Govindrao and Khanderao ................Diwan and officers advising him of their having collected five thousand men and being ready to join him [*whenever*] he should order; and within these two three days a strong report prevails that they have defeated the ministerial party, who have retreated to Baroda, and in consequence Govindrao and his forces had begun their march towards Cambay.

*Off Suvali, 15th March,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

Under the 3rd instant I mentioned to Your Honour, &ca the intelligence received from the collected army of Raghoba, and observed that, should a full confirmation arrive thereof, that our troops by proceeding to Cambay these springs would the soonest offer the desired junction. This was the opinion and advise given me by the Chief of Surat. In consequence of the foregoing I am thus far with the forces towards Cambay. *Towards Cambay*

I hope Your Honour, &ca will excuse my noticing that the limitation of 15 days is too confined a space to effect a junction with Raghoba's army. A point on which every advantage to the Hon'ble Company depends; and should it not be accomplished, the expenses that have hitherto been defrayed must be lost to them. By extending the time for the junction great advantages may be expected, and the friends of Raghoba not confined in their hopes but on the other hand encouraged to exert themselves to the utmost, and who no doubt will risk boldly to unite their forces with those of the Company under the immediate command of Raghoba; and which cannot be expected, if our assistance is so much contined as to its duration, since all their endeavours may lead them into danger without answering any good purpose. *15 days' limit*

The present disposition of Fatesing, who is desirous of coming to terms with Raghoba, is an additional and considerable circumstance and strongly in favour of a more extensive period; for, should we then united with Raghoba's forces appear before Baroda, it must be allowed that Fatesing would agree to proper terms without delay; for by Raghoba and his adherents their remaining inactive for some months, his enemies will undoubtedly increase and probably arrive to such a height of power, strength and consequence as to render it doubtful whether we can accomplish what Your Honour may now hope to effect hereafter. *Fatesing amenable*

From the informations received I have reason to believe we shall have the following addition to our force at Cambay. Two thousand Arabs belonging to Raghoba, collected at that place. The Nawab promises Mr. Gambier to join us with one thousand horse and as many foot; and it is expected that the Raja of Bhavnagar will also furnish two thousand horse. It is also reasonable to suppose that great numbers of the dispersed troops of Raghoba's army will come to Cambay, when our arrival is known; and I hope from detached parties sent by Govindrao and Khanderao added to the foregoing detail, we shall be able to assemble an army of four or five thousand horse, two or three thousand Arabs and one thousand other foot. With so considerable *Number of troops*

an addition to our troops I am of opinion we may with great safety take the field from Cambay and join the army under Govindrao and Khanderao, who by advices dated the 3rd instant repeat their expectation of Raghoba's orders, saying : "They look for him as people watching for rain in time of drought"; and add that, "if the English will assist you, all will go well; but if they will not, tell us so, and we will apply to Shuja-ud-daula, who will settle your affairs".

*Future plans* Having accomplished this junction, but which will require more than fifteen days, various methods will offer for raising money. Jambusar district may be taken possession of, the ministerial pandits removed, and large revenues collected, as this is the grain and cotton harvest. Ahmadabad or Baroda may be attacked and cash raised thereby for the necessary expenses; the overtures from Fatesing though serve to convince how much he dreads our assisting Raghoba; and should the enemy be induced to come to an action during our progress in any of the above methods, we shall, from our plan being properly concerted to draw them on, have every advantage from our preparations to engage.

*Skirmish near Surat* *Agreeable to what I wrote Your Honour, &ca under the 9th in*stant I ordered a detachment the 10th at night under the command of Captain Steuart, joined by about 1,000 country troops belonging to the Nawab, to attack the Marathas in the neighbourhood of Surat. The following day Captain Steuart informed me that at one o'clock in the morning he fell in with the patrols of the advanced party of the enemy, that were posted at a tree near three miles from Surat. He had before detached two officers to get between them and the camp and which they accomplished. That the patrols, discovering him with the main body moving forward, immediately gave the alarm to the advanced party, who pushed off to the left and began an irregular fire, which they continued during their flight to the Maratha camp. Captain Steuart continued in motion towards the camp, and about three o'clock took the advanced sentinel and entered it. The enemy were in great confusion, not expecting an attack at that hour, and as soon as possible rode off leaving their tents, &ca. Three camels, about 150 horse and some men were taken, and which afterwards fell into the hands of the country troops. The number of the enemy were said to be about three thousand. Not a man was hurt on our part.

## BLIGHTED HOPES

### (March—1775—August)

AFTER the signing of the treaty of Surat by Raghoba and its ratification by the President and Council at Bombay, the allies—the English, Raghoba and Govindrao—embarked upon a military campaign, the success of which surpassed their most sanguine expectations, when it is remembered that prior to the signing of the treaty the ministerial forces had routed Raghoba's troops on the banks of the Mahi. This time the ministerial armies were repeatedly defeated; and that the English documents do not give a one-sided account of the military operations is borne out by Fatesing's complete change of front. The condition of the ministerial army must have been desperate, since Fatesing abandoned them and joined Raghoba, though by the terms of the treaty of reconciliation Fatesing had to make considerable sacrifices, pecuniary and territorial.

Fatesing's volte-face was the crowning success of the campaign; for, besides further weakening the already discouraged ministerialists, it secured for the Company the cession of the Gaikwad revenue of Broach.

But the successful military venture was suddenly put a stop to by the merciless interference of Warren Hastings, who in a letter dated Fort William, the 31st May, 1775, and received in Bombay on the 12th August, 1775, declared the treaty of Surat invalid.

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## DOCUMENTS

*Surat*, 19*th March*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 164) **1775**
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

Whether Raghoba's forces will be able in so short a time as fifteen days to get rid of all the ministerial army and join Raghoba at Cambay, without our forces at all co-operating to this end, seems to me very doubtful; and it is not improbable that the ministerial party may get intelligence of the limitation, and if they do, they will easily contrive to render it highly serviceable to their affairs; for they may be liable by vigorous measures, particularly as our forces will be inactive, to prevent a junction for fifteen days, though they may not for a much longer time. ***15 days' limit***

P. S. The accompanying is an extract from a letter I have this instant received from Mr. Malet [*Resident at Cambay*], dated the 15th and 16th instant when our forces were not arrived at Cambay.

*Charles Warre Malet to Robert Gambier.*

*Situation of armies* The Nawab's last advices from the army give reason to think that Tukoji Holkar is totally estranged from the party which he at present apparently espouses, and by the best information I can collect very little harmony subsists amongst the other principal Chiefs. Khanderao and Govindrao remain as I have already advised you.

I was prevented dispatching this pattemar yesterday by the arrival of a messenger from Khanderao and Govindrao with a letter for Raghoba, which I shall present on his arrival. This messenger, who is a servant of Raghoba, tells me that Khanderao and Govindrao's forces remain entire and amount to about 25,000 men. Raghoba's first pattemar, which was dispatched for Surat, arrived at the camp about nine days ago.

*Enemy plans* P. S. Since writing the above a harkara is arrived with certain intelligence and letters, advising that Mahadji Sindia has gone off with twelve thousand men, and that it is certain that he will not be prevailed upon to return. That a report was spread that Haidar Ali, Gopalrao and Bajirao were united and moving towards Poona; which had determined the ministerial party to proceed thither; but which measure was then laid aside on account of our coming to this place. Great confusion raged among their councils; and whether they intend to proceed to Poona or elsewhere is not yet determined upon.

1775 *Bombay, 24th March,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*Bombay to Broach.*

*New parganas* By the fifth article of the treaty, amongst other places, the parganas of Jambusar and Olpad are ceded for ever to the Hon'ble Company, who are to be considered as the sole lords and proprietors of them. By the 8th article the sum of Rupees 75,000 per annum is made over for ever to the Company, which is to be paid from Anklesvar by the Maratha pandit; and by the ninth article, Amod, Hansot, Versaul [*Valsad*] and the remainder of Anklesvar are made over to the Company, who are to collect the revenues till Raghoba may find other means for raising money to defray the expenses of our assisting him agreeable to his treaty.

The Chief and factors at Surat will forward you the sanads given by Raghoba for these parganas agreeable to the treaty.

*Gaikwad cessions* By the 6th article of the treaty the Gaikwad share of the revenues from the town and territory of Broach is made over to the Company for ever, which must be considered accordingly, and for which a sanad is also given. though the grant by the Gaikwads was not delivered at the time the treaty was signed, Raghoba's situation then putting it out of his power to obtain it from them; but the Chief of Surat is instructed to procure it from him, when he will send it to you.

*28th March*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Raghoba to William Hornby.*

Being in great want of money I had a conference with Col. Keating on the subject, which *who* has written the Governor and to you, Gentlemen, on that head; and I now do the same from my part, earnestly requesting that you will take it into your consideration. On your assisting me with money I will punish my rebellious subjects (meaning the ministers) and settle everything. If you will supply me with money, I will give Col. Keating sufficient satisfaction for it at this place, and hope that you will send me an answer to this directly. *Request for money*

*28th March*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*.) 1775
*Raghoba to William Hornby.*

I set out from Surat with Your Honour's forces, &ca and arrived at Cambay the 16th instant. My army under Govindrao Gaikwad Senakhaskel Shamsher Bahadur, and Khanderao Gaikwad, Himmat Bahadur, is near Palanpur; I receive their letters from time to time. On hearing of my arrival here they have used their utmost endeavours to come to me; but, as the army of my rebellious subjects is between us, the junction has been delayed till this day; but now I hope no further delays will happen. They will come here directly, or I will go and join them. *Allies*

Your troops, ammunition and the officer, Col. Keating, whom you have sent to my assistance, are very strong. This officer is expert and diligent; and by this assistance I doubt not but that my rebellious subjects will meet with due punishment. *Keating*

But I am in great want of money, about which I had a conference with Col. Keating, who will write to Your Honour the whole; all which I beg you will take into your consideration and use every endeavour to assist in this particular, I will make Col. Keating sufficient satisfaction for it. I have written to the Gentlemen of Council on the subject. Your Honour is a man of your word, of good spirit, and desirous to put me into the government; all which my rebellious people know; on which they have become distracted. Money only is wanting. On Your Honour's assisting me with money, they will surely be punished, and your name will be great through the world. I beg Your Honour will send an answer to me and to Col. Keating by making a supply of money directly. I heard that the troops, etc. are arrived from Madras, for which I was very glad. *Money needed*

28th *March*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Raghoba to William Hornby.*

Colonel Keating acquaints me that a fresh supply of troops, which the Company have sent to my assistance, are arrived as far as Surat, and that they will join me shortly; hearing which rejoiced me much. Your Honour sent Colonel Keating to my assistance, these are enough. Your sending more forces, besides the above, gives more strength. My rebellious subjects (meaning the ministers) having heard of Your Honour's assisting me so strongly have become distracted. From time immemorial whosoever has been assisted by your sarkar has certainly been raised, by which the name of your nation is great *Arrival of troops*

and honourable. When you once resolved on punishing my rebellious subjects, it was done. I had no more fear; for my army will join me *Money* shortly; I am only in want of money and have communicated all to Colonel Keating regarding it, who will write to Your Honour; and I beg you will endeavour to let me have five lakhs of Rupees, sending me an answer to this directly.

1775 *Broach, 30th March*, 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

*Troops* The fleet arrived at Cambay the 18th, and the troops are now all disembarked and encamped about a mile out of town; but there was no certainty when or how a junction with Govindrao and Raghoba's army would be effected. When the Chief last heard from camp, which was the 29th, the ministerial army had then approached about twenty-five kos after the arrival of our forces, and for some days have been at a place named Keerah [*Kheda*], which is not above twenty kos distant from Cambay.

1775 *Narrancer Camp near Cambay, 30th March*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16A)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Appeal to Fatesing* Since my last address to the Board Fatesing wrote to the Nawab of Cambay for permission to send two [*messengers*] here on particular business. From this hint I conceived it possible to draw Fatesing from the ministerial interest. Thus prepared, I [*wrote*] to Fatesing that, "as friendship had long subsisted between his family and the English nation, I was desirous to save him from the danger now hanging over him; that from his long knowledge of the English he must be sensible that, whatever they undertook to perform in matters of war, they never gave up, until their plan was crowned with success; that in respect to Dadasaheb [*Raghoba*] they had most heartily engaged in his cause and were determined at all events to place him in the chair of his father, the deceased Bajirao; that his (Fatesing's) country was to be the first seat of war, consequently must be the first conquered; that, as I wished friendship to him, I gave him an opportunity of avoiding the dangers that threatened him by now inviting him to join his force to ours and by that means more speedily [*to*] do justice to his injured Master. If he accepted the offer, he had every prospect of advantage, if he refused it, we should be under the necessity of punishing him as the enemy of Dadasaheb." The above letter was followed by another next day confirming the first, and adding, "that Dadasaheb has invested me with full powers to adjust all disputes between him, Govindrao and Khanderao; that, as Fatesing had wrote, desiring leave from the Nawab to send his people here, and I supposing such request could only proceed from his wish to settle matters with Dadasaheb, I was ready to receive them for that purpose and engage myself to espouse his interest, as far as he had just reason to expect".

*Phadke's reply* The first letter was intercepted by Haripant Phadke, the second Fatesing himself received; but from the ill success of the first [*he*] was necessitated to communicate the contents to Phadke; upon which a council was called, and my letters, as I found by private intelligence, answered by Phadke; his seal is to it. The answer contained great

encomiums on the sense, justice, etc. of the English, reminding us of the friendship that had ever subsisted between Bajirao, Nanasaheb, Madhavrao, Narayanrao and us; then a long enumeration of crimes which they allege has been committed by Dadasaheb, one a direct charge of murdering Narayanrao. "What was done, cannot be recalled; but that it is our business to apply the best remedy to cure past ills"; [*and the letter*] concludes with hoping, "we will hear both parties' representation, and wherever we find dirt, throw it forth, and leave all parts undefiled". A second letter, made up as a private one, accompanied the above. The contents are strong professions of friendship, thanks for the proposal, and desire "that a passport may be sent to allow one Gopal pandit to come here to negotiate matters". As from good reasons I am convinced that Gopalrao is strongly in the ministerial interest, and that Fatesing did intend that Nagotta Cuttaree should be sent here—he is a man that knows Fatesing his whole soul—I have desired that both men may be sent here, and have told Fatesing in my private letter that, unless Cuttaree is sent, I shall not proceed upon business.

*Keating's reply*

My public letter to Fatesing contains some general and some particular refutations of the charges exhibited against Dadasaheb, concluding, "that my Hon'ble Masters were well convinced of the justice of the cause, before they engaged in behalf of Dadasaheb, and now firmly resolved to do him justice on his enemies, and place him in the seat of his father".

*Hopes*

These letters I despatched 29th instant and expect answers to-morrow night. Possibly the two vakils may then arrive. The Brahman I have employed to deliver the letters is sensible and well instructed as to the part he is to act in private with Fatesing. If Fatesing sees his interest in a proper and just point of view, he will not hesitate to join Dadasaheb the first favourable moment.

*Raghoba's allies*

The accounts from Govindrao and Khanderao give the strongest assurances of their joining us without delay. I have dispatched many guides to them, who are perfectly acquainted with every inch of ground between them and us. By the last harkaras Govindrao says, "that he is distant 55 kos, and determined to leave all his baggage, etc. in a strong defile guarded by his worst troops, and force a passage to us with his best". Madhavrao, the son of Khanderao, has wrote to Dadasaheb that he was now at the village Kadi, 40 kos from hence, with seven hundred (700) chosen men, and only waits for our orders to join us. Bijai Singh, Raja of Marwar, 200 kos from hence, has sent a vakil to Dadasaheb, offering to attack forts now possessed by the ministerial party, if he will grant him a jagir. This business is yet in a state of suspense. Dadasaheb wishes for no other assistance than ours, if [*it is*] to be done without.

*Raghoba's enemies*

The ministerial army are about 14 kos distant. We receive hourly threats of their intention to come and attack us. Time only can demonstrate what are their real designs. Should they keep their word, we are well prepared to receive them. Our ground and situation is strong and well adapted to our numbers, badly formed for a numerous body of horse to act on.

*Officers* The sepoys, coming under the command of Capt. Farrer, are not sufficiently officered, only four Subs instead of eight. You must be sensible that good officers are the life of service; I beg, therefore, you will contrive to send as soon as possible the proper proportion. Major Hazard, I fear, will not be able to proceed on the service.

*L. Gopal* Dadasaheb has appointed Lakshman Gopal to be his vakil at Bombay; he is brother to Naropant, who came with me from Bombay, and acts now as joint divan with Sadashiv Pant to Dadasaheb. Both these men, notwithstanding what has been represented to Mr. Gambier, are strong, staunch friends to us; therefore, I am to request that you will afford Lakshman your protection and friendship.

*Loan* The only thing now wanted to ensure success to our great enterprise is your granting Dadasaheb a supply of cash; five or four lakhs is the least that will serve the purpose, His whole and sole reliance is on you. Knowing this to be the case and also that it is now in your power to grant such supply, I have prevailed upon him, in consideration of such loan, to grant unto the Hon'ble Company, as a present, the chauth of Surat forever. And as a security for the payment of the said sum of five lakhs he is ready to make over and mortgage to the Hon'ble Company such villages or parganas as you shall name, and which shall be as soon as possible into your possession and remain so, until the whole of the said five lakhs shall be fully paid with interest. Enclosed is an instrument as a preliminary, wrote by himself, signed with his seal and name. You may suppose some management was required to gain this point, which, I hope, will prove pleasing to you and my Hon'ble Employers. It will be my greatest pleasure to contribute all in my power to promote their honour and interest.

*Other items* I have the satisfaction of assuring you that Major Dagon is in a perfect state of health, and proved himself, what I ever thought him, an excellent and diligent officer. I beg you will allow me to recommend his son for a cadet. I said before that I feared Major Hazard could not proceed on the service, so is the opinion of Doctor Richardson. Therefore am I to request an old captain may be ordered to join, Capt. Hopkins, a good parade officer, if you approve of him in other respects. Your knowledge of the impossibility of our proceeding without Dadasaheb being supplied with cash, at least four lakhs, makes it unnecessary for me to press you further.

1775 *Bombay*, 31*st March*, 1775. (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Bombay to Warren Hastings.*

*Letters* In our address of the 31st December last, which has already been transmitted in triplicate, we acquainted you with everything needful from the departing, as well with regard to the attack of Salsette as with the negotiation pending with Raghoba, the rightful Supreme Governor of the Maratha Empire. We have since been favoured with your letter in your Secret Department of the 16th January, to which our above-mentioned address we flatter ourselves will be considered by you as a full and satisfactory reply.

*Negotiations* Shortly after the date of that address Raghoba with his army arrived at Baroda not very far from Surat. The negotiation with him was continued through the Chief of Surat in the manner we before acquainted you that we proposed doing, and at length was brought so near a conclusion that we had transmitted from him a treaty on the terms we proposed, and had every reason to believe that it would be directly executed. Jewels to the amount of six lakhs were deposited by Raghoba, and the necessary sanads were delivered for the several districts and territories the Company were to be entitled to in virtue of the treaty and of the assistance that agreeable to the treaty we were to afford him.

*Hopes* Our forces accordingly proceeded from hence to Surat, that they might be ready to proceed from thence to join his army, as soon as the treaty was actually concluded; and we had great reason to hope that the war between Raghoba and the ministerial party would speedily have been brought to a happy and glorious issue, by which, when accomplished, the Company become quiet possessors of sundry districts and parganas, whose annual revenue will amount to near 20 lakhs of Rupees, and by which we hope this Presidency may be enabled to maintain itself and relieve you from the burthen of sending us large annual supplies; and to add to our satisfaction, about this time, some material advantages were gained by Raghoba over the enemies' army.

*Set-back* This pleasing prospect was, however, for a short time clouded.[1] The ministerial party, possibly learning that Raghoba was on the eve of concluding a treaty with the Company, that would most probably forever overset their ambitious hopes of subduing him, corrupted, as it is supposed, a part of his forces, Arabs, on whom he placed considerable reliance, [*where*] he himself was posted. They then attacked that quarter with the strength of their army. Raghoba seeing in the midst of battle that the Arabs neglected to do their duty, and then not knowing how far the treachery had spread, or whom in this emergency to trust, precipitately fled from the field with about one thousand (horse) only towards Cambay. The Nawab of this place, seeing his situation and dreading the power of his enemies, refused to admit him. He then made the best of his way towards Bhavnagar, where he luckily met with one of our gallivats, embarked on board her, and on the 23rd ultimo arrived at Surat, where the Chief received and entertained him as a friend and ally of the Company.

*Prospects* Notwithstanding this alarming step, it shortly appeared to us (Mr. Draper excepted who has given his reasons in writing for dissenting with us in this opinion as per copy enclosed) that Raghoba's affairs were not nearly in the desperate situation there was at first reason to fear; two principal chiefs, Khanderao and Govindrao, with many of his great officers remain firm to his interest and have collected an army to the number of about 25,000 men, mostly horse, within forty kos of Cambay. Many others are also likely soon to join him. We, therefore, esteemed it our indispensable duty not to give up the great

1 Referring to this defeat, Warren Hastings spoke of Raghoba as "a man who appears incapable of giving you any effectual assistance". See entry 12th August, 1775.

advantages that were to be reaped by the Company from the treaty when so fair an opportunity offered of retrieving his affairs by sending our forces to Cambay to join his army. Raghoba earnestly pressed us to this step, and we have little doubt, when a junction is once effected, but that success will attend their operations. Our forces proceeded accordingly and arrived at Cambay the 17th instant.

As the different persons that form the ministerial party are reported to be very much divided amongst themselves, and that Mahadji Sindia has actually deserted that cause, and others, it is expected, will very shortly fall from them, we, therefore, have reason to hope that Raghoba may in a short time be able to reduce them all to their due obedience to him.

*Narrancer camp near Cambay, 31st March,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*15 days' limit* Your revocation of your former orders, limiting my stay here to fifteen days for forming a junction with the Peshwa army, I hope will be attended with every desirable advantage.

*Govindrao* Every step has been taken to encourage Khanderao and Govindrao to come to us, and their repeated answers of being determined to do all in their power give me hopes of a speedy junction with them. Govindrao in his last letter to Raghoba mentions his determination to leave his baggage with his worst troops and with his best horse to force a passage to us.

1775 *Bombay, 4th April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated 3rd February,* 1775.

*Hastings displeased* Our last took notice of the recall of Mr. Mostyn and of the state of uncertainty in which we were left as to the motives and purpose. Among various conjectures a suspicion remained with us of your being on the eve of entering into hostilities with the Marathas. This suspicion is now confirmed by letters from the Presidency of Fort St. George, informing us that your troops had taken the field against those people and were actually besieging the fort of Thana on the island of Salsette, and further that the Marathas had a large fleet at sea, from which the trade of your parts would run some risk, if the men of war did not speedily appear on the coast.

This intelligence comes to us on the authority of the Chief of Tellichery. It leaves us no room to doubt of its truth. We, therefore, cannot refrain from testifying our surprise at the inattention of your Government to keep us duly advised of your transactions, [1] and now peremptorily require you to transmit us immediate and special information as to the facts in question, of their causes and of the motives for your conduct on the occasion. We also direct that in future you constantly and regularly report to us all the occurrences of your Presidency, and advise us of your plans and designs, that we may be enabled to fulfil the commands and intentions of the Legislature and our Employers by watching over and taking the earliest measures for

1 Warren Hastings seems never to have realised that it took at least two months for a letter to cover the distance between Bombay and Calcutta. His letter of the 31st May, 1775, reached Bombay on the 12th August, 1775.

securing the interests of the Company in India. Upon an intelligence so alarming as the present it gives us great uneasiness to be obliged to remain inactive; but, till we hear from you, it is impossible for us to take any step. In the meantime we shall hold you responsible for the consequence of this suspense.[1]

*Bombay, 5th April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*At a Consultation.*

Read the letter received yesterday evening from the Governor-General and Council of Fort William, upon which we must again observe that, as their letter communicating the intelligence of the new administration in Bengal was received here only on the 7th of December last, there was hardly time for our advices in consequence to have reached them by the day their letter is dated, even had we written immediately, which the variety of matters they desired to be acquainted of, however, put it out of our power for some days to do; and from these considerations we think they might have written in a style less peremptory; for they must have supposed that our advices were then on the road, which doubtless have long since arrived, when they will receive the satisfaction they desire. *Hastings' letter*

*Broach, 6th April,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*William Shaw to Robert Cay.*

We understand that Annaji, one of Fatesing's generals, with about 700 horse and 250 foot, is at a little distance from Jambusar: and as we have reason to think that his master is at present treating with Raghunathrao Peshwa, neither he nor his people are to be molested, unless they should attempt to impede you in your operations, or enter the Jambusar districts, in which case you are to require him immediately to depart out of it, or repel force by force; but you are on no account to pursue him into the Baroda pargana or beyond the Jambusar districts, as we are at present on terms of amity with Fatesing and have his chauthia in town. *Fatesing's troops*

*Bombay, 8th April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P D.* 16*A*) 1775
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

As you have not yet procured from Raghoba the sanads that he was to obtain from the Gaikwad, giving up to him or to the Company their entire right or title to the share of the revenues and places they hold in Broach and all its districts, we, therefore, direct that you by no means lose sight of this object, but that you procure it as soon as you can; and when obtained, it must be sent to the Chief and Factors at Broach, as the collection of their revenues will fall of course under their care and management. *Broach sanad*

*Amod, 9th April,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) 1775
*Robert Cay to William Shaw.*

But for the halt at Kalol we might have arrived last night, but as matters fell out, it is just as well as it is; for about seven, yesterday evening, Kessoo Pandit's troops attacked our horse that were advanced *Skirmish*

1 Published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, 232.

before our lodging without Tanchah, and drove them in: they next attempted our gros, but with a very small expense of ammunition were repulsed.

*Broach, 14th April,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*George Perrott to William Shaw.*

*Jambusar captured* The Chief this morning received a note from Mr. Perrott at Amod, advising that he had in obedience to the Board's orders proceeded directly to Jambusar and had arrived there in the evening, accompanied by the Sindians, that about midnight Kessoo Pandit with about seven or eight hundred horse and near one thousand foot, chiefly Arabs and Sindians, had entered Jambusar, and made an attack upon the ghurree, in which he was lodged; that he had defended the ghurree as long as there was any hope of success, and at last retired to Amod under cover of the night with a party of about forty horse, having lost everything he had with him to the value of about seventeen thousand Rupees.

*Amod* This evening Mr. Perrott returned to town, having been obliged to quit Amod from the insufficiency of its defence, on the greatest reason to conclude from every intelligence that the said party meant to take possession of it in like manner.

1775 *Broach, 14th April,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*William Shaw to Robert Cay.*

*Orders to Col. Cay* Mr. Perrott having returned hither after being driven from Jambusar, we shall to-morrow morning order him to return with a body of one hundred horse and about four hundred irregulars; and after dismantling Gerdgerah as far as may be done in the space of two or three hours, you are immediately after to march to Amod and meet the above irregulars, who have a supply of six days' provisions and some stores with them for the detachment; but, should you find by your intelligence that the enemy have any considerable force on this side Amod, we would have you march back as far as Tansha, the village where the pandit first attacked you, for the above purpose of joining the irregulars and securing the provisions; and having taken them under your command, you are to carry into execution our original orders for taking possession of Amod and Jambusar, and protecting those parganas as far as the force you have with you will admit, taking care to consider Jambusar as the principal object.

1775 *Broach, 15th April,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*At a Consultation.*

*Poona troops* The Chief lays before the Board a letter he has received from the quarter-master of the detachment, wrote by Colonel Cay's order, mentioning the Colonel's having received intelligence from Lieut.-Colonel Keating that Gopalrao Kaste with a body of ten thousand horse, on the 12th instant, marched from the ministerial encampment on their way to Jambusar.

*Amod; 16th April,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) 1775
*Robert Cay to William Shaw.*

We arrived here not till eight o'clock this morning, though we left Gudzerah before midnight. What retarded our march was that after passing the Dhader at Byzadra, we were infested with Maratha horse all the way hither. *Delay*

*Broach, 19th April,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) 1775
*William Shaw to Robert Cay.*

I had yesterday the pleasure to advise you that Gopalrao Raste's party had crossed the Narbada, which I now confirm, as our chauthia here has this day received accounts from the commandant of that party, who is his particular friend. Kessoo Pandit can, therefore, have no hopes of aid from him, and as little, I am well assured by the chauthia, he has to expect from Annaji, Fatesing's general, who on the reverse seems highly displeased with his having dared to enter the Broach parganas, in which Fatesing holds at present a considerable share. *Movement of troops*

*Broach, 21st April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*William Shaw to William Hornby.*

On Mr. Gambier's first intimation to me that a treaty was actually settled between the Hon'ble Company and the Peshwa Raghoba, he acquainted me with the principal articles; and it thereupon immediately occurred to me that, considering the situation of the Peshwa's affairs at that time, nothing could be more conducive to his success, and consequently for the advantage of the Hon'ble Company whose interests are now so intimately blended and connected with his, than to engage Fatesing, if possible, to give up the ministerial cause and espouse his; but not having at that time a copy of the treaty, I wrote Mr. Gambier on the occasion as follows: *Fatesing to be won*

"I very sincerely wish success to the Hon'ble Company in this and all their undertakings, and to remove every obstacle thereto. Impressed with this desire, I am, therefore, of opinion, as we purpose opening the campaign on this side, that, if Fatesing could be brought over from the ministerialists and induced to leave their party and return to Baroda, it would be a grand point gained. By means of his chauthia here I think I could effect this, and then the ministerial army would be deprived of their chief support, as Fatesing and his dependants only are acquainted with all the passes and people of this country, of which the Ministers' party is totally ignorant; and they would thus be left in the midst of Kolis and robbers, who would incessantly harass them, if deserted by Fatesing. But to effect this it would be absolutely requisite Fatesing should have assurances not to be disturbed in the possessions of his dominions, except Broach, which I think I could induce him on those terms to give up to the Company. As I have not yet seen a copy of the treaty with Raghoba, I know not how far this circumstance may clash with the tenor of it; but, unless we are thereby engaged to establish and support Govindrao, or unless Raghoba is fully resolved on supporting him in the Gaikwad government, I think this matter well worth his and our considerations. To us, I suppose, it is perfectly equal whether Broach be ceded by Fatesing

or Govindrao (or possibly better by the first, as with him our original treaty was made respecting it); and it may be well worth Raghoba's consideration whether, in the present circumstances of affairs, buying off Fatesing, who is the life and soul of the enemies' party, would not be a great step to his success. At our first setting out, I am sure, it would make conquest much more easy to us. Raghoba best knows, however, how far he is engaged to Govindrao, and whether he can or cannot manage so as to content both brothers, or otherwise satisfy Govindrao in so extensive a dominion as his will be, should he succeed, which I very sincerely wish he may. The object is a grand one, I mean taking off Fatesing. You have the treaty and can, therefore, judge the propriety of it, which I cannot for want of a copy. Fatesing has now a large force and may give us trouble, being so connected and acquainted with the country and people; and indeed I should look upon the ministerial army as half conquered, if he left them. I shall expect your answer impatiently, &ca".

*Difficult scheme*

Mr. Gambier in answer acquainted me he has communicated the matter to the Peshwa, who, being much attached to Govindrao, would on no account give up his pretensions to the Gaikwad provinces; but that, if matters could be so accommodated with Fatesing as to content him with half the Gaikwad dominions or even a little more, he (the Peshwah) would accede thereto on Govindao's behalf, nay would allow Fatesing to hold Baroda entirely, on giving up half the remaining provinces to Govindrao, a compensation for which he promised to make Govindrao from his own provinces.

*Fatesing approached*

I then acquainted Mr. Gambier that I had little hope of succeeding, as I scarcely thought Fatesing would give up half his country, which he had so long preserved the possession of, without force. However, on consulting the chauthia and other servants of Fatesing then here, they agreed to sound him on the matter; and after several other means tried by them, they proposed my sending some capable person to him underhand, so that the ministers' party might have no intelligence of what was going forward. I have accordingly sent one of our Broach people thither, who has privately been several days in his camp, and had sundry interviews with him. He writes me he finds him inclinable to retire and remain at Baroda perfectly neutral; and at length on seeing the great preparations making by us, and the fear of a junction being effected with the Peshwa's troops, and Govindrao's and our army, he wrote me a letter, of which the enclosed is a translate; but at the same time I understand he is treating with Colonel Keating, who offering better terms, he will scarcely agree.

*Govindrao's cause*

Nor indeed have I any well-grounded hopes that he will ever agree to quit the ministerial party, until his dominions at least are guaranteed to him both by us and the Peshwa, or possibly until he and the ministerialists have made trial of their forces with ours, as they entertain a very favourable opinion of their own abilities and force, which in numbers to be sure is formidable; yet I flatter myself, if the junction is soon formed, we and the Peshwa's army, joined by Govindrao, will be an overmatch for them with the noble train of artillery Your Honour, &ca have supplied; and assuredly Govindrao, who is so

much in the Peshwa's interests and favour, would be a much more eligible neighbour in our frontier than Fatesing, who is haughty and already in the dominions of the Gaikwad, whereas Govindrao would be sensible of holding them in some measure by the aid of the English, and consequently be more ready to cede the Broach parganas, and be a better neighbour and fitter barrier to all the Hon'ble Company's dominions on this side.

*Translate of Fatesing's letter to the Chief of Broach.*

Your kind and friendly letter I have received and perfectly understand, together with every circumstance you communicated by the mouth of Shankar Mall, (your vakil) and [*have*] given them a place in my heart. In our reciprocal treaty there has not hitherto been any breach, nor shall there be, whatever happens; but everything shall strengthen the same and our friendship. *Professions of friendship*

At present for a number of reasons, it is not possible or convenient that the certain proposed measures should be pursued openly; therefore I have kept Shankar Mall (your vakil) with me, and all will in the end be done agreeable to your wish, I will [*send*] Shankar Mall to you hereafter more fully to explain this matter and letter, which he will in person do; and what may be needful to put in writing with the seals and to perfect the business, he will get finished, and bring me; and in the end all shall be determined agreeable to your desire. On my part, believe my heart sincere, and I desire you will consider the two sarkars entirely as one; and thus let the friendship, that has so long subsisted between us, increase; the rest, Shankar Mall will tell you. What need I add more ? Let our friendship grow daily stronger.

*N.B.* Shankar Mall returned the day after the above was wrote, and acquaints the Chief, that Fatesing sent for him at midnight to write and despatch the above letter, which he then sealed in secret with his own hand, fearing to trust any of his ministers, who are all in the interest of the ministerialists. And Shankar Mall further reports that party have little confidence in Fatesing, and that he is narrowly watched by them and even by his own people, (who are in their interest), in so much that he can neither act or speak freely, having a small force in the midst of a large army. *Vakil's remarks*

*Darra Camp* (10 *miles from Cambay*), 21*st April*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775

*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

I have the pleasure of informing you that at 5 o'clock this afternoon the army under Govindrao in number near ten thousand (10,000) joined us; his baggage and bazar he has left about sixty kos from hence under the care of his uncle, Khanderao Gaikwad. The march was performed in little more than thirty-seven hours. *Govindrao arrives*

Nothing keeps us so from marching to attack the ministerial army but want of carts, &ca to carry our stores and baggage, with which I hope we shall be supplied in a few days. Shortly after I hope to be able to give Your Honour, &ca a proper account of them.

1775 *Bombay, 22nd April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

*Bombay anxious* You acquainted us that every step had been taken to encourage Khanderao and Govindrao to join our forces, and you add that a few days would determine that important matter. We have therefore waited thus long in anxious expectation of receiving your further advices on this particular point, and we cannot avoid testifying our surprise at our not having received any intelligence from you since.

As the ensuing springs are the latest which will admit of our forces returning from Cambay in boats before the close of the season, you are therefore to return at that time, with all the forces and stores under your directions, to Surat or Broach as may be most convenient, provided you should [*find*] it most eligible to return by sea, otherwise you are at that time to set off by land to Surat or Broach, and on your arrival at either of these places, which you are to accomplish with all expedition, you are to follow the orders of the Chief and Factors.

1775 *Darra Camp, 23rd April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Treaty with Fatesing* The treaty with Fatesing is now signing[1] by Dadasaheb. I was under an absolute necessity making the Company a party in it, as by that means Fatesing cedes to them the parganas depending upon the nawabship of Broach, the customs of the town, &ca, &ca; and their agents are to take immediate possession thereof and receive all and every part of its rents, revenue, &ca from this day. In order to enable Mr. Shaw to avail himself of this treaty for the advantage of the Hon'ble Company, I shall as soon as possible send him a copy thereof, and also one to the Hon'ble Board. The original I shall not choose to risk by any conveyance at this season. I was led to this measure from two motives: first, to save any kind of trouble to the Company by fighting for what could be obtained without bloodshed, and also to gain a formidable ally to Dadasaheb, who until very lately stood in the great need of it. Many other reasons I could urge in favour of this step; but I hope it will speak sufficiently for itself, and meet with your and the Board's approbation, and prove very advantageous to my Hon'ble Employers.

1775 *Amod, 24th April,* 1775 (1775 *Br. F.* 261)
*Robert Cay to William Shaw.*

*Poona forces* I have just received a letter from Lt.-Col. Keating dated Darra Camp, 21st April, 1775, with the following intelligence "The morning of the 9th a junction was formed at this village with the Peshwa's army under Sadashiv Ramchandra, Appaji Mahadev, Sakharam Hari, and Manaji Phankria. Their force consisted of near 35,000 horse and foot, who had in the course of about fifty six hours marched 60 kos, or ninety English miles, bringing with them their whole bazar, baggage.

*Govindrao arrives* "I had got thus far when I was interrupted by an account of Govindrao being within six miles, upon which I marched a detachment to meet him; which we did about four miles to the westward.

1 Forrest dates this letter the 28th April, and has: "The treaty with Fatesing is now signed by Dadasaheb".

His force is about ten or eleven thousand, mostly fine horse. He has left his bazar and baggage under the care of Khanderao, about sixty kos from hence. Our army is now about fifty thousand of all sorts, besides an immense bazar. The treaty with Fatesing is finished, except signing, which, I believe, will be done to-day. Nothing but want of carts has prevented me from marching to attack the Ministers' army, who are now retired and distant about twelve kos."

*Angla Camp, 27th April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16A) 1775
*George Lovebond to Thomas Keating.*

*Fatesing ignores treaty*

Agreeable to your request, I left our camp at Darra the 23rd instant in the morning, accompanied by Fatesing's vakil, Gopalrao, to procure his Master's execution of the treaty I possessed from you. The same evening at four I crossed the Sabarmati, and arrived in the confederate army. Expressing my surprise to the vakil for being conducted hither, he told me the whole force of Fatesing was united to that of the confederates. During the remainder of the evening I received the visits of only some of the inferior people both of Haripant Phadke and Fatesing. Early in the morning the vakil told me a tent was erected for me and the reception of his Master or his Diwan, Antaji Nagesh, there to conclude the treaty. I waited in it the arrival of either till 12 o'clock. When reflecting I had been in their camp near twenty-four hours without a mention of the treaty, I insisted on the vakil acquainting his Master how very differently you had treated his embassy. This letter produced but a verbal answer which was delivered at five o'clock the same evening by a single horseman, desiring I would follow Fatesing's army, which was then moving towards Dabhoi with that of the confederates, and that, on their halting, I might depend on an interview.

It was now eight o'clock, and the coolies greatly fatigued desired I would stop a few minutes, I had just complied with their request, when I observed several horsemen surrounded my palanquin. Asking by whose orders they attended, they told me by Haripant Phadke's, which were to conduct me to his tent. Gopalrao, the vakil, at this instant coming up, confirmed these people possessing such orders, and with great apparent anxiety importuned me to conceal the treaty[1] and letter explanatory of it, as Antaji Nagesh had just communicated to him his great apprehensions of Haripant's next ordering my papers to be seized, which, if he possessed, the consequences must prove fatal to his Master and perhaps to me. I own I gave the greater credit to the justness of these fears, having that instant experienced the insults of the horsemen in their repeated orders to me to prepare and follow

1 From the letter it would seem that Lovebond had been sent on a fool's errand. It has been surmised that he swallowed the treaty. Keating wrote on the 10th May 1775- "Fatesing's vakil was furnished with full powers. The vakil pressing in the warmest terms for the treaty being signed by us, it was so on the 22nd ultimo, and sent next day to him under charge of Mr. George Lovebond, our Judge Advocate. For the subsequent proceedings I beg to refer you to the enclosed copy of Mr. Lovebond's letter delivered to me on his return. I must remark I am exceedingly sorry this business did not take place. Had it been, the ministerial interest would thereby be totally destroyed in the Gujarat province. Fatesing is the life and the soul of their army in this country". Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series,* 224.

them, though, before I ventured to move, I used the precaution, the better to effect my resolution of destroying the treaty without suspicion, of ordering my coolies in the hearing of the horsemen to lower the check of my palanquin to prevent further inconvenience from the dust.

All fears of detection being now removed, I continued to follow the horsemen, till they reached the bazar of Fatesing's army. Here they all quitted me, as I supposed with an intention of returning immediately and proceeding with me. The vakil, however, begged me not to omit this occasion, but to follow him to a tent, where the same people I had seen the night of my arrival would receive me, and that I might depend the next morning on seeing Fatesing. Without further disappointment I was at eight o'clock past introduced to Antaji Nagesh and in an hour after to Fatesing himself. The usual compliments being over, I told him, now that I was so fortunate in a personal interview I expected, he would renew the treaty, which his apprehensions of Haripant seizing in my possession had persuaded me to conceal. He thanked me for the precaution I had taken in his favour and at his request, but remarked the vigilance of the confederates over his motions made it impossible for him to accede to that article of the treaty, which enjoined the speedy junction of his troops. He added he would elude their jealousy by a pretended return to Baroda and by that route join us, or that he would revolt with his whole force, whenever we might engage the confederates, if you approved that step best. Finding nothing I could urge would procure a renewal of the treaty, the heads of which I had taken down in my pocket-book, I requested his permission to return to our camp, which he assented to, and ordered an escort of horse to attend me thither.

1775 *Bombay, 30th April,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

*Letters* In our letter of the 31st ultimo we acquainted you of the treaty that had been entered into with Raghoba, of his situation, and of the steps we had pursued for fulfilling our engagements; at the same time we enclosed a copy of the treaty for your information, a duplicate of that letter, of the copy of the treaty, and of another paper, then enclosed, accompanies this.

*Hopeful outlook* We have now the satisfaction to acquaint Your Honour, &ca that our forces were joined by Raghoba's army in number about 40,000 horse and foot. at a village about ten miles from Cambay on the 19th instant, as we are just informed by advices from the commanding officer of our forces there. The ministerial army by the same account is not more than six miles distant from the place of their encampment, so that we shortly expect to hear of a decisive action, which we think can only be prevented by an accommodation taking place between Raghoba and the ministerial party; some overtures for which have been made, though we are yet unacquainted with the particulars, but it appears to us that the heads of that party, divided as we are assured they are amongst themselves, are endeavouring to make some terms of advantage with their Master, while they yet have it in their power.

We before advised Your Honour, &ca that Mahadji Sindia had deserted the confederate Ministers. We are now assured that he has actually entered into engagement for assisting Raghoba, and only wait for the first favourable opportunity to do so. Tukoji Holkar, it is also asserted, will never act against him; and Fatesing, it is said, is entering into engagements with him. *Allies*

Thus it should seem, from the advices of Lieut.-Colonel Keating, that the grand confederacy will be shortly greatly weakened if not entirely deserted. He represents that nothing is wanted to give life to Raghoba's cause but money, for which he is, it seems, in very great distress. Colonel Keating and indeed Raghoba himself have urged us to furnish him with a supply of at least five lakhs of Rupees, which request has been denied as out of our power to grant him. Besides, had it been just at that time in our power to furnish that sum or any other, yet whatever sum of money we could have sent, though considerable to the Company, would have gone but a little with so numerous an army towards retrieving Raghoba's affairs, and he would probably again have fallen soon in the same distress; we, therefore, judged it more prudent, especially as we had entirely complied with the terms of the treaty on our part, to give an absolute denial, that he might at once endeavour to find a pecuniary supply from some other quarter. *Money refused*

From this Your Honour, &ca will judge that it is not yet in Raghoba's power to bear any part of the expense of our forces, which by the treaty he has engaged to do. The whole expense of our army, therefore, at present falls on the Company, which by being in the field is of course very considerable. This circumstance together with many other urgent calls for money induces us earnestly to request you will send us a large supply in specie or otherwise, as soon as possible; and we hope that, when the matters at present pending are brought to a successful issue, and the Company in consequence in quiet possession of the territories ceded to them, that we shall be enabled from these revenues to carry on our Employers' affairs without being any longer a burthen to your Presidency. *Request for money*

The *Revenge* and *Bombay Grab*, two of our cruisers, fell in with the Maratha fleet some time ago in their passage to Tellicherry and were attacked by them, the enemy having previously sought their safety in flight, one of their vessels only excepted, which was driven on shore and totally destroyed: she was the commodore's vessel and mounted four and forty guns. *Naval engagement*

We have been favoured with your letters of the 3rd of February and doubt not but our address of the 31st December would reach you shortly after, when we hope Your Honour, &ca would be convinced that we have done, what the Legislature required of us, in giving you every information you could desire. We did not write you at the time that Mr. Mostyn was ordered to quit Poona, as the notice of your having taken on you the government of Bengal in virtue of the late Act of Parliament had not then reached us; and when it did, it required some days to compile and to digest, the detail of the Company's affairs at this Presidency, which you desired, as well as to give you a clear idea of the important matters we had then in hand. At that time the siege *Placating Hastings*

of Thana was carrying on, which also occasioned our advices being retarded for a few days, as we were then in daily and even hourly expectation of being in possession of the fort; and we wished together with the motives for our proceedings to be able to advise you of the success that had attended them. But somehow it happened that our operations at Thana were protracted much beyond the time we had reason to suppose. It is not, therefore, extraordinary that private advices should be received before our letter reached you; but Your Honour, &ca may depend that we shall always send you ample and timely and, we hope, satisfactory account of our proceedings.[1]

1775 *Bombay, 3rd May,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

*Keating blamed* In your letter to the President of the 23rd you say that the treaty with Fatesing was then signing by Raghoba, and that you have been under the absolute necessity of making the Company a party in it.

Though we are much pleased to learn that Raghoba has obtained the concurrence of Fatesing to the Company's possessing the Gaikwad's share of Broach parganas, which by our treaty with Raghoba he ceded forever to our Employers, yet we hope that the Company are no otherwise a party in the treaty than as guarantees; for you have no instructions or authority from us to engage in any negotiation or treaty wherein the Company are to become parties; and we, therefore, possitively prohibit you from entering into any treaty without our direction and express approbation.

From the little insight you have yet given us into the nature and stipulations of the treaty with Fatesing we are not able at present to give our sentiments upon it, but we much fear that Govindrao, the brother of Fatesing, who has always behaved like a staunch friend to Raghoba, has not been considered by the latter so much as he deserves; but of this we shall give you our sentiments, when the particulars come before us.

Lest you should not have received a copy of our treaty with Raghoba from the Chief, or the Chief and Council at Surat, we now enclose one, that you may act conformable to it.

1775 *Camp near Nadiad, 10th May,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*Thomas Keating to William Shaw.*

*Success* I have the pleasure to acquaint you that since our junction with Raghoba's forces we have had four engagements with the ministerial army, in each of which we have driven them off with considerable loss; and they are at present, as it is said, eight kos distance from us on their way to cross the Mahi, much dispirited and undetermined what further measures to pursue.[2]

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1 Published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series,* 233, 234.

2 This is an extract from a long letter published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series,* 223-225; in that letter Keating gives a detailed account of the military operations.

*Bombay*, 16*th May* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated* 8*th March*, 1775.

*Hastings displeased*

We have received your letters of the 31st December, containing as well the general state we required of the political situation of affairs of your Presidency as the particular accounts of your late operations at Salsette and Bassein. The first will be taken into consideration as soon as the hurry of other business will permit us, and directions in consequence will be transmitted to you. As to the last, the tardiness of your advices almost precludes us from saying anything at present on the subject. Our sentiments of this inattention will be sufficiently known to you by our letter of the 3rd February, triplicate of which accompanied this. We must, however, add that we cannot admit the plea of your being unacquainted with the new government having taken place here, because we conceive that the operations in which you were going to engage were too interesting to the Company's affairs at large and too likely in their consequences to affect this settlement, not to have become a matter of the most early intelligence to this Presidency under the late administration.

We have received advices from Ft. St. George of the steps they had taken in consequence of your application to them for assistance. For the reason we have already given, we suspend our opinion on your late measures and the consequence of it, but can assure you we shall be ready to afford you such support in your present circumstances as may be necessary for preventing, as far as may lie in our power, any injury to the Company's affairs.

*Ominous message*

We are alarmed at the declaration of your intentions of joining Raghoba. We must disapprove this as inconsistent with your negotiations with the Ruling Powers at Poona and with the authority of this Government. Your own report of his decline and of the power of his opponents prove it to be a measure dangerous and may force into a rupture with Sabaji Bhonsla, his declared enemy and our neighbour, with whom we are on terms of friendship. We cannot ratify your engagements with Raghoba without such reason as we cannot now foresee; and we therefore positively [*order*] you suspend your negotiations with him until you receive our further instructions.[1]

*Fazalpur Camp*, 21*st May*, 1775 (1775, *Br. F* 261) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Shaw.*

*Costly victory*

I had the pleasure of writing you last from Nadiad; since when, we have had one or two cannonadings with the confederate army and brought them to close action on the 10th instant, when we repulsed them with a very considerable loss indeed, the smallest account making it upwards of two thousand killed and wounded, among which were several officers of high rank. Our loss, considering the small number we had engaged, was severe. Out of fifteen officers we had six killed and five wounded, and about eighty private Europeans. The number of sepoys I cannot yet estimate.

1 Published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, 235. The treaty of Surat was signed by Raghoba on the 7th March; it was ratified by Bombay on the 16th March. Hastings' orders of the 8th March to suspend negotiations with Raghoba reached Bombay on the 16th May.

1775 *Bombay, 24th May,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*At a Committee.*

*Bombay apology* Read also the letter from the Governor-General and Council of Bengal entered above, on which we esteem it necessary to make some observations in justification of our proceedings.

Though these Gentlemen do not seem at present perfectly satisfied at not receiving more early intelligence of our proceedings, yet we flatter ourselves that the reasons we have assigned for it in our letter to them of the 30th ultimo will be fully sufficient, more especially when it is at same time considered that, owing to the distracted state of the Maratha Government,we knew it was totally out of its power even to attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's possessions in Bengal; and the treaty which we have lately entered into with Raghoba effectually secures them from being molested by the Marathas in time to come.

These Gentlemen in a following paragraph are pleased to say, that they must disapprove of our intentions of joining Raghoba, as inconsistent with our negotiations with the Ruling Powers at Poona, &ca.

We neither have, nor even had any negotiations with the ministerial party at Poona, which, we suppose, is meant by the Ruling Powers. We only acquainted them on this head long before the treaty with Raghoba was concluded, (and at a time we had little hopes of bringing it to the happy [*conclusion*] we have done) that, in case the ministerial party should gain the advantage, we would endeavour to reconcile them by explaining the motives for our attacking Salsette; but the conclusion of the treaty and the part we have in consequence taken, has rendered such an explanation quite unnecessary, and any negotiation independent of Raghoba of course can never take place.

Though it is true, as they observe in their letters, that Raghoba's affairs were then on the decline, yet they begin now to wear a much more favourable appearance; and indeed we make no doubt but that a steady perseverance and proper conduct, with our assistance, will enable him to conquer his rebellious subjects or else to bring matters to a compromise sufficiently favourable for him; and on either of these events taking place, the great advantages granted to the Company by treaty will be ensured to them on a stable footing.

From what we so particularly wrote in our letter on this subject of the 31st December last we hoped that they would consider that by acting in the manner we have done we have not only secured to the Company by the most effectual grants, (which Raghoba alone could give) the right of possessing those places, such as Salsette, Bassein, &ca, which our Employers so repeatedly and earnestly enjoined us to acquire for them, but even much more, and that without any expense, as the charges of the war are to be defrayed by Raghoba, who is also to pay the expenses of taking possession of all the parganas ceded to us.

The Governor-General and Council go on to express their apprehensions, that our taking part with Raghoba may force them into a war with Sabaji Bhonsla, their neighbour, who, they say, is a declared enemy to Raghoba.

Before we entered into these measures, we were perfectly convinced that they had nothing to apprehend from that quarter; for from the death of Janoji Bhonsla, which happened about 3 years ago, till Sabaji was killed, as he lately was by Mudaji, the Berar Government was torn in pieces by the civil dissensions of the two parties, headed by Sabaji and Mudaji; but since the death of the former it has been restored to quiet; and as Mudaji (who now governs for his son that was adopted by the late Janoji) is a known friend to Raghoba, of course they need be under no apprehensions of his taking umbrage at our proceedings.

We must here remark that, situated as the Governor-General and Council of Bengal are at so great a distance, it will be impossible for us at all times to benefit by circumstances as they fall out, provided we always wait for their directions in political matters. We need produce no other instance than the letter before us, which is dated the 8th March, was received here on the 21st instant, and is an answer to our advices of the 31st December last. Had we waited for their reply to these advices, Raghoba would have been entirely lost, and the advantages, the Company gain by our treaty, gone most probably forever. The Legislature indeed, foreseeing the great inconvenience, justly provided against it in the late Act from which they derived their authority. This we make no doubt but that these Gentlemen will always consider, more especially as we can assure them that we shall take no material step in political matters without their concurrence, unless it may be dangerous to postpone for so long a time coming to a determination.[1]

*Bombay, 24th May,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*William Hornby to Thomas Mostyn.*
*Instructions intended for Mr. Mostyn proceeding to Raghoba's army and Darbar.*

*Mostyn's powers*

Although Lieut.-Colonel Keating was in nowise authorised by us to enter into treaty or negotiation of any kind with any Power or Powers whatever, yet from his advices it appears that he has done so, and particularly with Fatesing. Indeed he acquaints us that he has been under the necessity of making the Company a party in the treaty between Raghoba and Fatesing; how or in what manner the Company were to be parties, he has not yet advised; and as he was quite silent on the subject in the letters he has wrote us, we do not know whether the treaty has taken place or not. We, therefore, deem it necessary that you should require the Colonel to acquaint you of every step he took regarding this treaty, and to lay before you in writing his proceedings with Raghoba and his correspondence with all or any of the Country Powers that he may have corresponded with, that we may receive the same through you with your sentiments at large thereon. Should any proposals or applications in future be made from any of the Country Powers, they must all be made to you in future and not to the commander of our forces; and whenever the Company's interest may be concerned, they are to be transmitted to us with your sentiments. In these matters the military Commanding Officer must not interfere.

1 This extract is perhaps the most telling criticism ever passed on Hastings' administration.

but we shall rely on you to take to support his consequence in every consistent manner, sensible as you must be that much will depend on his conduct.

1775 *Camp Sarbhon, 26th May,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Victorious march* On the 19th instant I had the honour of addressing you from the camp at Beltasi,[1] advising you fully of all transactions antecedent to that period, particularly of our engagement with the confederate army on the 18th. A duplicate of that letter I now transmit to Your Honour, &ca.

We crossed the Mahi the next day; and notwithstanding the deep defiles and difficult passes on the banks of that river, I have the pleasure to acquaint you that we crossed it in one day with all our ammunition, stores, etc. without meeting with any accident. We encamped on the banks near the pass of Fazalpur that night. The next morning we renewed our march and encamped that afternoon at Koyli, seven miles from the Mahi, the long and deep defiles, we were obliged to pass through, rendering our march so very tedious. I halted at Koyli the next day for the relief of the sick and wounded, who were greatly fatigued, and some of their cases very bad. We left Koyli at sunrise the 23rd, and after a march of nine miles we halted at Padra the remainder of the day. The 24th in the morning we marched from Padra and that afternoon crossed the River Dahder, ten miles from Padra, and encamped on the south banks near the village Manpoor. We struck our encampment there yesterday morning, marched nine miles and at night stopped at Matar, which we left this morning, and after a march of three miles encamped at this place, which is three kos from Amod.

*Decisive victory* Since our engagement on the plains of Arras near Nagpur on the 18th we have seen nothing of the enemy. Before that period they used to keep constantly near us, and harassed us by every means in their power. I am of opinion the great loss they sustained that day has totally dispirited them, if not entirely overset their cause. From their subsequent behaviour I do not suppose we shall see any more of them, I mean, to be troublesome for the remainder of this campaign. Every account, received since the date of my last, confirms the loss mentioned therein, sustained by the enemy, except of Haripant Phadke being wounded; which was a mistake. It seems that highly elated with the defeat they had given Raghoba a few months before on the plains of Arras, they had flattered themselves with a second victory of the like kind on those hitherto fortunate plains, notwithstanding the assistance of the English; and by these hopes kept up the spirits of their army, not a little depressed by their former losses, as an intercepted letter from Haripant Phadke to Sakharam Bapu, sent me by Mr. Shaw, plainly declares. They were, however, fatally deceived in their expectations of conquest; and since their defeat I have no perfect accounts of their future intentions or present proceedings.

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1 Published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series,* 226-229.

I am sorry to inform Your Honour, &ca that Lieut. Charles Yonge died of his wounds the 24th instant. The rest of the officers will, I hope, do well again. A few of the private Europeans and sepoys have died. I now enclose an exact return of the killed and wounded sepoys in the action of the 18th, which could not be prepared in time enough for my last address; at that time I did not imagine our loss of sepoys was so great. *Other news*

We are now drawing near to Broach, where I have written to Mr. Shaw, &ca for a supply of artillery, ammunition and stores, which we are much in want of. And from the great attention paid by Mr. Shaw throughout this service I am in hopes I shall be detained but a very short time in the neighbourhood of Broach. I have received several letters from him, wherein he assures me the supplies will be ready on my arrival.

I have been very much pressed by Govindrao to form the siege of Baroda; but two reasons principally prevented me. The first, which with me has ever been the grand object, is Your Honour, &ca's wish, so repeatedly mentioned throughout your correspondence, for my conducting Raghoba to Poona in the most expeditious manner. I could not, therefore, think of acquiescing in any delay of this kind, particularly when the season was so far advanced. In the next place, was I to attack Baroda, the monsoon would most certainly set in before I could cross the Tapti, which could be very detrimental to the present service, and give the enemy many advantages they must be deprived of by our accomplishing that measure before the rains set in, otherwise it would be utterly impossible to march this army over that river before the month of December, by which time I hope we shall be arrived at Poona. Besides, it is my sincere desire to be within the distance of twenty kos from Surat during the rains, by which means we shall have a communication with that city, and be able to get a supply of stores, &ca of which we stand in great need, and which will greatly accelerate the service on the opening of the next campaign. *Plans*

In my last I informed Your Honour, etc. it was Raghoba's desire and intention to spend the rains in the Khandesh country; but from the present advanced season it will be impossible to put that scheme in execution. nor am I sorry for it. Since, as I before observed, it will afford us an opportunity of receiving all supplies from our own settlements, and keeping up a correspondence with Your Honour, &ca during the rains.

In two days more I hope to be on the banks of the Narbada, from thence I shall proceed immediately to Anklesvar for the supplies expected from Broach.

*Broach, 31st May,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) **1775**
*A public visit.*

The Chief and the other members of the Board this afternoon made public visits to Raghoba and Govindrao at the camp without the suburb. *Visit*

1775 *Bombay, 1st June,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

*Summary of events* In the last address from this Department to Your Honour, &ca we advised you of the junction of our forces with the Peshwa's army and of the then situation of affairs; a duplicate thereof is now enclosed.

Since then nothing very decisive has taken place. Our forces in conjunction with the Peshwa or Raghoba's army are now on their march from Cambay towards Poona, and by this time, as we have reason to suppose, are near Broach; in five successive [*encounters*] with the ministerial army they have always been victorious and without any loss to our forces except in the [*encounter*] which happened on the 18th ultimo, when, though the victory was much more complete than in any of the former actions, and the number of the enemy killed and wounded very considerable indeed; with a great number of their horses, yet owing to some accident or mistake a detachment of our forces sustained considerable loss. The particulars of this affairs are related in a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Keating to us, dated the 19th ultimo, an extract of which is enclosed for your fuller information; six commissioned officers were killed and five wounded on this occasion, with about 75 Europeans killed and wounded, and about the like number of sepoys.

1775 *Jharesar Camp, 3rd June,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Money* In many of my former addresses to your Hon'ble Board, I took the liberty of requesting a supply of money in the most urgent manner, not only for ourselves but [*also for*[ Raghoba. I particularly set forth [*the reasons*] for being so strenuous in my application on that subject. What I then feared is now come to pass; the want of money has caused almost a general defection among Raghoba's army. Govindrao positively refuses to cross the Narbada; the Arabs, the most of his army, refuse to march without receiving part of their arrears. Thus situated, it will, I fear, be impossible to cross the Narbada before the ensuing dry season, or even then, without a supply of money; four lakhs of Rupees would have prevented all these disagreeable events.

*Plans* The most eligible step we can pursue under the above circumstances is in my opinion to oblige the enemy now at Bowapir to cross the Narbada. This, from every account we are able to collect, will be the means of dispersing them. Could this be accomplished, the Ministers will find it very difficult to assemble an army early in the ensuing dry season. Another advantage we shall gain by obliging the enemy to cross will be our having this country to act in, just as we think proper. When the first severity of the setting in of the rains is over, the reduction of Baroda, Dabhoi, &ca may be set about. When this measure is accomplished, it will [*put*] Raghoba into money and us into the peaceable possession of the Broach province; in the present state of affairs that event is very uncertain.

To facilitate the above measure Mr. Shaw has offered me such part of the forces and stores at Broach as I may think necessary; and from the numbers sent into the hospital at Broach from our detachment, I shall be under the necessity of having a reinforcement from thence.

From what I have now laid before Your Honour, &ca you will observe how my intentions of crossing the Rivers Narbada and Tapti, and by that means marching as near as possible to Poona before the rains are defeated. I doubt not Your Honour, &ca must be well convinced no endeavours of mine have been omitted to effect your grand wish of carrying Raghoba to Poona as soon as possible. I can only at present express my sincere concern at the reason that now prevents its being so speedily accomplished as I expected.

*Reinforcements*

Before I conclude, I must in the most earnest manner entreat Your Honour, &ca will as early as possible in the dry season send a reinforcement from Bombay to supply our late loss of Europeans and sepoys, together with stores, ammunition, &ca, which I will particularly mention in due season.

*Money*

But above all I think it my duty once more to urge in the most strenuous manner my request that you will assist Raghoba with five lakhs of Rupees. If you furnish him with that sum, I have not a doubt of accomplishing every measure to Your Honour, &ca's entire satisfaction. Without that supply I cannot but apprehend most dreadful consequences; for I am very sure that hardly a man in his army will take the field again without pay. Once more I beg leave to assure Your Honour, &ca I will leave nothing undone on my part to ensure success to the present service, and flatter myself my conduct will meet your approbation.

*Broach, 7th June,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261) 1775
*At a Consultation.*

*Delay near Broach*

The Chief acquaints the Board that in consequence of his representations to Raghoba and Colonel Keating of the pernicious consequence arising to the Broach pargana from the army remaining in it, the Colonel last night assured him he was determined to move on this day in pursuit of the enemy, who are in the Koral and Sinor districts, and leave this pargana as soon as possible, which indeed he has repeatedly declared to the Chief his inclination of doing from the first instant of his arrival; but that Raghoba to his (the Chief's) knowledge not having it in his power to pay his troops, they encircled his tent, and insisted on his not moving till he made good some of their arrears of pay. That in consequence of his being unable to satisfy the whole, several large bodies had actually left the army; but having now in some degree satisfied the remainder for the present, he was anxious to move in pursuit of the enemy, as he had received private advices of their being much divided in their councils.

*Dabhoi, 23rd June,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Successful advance*

My letter of the 3rd instant fully informed Your Honour, &ca of my proceedings to that period, together with the reasons of our detention near Broach. Those reasons obliged us to remain till the 8th, when we marched from Jharesar camp, and about two o'clock in the afternoon reached the pass of Shuklatirth with a full intention of crossing the Narbada; but after trying all parts of the river, we found it totally impassable; and therefore encamped that night near the village of Shuklatirth.

Early on the 9th we struck our tents and marched towards the pass of Bowapir. About five in the afternoon, after a very fatiguing march of ten kos, we reached the village of Serula, and there received information that the enemy were encamped close to the pass, not five kos from us; that most of their heavy bazar and baggage had crossed, and one-third of their army. Upon this it was resolved to refresh our troops as soon as possible and march at midnight with full hopes of being able to beat up their quarters with success.

A quarter before one in the morning of the 10th we marched from Serula, and proceeded for about three miles with some regularity; but very shortly after the Peshwa's army (who never observe the least order) broke through our line of march in several places. This obliged us to halt till day light, when we again got in motion, and after marching about a mile and a half plainly discerned the enemy's camp. An hour after sunrise they could clearly see us, as we were on an eminance, when they instantly began to strike their tents, colours, &ca, and appeared to be in the greatest confusion imaginable. The ground was now favourable. We, therefore, moved briskly and regularly; but, as we drew nearer, we found ourselves under the disagreeable necessity of making very large sweeps to avoid the defiles with which the country abounds. Between nine and ten we reached their encampment, but found nothing left except some grain and forage. The Peshwa's horse who had for the first time this morning marched in front of the English troops, possessed themselves of an elephant (formerly belonging to their Master, lost in his defeat at Arras), also some hundred different kinds of horses, fifteen or twenty camels, and a great deal of other plunder. The southern banks of the Narbada were covered with their bazar and baggage and, as near as I can judge, six or seven thousand horse; and the bed of the river, where fordable, was full of men, women and cattle of all kinds. From north to east of their camp ran a circular chain of hills about two miles distant, where the remainder of the enemy drew up. The situation of the ground and the harassed state of our troops would not admit their pursuing flying cavalry, and about eleven o'clock they went clear off. Could Raghoba's horse have been prevailed upon to cross the river, the whole of the enemy's bazar and baggage must have fallen into their hands. As it was, a few small parties did cross the river and plundered in the rear.

The panic our sudden appearance struck in the enemy was so great that they retreated with the utmost precipitation without the least order or regularity. In their hurry they threw a number of guns, ammunition and stores into the river. We found three of their guns, and took up some hundred shot; but a fakir, who resides in the grove where they were encamped, saw them throw a great number of guns, stores, etc. into the water; which I doubt not, had Raghoba's forces been more diligent, they might have met with. Could we have prosecuted our march without the impediments above-mentioned, we most certainly should have made ourselves masters of their whole encampment, as we should have been upon them before sunrise. As it was, nothing could exceed the consternation they were struck with and the confusion of their retreat.

*Change of plan* The reason of my again attempting to march to the southward, notwithstanding the difficulties that obstructed that measure at the

date of my last address, was Mr. Shaw having supplied Raghoba with one lakh of Rupees, which for the present put a stop to the clamours of his army; and when I waited on him (on the 7th instant), he seemed entirely to acquiesce in my proposal for crossing the Tapti before the rains. I have already mentioned our being prevented crossing the Narbada at the pass of Shuklatirth, but doubted not he still remained in the same mind, and would most certainly cross it at the pass of Bowapir, I was, therefore, not a little surprised when some of Raghoba's principal ministers came to my tent the day after we defeated the enemy, and acquainted me it was their Master's earnest wish to remain in this country till the opening of the fair season. They set forth his desire in the strongest forms, and enforced it by every argument they could think of to induce me to acquiesce. I once more told them what I had often repeated in Raghoba's Darbar, that it was the first wish of Your Honour, etc. to conduct Raghoba to Poona as soon as possible and establish him firmly in the peshwaship; that for this purpose and this only, you had assisted him with so large a force; that we had by every means in our power defeated the enemy and drove them before us; that our delaying any longer time in the Gujarat province was quite unnecessary, and in my opinion would be very prejudicial to his affairs; that our cantoning near Surat would afford us the means of an early communication with Bombay, from whence in the month of August we would receive a reinforcement and supplies of all kinds, and be so much further advanced towards his capital. These my sentiments were delivered to Raghoba, and I waited on him the same morning to enforce them in person by every method I could use; but he seemed totally averse to crossing the Narbada, and fully bent on going to Dabhoi and cantoning in that neighbourhood. Among many other reasons, he positively asserted repeatedly that wintering to the southward of the Tapti would be the ruin of his army; nevertheless, if I positively insisted on it, he would proceed towards Surat. Notwithstanding I was well persuaded it would be much better for the English army to canton near one of the Company's settlements, and be paying a more implicit obedience to your recommendation for conducting Raghoba in the most expeditious manner to Poona, yet as in your instructions you have enjoined me to take every opportunity of conciliating the good opinion of him and his ministers, seeing him so entirely bent on this measure, I was necessitated to comply with his request.

*Towards Dabhoi*

On the morning of the 12th we marched from Bowapir for Dabhoi, and after a long march of nine kos we halted at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon at a small village called Thantalow, seven kos from Dabhoi, and encamped on the adjacent plains. As soon as it was dark the monsoon set in with great violence; it rained the whole night, and the greatest part of the next day incessantly; the low grounds where our tents were pitched were in a few hours several foot under water; and from the nature of the soil in this country it was several days before we could get our guns out of the stiff clay in which they were buried. Every effort that men could use was exerted on this occasion, and we at last happily succeeded. The badness of the roads after the falling of such heavy rains and the great fatigue attending the dragging of our guns through them, prevented our reaching Dabhoi until the 19th instant; and I have now the pleasure to acquaint Your Honour, &ca

that our officers and men are all comfortably lodged; and I doubt not we shall be well supplied with provisions and necessaries during the time we may be under the necessity of continuing here. Our stores, ammunition, &ca are all got in and housed, with only a trifling loss, which from the severity of the weather and innumerable other difficulties we had to surmount in bringing them hither, it was impossible to avoid.

*Govindrao's request* In a letter I had the honour to write the Hon'ble the President under the 3rd instant I mentioned that Govindrao had pressed me very hard to reduce Baroda. I also remarked the great advantage that might arise to the Company from this measure, which might be undertaken after the severity of the first rains were over. Since that time Govindrao has many times enforced his arguments by every means in his power; so far as promises of a private nature could go did he in .............first conversation; but I made him sensible that was a matter of the least consequence to me, and that whatever services the English army might render him, must be recompensed by the firmest grants of territorial revenue made over in the fullest manner to the Company for such assistance; and should Your Honour, &ca approve of our reducing Baroda, I have no doubt of obtaining some very valuable acquisition for this service. This makes me extremely anxious of hearing from Your Honour, &ca, as it is now near two months since I have been favoured with any commands from you.

*Amod* On my acquiescing in Raghoba's proposal at the pass of Bowapir for wintering on this side the Narbada, I made him sensible it would be attended with loss and inconvenience to the Hon'ble Company, as it was contrary to the true meaning of the treaty and my instructions, which were to conduct him to Poona in the most expeditious manner, which was by no means the case in our marching northward to a place we had left behind us near a month ago. I, therefore, acquainted him I hoped he would make the Hon'ble Company some equivalent for rendering him such a service on purpose to oblige him. He desired me to point out to him what I wished him to grant them. I mentioned the province of Amod now mortgaged over to Your Honour, &ca for the payment of the charges incurred by the present expedition; and being a tract of country situated immediately between the Hon'ble Company's parganas of Broach and Jambusar, I thought it would be the most preferable on many accounts. I went yesterday to visit Raghoba. He has again confirmed his promise, and I expect sanads from him very shortly, making it over to the Hon'ble Company in the fullest manner forever. I flatter myself my conduct in the transaction will meet with Your Honour, &ca's approbation, and once more beg leave to assure you that the interest of my Hon'ble Employers is ever the first object of my attention.

*Fatesing's offers* On the 21st ultimo I wrote in such a manner to Fatesing as his conduct merited, and which I supposed must put a stop to all future correspondence between us; but on the 11th instant he sent me a letter and also another of a later date since; in both which he declares his readiness to join us immediately and hopes Raghoba and myself are still ready to abide by the treaty formerly offered him. I wrote him yesterday for answer that I was much surprised at his again writ-

ing me after knowing my sentiments so fully as I wrote him under the 21st ultimo, when I told him that he must expect no friendship from me, and I could not depend on a word he said, and that he must no longer attempt to impose upon me. I now told him I made no doubt he would be very glad of joining us, when he saw his party ruined and himself on the verge of destruction. I added that the terms contained in the treaty were granted him at a different time from the present; but that still, as he said he wished for my friendship, if he would now prove himself honest, he might come to Raghoba and endeavour to settle matters with the English and him, both of whom he had endeavoured for some time past to treat as bad as possible; that, if he only meant to act properly, he might write to me for a pass, which I should send him for himself and such attendants as he might think proper to bring with him. I concluded that, if he settled this business, it was well; if not, he might return without molestation and wait his approaching fate, and desired his answer might be both speedy and sincere. Whether Govindrao or Fatesing succeed in the possession of Baroda, or whatever terms may be settled between the Gaikwad family and Raghoba, I doubt not of being able to get some valuable acquisitions for my Hon'ble Employers from the share the English have had and must still have in the negotiations; but of this business I shall be able to advise Your Honour, &ca more fully in my next, when I suppose something will be determined,

Raghoba with his army is at present encamped on the banks of the river Ore near four kos from hence, and proposes remaining there during our stay at Dabhoi. *Raghoba*

The enemy after their retreat fled towards Dabhoi, and remained among the villages in this neighbourhood two days; but on their hearing of our intentions to winter here they left the country, and from the best intelligence I can procure I understand they are gone to the Malwa country, with a view of passing the Narbada at the pass of Cusker about sixty kos higher up the river. From all accounts it is most certain that the ministerial army are very much disaffected and discontented to the last degree. I have been informed they were crossing the river when the rains set in the 12th instant, and being suddenly overtaken in the bed of the river, numbers of them perished by the rapidity of the stream; reports say two thousand, of this I am not certain; but several private letters from Broach mention that they daily behold numbers of dead bodies, both of men and cattle of all kinds floating down the river. *Poona army*

*Bombay, 24th June,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

This, therefore, is chiefly to reply to your letter of the 8th of March, agreeable to what we promised in our address of the 1st instant.

We trust that the reasons which have been assigned in our letter of the 30th of April for not sending more early intelligence of our designs and operations against Salsette will prove sufficiently satisfactory, more especially when you consider that it was, as we well knew from the distracted state of the Maratha Government, totally out of its power to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's possessions in *Bombay apology*

Bengal or those of their allies on account of our proceedings on this side of India; and so the event has fully proved; and provided our present operations in support of Raghoba are crowned with that success which we hope they will, the treaty we have entered into fully binds Raghoba and his successors from ever taking part against the Company; and indeed we doubt not but that the gratitude will induce him always to be ready to act in their behalf.

Your Honour, &ca observe that you are alarmed at the declaration of our intentions of joining Raghoba, which, you add, you must disapprove as inconsistent with our negotiations with the Ruling Powers at Poona, and that it is a measure which may force you into a rupture with Sabaji Bhonsla, his declared enemy and your neighbour, with whom you are on terms of friendship.

We never had any negotiations with the ministerial party, whom we suppose you mean by the Ruling Powers. We only acquainted you on this head long before we concluded the treaty with Raghoba and at a time that there was little probability that it ever could be concluded, that, in case they gained the advantage in the present contest, we should endeavour to reconcile them by explaining our motives for attacking Salsette. The conclusion of the treaty and the part we in consequence took against them rendered any explanation or negotiation on this account quite unnecessary, and therefore all thoughts of a negotiation with them, independent of Raghoba, have been long dropped; and Raghoba's affairs have wore but an unfavourable aspect, yet we make no doubt but that a steady perseverance and proper conduct will enable him with our assistance to overcome his enemies, or else to accommodate matters favourably with them, which in the end must ensure to the Company on a stable footing the great advantages granted to them by the treaty, a copy of which has been long since transmitted to you.

When Your Honour, &ca takes this subject into your consideration, we request that you will particularly attend to the following circumstances. First, that the part we have taken is in support of the rightful Supreme Governor of the Marathas, and who had been in possession of that dignity, and that the ministerial party are his subjects who have rebelled against him, and most unjustly endeavouring to dispossess him of his seat.

Secondly, that by acting in the manner we have done we have secured to the Company by the most effectual grants (and which Raghoba was the only person who had any right to give) the right of possessing those places, such as Salsette, Bassein, &ca, which they have repeatedly and earnestly enjoined us to procure for them; and even more, what is still further for that benefit, the expenses that will be incurred in this war are to be amply repaid to them, and in the end we doubt not such a currency will be given to the affairs of the Company in these parts and to trade in general, as will be attended with singular benefit to them and to individuals trading under their protection, and [we] flatter ourselves you will view our proceedings when the whole comes before you.

We were and are convinced that Your Honour, &ca may be perfectly free from any apprehensions of being forced into a rupture with the Bhonsla on account of our proceedings, even had Sabaji been yet alive; for from the death of Janoji Bhonsla, which happened about three years ago, till Sabaji was killed, as he was lately by Mudaji, that Government, commonly known to us by the name of the Berar Government, was torn in pieces by the civil dissenssions between Sabaji and Mudaji; but since the death of the former it has been restored to quiet; and as Mudajee (who now governs for his son that was adopted by the late Janoji) is a known friend to Raghoba, he will consequently be rejoiced at the part we have taken, instead of being disgusted with it.

Thus we hope that we have removed Your Honour, &ca's objections to our entering into the treaty with Raghoba, and that you will concur with us in opinion that we were and are pursuing the true interest of our Employers; for, had we not laid hold of the present opportunity, which was so very favourable to procure grants of the places that we wished to possess, it is more than probable that another such would never again have offered.

We beg leave here to remark that, as Your Honour, &ca are situated so very distant from this Presidency, it would be totally impossible for us to benefit by circumstances as they fall out, provided we always wait for your directions. We need produce no other instance than the letter before us, which is dated the 8th of March, not being received here till the 21st ultimo, and is an answer to our advices of the 31st December last. Had we waited for your reply to these advices, Raghoba would have been entirely lost, and the advantages the Company gain by treaty, gone most probably forever; the Legislature has indeed provided against this great inconvenience in the late Act of Parliament, which we make no doubt but that you will always consider; and we assure you that we shall take no material step in any political matter without your concurrence, unless when it may be dangerous to postpone for so long a time coming to a determination thereon.

In the preceding part of this letter we acquainted you that we had no advices from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating since the date of those noticed in our last address; but private letters from Surat mention that the army is arrived in the neighbourhood of Broach in its march towards Poona; that our forces have had another engagement with the ministerial army, in which the latter were again worsted, and that the affairs of the confederacy, owing to their want of money and to dissensions amongst themselves, are in a very declining way.

*Surat, 26th June,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

To this account [Keating's][1] I have nothing to add but that those of the ministerial forces which had crossed the Narbada, on finding Haripant had fled, came as they could this way. Some went up-country towards Songarh, but on crossing the Tapti near Golaw, which is about fifteen coss from Surat, lost near a thousand men with their horses, as there was a strong current, and many of the rafts they *Poona losses*

1 See Keating's letter to William Hornby, dated 23rd June, 1775.

made to pass the river, overset. All the ministerial forces which were in this country are gone off, and I hear of none being nearer us than Songarh. I know not exactly where Haripant Phadke is with the remains of his army; but the Colonel writes that ever since the tenth he had been retiring as fast as he could towards the Malwa country; and it is now the general opinion that his forces are so effectually scattered and dispersed that they will never be able to make any head against us any more.

By what the Colonel writes me it appears determined by Raghoba to winter at Dabhoi, where they will have good accommodation. Fatesing and Khanderao after the 10th separated from Haripant, and are now, I hear, encamped at the distance of a few kos from our forces, and are in treaty with Raghoba.

1775 *Broach, 3rd July,* 1775, (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*The Council at Broach to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest* The army under Colonel Keating continues at Dabhoi, and a considerable party of the Peshwa's troops, with Govindrao in person, is within two kos of Baroda. A pattemar who left the latter place in the morning of the first says that Fatesing went out at the same time to hold a conference with his brother, Govindrao, and he adds that there was an English gentleman sent to invite him, but without further particulars.

1775 *Broach, 4th July,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*The Council at Broach to Thomas Keating.*

*Peace in sight* We understand from private pattemars that Fatesing was on the point of leaving Baroda to wait in person on the Peshwa, in hopes of making his peace with him, in which case we doubt not you will remind the Peshwa of his engagement as to the Gaikwad share of the revenues of this pargana.

1775 *Surat, 6th July,* 1775, (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Daulatrao* The harkaras I dispatched to find out where Phadke was, are not yet returned; but those I sent to Songarh are, and bring advice that a Maratha officer by name Daulatrao, who was some months ago in Govindrao's service, which he quitted at Baroda, while that place was attacked, under pretence of going to join Raghoba, but instead of that went on towards Poona, and stopped at the pass called Tangread, which is about 100 kos from Surat, 80 from Poona, and 20 from Songarh, is still thereabouts with 4,000 horse of his own, and has been lately joined by 15,000 horse, which separated from Phadke after the surprising of his camp at Bowapir, and also by all the troops which were so long in this neighbourhood, except about 1,000 horse, which are yet at a small fort called Verah, distant about 30 kos from Surat and about the same from Songarh; and that these also were believed to intend shortly to join the rest at Tangread. The harkaras say that Daulatrao declares himself neuter and seems determined to remain with his own forces, till something decisive in the present dispute happens; and that it is believed that Phadke's forces will soon divide and proceed to their

respective homes, being much dispirited at the disappointment of their hopes in the several actions with our forces, and very discontented with Phadke.

*Nizam Ali's offer*

The Nawab here informed me that Nizam Ali has repeatedly written him to desire that he would by the means of the English mediate a peace between him and Raghoba, and promises to join with all his forces to put Raghoba into the full possession of the Maratha dominions, on condition that he gives up to him, after he is re-established, the several forts and places he took from him, and concludes a treaty with him on the same terms he offered to Nizam Ali, when he (Raghoba) was some months ago at Burhanpur and there applied to the Nizam for his assistance, which he then, having other engagements with the ministerial party, refused. The Nawab assured me that the Nizam appears to be seriously desirous of assisting Raghoba, provided that through our means he can negotiate with him a treaty on reasonable terms; but the first point he insists on is that Your Honour, &ca on the part of the Hon'ble Company guarantee whatever treaty is concluded; for he will not trust Raghoba.

*Raghoba's Camp, on the north banks of the Dahder, 8th July,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775

*Thomas Keating to Robert Gambier.*

*Treaty with Fatesing*

In my last I advised you I hoped shortly to bring Fatesing Gaikwad to settle terms with the Peshwa and to procure from him something advantageous for the Hon'ble Company. I have the pleasure to acquaint you that I have this day fully succeeded in both, and therefore flatter myself my conduct in this negotiation will meet with Your Honour, &ca's approbation.

Finding Fatesingrao Gaikwad desirous of settling matters on pacific terms, I left Dabhoi the 1st instant and came out to Raghoba's encampment on the northern banks of the Dahder, half way between Dabhoi and Baroda, as being a place on many accounts much better to transact business in than Dabhoi. I prevailed on Fatesing to come here the 5th instant. Unlucky days and other reasons prevented our settling matters until this morning, when the following terms were agreed on :

*Fatesing's cession of lands*

Fatesingrao Gaikwad is to cede to the Company the whole Broach province and every matter and thing appertaining thereto, also the village of Chikhli near Pulparah, the village of Koral in the Baroda district, and one equal in value to the village of Desbarah near Amod as we may hereafter agree upon. All these places to be made over to the Hon'ble Company in the fullest and firmest manner forever; and I expect the Broach Province this afternoon. These places are at this time in his sole possession and his actual property; and he has given them to the Hon'ble Company for the services they have rendered him in accommodating matters between him and the Peshwa, in whose names alone the treaty is made out, the Hon'ble Company being only guarantees for the due performance of the articles entered into by the contracting parties. The amount of these villages I estimate at present at one lakh and a half per annum, which is from the

best accounts under value, but they are capable of great improvement, and I doubt not under the English Government they will yield a much larger revenue.

*Gaikwad settlement* The rest of the Gujarat country now possessed by Fatesingrao Gaikwad, under the seal of Shivajirao Shamsher Bahadur, is to remain in his hands forever on the following condition:

That Fatesingrao Gaikwad shall pay to the Peshwa the sum of eight lakhs of Rupees per annum as usual; furnish 3,000 men as customary to remain in Poona or otherwise to be disposed of at the Peshwa's pleasure, and in time of necessity five thousand, the Peshwa [*meeting*] the expense of the additional two thousand. The jagir of three lakhs of Rupees, ordered by the late Madhavrao Peshwa to be paid to Govindrao Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur Senakhaskhel by Fatesingrao Gaikwad from the possession of Shivaji, shall from this day cease forever, and in lieu thereof the Peshwa engages to grant unto the said Govindrao, a jagir in the Deccan of the full sum of ten lakhs of Rupees per annum forever.

Besides the above articles, the sarkar of Poona, the Peshwa, great ministers, officers, and servants of the Darbar are to receive from Fatesingrao Gaikwad the net amount of twenty-six lakhs of Rupees in the course of sixty days.

*Another pargana* I mentioned in my last an expectation of my getting a sanad from the Peshwa for the district of Amod for the services therein set forth; but, as that piace is bestowed on the Hon'ble Company through another channel, the Peshwa has promised me an equivalent, of which I shall more fully advise Your Honour, &ca in my next, when I hope to have the grants in my possession.

1775 *Broach, 10th July*, 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*At a Consultation.*

*Sanads* Received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Cay, enclosing sanads for the pargana of Koral and the Gaikwad share of the Broach pargana.

*Col. Cay* Letter of Col. Cay, dated Raghoba's camp, north banks of the Dhadar, 9th July, 1775.

*Terms of peace* I wrote you under the 5th instant that a settlement of all affairs between the Hon'ble Company, the Peshwa and Fatesing would now take place, much to the advantage of my Hon'ble Employers. I have now great satisfaction in acquainting you that terms are agreed upon by the said parties, by which the Company are to be put into immediate possession of the whole of the Broach pargana, also the village of Chikhli near Surat, and Koral on the banks of the Narbada. Fatesing also obliges himself to cede to the Hon'ble Company another village, as may be hereafter agreed upon. equal in value to the village of Desbarah near Amod, together with all and every district and advantage depending on the said villages.

*Sanads* That no time may be lost in availing the Hon'ble Company of every advantage that can possibly arise from the above acquisition, I have got the sanads made out for the Broach pargana and the villages of Koral and Chikhli, knowing that this is the proper season for letting out and cultivating the lands. Copies of the two first are now enclosed.

*Bombay, 13th July, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)* **1775**
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

We have once more considered what you have again so strenuously set forth in respect to our supplying the Peshwa with money, and we see no reason to alter the directions that were given you on this head in our letters of the 22nd April and 3rd May; to those directions you are, therefore, to adhere. ***Money refused***

*Translate of a grant of Chikhli to the Company.*

As you have made a friendship between me and Raghunathrao Pant, I have therefore from my sarkar ceded forever to the Company a pargana called Chikhli, and the friendship must be continued without any alteration according the agreement dated 9th July. ***Chikhli sanad***

*Bellapur Camp on the northern banks of the Dahder, 22nd July, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)* **1775**
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

I have now the pleasure to acquaint Your Honour, &ca that the treaty between Raghoba and Fatesing was sealed by both parties the 18th instant with only a few trivial alterations from what I mentioned under the 8th. The delay between the 8th and 18th was occasioned by several little disputes between the contracting parties, chiefly on the side of Raghoba, but the grants to the Hon'ble Company are exactly as I then advised you; and now I have the sanads for the whole, except Variav, made over in the fullest manner to the Hon'ble Company forever. The grant for Variav I expect some time to-day. ***Treaty signed***

*Bombay, 13th July, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16A)* **1775**
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

The war we are at present engaged in for the support of Raghoba is of the utmost importance to the Hon'ble Company, as we have already fully explained to you. it, therefore, calls upon us to be particularly [*alert*] to pursue every means in our power to bring it to a speedy and successful issue; for on that will depend the great advantages that the Company are to reap by the engagements we have entered into in their behalf; and it is moreover a matter of the utmost importance to conclude the war, if possible, in the course of the ensuing season. ***Summary of events***

Our forces in every engagement with the enemy have gained all the advantages that we had reason to hope for, so far as depended on them; but, at the time we sent the body of men we did to the assistance of Raghoba, it was concluded that his own forces would be of material service in the course of the campaign. The contrary, however, has been found to be the case; and it has, therefore, frequently happened that our army has been unable to reap every advantage that might have been expected from its victories over the enemy. The commanding officer has, therefore, requested, and Raghoba has earnestly solicited a reinforcement may be sent against the time they will again be able to take the field, which will be the beginning of November next; the rainy season having obliged the army to go into quarters at Dabhoi near the banks of the Narbada; for this reinforcement, the necessity of sending which we are sufficiently convinced of, Raghoba is to make

over additional advantages to the Hon'ble Company, exclusive of those mentioned in the treaty.

*Reinforcements* We shall also require a military force for the protection of Salsette and the provinces ceded to the Company as well as to ensure the collection of the revenues of them for the ensuing season.

1775 *Bombay, 13th July,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

*Help to Govindrao* The reasons you have urged for attacking Baroda we acknowledge [*carry much*] weight; many other circumstances also concur to induce us [*to adopt*] this measure, and particularly because, situated as Baroda is so near to our own territories, it will be highly inpolitic to leave it in the hands of Fatesing, who is strongly attached to the ministerial interest,[1] and had lately, as we understand, gone to that place. We, therefore, direct that you consider the reduction of Baroda and the putting Govindrao in the possession of it as the first object of your attention, as soon as the season will admit; and you are to make the necessary dispositions accordingly. You are also from hence forward *to hold no intercourse with Fatesing, but to* assure Govindrao of our firm support.

As Raghoba as well as Govindrao is so very solicitous for the accomplishment of this point, and which indeed is more than by the treaty we are obliged to perform, it will, therefore, be necessary to insist upon their complying in some points, without which the reduction of Baroda must not be undertaken.

First, that Govindrao for himself and the Gaikwad does give up for ever all claim to any share or participation whatever in the revenues of the town and the districts of Broach. This article is indeed no more than Raghoba has engaged for by treaty, and therefore is no additional advantage more than the Company has a right to expect.

Secondly, that Raghoba does make over the pargana of Amod forever, in like manner as he has already done those of Jambusar and Olpad, and if possible, in addition to Amod you are to obtain Hansot and Desbarah.

1775 *Surat, 13th July,* 1775, (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*)
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

*Nizam's double game* I heard lately that Nizam Ali had entered into some agreement with the ministerial party, who have ceded to him the fortress of Daulatabad; but the Nawab here assures me that, notwithstanding this may be true, the Nizam will detach himself from all connections with that party, whenever he is certain of settling through our mediation a treaty with Raghoba, and desired me to write Your Honour. &ca accordingly.

1775 *Belapur Camp, 26th July,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*Thomas Keating to the Board of Broach.*

*Treaty signed* I wrote you under the 9th and 15th instant, acquainting you that a treaty was agreed on between Raghoba and Fatesing.

1 This letter was written before the news of the treaty between Raghoba and Fatesing had reached Bombay. See entry 1st August.

On the morning of the 18th instant, everything was finally concluded by the seals of both parties being affixed to the treaty, and on the 19th Fatesing returned to Baroda. He has done everything to the entire satisfaction of the Peshwa, and I flatter myself that the grants I have obtained on the occasion will be pleasing to the Hon'ble Company and the Board at Bombay.

*Surat, 27th July,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

He (Thomas Keating) further writes that Fatesing had received advice that Haripant with the remains of his forces being about 105 kos off, some on the northern, and some on the southern banks of the Narbada, that he had received bills from Poona for 15 lakhs of Rupees, with which he proposed to remain where he was till the rainy season was over, but his army all and one refused; and that the shroffs on whom the bills were drawn had refused to accept or pay them, which had caused a great deal of distress and confusion amongst his people. This is all the Colonel writes; but I hear from other quarters that Raghoba had detached a strong party of his own forces to Ahmadabad, for the surrender of which place the present Governor, Appaji Ganesh was in treaty with him and, this once effected, the country to the northward of the Narbada will be entirely reduced to obedience to Raghoba.

*Enemy troops*

*Ahmadabad*

*Dabhoi, 30th July,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

I have now the further satisfaction to acquaint Your Honour, &ca that Fatesing has already paid near two lakhs of Rupees in part of the sum stipulated, as particularly mentioned in my address of the 8th instant, and am in great hopes he will discharge the full amount within the time limited.

*Fatesing pays*

*Bombay, 1st August,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) 1775
*At a Committee.*

Read the letter received from Lt.-Colonel Keating on the 23rd instant. We are glad to find that Raghoba has obtained from the Gaikwads their cession of their rights in the town and districts of Broach, which by our treaty with him he had engaged to procure; and we approve the other cessions that have been made to the Company.

*Treaty with Fatesing*

We hope that Fatesing will be kept to his engagements, and that Govindrao is satisfied with the stipulations regarding him.

It gives us satisfaction to find that Fatesing has stipulated to pay Raghoba so considerable a sum of money as 26 lakhs of Rupees within 61 days; and as the Peshwa will by this means be in cash, Col. Keating must be ordered strenuously to urge him for the payment of the arrears of the monthly stipend and the repayment of the sum that he advances him out of the Company's money.

*Payment*

1775 *Translate of the copy of the treaty between Raghunathrao on one part, and Fatesing and Sayajirao on the other part.*

That Sayaji and Fatesing Samsher Bahadur had disobeyed and joined with the rebels, but now by the means of Colonel Keating, who for, and in, behalf of the Hon'ble United English Company, has by promising presents accommodated matters with Pandit Pradhan, the following are the articles of their proposals:

*Article 1st* That Sayaji and Fatesing Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur do hereby agree to pay the sum of eight lakhs of Rupees every year to the sarkar.

*Article 2nd* That they are as usual to attend with a troop of 3,000 good horse and men, which numbers are not to be lessened.

*Article 3rd* In the Madhavrao's time they used to pay every three years 3 lakhs of Rupees to Govindrao Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur, which sum [*they*] are settled not to pay him henceforth, and about which Govindrao is to make no claim against Sayaji and Fatesing.

*Article 4th* Khanderao Gaikwad Himmat Bahadur is to be countenanced on the same footing and agreeable to the assessment made in the time of the late Damajirao deceased.

*Article 5th* That the government and revenues of the pargana of Broach have been ceded to the Hon'ble Company agreeable to the agreement made between them and Shrimant Pant Pradhan, about which Sayaji and Fatesing are not to make any dispute.

*Article 6th* The parganas of Chikhli, Variav near Surat, and Koral near the Narbada and about 15 kos distance from Broach, which altogether makes three parganas, the Gaikwad has ceded to the Hon'ble Company forever, on account the peace they make between the Gaikwad and Shrimant Pant Pradhan.

*Article 7th* That in the Court of Shrimant Pant Pradhan the Gaikwads must pay a due attention to everything that is reasonable without having any communication with the enemies.

*Article 8th* That for the confirmation and (fulfilment) of the above articles the Hon'ble Company stands guarantee; and should the Gaikwads appear any ways false, the Hon'ble Company are not to preserve them. Raghoba is also to fulfil the above-said articles without any difference.

1775 *Jagunath Camp, 3rd August,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

***Fatesing not trusted***

I am just returned from a meeting with Govindrao. We had a very long particular conversation, which on his part was attested by the most sacred oath on his household gods.

From his relation and some other circumstances, I was this day made acquainted with, I am under no doubt that Fatesing is once more endeavouring to deceive us. Six days more will clear up the matter to a demonstration, as in that space of time he stands engaged to pay the Peshwa a very large amount, for which he seems not to make the least provision.

This conduct of Fatesing, the firm assurance of Govindrao to cheerfully comply with all that can in reason be expected form him, and your orders of the 13th ultimo have brought me to a resolution of making every preparation for undertaking the siege of Baroda. Indeed I never placed a firm reliance on Fatesing and, therefore, have been making everything ready in case of necessity.

*Bombay, 6th August,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) **1775**
*Bombay to Warren Hastings.*

***Situation of affairs*** The situation of our army in the field is the same as we last advised, the season of the year not admitting their quitting their present cantonments; but we have the pleasure to acquaint you that Raghoba has obtained a very material advantage by Fatesing's having quitted the ministerial party and come over to his. A treaty has been concluded between them, by which he is to furnish the Peshwa with the same body of forces, and to pay the same annual stipend as the Gaikwads always used to do; and he is moreover to pay the Peshwa for making peace with him 26 lakhs of Rupees within 60 days after the treaty was executed, which is above one month ago.

The immediate advantages to the Company from this event are that Fatesing has made over his right and title forever, as well as those of his family, to their share in the revenues of the town and district of Broach, which by our treaty Raghoba had obliged himself to obtain. Fatesing has also given up two districts to the Company forever, convenient to Surat and Broach, for their mediation in this business, whose annual revenues may be about 1½ lakhs of Rupees.

*Bombay, 12th August,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*A*) **1775**
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated 31st May.*

***Treaty invalid*** We have received your letter of the 31st of March with the copy of your treaty of Raghoba enclosed and the advice of your subsequent operations.

Our duty imposes upon us the painful necessity of declaring we totally condemn the measure which you have adopted, that we hold the treaty which you have entered into with Raghoba invalid, and the war which you have entered into against the Maratha State impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust; both are expressly contrary to the late Act of Parliament.

***Reckless scheme*** You have imposed on yourselves the charge of conquering the whole Maratha Empire for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual assistance in it. The plan, which you have formed, instead of aiming at a decisive conquest, portends an indefinite scene of troubles without an adequate force, without money or certain resources to extricate you from them. Nor have you the plea, either of injury sustained from the party which you have made your enemy, or of any prior obligations to defend the man whose cause you have espoused.

***Troops recalled*** We solemnly protest against you for all the consequences, and peremptorily require you to withdraw the Company's forces to your own garrision in whatever state your affairs may be, unless their safety

may be endangered by an instant retreat. We leave the means of effecting this to you, but shall expect your punctual compliance with our commands. You have neither informed us for what purpose the detachment was sent to a distance so remote from the obvious scene of its operations as Cambay, nor what plan you have concerted for their subsequent progress. You have not informed us of the situation of the places assigned you for paying the subsidy, in whose possession they were, from whom they were to be either peaceably surrendered or taken by force, nor of the amount of the ceded islands; all which points we conceive to be necessary for our information.

*Blame*

In the dangerous consequences which we apprehend from the state in which you have placed the Company's affairs in your quarter, we do not advert to any part of your conduct, which respects merely the former line of your policy. Yet, as this Government has been charged by a solemn Act of Legislature itself with the general interest of the Company in India, and armed with controlling powers over the other Presidencies, we cannot pass without notice the entire disregard which you appear to have shown to our authority. For the past we content ourselves with leaving to you the consequences of your own act; but for the future, in cases of like inattention on your part, after the peremptory injunctions we have found it necessary to prescribe for your conduct, we shall deem ourselves accountable, if we neglect to exercise the authority vested in us by the Act of Parliament for supporting the authority committed to us.

*Negotiations with Poona*

In order that nothing may be omitted on our part to extricate you from any difficulty to which your immediately relinquishing your engagement with Raghoba may expose you, it is our intention to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Maratha State at Poona as soon as possible. We shall advise you of the measures we take for this purpose. In the meantime we direct you to receive and encourage any pacific overtures that may be proposed to you, making the instant cessation of your arms and a continuance of your possession of the island of Salsette and Bassein your first object. But you are not to aim at more extensive acquisitions, nor conclude any definitive treaty without our approbation.[1]

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1 Published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, 238, 239. Hastings' letter of the 31st May reached Bombay on the 12th August. Hastings relies on information received in a letter from Bombay, dated the 31st March. He was totally unaware of the defeat and the discouragement of the Poona troops.

## No. 4. POONA ALLIANCE

### (August 1775–May 1776)

AFTER invalidating the treaty of Surat, Warren Hastings addressed himself to the ministers at Poona, and informed them of his intention to put an end to the conflict. At the same time he dispatched Colonel Upton as his plenipotentiary to the Poona Darbar to settle the terms of the new treaty. The Bombay Government, whilst obeying the orders from Fort William, made frantic efforts to make the Governor-General change his mind; but all their efforts were in vain. Meanwhile the ensuing confusion well-nigh baffles description; Raghoba was helpless and in despair; his allies, Govindrao and Fatesing, were equally perturbed; and the Poona ministers made preposterous demands. In the general confusion the Gaikwad contest was relegated in the background and came to an end. As the Bombay Government realised that they could in no way influence Warren Hastings, they left no stone unturned to make Colonel Upton realise the situation of affairs. But Colonel Upton was as impervious to reason as his master; and despite the protests of the Bombay Government he signed the treaty of Purandhar.

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## DOCUMENTS

*Bombay, 15th August,* 1775 (1775. *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) **1775**
*At a Consultation.*

Mr. Draper acquaints the Board that agreeable to their desire he has had a meeting with the Maratha agents.

The agents acquainted him the first proposals they were empowered to make, about four months ago, were that we should return to them Salsette and Karanja and to deliver up Raghoba into their hands, and that afterwards they were authorised, on condition with our compliance with those proposals, to agree to the defraying our expenses; and though Mr. Draper imagines the agents must have been empowered to make up far more reasonable overtures, previous to their knowing that the Governor-General and Council had written to their sarkar, the agents would not acknowledge that they had any further powers, and then proposed, acquainting them what he had to offer; in reply to which he observed that those proposals were so totally inadmissible that he could say nothing to them. ***Sheer arrogance***

Fatal interference

We can never sufficiently lament this most unfortunate interference of the Governor-General and Council in the peremptory and positive manner they have done, which is the more particularly unlucky for our Hon'ble Employers, as from the very favourable situation of affairs at present, and the accession of power and strength acquired by Raghoba in his late treaty with Fatesing, and the falling off of other late adherents to the ministerial party, likewise from the great loss they have sustained in the several engagements with our forces, their army is at present so broken and dispirited that from various concurrent testimonies we have every reason to think that it would have been quite out of the power of the ministerialists to have brought more than an inconsiderable force into the field on the opening of the season. Nay we are convinced that Raghoba might have been carried with facility to Poona shortly after the opening of the season, and been replaced in the seat of his ancestors; and certain it is from the past that the nearer he would have advanced towards his capital, the stronger would have been his party by the falling off of one or other of the opposite one, and by the junction of those who wish to declare in his favour, yet dare not attempt, till he is at hand, to afford him support; and indeed we have great reason to conclude, that on his arrival at Poona there would not have been any considerable declared enemy in all his dominions to have opposed him. But even had not that been the case in the event of his arrival, the Company were entitled to every advantage stipulated by treaty, whether he afterwards succeeded or not. However by the orders before us from Bengal and by the measure, the Governor-General and Council have so very impolitically taken, of declaring our want of power, their orders to us and their intentions at once to the ministerial confederacy, as it appears they have done by the copy of the Governor Hasting's letter to Sakharam Bapu, noticed above, and translated as entered hereafter, we say by this very impolitic step the ministerialists have every advantage given them that they could even wish for. They thereby know that we cannot prosecute the war or afford Raghoba any further support; and therefore, as it appears by Mr. Draper's conference with their agents, who came here some time ago to make overtures of peace, they will not now make any offer that can in the least degree be deemed admissible, and thereby the certainty we had of acquiring the revenue for the Hon'ble Company of about £ 250,000 per annum, so necessary for enabling this Presidency to support itself, is in a great measure lost and will, we much fear, be entirely so, unless the gentlemen at Bengal can be induced to revoke or reverse their present orders. Besides, by their mode of proceeding, the proper influence of this Government is injured in a manner scarcely to be retrieved, nor do they seem in the least to have attended to the very pernicious consequences that must ensue in all probability from our breach of faith to Raghoba.

1775 *Bombay, 23rd August,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

Bombay achievement

You know that our forces were sent to Cambay, as represented in our letter to Bengal of the 31st of March, for effecting a junction, as they did near that place with the Peshwa's army, and that the plan

laid down was for them to proceed from thence to Poona; that the countries ceded to the Company for ever, except Salsette and Bassein, are such as lay nearest and most convenient to Surat and Broach, and whose revenues could, therefore, be collected with less expense and greater facility; that we have since obtained sanads from the Gaikwads for their share in Broach and its districts; that Raghoba has since given up Amod for ever; and Fatesing, for negotiating his treaty, has made over Koral, Chikhli and Variav for ever to the Company, which with Amod may be an addition of about two lakhs and an half per annum, and consequently increase the revenues of the whole of the territories made over to the Company, according to their present estimate, to nearly 22 lakhs per annum.

*Bombay, 19th August*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

We sincerely lament that these Gentlemen [*of Fort William*] have so unluckily taken upon themselves to interfere, as they have done, at this juncture, because we are sensible that the fate of Raghoba and the securing to the Company the great advantages stipulated to them by treaty depended in a great measure on carrying him to Poona, as we hoped to be able shortly to do; yet circumstanced as we are with respect to the Bengal Gentlemen, we are under an absolute necessity of ordering, as we now most positively do, that you cease committing any manner of hostility against the ministerial party, unless you should be attacked by them, which we conclude will not be the case; and you are consequently to remain quiet in your present situation and not to move from it, until we shall send you orders to return to our garrison; which we shall, as soon as the season will admit. ***Orders to Keating***

*Bombay, 19th August*, 1775, (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*William Hornby to Raghoba.*

In these days I have received letters from the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, in which they acquaint me that they esteem it for the interest of the Hon'ble Company and for that of the Maratha State to bring the present war to a conclusion. They have written to the Ministers to the same purport, and the latter have in consequence sent orders to all their officers not to commit any further act of hostility either against the forces of the Hon'ble Company, or against you, or those of your friends and allies. This I hope will be strictly observed, and in this hope I have sent orders to Colonel Keating to forbear all further acts of hostility; and I request you will do the same to your officers, and that you will order your friends and allies to do the like. Until peace may be restored, everything is to remain in the same state as at present; and that your interest and safety may be taken care of in the treaty which is to take place, I shall send a member of my Council to Bengal to endeavour to promote your interest and to endeavour to convince the Governor-General and Council of Bengal of your greatness, of your right to the supreme power over the Marathas, and of your great regard to the Hon'ble Company, which you have manifested by the treaty you concluded with myself and Council. I assure you of every support and assistance in my po- ***Informing Raghoba***

wer to give both now and hereafter, and that I sincerely wish you health and success. What need I say more ?

1775 *Mustubag Camp*, 21*st August*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing made to pay* Early on that day [15th *August*] Captain Scott's detachment with five pieces of ordnance decamped their ground at the village of Jaggernaut, and halted within about one thousand yards of Baroda. At two, the same evening, he was joined by Capt. Westphal from Dabhoi, with the 2nd Grenadiers Company, some sepoys, and six additional cannon. This near approach to the town produced hourly assurances from Fatesing of his intended punctuality. But warned by every former knowledge of his character and the best reason for questioning his veracity in the payment of the first two lakhs, I confided nothing in him, but made every preparation as though the attack of the town were certain; and even determined on what part it might be best attacked.

I still employed the time in every necessary preparation, and on the 17th urged the immediate payment of such part as by the treaty then became due. Promises were at first the only assurances Fatesing returned. He next made the proposition of coming into our camp, and requested my written declaration of his continuing here in safety; to which I answered that, though I listened to his intention, I must nevertheless limit the promise of my protection to the hour of 12 the same day and no longer, as he must be sensible his payment was then to be made good. Thus pre-advised, he yet deferred quitting his town till eight at night, when he declared his intention of erecting his tent near mine, and [*at last*] fulfilled on his part what he had by treaty [*promised*]. I was notwithstanding obliged to continue importuning him till the 20th; when receiving the same evasive answers as before, I was then compelled to tell him much stricter guard must be kept over him than had already been, if he persisted in his delays. He still affirmed he intended fulfilling his part of the engagement, and that its having been in so great a degree violated and infringed by the troops of the Peshwa and Govindrao, more especially those of the latter, who were continually committing depredations on his villages and had even murdered the inhabitants, and he having made a discovery of intrigue and duplicity in his Diwan, (who had certainly been put to death by one of his principal officers in my tent, had I not interfered) were the only reasons for having delayed acceding to the treaty hitherto. He then solemnly promised he would the next day pay ten lakhs, inclusive of the sums already paid; and added it was absolutely necessary he should first go into town, no one but himself being acquainted where a principal part of his treasures lay deposited; and that I might be under no apprehension for his return, he previously sent for his only daughter and left her with four of his principal officers as hostages, till I again saw him, which was within two hours from his leaving the camp. Immediately after his discharging the present payment, he desired such villages, as Govindrao has possessed himself of, may be restored to him; when a further sum of five lakhs shall be paid ten days after he is possessed of one of them; and the remaining amount [*shall be*] dis-

charged by the time expressed in his agreement with the Peshwa; to all which propositions the latter readily assents.

*Mustubag Camp, 30th August,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) **1775**
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

Your letter of the 19th instant I received the 28th following, and Your Honour, &ca may depend on my strictest attention to every part of the orders contained therein. I lost no time in waiting on the Peshwa to deliver him the Hon'ble the President's letter. His disappointment on the perusal of it, though truly great, did not exceed his wonted firmness of mind. After dwelling a while on it, he told me his reliance was still on the English, with whom he should concur in whatever they might determine; [*this*] should be his conduct from this time forward. My general advice to him tended only to recommend a residence at Bombay, and wait the event of the pending treaty. Being at this time on the march, he deferred any final resolve, till I waited on him again. ***Raghoba upset***

With all due submission I suggest Your Honour, &ca what I fear will be the fatal consequence to this country and our own possessions in it, should we suddenly quit it and leave the whole at the mercy of the Peshwa's army, with Fatesing alone to oppose them, that the whole will become an instant scene of rapine and devastation; which I am the more inclined to apprehend from the recent [conduct] of Govindrao especially. The only alternatives, which offer themselves in opposition, are in my opinion, either to supply Fatesing with stores, &ca to expel Govindrao from the Gujarat province, or remain ourselves on the frontiers of our own parganas, ready to resent any hostilities practised. Fatesing, I have not a doubt, would readily share the expense of our army continuing in this country for the last purpose, as his own parganas would remain secure by our presence. ***Various proposals***

A material part of my advice to the Peshwa this day will be to detach his army towards Ahmadabad, and when far removed, accompany me whither I may be directed by Your Honour &ca; or if he prefers it, proceed immediately to Bombay, till he knows the results of the negotiation of the Supreme Council with the Poona ministry.

*Bombay, 31st August,* 1775 (1775 *P. D. Let. to Court of Dir.* 22) **1775**
*Bombay to the Court of Directors.*

41. In consequence of some overtures made by an agent of Raghoba, the Peshwa or Supreme Governor in the Maratha Empire, to the Chief of Surat for the assistance of a body of the Company's forces to reduce his enemies, the ministerial party, which were communicated to the Select Committee, they judged it a most favourable opportunity to procure a grant for Bassein and such other places as lay convenient for the Company near Surat and Broach, whose revenues might produce such an annual amount as would enable this Presidency to support itself, without being obliged any longer to draw such considerable annual sums from Bengal, as we have of late been obliged to do. They, therefore, entered into a negotiation for this purpose, as they were of opinion, and which certainly was the case, that in this time of profound peace a body of our forces might very well be spared for some months, ***Bombay achievement***

when the object to be gained for the Company was so very important as that [*which*] they had in view, namely to acquire a permanent revenue of near nineteen lakhs of Rupees per annum, more especially as there was but little doubt of Raghoba's fully succeeding in the accomplishment of his wishes, when our weight was thrown into his scale.

42. It was from these motives that the negotiation with Raghoba was begun, and that the treaty was at length concluded by us, the Committee having communicated all their proceedings in this business, some time before it was brought to an issue, when those members who were not of the Comittee entirely concurred in the expediency of the measures than [*then*] in agitation, as Your Honours will observe by our proceedings entered in the diary of the Select Committee under the 19th and 22nd January, 10th and 11th February, to which permit us to refer you.

43. A copy of the treaty with Raghoba is in the packet under No. 45, which, we flatter ourselves, Your Honours will be of opinion is as advantageous as you could have wished, more especially when it is at the same time considered that the only article in which we are bound, is to assist with a body of your forces, the expense of which is to be largely paid for.

44. In consequence of this treaty a body of your forces is at present engaged in the support of Raghoba and his cause under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating; but for every particular respecting this affair, the success that has hitherto attended their proceedings, their expectation, situation and designs, permit us to refer you to the Select Committee, with whom, agreeable to your orders such matters rest, and in whose diary the whole will appear as well as the reasons for the appointment of Lieutenant-Col. Keating to this command, when the General objected to it; and a further reason for our referring entirely to the Select Committee is that those members now of the Board, who are not in that Committee, were not admitted of council till some time after the treaty was entirely concluded.

45. We shall, therefore, here only speak of such public proceedings in consequence of these engagements as have come before the Board at large and will appear on our proceedings.

46. Sundry districts being made over to the Company by treaty, situated most convenient to Surat and Broach (exclusive of Bassein and its dependencies), we took into consideration the 24th March, as soon as the treaty was ratified, in what manner the revenues could be best collected [*and*] their future government best provided for; when we determined that the parganas of Jambusar, Amod and Anklesvar should be put under the direction of the Chief and factors at Broach, Olpad and Versaul (*Valsad*) under those at Surat. The lateness, however, of the season, at the time matters were so far concluded as to require our giving these directions, together with the weakness of the garrisons at Surat and Broach by the drafts made from thence for the army, added to the pandits of the several places being at that time mostly in the ministerial interest, would not admit of much being done, either as to taking possession, or collecting the revenues of them; some steps, however, were taken, the particulars of which Your Honours

will be informed of by the letters from those places, entered in our inward letter book now transmitted; but we are not yet advised from either place what the amount may be of the collections that have been made on the Company's account.

47. Notwithstanding we have the sanads for Bassein, it has not yet been in our power to obtain possession of it; the fort is strong, and it is garrisoned by the ministerialists; however we hope some favourable opportunity may offer ere long to obtain it, the right of possessing it by the grant of Raghoba, who alone had power to give it, being now vested in the Hon'ble Company.

*Mustubag Camp, 2nd September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 1775) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba's feelings*

He (Raghoba) wished [*that*] prior to any decision those gentlemen would [*give ear*] to every evidence that can be produced by him and by the adverse party; when. if it should be fully proven to their satisfaction that a lawful son of Narayanrao exists, let such son be appointed Peshwa and himself, as next of blood, act as his Dewan, until his minority expires, at which period he will rest satisfied with a provision independent of any employment; but on the contrary, should it prove to the Governor-General and Council that the child, said to be the son of Narayanrao, is an imposture—and which he doubts not to make evident—then he is justly entitled to the peshwaship of the Maratha dominion, with which, if he is immediately invested, as instantly he means to fulfil the whole of his engagements with the Hon'ble Company. This he closed with the declaration, if it should be his further ill-fortune to be totally disappointed in these expectations from the Governor-General and Council, it was his fixed resolve and indeed appeared his final resort to appeal to the Company, whose known equitable character he was well acquainted with.

*Mustubag Camp, 6th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Raghoba helpless*

In those letters, the duplicate of which I now enclose, I have been so minute and circumstantial that nothing now remains to inform Your Honour, &ca of, but that Fatesing has not yet experienced those assurances, the Peshwa gave at the payment of the ten lakhs, of repossessing him of the whole of his parganas; which at once infringes the treaty on the part of the latter. The little influence the Peshwa has over Govindrao, since he has learned the contents of your letter of the 19th ultimo, best apologizes for this breach of promise. Indeed I cannot avoid the declaration that the English faith may in future be justly questioned, unless Fatesing benefits by the treaty, which they have in some degree guaranteed and derived considerable advantage from. The Peshwa, as Your Honour, &ca may well suppose, continues greatly depressed. He meets with every consolation I can afford his situation by assuring him how much Your Honour, &ca are interesting yourselves for him in having sent a member of your Board to discuss his cause with the Supreme Council.

*7th September* (*diary entry*), 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Govindrao to Thomas Keating.*

*Govindrao's appeal*

Your friendly discourse with Narayan Ganesh has already been communicated to me by a letter from him in consequence of your let-

ter. I [*am*] sixty kos from Cambay, of which you are well acquainted, and it was on account of your friendship; but as now happens, so I trust upon you; and what can I help it! For it is my disgrace, and I will not put a word upon you hereafter. I hope you will look on my business, of which I have your full confidence. Therefore you are not to omit the opportunity; and by your endeavours should it not be done? Wherever I go, I am far from you. What shall [I] say more ? For you are well acquainted with all matters. Further Narayan Ganesh will personally talk with you at large. Pray always write me letters to console my soul.

1775 *Mustubag Camp, 8th September,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*Thomas Keating to the Board of Broach.*

*Fatesing's request* Fatesing has just desired me to inform you that five boats belonging to him were taken by Mr. Shaw's orders from Sinor and other places on the Narbada about two or three months past; and he now requests you will give orders for their being restored to the person he now sends (Rama Patel) to Broach to point them out.

1775 *Bombay, 9th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*At a Consultation.*

*Bombay indignant* We are very much concerned to find that the Governor-General and Council should have been so hasty in sending Lieut.-Col. Upton to Poona, without waiting for further advices from us. Sorry are we to say that this step is most derogatory to this Presidency and almost entirely defeating the end for which Mr. Tayler was deputed to Bengal; and it is well worthy of remark that, notwithstanding they complain want of sufficient information as to the present state of affairs in the letter before us, and acknowledge by their instructions to Colonel Upton, the little acquaintance they have with the nature of the Maratha State, the situation of the affairs of the confederacy or of Raghoba, yet have they given this Gentleman plenipotentiary powers to treat of, and to conclude, just as he thinks proper, almost every matter respecting the interests of this Presidency, with which of course he must be less acquainted than even the Governor-General and Council seem to be, and this, as appears from the instructions before us, without even ordering him to apply to us for advice, information or instructions in regard to any single point whatever, though it should seem from the translate of the Governor-General's letter to Sakharam Bapu, entered on the 18th ultimo, wherein he speaks of the vicinity of Bombay to Poona, that he did of course intend to carry on the negotiation in concert with us; and we think the indignity they have shown us by this manner of proceeding well deserves to be particularly noticed to the Hon'ble Company, our Employers, that through their interference the like may be prevented in time to come.

1775 *Bombay, 9th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Fatesing to William Hornby.*

*Professions of friendship* We have a firm friendship subsisting between us, in so much that I cannot hereby express. I as an old friend wish that our friendship may be increased daily more and more, please God. I do not

want anything else but Your Honour's favour and kindness; and pray God will send it, that all the business be done agreeable to the wishes. Now the affairs of my side have been settled by means of Colonel Saheb, all which Mr. Forbes, who now goes to you, is very well acquainted with; and when he will wait upon you, will tell you everything regarding the settlement of the affairs of the other side. Your Honour has the care and regard of the credit of what is settled; and I have full hopes that Your Honour will grant your favour in all the business; in doing which our friendship will be more fast. God will not, I hope, decrease our said friendship upon any accounts; and I further hope that Your Honour will continue honouring me with your favourable letters.

*Mustubag Camp, 10th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest*

Since addressing Your Honour, &ca under the 6th instant, duplicate of which is enclosed, the partisans of Govindrao have expressed themselves to me anxious for an accommodation between their Master and Fatesing, concluding, as I imagine, his hopes from the Peshwa, if not totally frustrated by the interference of the Supreme Council, yet wear an extremely doubtful aspect. Till the receipt of the President's letter of the 19th ultimo it was the Peshwa's intention to have reduced Ahmadabad for Govindrao; but having no claim to our assistance since that time, he cannot expect success from his army alone. Consequently Govindrao must continue still unprovided for. If the negotiation should again be entered upon between Fatesing and Govindrao, the latter would stipulate an equal partition of the whole of the Gaikwad revenues to be the portion of each, though I am well persuaded he would prefer a third part to remaining any longer a dependant on the Peshwa, curcumstanced as he is likely to be. Whatever may be the settlement between the brothers, it cannot in my humble opinion affect the grants made by Sayajirao Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur to the Hon'ble Company. Of course this can be of no consequence to them.

*Bombay, 10th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*At a Consultation.*

*Policy to be followed*

Govindrao has always been attached to Raghoba and to his cause, and is so still, for anything we know to the contrary; and as the Select Committee in their advices to the Colonel did on that account always wish to support his cause, it appears very extraordinary that the Colonel should at once adopt so different a system of politics, as he appears to have done in that part of his letter now before us,[1] wherein, without assigning any reason for the alteration, he speaks of expelling Govindrao [*from*] the Gujarat province, and of remaining firmly attached to Fatesing, who, he says, will readily bear a part of the expense of any army for continuing in that country. This must be remarked to Colonel Keating, who must be acquainted that we neither can nor shall embrace the cause of one or the other; that we wish everything may remain upon the same footing, as when the cessation of arms took place, till we hear from Bengal, or Colonel Upton may

1 See Keating's letter dated 30th August, marginal heading: *Various proposals.*

settle matters. In the meantime he is to follow our orders, by coming into our own parganas with the Company's forces, and with Raghoba, and with such part of Raghoba's [*forces*] as he (Raghoba) may be able to maintain; and there they must remain quiet till further orders, unless the Company's possessions should be attacked, in which case force must be repelled by force.

*Raghoba's hopes* The Governor-General and Council and Lieut.-Colonel Upton must be acquainted with Raghoba's expectations in case of a treaty taking place; and his pretentions [must be] particularly noticed to the Hon'ble Company, and their sentiments desired thereon.

1775 *Broach*, 14*th September*, 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261 *A*)
*William Shaw to the Committee.*

*Fatesing's boats* The boats you mention were taken away by Raghoba's desire, when Fatesing and the ministerial army were near the river, that they might be of no use to them. They have been long since ordered by me to be given up to the proprietors, and accordingly either three or four of them are gone; the other, it seems, is hauled up near the phurja, ready also to be delivered to the proper claimants.

1775 *Bombay*, 14*th September*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16 *B*)
*Bombay Board to the Company.*

*Maratha agents arrogant* At our next meeting, which was on the 18th ultimo, Mr. Draper reported that he had a meeting with the ministerial agents agreeable to our desire; but that, instead of opening themselves on the proposals they were first furnished with, they showed him a letter from the Governor-General and Council to Sakharam Bapu, the Chief of the confederacy at Poona, conformable to their letter to us of the 31st of May, acquainting them of our total want of power and authority for what we had done and of their orders to us to cease hostilities and to withdraw the forces of the Company. For the particulars of this conference permit us to refer Your Honours to our minutes of that day, and only here remark that we could not draw from the agents the nature of the proposals they were at first empowered to make, though we are perfectly satisfied from the very low situation to which the affairs of the confederacy were reduced before the unhappy interference of the Governor-General and Council that they must have had advantageous proposals to offer for the Company; for otherwise in the flourishing situation of our affairs and those of Raghoba what could it have availed them to make any overtures but such as they could suppose would have been admitted! They have, however, it seems vast expectations from the interference of the Governor-General and Council, and therefore immediately sent orders, as we are assured, to their officers to cease from all hostilities, and that they have agreed that everything shall remain in its present situation till a treaty may be finally concluded; and well they may, as in all probability, had the Gentlemen at Bengal adopted our sentiments of this business and permitted us to proceed on our plan to its final issue, the ministerial confederacy would have been entirely broken, and Raghoba replaced in the seat of his ancestors—at least we had great reason to expect it.

Whereas by the orders from Bengal and by the measures the Governor-General and Council have so very impolitically adopted of declaring our total want of power, their orders to us, and their intentions at once to the ministerial confederacy, and this even before the least preliminary towards a pacification was agreed on, they have given that party every advantage they could even wish. For they know that we cannot prosecute the war, nor afford Raghoba any further support; and therefore as Your Honours will observe by Mr. Draper's conference with them they will now make no offers that are in every degree admissible; and thus the moral certainly we had of acquiring a revenue for the Company of about £ 250,000 sterling per annum, so very necessary for enabling this Presidency to support itself, is put to a great risk and, we fear, will be entirely lost, unless the Bengal Gentlemen can be induced to revoke or palliate their orders. *Fatal interference*

Besides, by the above mode of proceeding the proper influence of this Government is injured in a manner scarcely to be retrieved; nor do the Governor General and Council seem to have attended to the very pernicious consequences that must in all probability ensue from our breach of faith to Raghoba; nor do they speak of his interest in the least, or consider the attention we certainly owe him, but only to think of making a peace with his rebellious subjects, whom they term the Maratha State.

From all these circumstances we are clearly convinced that the Governor-General and Council are not properly acquainted with the policy or situation of the Maratha Government, and we fear that they have formed their judgment from private and partial representations. At the same time from the general terms in which they have expressed their disapprobation of our measures, it seemed quite out of our power by letter to remove their objections, though Your Honours' interest much required that they should be immediately removed. We, therefore, esteemed it highly necessary to depute a member of our Board to proceed to Bengal for more effectually accomplishing these points; and the President through Mr. Draper nominated Mr. William Tayler for this commission. We appointed him for that purpose, and he accordingly proceeded on the *Terrible* to Bengal on the 30th of ultimo. *Tayler sent to Calcutta*

But, situated as we are with respect to the Bengal Gentlemen and of whose power we are fully sensible, we resolved in compliance with their positive order, however contrary at present we think it to the interest of the Company, to cause a cessation of arms to take place; directions for which are sent [*to*] Col. Keating· and it has been published to your forces here and at the adjacent settlements, though not a single preliminary is yet adjusted; and your forces have been further directed to return into your territories near to Surat or Broach, as soon as the season will permit them to move with their stores. *Orders obeyed*

Raghoba will of course be greatly and justly alarmed, as soon as he learns his present situation clearly. Many of his adherents, we apprehend, will immediately fall from him, when they understand that our hands are tied up from affording him any further support; and we fear that it will be the means of inducing Fatesing to evade paying the large sum of money which he engaged to the Peshwa to do, and which was so very necessary to assist in the re-establishment of the *Raghoba alarmed*

Peshwa's affairs. The President, however, has written him a suitable letter on the occasion; and we have ordered Col. Keating to assure him of our good will, and that his interest shall be taken care of in the definitive treaty as far as it may be in our power. At any rate we have assured him of any asylum in any of our settlements till Your Honours' orders may be received on the subject.

*Upton's mission*

It appears to us a matter truly to be regretted that your Governor-General and Council should have been so hasty in sending Lieut.-Colonel Upton on this embassy without waiting for further advices from us. It is a step most derogatory to this Presidency and almost entirely defeating the end for which we have deputed Mr. Tayler to Bengal. It is also well worthy of remark that, notwithstanding they complain of want of sufficient information as to the present state of affairs, in their very letter of which we are speaking, and acknowledge by their instructions to Colonel Upton the little acquaintance they have with the nature of the Maratha State, the situation of the affairs of Raghoba or of the confederacy, yet have they given this Gentleman plenipotentiary powers to treat of, and to conclude, just as he may think proper, almost every matter respecting the interests of this Presidency, with which of course he must be less acquainted than even the Governor-General and Council, and this, as appears from the instructions entered under the 5th instant, without even ordering him to apply to us for instruction.

*Bombay fears*

What may be the result, and how matters may be finally determined, is not in our power to advise; but we much fear that Raghoba will not be considered in the manner he ought. We also fear that the ministerialists will never consent to give up Bassein, or to the Company continuing in the possession of Salsette and the parganas ceded to them by Raghoba near to Surat and Broach. That we are clearly convinced that, had the Governor-General and Council left to us to negotiate the accommodation without at once absolutely ordering a cessation of arms and acquainting at the same time the enemy that they had done so, that we could have obtained as advantageous terms as we could have wished for our Hon'ble Employers, and terms of advantage for Raghoba. How different then would have been the situation of the Company's affairs to what they now are. Had they interfered no further than to order an accommodation, everything would have been well; whereas they have put to the greatest hazard the certainty we otherwise had of obtaining an annual revenue for Your Honours of about £ 250,000 sterling. Such are the unhappy effects of the first exertion of the Governor-General and Council's power over this Presidency, and therefore your orders on the subject are earnestly requested by us.

*Forces retire*

We have ordered your forces into your newly acquired parganas near to Surat or Broach, till we may find what will be likely to be the issue of the important matters at present pending.

1775 *Mustubag Camp, 18th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)

*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Govindrao's demands*

I have now pleasure to enclose to Your Honour, &ca duplicate of my last address to you under the 10th instant. The Peshwa has

since that date got Fatesing to give up to Govindrao one-third of the Gaikwad possessions upon certain conditions, but notwithstanding this offer is infinitely more than he has a right to expect, or was ever before stipulated for him, yet he and his partisans pretend not to be satisfied and in a degree insist on the Peshwa ceding a considerable part of his own country to make up what, it is said, Govindrao ought to have. This unreasonable demand was rejected by the Peshwa for good reasons: first, that Govindrao in receiving the third of the Gaikwad country is well provided for; and should the Peshwa give way to his demand for an addition, it is no other than a fore-runner of many such arbitrary, unreasonable demands, planned by a cabal of the principal men in his army. Two days since, Govindrao's force drew off from the Peshwa to the distance of six kos; and I could wish to be able to add they were entirely out of the Gujarat country, to which they are equally destructive as the plague of Egypt. How this business will end is hard to say. The friends of Govindrao throw out hints of complaining to you against the Peshwa; but, as he deserves no favour, so do I hope he will meet with no encouragement from Your Honour, etc.

*New pargana from Fatesing*

Some time past Mr. Gambier mentioned to me a village so contiguous to our pargana of Olpad as to make it inconvenient to us to be in the possession of any other Power, and wishing Fatesing, to whom it belongs, would make [*it*] over to the Company. Though the reason is far from being sufficiently powerful to induce a man to give up his property for nothing, yet knowing Fatesing's friendly wishes to the Company, I applied to him for it; and it is with great satisfaction I now acquaint Your Honour, &ca that he with great cheerfulness agreed to cede it to the Hon'ble Company, and has promised that the necessary sanads shall be made out as soon as a proper provision is fixed on for a fakir or gosain that now has a jagir on the said village named Deballia.

Fatesing has this instant sent me the sanads for the village of Deballia with the necessary orders for its being delivered to the Company. The latter I shall immediately forward to Mr. Gambier.

*Bombay, 19th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) **1775**
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

*Policy to be followed*

We have already acquired for our Hon'ble Employers as large a territorial revenue as we think their interest require; other reasons also forbid our aiming at more extensive acquisitions. You are from henceforward to aim at procuring no further grants from any one, but to exert every proper means for securing the debt due from the Peshwa in a more eligible way.

We also direct that you enter upon no negotiation whatever with any party, nor continue any that you may have begun; but that you retire into the parganas ceded to the Company in the manner laid down in our letter of the 6th instant.

*Broach, 25th September,* 1775 (1775, *Br. F.* 261)
*Sanads.*

*Sanads*

The principal inhabitants having been directed to assemble in the Darbar square at 10 o'clock this morning, the Peshwa's sanad for

the pargana of Amod was published, together with the Gaikwad sanads for the pargana of Koral and their share of the Broach revenues, the translates of all which are entered hereafter.

*Translate of a sanad under the great seal of Raghunathrao Peshwa Pandit Pradhan.*

Be it known to the desmukh and despande of Amod, on the *Amod* part of the illustrious Raghunath Bajirao, that in 1176 I have dismissed the former kamavisdar, and in this present year have delivered the same unto the Hon'ble Company; on this account, therefore, you are to be ever present to their command and be fully sensible that the Company are invested with the full authority of the aforesaid pargana. Dated 13th Jamadi-al-akhir or the 21st day of August.

*Translate of a sanad under the great seal of Sayaji Gaikwad, son of Damaji, Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur.*

*Broach* To the havaldars, kamavisdars, etc. officers of the pargana of Broach.

Wealth and the favour of the great ever attend you. Sayajirao Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur having in the year 1176 (or the year 1775 of the Christian era) settled the terms of peace and friendship with the English, the high and illustrious Raghunath Bajirao and myself have both of our free will and accord given unto the Hon'ble United English East India Company from our sarkar forever the usual three shares possessed by us of the pargana afore-said. In order that our friendship, may remain perfect, and that no cause of dispute may ever happen, all officers whatever are to render due obedience to this my command, and on sight of this deed they are instantly to deliver up the three shares afore-said. To this deed I have caused my seal to be affixed at Bittoopoor *(Bhillupur)* 17th Jamadi-al-awal (or 16th July), closed with the small seal of the said Sayajirao Gaikwad.

*Translate of a sanad under the great seal of Sayaji Gaikwad, son of Damaji, Samsher Bahadur.*

*Koral* To the havaldars, kamavisdars, etc. officers of the pargana of Koral.

Wealth and the favour of the great attend you. Sayajirao Gaikwad Samsher Bahadur having in the year 1176 (or 1775 of the Christian era) settled the terms of peace and friendship with the English, the high and illustrious Raghunath Bajirao and myself have both of our free will and accord given unto the Hon'ble English East India Company from our sarkar forever the afore-said Koral. In order that our friendship may remain perfect, and that no cause of dispute may hereafter arise, all officers whatever of my sarkar are to render due obedience to this my command, and on sight of this deed they are instantly to deliver up the pargana afore-said. To this deed I have caused my seal to be affixed. Dated at [*Bhillupur*] 17th Jamadi-al-awal (or 16th July), closed with the small seal of the said Sayaji Gaikwad.

1775 *Mustubag Camp, 27th September,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest* I wish I could give Your Honour, etc. pleasing accounts concerning the Gaikwad family, but their business is nothing advanced

towards a settlement since the date of my last, and Fatesing has at my request agreed to deliver to Govindrao one-third of the Gaikwad possessions, which produces a revenue of eighteen lakhs or a net one of ten; and the Peshwa—has offered to add jagirs of three lakhs per annum; yet Govindrao is so perverse as to refuse it, and prefers to it the life of a freebooter. I am utterly at a loss how to account for such strange behaviour, but must suppose it is more owing to bad advice than absolute want of sense, and knowing that the offer ought to be esteemed greatly beyond his expectations.

*Mustubag Camp*, 1*st. October*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

Agreeable to Your Honour, &ca's desire I shall now proceed to give reasons for my change of sentiments with respect to Govindrao. In my letter of the 9th August I informed you I had that evening a long and particular conversation with Govindrao. I first observed to him how exceedingly distressed the Peshwa was for money to carry on the current expense of his army; that, without a considerable supply, his affairs, though we afforded him every other assistance, were not likely to succeed; that he (Govindrao) and his friends allowed, supposing he was possessed of Baroda, unable to secure such a supply; therefore had the Peshwa determined to treat with Fatesing. But prior thereto he had resolved to allow him a jagir of ten lakhs of Rupees per annum and one fort; that now the treaty stood as follows: Fatesing was bound to pay a very large amount to the Peshwa in the course of the ten following days; and the Peshwa to prevent any kind of molestation in his country; that to this time Fatesing had made loud complaints of the depredations of Godvindrao, and alleged that as a reason for his not having paid a large amount; that Govindrao knew that the English were bound in a degree for the performance of the treaty; and, therefore, it ought to be his great care not to infringe it, and more especially as he professed a reliance on their friendship. I then acquainted him of your friendly intentions towards him, and upon this ensued what I related to you in my letter of the 9th August. Then I proposed to Govindrao that, agreeable to an order sent him by the Peshwa for delivering Fatesing six parganas, that were then in his possession, he should send me sanads for two of them, and he and his army remain perfectly quiet and give no kind of molestation to Fatesing for the ten following days; since, if he acted so, and Fatesing failed in payment, we should attack Baroda. He agreed to both, and solemnly declared to abide strictly thereby. Next day Govindrao sent me sanads for the parganas, and by the Peshwa's desire a purvoe of mine and two sepoys were sent to Padra, which was delivered to them; but in three days after they were turned out in a disgraceful manner, nor did a day pass without Govindrao and his people continuing or, if possible, increasing their former improper conduct. It was the above glaring breach of promise that first established in my mind an unfavourable impression of Govindrao, and subsequent events have justified it. While there was a fair prospect of his obtaining Ahmadabad and a jagir of ten lakhs per annum, he treated it highly; the cessation of

*Govindrao's conduct*

hostilities clouded the prospect; and then he wished to have what before he slighted. Lately Fatesing has consented to make over to Govindrao the third part of the Gaikwad territories, amounting to eighteen lakhs of Rupees per annum, and capable of great increase by proper regulations. To this the Peshwa offers to add three lakhs of Rupees per annum. This, too, is treated with contempt, and he rather chooses to ramble over the country levying monies by every kind of cruelty. This description, to my best belief, is really just, perhaps rather favourable. Enclosed is the paper containing the offer made yesterday by Fatesing, at the Peshwa's Darbar. Some of Gonvindrao's friends were present, who declared they did not believe he would accept of it. Being present, I asked of the Peshwa if Govindrao was the very staunch friend to him that fame proclaimed, if he had ruined his fortune in supporting his cause, and whether he had shown himself ready to act reasonably. The Peshwa answered negatively to all, observing that he had bad advisers, and was himself but a weak-minded man, and concurred in an observation made, that in the different actions he never drew his sword. I could enlarge greatly on this subject, were I inclined; but I hope it is sufficient to be able to account Your Honour, &ca for my not esteeming Govindrao in the light I once did.

1775 *Mustubag Camp, 8th October,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Four villages from Fatesing*

On the first instant I received a letter from Mr. Mostyn, wherein he mentions his wish of the Hon'ble Company obtaining some villages from Fatesingrao Gaikwad, that were formerly a part of the Broach pargana, but separated therefrom for upwards of forty years, and now known under the denomination of the autgaums. There are twelve in number, but four are in the heart of Broach pargana, consequently improper to be possessed by any other Power.

It is some time since I mentioned to Fatesing the above business. He expressed his willingness of obliging the Hon'ble Company and pleasing Your Honour, &ca by every possible means in his power; yet desired to defer giving his consent thereto, until convinced Your Honour, &ca were inclined to esteem him as a man who much wished and in some degree merited the future friendship of the Hon'ble Company. Should Your Honour, &ca think it proper to instruct me to endeavour obtaining the above-mentioned four villages I doubt not of succeeding.

1775 *Mustubag Camp, 8th October.* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest*

Since my last advices the Peshwa has been very assiduous in endeavouring to accommodate the differences between Fatesing and Govindrao. I have constantly recommended a speedy adjustment, and which would have taken place some days ago, had Govindrao conducted himself with becoming moderation. Information has been received of his attacking Fatesing's people with his whole army at Petlad, and that he had killed and wounded two hundred of them. He continues plundering the country on the other side of the Mahi, and at the same time sends his Diwan to the Peshwa, requiring as his

share of the family dominions all the country on the north side of the river Mahi, alleging that the same is only one-third.

Notwithstanding the depredations and destructions to his people as committed by Govindrao, Fatesing continues firm to his offer, as explained to Your Honour, &ca in my address of the 1st instant, and will readily for the sake of tranquillity resign to his brother so much of the country on the north side of the Mahi as shall be esteemed one-third of the family dominions; for the whole of that fertile country, Fatesing affirms in contradiction to Govindrao, greatly exceeds the stipulated proportion of one-third. However, as the Peshwa's ministers, Fatesing, and Govindrao's Diwan are to meet this day on the foregoing, I hope that matters may be happily concluded, and Your Honour, &ca may be assured of my endeavours on this occasion, so far as advice and recommendation can be serviceable.

*Calcutta, 9th October*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*William Tayler to Warren Hastings.*

*Cessions to Bombay*

Ceded for ever by the treaty with the Peshwa:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Salsette with Karanja, Hog Island and Kenery | | 3,50,000 |
| Bassein & its dependencies .. .. .. | | 4,00,000 |
| Olpad .... .. .. .. .. .. | | 3,50,000 |
| Jambusar .. .. .. .. .. .. | | 4,00,000 |
| Broach, the Gaikwad's share .. .. .. | | 3,50,000 |
| To be paid annually from Anklesvar .. .. | | 75,000 |
| | | 19,25,000 |

Presented to the Company since by Raghoba and Fatesing on the conclusion of the treaty between them, viz.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Coral near Broach .. .. .. .. | 50,000 | |
| Chikhli „ Surat .. .. .. .. | 100,000 | |
| Variav „ Surat .. .. .. .. | 28,000 | |
| Amod adjoining to Broach .... .. .. | 1,50,000 | |
| | | 3,28,000 |
| Ceded for ever to the Company .. | | 22,53,000 |

Made over by the Peshwa for the payment of the subsidy, Amod (since entirely given up), and therefore the others remain as a pledge for the payment of the subsidy.

| | |
|---|---|
| Amod .. .. .. .. .. | 1,50,000 |
| Anklesvar the remr. of its revenue .. .. | 1,10,000 |
| Hansot .. .. .. .. .. .. | 1,27,000 |
| Valsad .. .. .. .. .. .. | 10,000 |
| | 4,87,000 |

*Tayler's remonstrance*

Had you but been pleased to signify to the Government of Bombay alone your pacific determinations, there is no doubt but a general ac-

1 Tayler's letter, which runs to 13,000 words, has been published by Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*, 248-268. A few important extracts are here given.

commodation might soon have been effected with honour and credit to the Company, and all the cessions and advantages secured to them, which are stipulated for in the treaty with the Peshwa, as the terms of that treaty were never understood by either party to extend further than our assistance to defeat the ministerial confederacy and by conducting him to Poona to reinstate him in the Peshwaship, whether this was effected by force of negotiation, the Company were equally entitled to the several benefits, which induced them to form these engagements.

*Poona elated* But much do I fear that, whatever your future resolves may be in consequence of these my representations, the letter from the Hon'ble the Governor-General to Sakharam Bapu and your positive orders to withdraw our troops from the Peshwa will utterly destroy all the fair hopes of success which from circumstances we had a right to conceive. Nothing can give a stronger idea of the unfavourable consequences which may probably ensue than the triumphant insolence of the confederates, as expressed in their offers subsequent to the receipt of Governor Hastings' letter, instead of permitting us to retain Salsette and Bassein, the last of which, I have observed, is not in our possession, they demand Raghoba to be delivered up to them, Salsette and other acquisitions to be restored, for which they will design to reimburse our charges. But a few days before, I may venture safely to assert, they would have been glad to have compounded for the guarantee of the English to the safety of their persons and property. It is not in their nature to conceive that a spirit of justice dictated this apparent concession; they attribute it to fear or to a conscious inability of performing our engagements.

*Fatal consequences* As the Ministers will take every advantage of this circumstance and no doubt highly exaggerate it, I must confess myself at a loss to judge with precision what consequences may ensue.

The first that strikes me is that Fatesing will fly off from all his engagements, retain such part of his 26 lakhs as are not paid, and refuse the Company quiet possession of the several districts he had ceded to them. By this means the Peshwa will lose all the dependence he had in Gujarat; for having been obliged in some measure to disappoint Govindrao's expectations on that province, in order more effectually to secure so important an object as having the whole Gaikwad family at his devotion, it is not to be doubted but that Govindrao, when he finds the Peshwa incapable of performing his late promise, will accommodate matters with his brother, Fatesing, and both decline any further interference.

By our desertion, and that of the Gaikwads,' and probably most of his troops for want of money, the Peshwa will really find himself for a time that forlorn and abandoned man which you Gentlemen imagined him to be. Whatever part he may then take, must be detrimental to the interests of the Company in the west of India and perhaps dangerous to their possessions in the east.

1775 *Fort William, 9th October,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Warren Hastings to William Tayler.*

*Orders confirmed* After duly considering the representations which you have been pleased to deliver to us, as well as the several informations which you

have communicated respecting the nature, motives and objects of the engagements of the Bombay Presidency with Raghunath Row and the present state of the Maratha Government at Poona, we have for the present to acquaint you that we are confirmed in our opinion of the expediency of the Company's troops being immediately recalled from the service of Raghoba into their town garrison. Our orders for this purpose will therefore remain in force.

*Disposal of troops* But, as you seemed to understand by the proposition, which you urged at taking leave of the Board this evening, that our direction implied the recall of the Company's troops to Bombay, we think it necessary to explain our meaning to have been that it should remain at the option of the President and the Council of Bombay to withdraw them into such of their garrisons and distribute them as they might see fit for the protection of the Company's possessions, including Salsette.[1]

*Calcutta, 9th October,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775

*William Tayler to Warren Hastings.*

*A last attempt* I have this instant received your letter of this date: and purposing in consequence to address the Hon'ble the President, &ca of Bombay, I must request you will favour me by explaining whether by the "Company's possessions" you mean to include such of the several districts ceded to us by the Peshwa and by Fatesing Gaikwad as are now our possession, or whether you mean to confine it only to Salsette and the territories belonging to the Company previous to the commencement of our engagements with the Peshwa.

*Fort William, 10th October,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775

*Warren Hastings to William Tayler.*

*Disappointment* We have received your favour of yesterday, and beg leave to explain our meaning by the Company's possession expressed in ours of the 9th to be the territories possessed by the Company previous to the date of the treaty entered into with Raghoba; and we added, including Salsette, because the President and Council at Bombay had taken possession of it before that period.

*Bombay, 11th October,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775

*At a Consultation.*

*Deballia* The Chief of Surat must be directed to acquaint us with his reasons for requesting Colonel Keating to make application to Fatesing for the village of Deballia.[2]

*Calcutta, 12th October,* 1775, (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775

*William Tayler to Warren Hastings.*

*Tayler's remonstrance* Agreeable to what you did me the honour to notice to me in your favour of the 9th I have received a copy of your instructions to Lieutenant-Col. Upton. The representations I had made to you

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1 Published by Forrest, *Selections. Maratha Series*, 269. It should be noted that Hastings' reply is of the same date as Tayler's letter. It did not take him long duly to consider such a lengthy letter

2 *See* Keating's letter, dated 18th September, marginal heading: New pargana from Fatesing

would, I flattered myself, have conveyed far different ideas from those which dictated these instructions; but it rests with you alone to determine on the propriety of changing your line of politics. Convinced as I am of the detriment that must befall the present prosperous situation of the Hon'ble Company's affairs on the western side of India, if that line, which has been adopted, is continued to be pursued, I can only lament my ill success. My duty calls upon me to tell you that the moiety of the revenues of the town and pargana of Broach, which has been ceded to us by Fatesing, is in his gift alone.

Permit me therefore, in justice to all the Gentlemen of the Board of Bombay, but particularly to those concerned in the treaty with the Peshwa, to remonstrate to you that, situated as they are in the neighbourhood of the Marathas, having frequent communication with them and constant opportunities of becoming acquainted with the views, connections and interests of the different persons in the Poona Darbar, they certainly must be best qualified for negotiating the several matters entrusted to Col. Upton, an entire stranger to their whole system of government; and I trust it will appear to Your Honour, &ca that at the time it pleased the wisdom of Parliament to arm you with controlling powers over the other Presidencies, it was by no means their intention that they should appear so much degraded and contemptible in the eyes of the Country Government as the presidency of Bombay must do, unless you will commit the treaty of peace to their management.

1775 *Camp at Karwan*, 16*th October*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16B)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest* Fatesing continues uniform in his conduct towards his brother, Govindrao, and has manifested his earnest wish to bring matters to a speedy accommodation. I am inclined to think that intrigue on the part of Govindrao's Diwan and his friends at the Darbar has prevented it; for at a conference, held the day we marched from Baroda, at which the Peshwa's ministers, Fatesing in person and Govindrao's Diwan were present, Fatesing made the following four propositions.

*Fatesing's offers* The first, to finally comply with the terms entered into with the Peshwa, a copy of which Your Honour, &ca have been furnished with, by instantly paying the remainder of the stipulated sums upon his receiving the countries provided for in his possession. But, as this could not in any degree be of advantage to Gonvindrao, the Peshwa, not having it in his power from the late change of circumstances to provide for him, the three following offers were then made by Fatesing.

That he would give up to Govindrao all the country on the north side of the Sabarmati; and whatever deficiency of one-third of the whole Gaikwad dominions might be in this portion of country was to be made up from the parganas near Surat.

That he would resign to Govindrao all the country between the rivers Sabarmati and Mahi, the deficiency to be made up as above.

That he would resign all the country between the rivers Mahi and Narbada with the town of Baroda, provided he would take upon him the debts of the army in garrison at Baroda.

After some consideration the first of these three was accepted; and it was agreed that the necessary sanads be lodged in my possession, to be delivered to Govindrao, provided he agreed to the offer, within 18 days from the date of the sanads; if otherwise, the sanads to be returned to Fatesing. The foregoing would have been carried into execution, had not one of Raghoba's ministers started a number of difficulties, and in short insisted upon the country being delivered into the care of English troops, and afterwards Govindrao to be allowed 18 days for consideration. Well knowing a consent to interfere in this manner would be acting without due regard to your orders, I, therefore, declined taking upon me the part that was required. The conference accordingly broke up without concluding anything. From the importance of this business I thought proper to desire Mr. Holmes to be present at the conference, who took minutes thereof. Since our marching I have received frequent messages from the Peshwa's different ministers, all serving to show their sorrow for not accepting one of the offers, and leaving matters unsettled. They appear inclined to draw Govindrao towards us, and are now desirous of concluding without further intrigue; but whether they will speedily conclude or not, I cannot with any certainty advise Your Honour, &ca. My endeavours shall not be wanting so far as I can exert myself, observing at the same time exact obedience to your commands. ***Settlement delayed***

*Bombay, 20th October,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) **1775**
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

You may acquaint Raghoba that the Governor-General and Council have signified to us their intention to open a negotiation with the ministerial party at Poona for the re-establishment of a general peace with the Marathas, and that they had appointed Lt.-Colonel Upton to proceed to Poona for this purpose. They have instructed this Gentleman to include Raghoba in whatever treaty he might negotiate with the ministers and to obtain such terms for him as he might reasonably expect. ***Raghoba informed***

*Surat, 30th October,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) **1775**
*Robert Gambier to William Hornby.*

I have been favoured with your commands of the 15th instant, and in reply thereto beg leave to acquaint you that the place I mentioned to the Colonel as a proper possession for the Hon'ble Company, if any further cessions of territory were obtained from the Gaikwad, was a village called Batta, and not Debailia, which he through mistake applied for and obtained from Fatesing the sanads. Batta is a large village or rather town with a considerable district belonging to it, which affords an annual revenue of about Rs. 20,000, situated near the banks of the river, on the opposite side, a little below the Hon'ble Company's Garden House. It formerly, I am told, belonged to the Olpad pargana on which it borders; and as that pargana borders on Hansot, Batta is the only district that prevents the Company from enjoying without interruption the whole territory for a considerable breadth between the rivers of Surat and Broach; and on this account I mentioned it to the Colonel, when I found he was negotiating with the ***The wrong village***

Gaikwads for territories to be ceded to the Hon'ble Company, as a place which would be both convenient and advantageous to be annexed to our possessions. Most unluckily he somehow mistook the name and accepted sanads for a village called Deballia, which is a very trifling farm, situated on the banks of our rivers on the Surat side, a little below a well-known place called Variav, now belonging to the Hon'ble Company as ceded to them by Fatesing. Not imagining that such a mistake could arise as to the name, immediately as I received advice from the Colonel that he had procured the sanads, I concluded they were for Batta, and sent to take possession of that place; and not till some time afterwards, when I got the sanads translated, did I find out the mistake, which I then noticed to the Colonel, and begged him to rectify it.

1775 *Kisnapur Village, 4th November,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Gaikwad contest* I have the pleasure to acquaint Your Honour that the differences between Fatesing and Govindrao are adjusted, except the article of Petlad, which he now requests may be included in the one-third he is to receive of the Gaikwad dominions; and as I have every reason to expect that Fatesing will be induced to grant the same, I hope in a short time to transmit Your Honour, &ca certain advice of the final accommodation of the difference between these brothers, which, I cannot avoid observing, has been so long pending chiefly from the intrigues of some ministers in the Maratha Darbar.

I am earnestly desired by Fatesing to inform Your Honour, &ca that he shall manifest on all occasions his inclination to render every service to the Hon'ble Company, and that he will constantly be attentive to preserve their friendship in every instance.

*Four villages* I request Your Honour, &ca will give me directions as to procuring from Fatesing the villages of the autgaums which are mixed with those of the Broach pargana, as set forth in my address of the 4th ultimo.

1775 *Baroda Camp, 13th November,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby*

*Gaikwad contest ended* I have the pleasure to acquaint Your Honour, &ca that Fatesing has consented to give Petlad to Govindrao, which is to be included in the one-third of the Gaikwad dominions he is to receive. By this concession Govindrao has obtained all that he demanded; and this evening I shall go to the Darbar and endeavour to have every point formally adjusted relative to this accommodation.

1775 *Bombay, 24th November,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*At a Consultation.*

*Four villages* Likewise read two letters entered above from Lt.-Col. Keating and Mr. Mostyn, now acquainting us that four of the autgaums, mentioned in the first of these letters are situated in the very centre of the Broach pargana, and formerly composed a part of it, until they were wrested from the Moguls by the Gaikwad family. The Colonel must, therefore, be directed to use his influence with Fatesing to obtain a grant of these four autgaums, which we conceived we have a right to

expect by virtue of the sanad we possess for the town and pargana of Broach; and if Fatesing would likewise give up the remaining autgaums in the room of Sinor, which we voluntarily relinquished, it would be very agreeable to us.

*Calcutta*, *26th November*, 1775 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17) 1775
*William Tayler to the Court of Directors.*

*Gaikwad cession*

I have, however, the pleasure to inform you that, though my deputation has not been in general successful, yet that I trust it has not been wholly ineffectual to the advancement of your interests. For, on further representation from me and explaining the nature of the tenure and the particular convenience these cessions would be of to you, the Governor-General and Council wrote to me under the 18th ultimo that the Gaikwad possession of the revenues of the town and pargana of Broach and the districts of Koral, Chikhli and Variav having been made over to you by Fatesing, who appears to have the right and authority to make this concession, they had instructed the Presidency of Bombay to retain possession of them, until a definitive treaty of peace shall have been concluded with the ruling party at Poona; from which circumstance I hope they mean to retain those cessions, the revenue of which is valued at so consideratble a sum as 5,28,000 Rupees.

*Bombay*, *28th November*, 1775, (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated Calcutta 25th May*, 1775.

*Displeasure*

We have not been favoured with any letters from you or your Select Committee respecting the political affairs of your Presidency since your letter dated the 31st of December.

In this situation your silence becomes truly astonishing;[1] but under the want of precise and authentic information from yourselves, we are obliged to suspend our final judgment of your proceedings, and in the meantime protest against all the consequences of any hostile measures taken, or offensive engagements entered into by you without our consent. We consider them as directly contradictory to the provisions made in the Act of Parliament for uniting the several Presidencies under the political superintendence of this Government, and equally contrary to the common principles of prudence and policy, since the partial resolutions and operations of a single Presidency may eventually involve all the Company's settlements in a general war, without any previous concert or a general plan for conducting it.

*Bombay*, *28th November*, 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Warren Hastings to John Upton, dated 21st June*, 1775.

*Hastings' policy*

If there is any foundation for the intelligence, which we have lately received, and which we believe to be authentic, of some signal advantage which has been gained by Raghunathrao over the ministerial army, we apprehend you may be able to obtain the cessions of Salsette and Bassein with the other conquered islands without much difficulty, and in this case you may also have it in your power to gain more substantial advantages to be yielded to the Company. Your next object must, therefore, be to obtain a formal surrender of the

1 The Bombay letter of the 31st March was on its way to Calcutta

moiety held by the Marathas of the revenue of the town and pargana of Broach; but we must leave these, or any other point, which you may be able to secure for the interest of the Company, to your discretion; and you will propose them or not, as you see occasion from the course of events, the operations of Raghoba and the inclinations of the Ministers to a pacification. If any offers shall have been made before your arrival by the ministerial party to the Government of Bombay, it is unnecessary to recommend to you to insist on them, if they should be of advantage the Company.

1775 *Bombay, 28th November,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Bombay to the Company.*

*Uncertainty* We are as yet in the utmost uncertainty respecting the success of our representations to the Governor-General and Council, not having received the least advice either from them or Mr. Tayler since we last had the honour to address you. Neither have we any accounts from Lieut.-Col. Upton, who, we acquainted you, had been deputed from Bengal to treat with the ministerial party at Poona.

*Raghoba's prospects* We have every reason to believe by repeated advices from Col. Keating that, if we were at liberty to prosecute the war, we should soon be able to bring it to a happy conclusion. By his letters enclosed under the 17th ultimo and 9th instant you will find that several of the most principal officers in the ministerial party have quitted the confederacy, and entered into an association to support Raghoba's cause, which they have signified to him with strong assurances of joining him with 25,000 good horse. A vakil has also been sent to Raghoba by Baiji Singh, Raja of the Marwar country, with offers of service and the warmest assurance of friendship and regard for the Peshwa and his cause. The Raja was encamped within 45 kos of Ahmadabad with an army of 10,000 men, and wishes immediately to join the Peshwa. We likewise hear that Sakharam Bapu, the head of the confederacy, and Vamanrao and Benirao, two considerable partisans in the ministerial party, are lately dead. With these flattering appearances Your Honours will believe we feel the most sensible concern at being obliged to remain inactive with an expensive army in the field, until we can receive the determination of the Governor-General and Council.

1775 *Bombay, 28th November,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Bombay to the Company.*

*Gaikwad contest* The several letters from the Lt.-Col. Keating contain a full account of the disputes between Govindrao and Fatesing, in consequence of the treaty between the latter and Raghoba; and we have the pleasure to find by his letter, entered under the 23rd instant, that their disputes are accommodated to the satisfaction of both parties, which is another circumstance very favourable to Raghoba.

1775 *Bombay, 29th November,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated 9th October,* 1775.

*Disposal of troops* It appearing by a representation from Mr. Tayler that he understood our orders to you for withdrawing the Company's troops from

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1 See letters dated the 9th and the 10th October.

Raghoba to imply the recall of them to Bombay, we think it proper, lest you should put the same construction on them, to take this opportunity of explaining our intention to have been that it should be left to your option to withdraw the forces to any of the Company's garrisons which you might judge most proper for their reception, or to distribute them to each, and confine your operations to the protection of the territories possessed by the Company previous to the date of your treaty with Raghoba, including Salsette.

*Bombay, 2nd December,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*William Hornby to Thomas Keating.*

We conceive that by virtue of the sanad we possess for the town and pargana of Broach, we are entitled to the four autgaums mentioned to you by Mr. Mostyn, as we learn they formerly composed a part of that pargana, until they were wrested from the Moguls by the Gaikwad Family about forty years ago. We, therefore, suppose that Fatesing will make no difficulty of giving up these four autgaums, which, being situated in the very centre of our pargana, may otherwise prove a constant source of disputes; and if he could be prevailed upon to make a cession of the remaining eight, in the room of Sinor, which we relinquished, it would be very agreeable to us. *Autgaums from Fatesing*

*Bombay, 5th December,* 1775 (1775, *S. P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated 7th September,* 1775.

We are very sorry to find the truth of our conjunctures as to the consequence of this engagement that the whole burthen of the expensive war undertaken by you in support of Raghoba's claim to the peshwaship has fallen upon yourselves, and that no dependence can be placed on the assistance of his troops. [1] *Hastings' orders*

We have been so particularly enjoined by the Court of Directors, to attend to the preservation of peace in general with the Country Powers throughout India that we thought it necessary in our letter of the 31st May to give you positive orders to recall your army from Raghoba to your own garrisons, in whatever state your affairs might be, unless their safety might be endangered by an instant retreat. We hope you have acted in conformity thereto; if not, we now repeat those directions, judging it more particularly requisite at this period, as it appears that Raghoba is not able to fulfil his part of the treaty; and we require you to confine your views to the protection of the Company's possessions, including Salsette and the share in the revenue of Broach given up by Fatesing, in the best manner you are able. This last we have also instructed our minister at Poona to secure if possible by the treaty with that State.

*Corode Camp, 8th December,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

I am truly concerned to have occasion to observe to Your Honour, &ca that of late the Peshwa appears exceedingly dejected; all the assurances I can give him are insufficient to dispel a melancholy proceeding from being disappointed in his hope that matters before *Raghoba's prospects*

1 Warren Hastings was totally unaware of the situation in Gujarat

this time would have terminated in his favour. He observes that the present delay is giving his enemies every advantage they could wish, for collecting and recruiting their dispersed and broken army, and at the same time shaking the resolution of such of the ministerial party who were on the very brink of coming over to him. Since my last the Peshwa sent two men to me, named Biraji Pol, and Umaji Bapuji. They came as secret vakils from Moroba Fadnavis, Apparao Patankar Moloji Gorparde, Visaji Pant Benewalla, Chintoo Wittul, Wittul Sewdew and Ragopatrao, men who were formerly attached to the ministerial interest. The above-mentioned vakils asserted, that their employers are determined to join the Peshwa with 15,000 good troops, provided the English still support him. But, as a contrary report had gained credit in the Deccan, their business was to see with their eyes whether the English army still continued with the Peshwa, also to be informed by the mouth of the officer who commanded it what is the future intention of the English relating to the Peshwa. I gave them a general answer with every assurance consistent with your orders, and observed to them that the English were remarkable for fulfilling their engagements, and that I did not doubt but that all would be concluded to the satisfaction of the Peshwa.

1775 *Bombay, 13th December, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16B)*
*Warren Hasting to William Tayler, dated 18th October, 1775.*

*Hastings' refusal* With respects to the other parts of your letter, we are concerned to find you infer such consequences to the President and Council at Bombay, as you seem to apprehend, will result from the appointment of Col Upton to Poona. We think it proper to assure you that it is our wish to support the reputation and credit of their Government, as far as we can consistently with the due execution of the powers entrusted to us by the Legislature. It shall also be our endeavour to secure the Presidency of Bombay from every slight or disrespect of their authority. We are satisfied of the knowledge and experience of these Gentlemen in the political views and interests of the Maratha Government, nor do we question their abilities to conduct a negotiation for a peace. Yet however we may be influenced by these motives and by our confidence in their integrity and strict desire to fulfil our intention, we do not think that we can repeal or alter the appointment of Col. Upton consistently with the orders and resolutions which we have already made public and signified to the Ministers at Poona, or with the dignity of this Government, [1] which he has been deputed to represent in his character of public minister at the Maratha Court.

1775 *Bombay, 12th December, 1775 (1775, S. & P. D. 16B)*
*Letter from Warren Hasting to William Tayler, dated 18th October, 1775.*

*Gaikwad cessions* The Gaikwad proportion of the revenues of the town and pargana of Broach and the districts of Koral, Chikhli and Variav having been made over to the Company by Fatesing Gaikwad, who appears to have possessed the right and authority to make this concession,

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1 It would seem that rectifying a mistake was in Hastings' opinion incompatible with the dignity of his proconsular office.

we have instructed the President of Bombay[1] to retain possession of it until a definitive treaty of peace shall have been concluded with the ruling Power at Poona, as they may be held without increase of expense to the Hon'ble Company.

*Bombay, 12th December,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Letter from William Tayler, dated* 21*st October,* 1775.

I have the pleasure to inform you in answer to further representations from me regarding our title to the Gaikwad proportion of Broach and the districts of Koral and Variav, the Governor-General and Council acquaint me that they have instructed you to retain possession of them, until a definitive treaty of peace, shall have been concluded with the ruling party at Poona, as they may be held without an increase of expense to the Company; also that, as it is possible Raghoba may seek refuge in some of the Company's garrisons, they have further directed you to afford him an asylum with his attendants only, in case he should find himself reduced to solicit this mark of your favour. *Broach revenue*

*Bombay, 12th December,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*At a Consultation.*

Likewise read the letter entered above from the Governor-General and Council, upon which we have to remark that, had we implicitly followed the directions contained in their former letters, we should have abandoned the Gaikwad share of the Broach revenue and our other acquisitions, whereas by the letter before us they authorise us to retain the share of the Broach revenues given up by Fatesing. *Broach revenue*

*Carole Camp, 22nd December,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*) 1775
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

In consequence of your directions, I have prevailed upon Fatesing to give a sanad for the pargana of Batta, in lieu of that for Deballia, in behalf of the Hon'ble Company; but he hopes that, in consideration of his ready concurrence to your requests, you will afford him your assistance towards accomplishing a final accommodation between him and his brother, Govindrao; since he on his part is perfectly reconciled to the determination of the Peshwa as to the division of the Gaikwad dominions, of which Govindrao is to have one-third, he is of opinion your signifying your approbation of his division to Govindrao will answer every purpose and secure the country from further molestation. *Batta given by Fatesing*

From advices from Fatesing and his instructions to his vakil with me I have great hopes of obtaining the four villages or autgaums, which are situated in the middle of the Broach pargana, and Your Honour, &ca may depend on my utmost endeavours to procure a cession from him to the Hon'ble Company of the remaining villages of the autgaums. *Autgaums*

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1 It is difficult to understand how Warren Hastings could consistently invalidate the Surat treaty and at the same time ratify, even conditionally, one of the clauses of that treaty

1775 *Bombay, 29th December,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D,* 16*B*)
*Bombay to Warren Hastings.*

*Bombay's protest* The cessions of territory made by Raghoba appear to us objects of such importance to the Company that we are greatly alarmed at your intentions of relinquishing them. The Company's right to them is indisputable, as being derived from valid grants made by the lawful sovereign of the ceded countries; and we are convinced that, if Col. Upton shows a determination not to part with them, it will be no obstacle to the conclusion of a general peace, whichever party he may treat with. The compact and convenient situation of several of the parganas with respect to our settlements of Surat and Broach will enable us to collect the revenues with little expense; and a very small addition to the garrisons at those places will be quite sufficient for their defence. The revenues will defray the expenses and provide the investment of this Presidency. The Company will possess many valuable articles of commerce within their own territories, and be able greatly to extend the sale of woollens and other staples of Great Britain. We have been some [*time*] in peaceable possession of all the ceded territories, except Bassein. The revenues are collecting without any difficulty, and the Marathas alrady consider them as dismembered from their empire. Your Honour, &ca must, before this time, be so well informed on the subject that it is unnecessary for us to add more; but we hope soon to be able to send you an accurate account of their revenues and a correct chart.

*Gaikwad contest* Colonel Keating's letters contain all the information we possess respecting Govindrao and Fatesing; and we have the pleasure to observe that the dispute between them is nearly compromised, which will be a circumstance very favourable to Raghoba.

1775 *Bombay, 29th December,* 1775 (1775, *S. & P. D.* 16*B*)
*William Hornby to John Upton.*[1]

*Summary of events* But as your being advised of the true situation of Raghoba's affairs, before you commence your negotiations, may be of the utmost consequence, we dispatch this express to convey to you the most authentic intelligence we possess respecting him; and in order to give you the most perfect idea of his situation, [*we*] shall begin our detail from the time we received the Governor-General and Council's prohibition for carrying on the war and advice of their having deputed you to treat with the Ministers for a general accommodation.

Raghoba's army and our troops were then cantoned during the rainy season at Dabhoi, a place about twenty kos from Baroda, after having carried on a very successful campaign against the ministerial army, whose forces were so broken and dispirited by repeated defeats that we are persuaded their chiefs would have found the utmost difficulty in bringing them again to act against us. Raghoba likewise had lately detached Fatesing from the ministerial party and concluded a treaty with him, by which he not only gained a powerful ally, but stipulated for a subsidy of twenty six lakhs of Rupees, a considerable part of which was received before the receipt of the above-mentioned

1 **After having failed in their remonstrance to Warren Hastings, the Bombay Government tried to reason with John Upton, but the latter was as impervious to argument as his master**

letter trom the Governor-General and Council, and by this seasonable recruit to his finances, he would have been enabled to have taken the field, the ensuing campaign, with great advantage.

Upon receipt of the Governor-General and Council's orders for recalling the Company's troops into our own garrisons, we gave the necessary directions for their marching from Dabhoi into the parganas adjacent to Surat or Broach, whenever the season would permit; and at the same time advised Raghoba to accompany and remain with them with such part of his forces as he could maintain, until we received an answer from Governor-General and Council to the representations we had deputed Mr. Tayler, a member of our Board, to make to them; for we were sensible, had we abruptly withdrawn our forces from him, his adherents alarmed and discouraged by our desertion would have instantly forsaken him, and his destruction become immediate and inevitable; which would [*have*] greatly embarassed you in your negotiation, as the Ministers relieved from all apprehensions of Raghoba would have demanded conditions very different from what we are clearly of opinion thay may now be easily brought to, should you think it expedient to treat with them. The event has justified our conjectures of the good effects that would attend the appearance only of our forces continuing in concert with Raghoba. During the march from Dabhoi towards Surat he received repeated overtures from many of the ministerial chiefs, who were ready to return to their allegiance to him. Under the 16th October Colonel Keating, the commander of our forces with Raghoba, writes to us, that Moroba Dada, Butchuba, Chintoo Wittul, Ramchandra Ganesh, and Maloji Gorparde, all principal men and officers in the confederacy, and then in the neighbourhood of Poona, had entered into an association to support Raghoba's cause; which they had signified to him with strong assurances of joining him with 25,000 good horse. Baiji Singh, Raja of the Marwar country, likewise sent a vakil to the Peshwa on the 28th of October with the warmest assurances of friendship and offers of immediately joining him with 10,000 men, then encamped with 45 kos from Ahmadabad.

Every day almost brings favourable accounts to Raghoba. Differences are continually arising amongst the chiefs of the ministerial party, and most of the principal men in the Maratha Empire are ready to acknowledge him as Peshwa. Mahadji Sindia has sent to inform him that, if the English continue with him, he will immediately join him with a large body of forces; and if they should abandon him, he then requested the Peshwa would retire with his army to Ujjain, where they would concert the necessary measures for the good of his cause. Appaji Mahadev, one of Raghoba's adherents who had been at Ujjain to negotiate with Mahadji Sindia, returned to camp about ten days ago with a body of 2,000 horse. The beginning of this month two vakils arrived with Raghoba from Moroba Fadnavis, Butchuba Pronder, Shohaji Bhonsla, Dara Scindy, Apparao Patankar, Maloji Gorparde, Vissaji Pant Benewalla, Chintoo Wittul, Wittul Sedew, and Ragopantrao, men who formerly were attached to the ministerial interest, and who had empowered these vakils to assure Raghoba of their determination to join him with 15,000 good troops, provided the English supported him.

The English and Peshwa armies are now encamped at Corode, on the southern banks of the River Tapti, about 15 kos from Surat, where we purpose they shall remain until we receive final orders from the Governor-General and Council, or your negotiation is brought to some conclusion, for which we have stated our reasons very fully to them.

1775 *Corode Camp, 28th December,* 1775 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*Thomas Keating to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing ready to oblige* Under the 22nd instant I advised Your Honour, &ca, that I had obtained the sanad for Batta from Fatesing; since then he has sent me a sanad by which he grants unto Govindrao and his heirs one full third of the Gaikwad dominions agreeable to lists accompanying the sanad, and specifying the particular parganas so surrendered. He wishes me to take Govindrao's assurance promising to the Hon'ble Company to give no further molestation to him or the remaining part of the Gaikwad territory; and then, and not till then, to deliver to him the sanad and sealed lists, by which he will be authorised to take immediate possession. I now hope this business will be finally concluded, which will ensure tranquillity to the Hon'ble Company's possessions in the Gujarat province.

As the Peshwa has often declared that a third of the Gaikwad dominions is a proper and a sufficient portion for Govindrao, I hope that, should any obstacles be thrown in the way of the above settlement by any of the Darbar intrigues, he will render the same abortive.

I cannot avoid observing that in every late instance Fatesing has shown himself ready to do whatever is for the Hon'ble Company's interest.

1776 *Bombay, 8th January,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*At a Consultation.*

*Informing Upton* The propriety of his [*Mr. Upton's*] insisting upon the Ministers confirming the cessions made by Raghoba to the Company must be strongly enforced to him; and he must be acquainted, as far as we know them, with the sentiments of the Governor-General and Council upon this subject.

1776 *Bombay, 18th January,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*William Hornby to John Upton.*

*Cessions maintained* The cessions stipulated by our treaty with Raghoba have completed the Company's views beyond their expectations. The revenue [*is*] equal to all the demands of this Presidency. The Company will possess many valuable articles of commerce within their own territories and be able greatly to extend the sale of woollens and other staples of Great Britain. The compact and convenient situation of the northern parganas, with respect to our settlements of Surat and Broach, will enable us to collect the revenues with little expense, and a small addition to the garrison already at those places will be sufficient for their defence. The Company's right to them is indisputable, as being derived from valid grants made by the lawful sovereign of the ceded countries, and we have been in real possession of Jambusar, Amod, Hansot, Anklesvar, Olpad and Versaul [*Valsad*] since the month of

April last, so that they may be considered as already dismembered from the Maratha Empire; and we cannot but think it would reflect the highest disgrace on the Company's arms to purchase a peace from the Ministers by the restitution of possessions lawfully ceded to them; and we must be of opinion from the present state of affairs that, if you show a determination not to part with them, it will not prove any obstacle to the conclusion of a peace.

The Ministers must be sensible that, had the war continued, Raghoba's success was inevitable; and we, therefore, think they have reason to rejoice that they have it now in their power to obtain terms of honour and safety to their persons and estates, which they would have had no right to have expected a few months hence from Raghoba at the head of a victorious army at Poona.

We, therefore, are firmly of opinion that from the present circumstances and situation of affairs and from the event of the operations of Raghoba the Company are entitled to expect that the treaty with him be confirmed in every article; and we further think that their honour and future influence with the Powers of Hindustan very much depend on your insisting on these points; and as Raghoba since the conclusion of the treaty has granted to the Company forever the districts of Amod and Hansot, which were two of the places assigned for the payment of our expenses, we think it should be stipulated that other places of equal value should be substituted in lieu thereof, or that our expenses should be made good in money on the signing of the treaty, an account of which will be delivered bona fide. *Amod Hansot*

Fatesing Gaikwad had also made over sundry districts to the Company in return for their good offices in effecting an accommodation with the Peshwa. We do not imagine these grants can be affected by your negotiations, as the places ceded are in Fatesing's gift alone, and he has renounced all connection with the Ministers. He has confirmed the cession of the Gaikwad share of the Broach revenues, and we have also requested him to cede the autgaums, being some villages situated in that pargana, which he had not considered as included in the first grant. The districts of Koral, Chickhli, Variav and Batta, the former adjoining to Broach, and the three latter to Surat, have been also ceded by him. Fatesing had likewise granted the district of Sinor, producing a revenue of about a lakh of Rupees per annum, which we relinquished, as it lay out of the line of territory we wish to acquire for the Company. *Other cessions*

The Governor-General and Council have authorised us through Mr. Tayler to retain possession of the Gaikwad share of the Broach revenues and of the districts of Koral, Chickhli, Variav, until a definitive treaty of peace may be concluded with the ruling party at Poona: and at the date of their letter to him they did not know that we had obtained Batta, and were soliciting the autguams. A copy of this letter is enclosed, but the letters therein mentioned from the Governor-General and Council have not been received. *Hastings' orders*

To give you an idea of the value and importance of the several cessions made by Raghoba and Fatesing, we here subjoin a list of them *Revenue estimate*

with the estimated revenue annexed to each place ceded for ever by the treaty with the Peshwa.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Salsette with Karanja, Elephanta, Hog Island and Kenery .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | Rs. | 350,000 |
| Bassein, with its dependencies .. .. .. .. | | | „ | 400,000 |
| Olpad .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | „ | 350,000 |
| Jambusar. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | „ | 400,000 |
| Broach the Gaikwad's share and since continued by Fatesing .. .. .. .. .. .. | | | „ | 350,000 |
| To be paid annually from Anklesvar .. .. .. | | | „ | 75,000 |
| | | | Rs. | 19,25,000 |
| Presented since by the Peshwa: | | | | |
| Amod. .. .. .. .. .. | Rs. | 150,000 | | |
| Hansot adjoining to Broach. .. .. | Rs. | 127,000 | | |
| | | | Rs. | 277,000 |
| Presented by Fatesing: | | | | |
| Koral .. .. .. .. .. .. | Rs. | 50,000 | | |
| Autgaums .. .. .. .. .. | „i | 15,000 | | |
| Chickhli .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 100,000 | | |
| Variav .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 28,000 | | |
| Batta .. .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 20,000 | | |
| | | | Rs. | 2,13,000 |
| | | | Rs. | 24,15,000 |

Made over by the Peshwa for the payment of the subsidy:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Amod } since entirely given up; therefore the others | Rs. | 1,50,000 |
| Hansot } only remain as security for the subsidy. .. | „ | 1,27,000 |
| Versaul [*Valsad*] .. .. .. .. .. .. | „ | 1,00,000 |
| Anklesvar, the remainder of its revenues .. .. | „ | 1,10,000 |
| | Rs. | 4,87,000 |

1776 *Bombay, 20th January,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 1776)
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated 26th October,* 1775.

*Gaikwad cessions* The Gaikwad proportion of the revenue of the town and pargana of Broach and the district of Koral, Chickhli and Variav having been made over to the Company by Fatesing. who appears to be the person possessed of the right and authority to make these grants, and as we understand that they may be held without any material increase of expense, we desire you will retain possession of them, until a definitive treaty of peace shall have been concluded with the ruling party at Poona.

1776 *Poona, 24th January,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*John Upton to William Hornby.*

*Fatesing's cessions* I shall be much obliged to you, Gentlemen, to inform me if the cessions made by Fatesing were antecedent to your receipt of the Governor-General's letter, ordering the troops to discontinue hostilities. Fatesing has all along, according to the account of the Ministry, and

they offer to produce his letters, corresponded with them, and advised that, unless more troops could be sent to him, he must give up such places as were demanded. They say he was compelled to this, after the cessation of arms had taken place.

*Bombay, 28th January,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17). 1776
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

*Appeal to Hastings*

We have very strongly urged to the Colonel the propriety of insisting upon the Ministers confirming our treaty with Raghoba in every article, and settling honourable and satisfactory terms for him. We cannot more fully explain our reasoning and sentiments on this subject than we have in the enclosed copy of our letter to him, to which we, therefore, beg leave to refer you.

*Bombay, 28th January,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17) 1776
*William Hornby to William Tayler.*

*Bombay helpless*

We cannot give you the least information of the state of Colonel Upton's negotiation, as he has not communicated to us any particular whatever relating to it. We have strongly urged to him the propriety of insisting upon the Ministers confirming the treaty of Surat in every article and obtaining satisfactory and honourable terms for Raghoba.

*Bombay, 30th January,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17) 1776
*At a Consultation.*

*Informing Upton*

The information he [*Colonel Upton*] desires, must be given him respecting to the cessions made by Fatesing, which, except Batta, were made long before the cessation of arms took place.

*Bombay, 1st February,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17) 1776
*William Hornby to John Upton.*

*When cessions were made*

The several cessions from Fatesing, except Batta, were made long before the receipt of the Governor-General and Council's orders for discontinuing the war. The treaty between him and Raghoba was executed on the 18th of July last, near Baroda, whereas these orders did not reach Bombay until the 12th of August; and it was in the treaty that the Gaikwad share of the Broach revenue and the villages of Koral, Chickhli, and Variav should be ceded to the Hon'ble Company. Fatesing before this was openly connected with the Ministers' party; but, when he found Raghoba supported by the English, he was glad to make his peace with him and return to his allegiance; and these cessions were made to the Hon'ble Company for the services rendered him in accommodating matters between him and the Peshwa. He has lately made many professions of his attachmnt to the Hon'ble Company, and in a letter to our President at the time expressed his satisfaction at the accommodation effected by Colonel Keating. The only cession obtained, since the cessation, was the village of Batta, which is so connected with our other possessions that a grant of it was requested from Fatesing in the room of Sinor, a place producing a much more considerable revenue, which we voluntarily relinquished, because it was not so conveniently situated

*Batta*

*Autgaums* We have also lately requested him to give up his pretensions to the autgaums, some villages situated in the very centre of the Broach pargana, which he does not seem to consider as included in his grant of that district; but [*we*] are not yet apprised of the success of this application. We never authorised, nor do we believe any compulsion ever was used, to obtain these grants from Fatesing.

*Appeal to Upton* We must again strongly urge to you the propriety of your insisting upon the Ministers settling an establishment for Raghoba immediately; for we may venture to foretell that, if you receded from this point, they will protract and retard the negotiation by every artifice in their power, in the hopes of Raghoba's army disbanding from want of pay; which would entirely frustrate the good efforts we with so much reason expected from our late measures; and we are also apprehensive it will be a difficult matter to prevent an army without pay in a plentiful country from committing some irregularities, which the Ministers will be very ready to term an infringment of the cessation.

1776 *Poona, 10th February,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*John Upton to William Hornby.*

*Upton's proposals* Should it be agreed to exclude all foreigners from settling in Bassein and to allow the Company to have a factory thereon, what are the necessary privileges in trade most for the advantage of the Company to be stipulated for? Supposing the cessions in the Gujarat country not to be kept by the English, would it be advantageous to have a factory at Jambusar? If so, what privileges most beneficial to the Company should be granted?

1776 *Bombay, 15th February,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*William Hornby to John Upton.*

*Bassein* We were struck with the utmost surprise by the questions you have put us respecting Bassein. We never imagined that you could entertain an idea of stipulating for our having a factory only at that place, when your instructions are so peremptory for your insisting on the absolute cession of it to the Company. A factory there would not be attested with the least benefit or advantage to them; and it is our opinion that the interest of the Company requires that you should insist upon this cession, and that you cannot act otherwise consistently with your principles.

*Dismay* We were equally alarmed and concerned at the supposition you have made that the cessions in the Gujarat country should not be retained by the Company. We have sufficiently explained the importance of these acquisitions in our letter dated the 18th ultimo; and in that letter and the one dated the 1st instant we particularly mentioned the names of the ceded places, and plainly distinguished by whom and when ceded. For your full satisfaction we will repeat these particulars, premising that what is termed the Gujarat province commences from the River Tapti or Surat River, extending from thence to the northward, and that consequently some of the northern cessions are not strictly speaking situated in that province.

*Ceded by Raghoba* Cessions in the Gujarat province by the treaty with Raghoba executed in March, 1775: Olpad, Jambusar, the Gaikwad share of the Baroda revenues, since confirmed by Fatesing; an annual collection

from Anklesvar of 75,000 Rupees, presented by Raghoba since the conclusion of the treaty; Amod presented in the month of June last; Hansot granted in the month of July with the provision that the Company's right should not commence until the 6th of October, it having been farmed out until that time. These two places with Versaul [*Valsad*] and the remainder of the Anklesvar revenues were taken possession of in the month of April, being mortgaged by the treaty for security of the monthly stipend. Versaul [*Valsad*] is situated to the southward of Surat and, therefore, is not in the Gujarat province.

Cessions made by Fatesing, agreeable to the stipulation in his treaty with the Peshwa executed the 18th July: Raghoba's grant of the Gaikwad share of the Baroda revenues confirmed and the above-mentioned Koral near Broach, Chickhli and Variav to the southward of Surat river. *Ceded by Fatesing*

Ceded by Fatesing in November: Batta situated between the parganas of Olpad and Hansot, which it connects, and for that reason a grant of it was requested from Fatesing. We likewise, to prevent disputes hereafter, solicited the grant of some villages called the autgums, situated in the centre of the Broach parganas. Fatesing did not seem to consider them as included in the former sanad. We are not yet apprised of the success of this application, though we think the Company's right to them indisputable, as they formerly belonged to that province in the time of the Moguls. We before observed that we did not imagine the cessions made by Fatesing could be affected by your negotiations, and we have forwarded to you a copy of the Governor-General and Council's letter to us on that subject.

We cannot see any possible advantage that will arise to the Company from having a factory at Jambusar and, therefore, wish not for any privileges there upon that footing. We might have formed a settlement there many years ago, had we thought it eligible. *Jambusar*

The revenues of the northern parganas have been collected by and for the use of the Company ever since the month of April last, and very considerable sums have lately been received. *Revenues*

*Poona, 20th February,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17) **1776**
*John Upton to William Hornby.*

With your letter of the 15th instant I am also favoured. Permit me, Gentlemen, to refer you in return to my instructions. You will perceive I am directed to act as appears to me best (particularly regarding this very island of Bassein) for the honour and benefit of the Company; and this I am determined to do. We have very little just claim to anything. If the peace should take place, it should be both honourable and beneficial. You know as well as myself the sense of the Governor-General and Council regarding this war. You will, therefore, Gentlemen, easily consider what it must be respecting the treaty they wish to have considered with the Marathas. They are ever mindful of the honour as well as advantage of the Company. *Upton's views*

P. S. I have to request the favour of your forwarding to me copy of one of the grants or sanads by which Fatesing made over any part of the Gujarat country, as the Ministers maintain no such powers were even vested in him, and therefore that such sanads are of no force or value. *Fatesing's sanads*

1776 *Bombay, 25th February,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*William Hornby to John Upton.*

*Upton's instructions* According to the copy we possess of your instructions, dated the 21st June, the third paragraph, to which we suppose you mean to refer us, runs as follows:

"If there is any foundation for the intelligence, which we have lately received and which we believe to be authentic, of some signal advantages which have been gained by Raghunathrao over the ministerial army, we apprehend you may be able to obtain the cession of Salsette and Bassein with the other conquered islands without much difficulty; and in this case you may also have it in your power probably to gain more substantial advantages to be yielded to the Company. Your next object, therefore, must be to obtain a formal surrender of the moiety held by the Marathas of the revenues of the town and pargana of Broach; but we must leave these or any other points, which you may be able to secure for the interest and advantage of the Company, to your discretion." This is the only passage we can discover in your instructions in any shape lending to give you this discretional power with respect to Bassein, though in our opinion the word "These" evidently relates to the other advantages to be secured in addition to Salsette and Bassein, and does not include these places, the cession of which in the preceeding articles is made a principal object of your deputation. But whatever construction may be put upon that expression, the intention of the Governor-General and Council is already explained in the very next paragraph, in which your power of relinquishing these cessions is particularly excepted against in the following very explicit terms, *viz.*

"Though we do not mean absolutely to insist upon all these concessions, if manifest advantages should have been gained against the Company's arms, yet we are determined on no account to relinquish the possession of Salsette and Bassein. Therefore, should the Peshwa hold out against yielding them, you are at no rate to agree to restore them, declaring to them if necessary that, the matter having been referred to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, it is impossible to relinquish these places, without their express permission."

But in the record set of your instructions of a much later date this matter is, if possible, placed in as still clearer light, and every possibility of a doubt of the Governor-General and Council's intentions on this head removed. The copy transmitted us by them is dated the 17th July, and the paragraph we mean to allude to runs as follows: "The direct purpose of your appointment is to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace between the Maratha Government and the Presidency of Bombay, and to obtain a confirmation to that Presidency of the Islands of Salsette and Bassein to the Company. These points you are to consider as indispensable."

*Bombay view* We do not think that the Company's right to Bassein or the force of your instructions respecting it are in the least impaired by the circumstance of our not having possession, though the difficulty of prevailing with the Ministers to consent to this cession may be increased; and we have already apprised you how very anxious the Company are to obtain this acquisition, without which their views upon

this coast will remain unaccomplished. Therefore, upon the most thorough conviction we persevere in the opinion we before expressed that you cannot agree to any treaty wherein this cession is not included, without acting inconsistently with and, we will now add, in direct breach of your instructions.

We readily allow that if a treaty is to take place with the Ministers, it had better be concluded before Raghoba's army disperses; but we do not mean by this acknowledgement that it is necessary the treaty should be concluded at all events. We are far from considering Raghoba's cause irretrievable, if the treaty with the Ministers was to break off and the Company to continue to support him. *Raghoba's cause*

We will not say anything on the subject of the Company's right to the cessions made by the treaty, as that question cannot be decided either by us or you. *Co.'s rights*

*Poona, 2nd March,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17) 1776
*John Upton to William Hornby.*

I am sorry we differ so widely regarding the sense of my instructions. You will permit me to observe that the words "relinquish, restore and confirm" imply having possession, which never was our case; and I am quite clear also that I have acted very consistently with the private (verbal) instructions I received, before I left Calcutta; and I have neither had or seen cause since to deviate from them. *Upton's views*

The treaty of peace between the Hon'ble Company and the Maratha Government was signed yesterday afternoon. Such articles of convention as concern the Presidency of Bombay, I have the honour to forward. *Treaty*

Broach is the place appointed for two Marathas to meet at, to fix the boundaries of the ceded country amounting to three lakhs of Rupees per annum. The persons sent by this Government will be furnished with a letter from me, signifying their being the people appointed by them, to assist in carrying this agreement into efect. *Meeting at Broach*

*P.S.* You will be pleased to appoint two gentlemen to proceed to fix the boundaries of the pargana to be ceded near, or adjoining to, Broach, The Ministers agree to our taking any district that is not jagir land.

*Treaty concluded between the Hon'ble Company and the Maratha State at Purandhar, the 1st day of March,* 1776.

1*st Article* Peace shall be established and take place from this day, between the Hon'ble the English East India Company in general and the Government of Bombay in particular and Rao Pandit Pradhan and his Ministers Sakharam Pandit and Baliaji Pandit on the part of all the Marathas, and the following articles are to be observed inviolable by both parties. *Treaty of Purandhar*

*2nd Article* The peace to be forwith proclaimed between the Hon'ble Company and the Maratha State at the Presidency of Bombay and all its dependencies, at the head of the English troops' encamped at Mandavi, and in every part of the Gujarat province where there are British subjects. The Maratha Government will also order proclamations to be made throughout all their dominions.

*3rd Article* The Peshwa Rao Pandit Pradhan and his Ministers being desirous of having Salsette and the small islands subdued by the English in this way restored to them, do offer to give in exchange a country of three lakhs of Rupees with its chauth, &ca in the neighbourhood of Broach. Colonel Upton having declared that he could not restore the said islands, it is therefore agreed that they shall remain as they now are, and that they shall write to the Hon'ble the Supreme Council of Calcutta; and both parties engage to abide by their determination. If the Governor-General and Council of Fort William do not restore them, they shall continue in possession of the English, and the Marathas will then give up all right and title to the said islands. Should the Governor-General and Council of Calcutta restore Salsette with the said islands, the English will accordingly deliver them over to the Peshwa.

*4th Article* The Marathas do agree to give to the English Company forever all right and title to their entire share of the city and pargana of Broach as full and complete as ever they collected from the Moguls or otherwise, without retaining claim of chauth or any other demand whatever, so that the English Company will possess it wthout participation or claim of any kind.

*5th Article* The Marathas do agree (by way of friendship) to give forever to the English Company a country of three complete lakhs of Rupees near, or adjoining to, Broach, on which there is to be no claim of chauth or any other demand whatever. Two persons on the part of the Company and two persons on the part of Rao Pandit Pradhan to proceed and determine the place and boundaries, when the Peshwa will give the sanads.

*6th Article* The Peshwa and Ministers agree to pay to the Company twelve lakhs of Rupees in part of the expenses of the English army in two payments, *viz.* six lakhs within six months of the date of this treaty, and the other six lakhs within two years of the same date.

*7th Article* The English do agree that every part of the Gujarat country, ceded to the Company by Raghunathrao, or taken possession of by them, shall be forthwith restored with all the forts and towns thereunto belonging, except what is settled by this treaty. The country ceded to the English by Sayaji or Fatesing Gaikwad shall also be restored, when it is proved by their letters and copies of the sanads granted by the former Peshwas, and now in their (the Gaikwads') hands, that they do not possess power or authority to make such cessions. The parganas of Chikhli and Koral with the town of Variav, three villages of the pargana of Chorasi, and the village of Battahgang are to continue as pledges in the possession of the English until the sanads of the country of three lakhs are made over. All treaties and agreements subsisting between the English and Raghunathrao are hereby annulled, and those of Sayaji and Fatesing Gaikwad are to be also annulled when the abovementioned proofs are produced; and these treaties are to be destroyed in the presence of the Peshwa's Ministers when they come to hand.

*8th Article* The English do agree that the troops now in the field from the Presidency of Bombay are to be marched immediately into their own garrisons and districts.

*9th Article* It is agreed that Raghunathrao is to disband his army within one month of this date. His followers and adherents, (except the servants about his person) are to separate also within the same time. And proclamation is to be made by the Maratha Government, granting a full pardon to all the adherents and followers, and all such as have been in arms with Raghunathrao. The four following excepted, *viz.* Abajee Mahadu, Noor Edun Gardie, Toola Hutmutgar, and Hurry Sing Chokidar, who for crimes and misdemeanors committed against the State are for ever banished [*from*] the Maratha dominions.

*10th Aricle* If Raghunathrao refuses to disband his army, the English are to withdraw their forces and are not to assist him.

*11th Article* The conditions of the ninth article being complied with, the Peshwa and Ministers then consent to establish a household for Raghunathrao, consisting of one thousand horse and some foot, who are to be paid and relieved at the pleasure of Government, but to obey all legal orders given them by Raghunathrao. Also two hundred domestics to be chosen by Raghunathrao, and paid by Government. They will cause to be paid also to Raghunathrao to defray his other expenses three lakhs of Rupees per annum by monthly payments at the rate of twenty five thousand Rupees per month, conditionally that he resides at Cooper Gang on the banks of the Ganga Godavri. If at any time he wants to change his place of residence, application is to be made to the Peshwa, without whose permission such a change is not to take place; and he is not to cause any disturbance or carry on improper correspondence with any person.

*12th Article* It is agreed that no assistance is to be given by the English to Raghunathrao or to any servant, or subject of the Peshwa's that shall cause disturbance or rebellion in the Maratha dominions.[1]

*14th Article* It is agreed that, in case of shipwreck of any English ships or vessels, or ships or vessels trading under their protection on any part of the Maratha coast, every assistance shall be given by that Government and the inhabitants to save as much as possible, and the whole that may be saved shall be returned, all reasonable charges being defrayed by the owners. In like manner the English Company engage their assistance, should any Maratha ships or vessels be wrecked on any of their coasts.

*15th Article* The treaties between the Government of Bombay and the Marathas, dated July 1739 and the 12th October 1759, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were first entered into, unless any article or articles of either of them should in other manner be provided for by this treaty. In such case such article or articles are to be rejected and those of this treaty abided by.

*16th Article* All other treaties or agreements subsisting between the Government of Bombay and the Maratha Government, not having undergone alteration or otherwise provided for by this treaty, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were first entered upon.

1 The 13th article is missing and was subsequently suppressed; see entry 22nd May, 1776.

*17th Article* It is agreed that, if Raghunathrao has lodged any jewels belonging to the Peshwa Rao Pandit Pradhan in the hands of the English, they are to be restored on the obligation being complied with for which they were lodged.

*18th Article* The Hon'ble the English Company shall be considered as the sole lords and proprictors of all the places ceded by this treaty from the dates of the respective sanads or grants, and are therein accordingly to exercise their own laws and authorities. And the Marathas are not to cause any disturbance in any of the ceded countries, nor shall the English occasion any disturbances in the Maratha dominions.

19th *Article* In the places hereby ceded to the Hon'ble Company and in all the places restored to the Maratha Government by the English it is agreed that both parties shall commence to collect the revenues thereof from the day on which they are delivered, and no demand of collections for past time shall be made.

1776 *Purandhar, 22nd May,* 1776 (1776-77, *Br. F.* 262)
*John Upton to William Hornby.*

*Changes in treaty* (a) It has been agreed between the Governor-General and Council, and the Peshwa and his Ministers, that the following alterations and clauses should be made in the treaty. This has been accordingly done, and the treaty finally signed and made over by both parties.

(b) The 13th and 17th articles are omitted entirely. The 14th article therefore becomes the 13th and so on, and the 18th article becomes the 16th and so on.

The concluding words of the seventh article "*and these treaties are to be destroyed in the presence of the Peshwa's ministers when they come to hand*" are also omitted

(c) Additional clause.

Whereas it is declared by the 3rd article of the foregoing treaty "that the Peshwa Rao Pandit Pradhan and his Ministers being desirous of having Salsette and the small islands, subdued by the English in the late war, restored to them, and offer to give in exchange a country of three lakhs of Rupees with its chauth, etc. in the neighbourhood of Broach, and further that, if the Governor-General and Council of Fort William do not restore them, they shall continue in the possession of the English, and the said Peshwa Rao Pandit Pradhan and his Ministers will then give up all right and title to the said islands,"—the said Governor-General and Council hereby declare their resolution not to relinquish the said islands of Salsette, Karanja, Elephanta and Hog, or to accept the territory offered in exchange for those islands. And the said islands are accordingly to remain for ever in the possession of the English by virtue of the present treaty.

## No. 5 LAST FLICKER OF HOPE

### (August 1776—December 1776)

THE Bombay authorities had resigned themselves to the inevitable by their acceptance of the treaty of Purandhar, which upset all their schemes at securing for themselves a yearly revenue that would make their Presidency financially independent of Calcutta. For a moment hope revived within them that the Governor-General's treaty was ultra vires, because the Company in their letter of the 5th April, 1775, gave their whole-hearted approval to the Bombay negotiations with Raghoba. But this hope was shortlived; for Warren Hastings' interpretation of the Company's letter and his threats to withhold all financial help irrevocably sealed Bombay's final disappointment.

The documents give a detailed account of this tragical episode.

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### DOCUMENTS

*Bombay, 17th August,* 1776 (1772-1777, *P. D. Let. from the Court of Dir.* 9) **1776**
*Company commands, dated 5th April,* 1775.[1]

38 We have with great impatience waited to this time for the long expected advices relative to the proceedings on your becoming possessed of Salsette and the other acquisitions mentioned in your last overland advices. Our disappointment for want of sufficient information, subsequent to those events, on the arrangements made regarding the revenues and for the lasting security and preservation of those possessions puts it out of our power at present to give our sentiments and directions thereon, until we shall be fully acquainted with your proceedings, which, we hope, will be very soon, that our remarks and orders may be communicated by a vessel, which we intend shortly to despatch for India. ***Company's orders***

39 We, however, approve under every circumstance the keeping of all territories ceded to the Company by the treaty with Raghoba, and have directed our Governor and Council of Bengal and our Governor and Council of Fort St. George to adopt such measures as may be proper for the preservation and defence of those territories so far as exigencies shall render it necessary for them to contribute thereto.

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1 The Company's commands of the 5th April, 1775, are endorsed "received on the 10th April, 1776, by the *Greenwich*." It has been impossible to ascertain where they were received. Bombay first heard of them on the 17th August, 1776, by the *Latham* (See letter from William Hornby to Warren Hastings, dated Bombay, 20th August, 1776). Calcutta knew of them before Bombay, as is made evident by Tayler's statement: "On the 5th instant (July, 1776) I received a copy of the 48th [38th?] paragraph of the Company's general letter to this Presidency" (See entry, 14th September, 1776).

40 In attending to this object you will not fail to communicate our sentiments to the commander of His Majesty's squadron, if at your Presidency, or to request such countenance and support fom the King's ships as shall from time to time be necessary for the security of our possessions and for the advantage of our affairs on your side of India.

1776 *Bombay, 20th August,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*At a Consultation.*

*Company's orders*

Read the 38th, 39th and 40th Paragraphs of the Hon'ble Company's commands dated the 5th of April last.

As they have been pleased to order us in the most express and positive manner to keep possession under every circumstance of the territories ceded by Raghoba, we cannot think, with these special orders before us, of relinquishing Jambusar and such of the other cessions as still remain in our hands. It is, therefore, resolved at all events to retain them, which determination must be immediately signified to the Governor-General and Council and Colonel Upton, and copies of the Company's orders sent to them.

The same communication must likewise be made to Sir Edward Hughes.

Though we have resolved as above to send a copy in form of the Company's orders to the Governor-General and Council, yet we know by a private letter from Mr. Tayler to the President that these orders have reached Bengal; and we have received a letter from those Gentlemen of a later date than Mr. Tayler's, wherein they take no notice of this circumstance, which appears to us very extraordinary.

1776 *Bombay, 20th August,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to John Upton.*

*Cessions stopped*

This is purposely to enclose an extract from the Hon'ble Company's commands, received by the *Latham,* in obedience to which we have determined at all events to keep possession of Jambusar and such other of the late cessions as are not yet relinquished; which we think it necessary to apprise you of, that you may regulate your conduct accordingly.

1776 *Bombay, 20th August,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to Rawson Hart Boddam at Surat.*

*Cessions stopped*

This purposely to direct that, in case any of the parganas ceded by Raghoba remain still in our possession, you do on no account whatever relinquish them.

1776 *Bombay, 20th August,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

*Cessions stopped*

This is purposely to direct that you do on no account whatever relinquish Jambusar or any other of the places ceded by Raghoba that may be now in our possession.

1776 *Bombay, 20th August,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

*Cessions stopped*

The *Latham* arrived here from Great Britain on the 17th instant, and we now transmit the extract from the commands of the

Hon'ble the Court of Directors by that ship. With these special orders before us, we cannot think of relinquishing Jambusar or any other of the possessions which are not yet restored; and we have, therefore, in obedience thereto determined at all events to retain them, which we shall signify to Colonel Upton, that he may regulate his conduct accordingly.

*Bombay, 20th August*, 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) 1776
*William Hornby to William Tayler.*

We enclose a copy of our letter under this date to the Governor-General and Council, by which you will learn our determination not to relinquish any of the parganas ceded to us by Raghoba, which are yet in our possession, in consequence of special orders received from the Hon'ble the Court of Directors by the ship *Latham*. ***Cessions stopped***

*Poona, 27th August*, 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) 1776
*John Upton to William Hornby.*

I hardly know how sufficiently to express my surprise and concern at your letter of the 20th. You say, Gentlemen, you have determined at all events to keep possession of Jambusar and such other of the late cessions as are not yet relinquished. I have to request you will be pleased to acquaint me if this resolution is so unalterably fixed that neither further orders from the Supreme Council, or representations from the Ministers here, or from me can effect a change in this measure so very repugnant to the late treaty ratified by the Supreme Council and now in possession of the Peshwa. I am the more desirous of this information, as I received letters last night from the Governor-General and Council, wherein I am ordered, on a supposition that my services are no longer necessary at Poona, to proceed to Bombay in order to promote the accomplishment of such articles of the treaty as remain still to be carried into execution. If, as you have wrote me, your resolutions are at all events determined, my presence at Bombay can be of no use, on the contrary may essentially injure by giving room to the Ministers to suspect that the Supreme Council were privy to those designs, fix an indelible stain on these Gentlemen, and prevent their hereafter being able to treat with the Ministers by having lost all confidence with them. I hope your late resolutions will for some time be kept quite secret, and no orders in consequence of them sent to any subordinate settlement, which cannot ? yet be required, as neither Jambusar nor any of the cessions made by Fatesing can be made over to the Peshwa without your particular orders. My personal safety and that of the Gentlemen with me may require this precaution. ***Upton's dismay***

I cannot help remarking how very contrary your present resolutions are to the professions you have so repeatedly desired me to make to the Peshwa's Ministers of your strict observance of the late treaty, and your taking every means to remove the jealousy that subsisted between your Presidency and the Poona Government. You will easily conceive the chagrin I must suffer at having made these professions on your part.

1776 *Bombay, 28th August, 1776 (1776, S. & P. D. 17A)*
*Daniel Draper's minute of dissent.*

*Draper disagrees* On recovering from my late indispositions I observed from the minutes of Council and correspondence during that interval that Your Honour, &ca had on the 20th instant resolved that the 38th, 39th and 40th paragraphs of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, their commands, dated the 5th of April last [*5th April*, 1775] received by the *Latham*, contained special orders for keeping possession of all such territories ceded by Raghoba as were not then relinquished, notwithstanding the late treaty of peace concluded by Colonel Upton with the Maratha State; and that you have dispatched positive orders to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach on no account whatever to deliver up Jambusar and such other cessions as then remained in our hands and were to be relinquished agreeable to the treaty; also that you have wrote conformably to the above-mentioned resolution to the Governor-General and Council and to Colonel Upton. The first notice of Your Honour, &ca having taken such measures affected me very sensibly, as I had perused the afore-mentioned commands without perceiving that they ought to be construed in that manner; and the more I have considered the subject, the more necessary it has appeared to me to differ in opinion with Your Honour, &ca for my justification with the Hon'ble the Court of Directors and the Governor-General and Council.

*Draper's views* I conclude Your Honour, &ca have been influenced in the above resolution by knowing that the Court of Directors had received intelligence by the *Northumberland* that the Governor-General and Council had appointed a cessation of arms, and that Colonel Upton had proceeded from Calcutta with full powers to conclude a peace at Purandhar; also that you think that a particular stress should be laid on the words "under every circumstance," contained in the 39th paragraph; but it appears to me that the Hon'ble Court by no means intended by these paragraphs to convey special orders to counteract anything Colonel Upton might have done, not choosing to take it for granted that he would be able to conclude a peace, as had very near proved the case, but rather according to our advices to consider us in a state of war and enjoin us to attend to the security and preservation of the cessions we were entitled to by the treaty with Raghoba, the Directors well knowing that, if Colonel Upton should conclude treaty, it must operate according to the late Act of Parliament, till they could be informed of the conditions and give their definitive orders thereupon.

I allow that the above quoted words "under every circumstance" are very comprehensive; but I can by no means concur with Your Honour, &ca that they relate to our present peaceable situation. I am rather induced to think that they are expressive of the Directors' approval of the several stipulations contained in the treaty with Raghoba, and that, when they become acquainted with our present circumstances, they will be very sorry to find that Your Honour, &ca have construed those words in the manner you have done. And in support of my opinion that they meant only in a general way to reply to our advices then before them, considering us in a state of war, without superseding and unhinging everything established by the late treaty, I beg leave to refer Your Honour, &ca to the several expressions contained

in those three paragraphs, relative to the security and preservation of the cessions made by Raghoba, on a supposition that we enjoyed them by that tenure only; for, as above observed, they will know that we must submit to the controlling power of the Governor-General and Council as to war and negotiation, till their definitive orders might be received.

The expressions above alluded to, for my believing that the Hon'ble Court chose to confine their orders, as considering us in a state of war instead of peace as is now the case, are the lasting security and preservation of the possessions acquired from Raghoba, mentioned in the 38th paragraph. Their approval of keeping them and directions to the Governor-General and Council, and the Governor and Council at Fort St. George for adopting measures most proper for the preservation of those territories according to the exigencies, as comprehended in the 39th paragraph, and requesting countenance and support from the King's ships for the security of those possessions, as noticed in the 40th paragraph, which surely are not at all applicable to a state of peace and tranquillity.

*Reasons for dissenting*

Having thus fully stated to Your Honour, &ca the reasons which have induced me to differ in opinion with you regarding the Hon'ble Court's paragraphs, I now more particularly [*proceed*] to assign the reasons for my dissenting to the resolution you took the 20th instant and all consequences which may result therefrom, *viz.*

Because in my opinion Your Honour, &ca's resolution is a direct and manifest infringement of the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, as well as of the strict orders lately given by the Governor-General and Council for avoiding every measure which might even give the Marathas distrust or jealousy;

Because in our situation, considering the advantages reaped by the treaty, the resolution is both unreasonable and impolitic: unreasonable, considering the advantages of the treaty; and impolitic on the two following accounts:

Because I take it for granted we shall forfeit the receipt of the twelve lakhs of Rupees, stipulated to be paid—six lacks whereof would have been due the first of next month;

Because the cession of the country of three lakhs per annum, contiguous to Broach, will of course likewise be forfeited—the peaceable enjoyment of which would in my opinion be far preferable to the parganas of Jambusar (the only one we shall probably retain in consequence of the resolution) though estimated at 5 per annum; as I am of opinion more than the difference will be absorbed by maintaining it by force of arms; and Your Honour, &ca will know that Jambusar has been continued with us merely as a security for the country of three lakhs, without being allowed to collect the revenues;

Because I think we ought religiously to have proceeded in the execution of the treaty, or at least to have temporised till we could hear further from the Court of Directors, or the Governor-General and Council; but I should have prefered the former conduct;

Because we are at this place 29 lakhs of Rupees in debt, accumulating at an interest of 3/4 cent per month; also because the Governor-General and Council furnishing us with sufficient supplies of money, in case of the peace being disturbed by the above resolution, I think very uncertain;

Because on the 31st ultimo the Company's remains of Europe goods amounted to about ten lakhs; to the amount of three lakhs have since been received by the *Latham*, and the purchased remains under the 31st ultimo amounted to nearly eight lakhs, the realising of which, I apprehend, will be much obstructed, and that the trade of private merchants will equally suffer;

Because the number of European troops since the attack of Thana is reduced from 1,996 to 1,416;

Because the state of public affairs at home prevented any number of recruits being sent this season, and the same reason may unfortunately subsist the next year.

I beg that a copy of this my dissent may be transmitted to the Governor-General and Council by the first opportunity.

1776 *Bombay, 30th August,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*James Carnac's opinion.*

*Draper refuted* There appeared to be but one opinion at the first Committee held after the receipt of the general letter of the *Latham*, but Mr. Draper has since entered a dissent, in which the most weighty reason, offered for deviating from the orders of our Hon'ble Employers, arises from an apprehension that we may draw upon ourselves a Maratha war; but it is now become problematical at least whether an adherence to the former treaty would not be the most likely means of avoiding it; for, if your intelligence of the designs and preparations of Sadoba is to be relied on, and that he really means, as it is said, to co-operate with Raghunathrao, we have cause to expect that, so soon as the season for action commences, the face of things in the Maratha Empire be changed. The Ministers will be reduced to the same desperate state Raghunathrao has been in, and he in his turn will be triumphant.

*Financial straits* There is indeed an objection almost unsurmountable against our continuing firm to Raghobarao, though but slightly touched on by Mr. Draper, namely that, if the Gentlemen of the Supreme Council persist in the new alliance, we may and probably shall have our resources from Bengal cut off, without which we are in no condition to give him that effectual assistance, as he may think sufficient to merit the confirmation of all the concessions stipulated in the treaty of Surat.

1776 *Bombay, 3rd September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*Letter from Warren Hastings, dated 1st July,* 1776.

*Company's orders ignored* The Hon'ble the Court of Directors having signified to us by the *Greenwich* their orders in consequence of the capture of Salsette and of the treaty which at the date of your advices to them you were negotiating with Raghoba, we think it proper to enclose a copy of these orders for your information, and of the resolutions which we have come to on reading them.

As the treaty of Poona [*Purandhar*] has not left us at liberty to follow the apparent intentions of the Court of Directors on this occasion, we leave you to act agreeable to our resolutions, which will point out the plan we have judged it necessary to adopt in consequence of their directions; to which we must add that, if you shall not have put the officers of the Peshwa in possession of the districts ceded to the Maratha State by the 7th article of the treaty before the receipt of this letter, we peremptorily repeat our injunctions that you cause these districts to be delivered up immediately, and that you admit of no further delay in this point, or in executing any article that remains unaccomplished on your part, but observe with the most scrupulous fidelity every condition required of you by the treaty. *Calcutta orders*

We have directed Colonel Upton to proceed to, and continue at, Bombay till further orders, that he may finish any negotiations with the Ministers, which remain unsettled at the time of his departure. We recommended him to your attention; and as we have not communicated to him the orders of the Company and the measures we mean to pursue, we request that you will impart them to him on his arrival at your Presidency. *Orders to Upton*

*Extract from Fort William Consultation on 1st July,* 1776.

The Board having so long ago as the 31st May, 1775, unanimously declared their opinion that the treaty formed by the Presidency of Bombay was invalid, and having in consequence of that resolution concluded and ratified a treaty in the name of the Company with the Ministers of the Maratha State, are no longer at liberty to carry into execution the intentions of the Court of Directors, expressed in the 48th paragraph of their letter by keeping all territories and possessions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with Raghoba, since many of those territories have been again ceded to the Maratha Government by the above treaty with them, and cannot either be retained or resumed consistently with the public faith of this Government, except in the case of a direct violation of the treaty on the part of the Marathas. *Calcutta resolution*

It is, therefore, resolved that a letter be written to Colonel Upton, directing him to demand his immediate dismissal from the Court of Poona and to proceed to Bombay as soon as he conveniently can after the receipt thereof, informing the Ministers that we have judged his presence to be no longer necessary at Purandhar, and that his interposition may be more effectually employed with the President and Council at Bombay in urging them to the speedy accomplishment of the conditions of the treaty, which remain to be carried into execution on their part, and which we are sorry to have seen so long delayed.

*Bombay, 4th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) 1776
*Messrs Mostyn, Stackhouse and Garden, their opinion.*

(*They*) join in opinion, with Mr. Draper that temporising measures, as far as prudence will admit, should be observed, and every means used to avoid a war; and were we convinced that the persons with whom Mr. Upton has concluded a treaty could possibly support themselves in the Government, we should also be of his opinion in every *Delay advised*

other point, but firmly believe the Ministers will not be able to continue in Poona many months longer; for there remains not a doubt with us but Sadoba will, as soon as the season opens, get possession of the government, more especially as there is a prospect that Raghoba means to join him by coming to the southward; and should this be the case, we apprehend they will not want our assistance. Consequently we can have no right to the possession granted us by the treaty made with Raghoba, nor can the Ministers comply with theirs. Thus situated and the Company's express orders by the *Latham* before us, we cannot help thinking the resolution of the Board last council-day the properest measure we can adopt in the present unsettled situation of affairs, though for the reasons given in the general minute we are obliged to deviate from the Company's orders.

1776 *Bombay, 4th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*Mr. Ramsay's minute.*

*Cessions to be stopped*

If the Maratha Empire was now in the same settled state it was in before the death of Narayanrao, and the present Government of Poona in a condition to fulfil the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, however inadequate that treaty may in some respects be, Mr. Ramsay would entirely concur with Mr. Draper that the unanimous resolution of the Board at their last meeting for retaining Jambusar and such other territory as has not yet been restored to the Marathas in consequence of that treaty would be impolitic and unreasonable; and the reasons Mr. Draper has brought in support of that opinion would in that case weigh most forcibly; but circumstanced as we are now, Mr. Ramsay cannot hesitate a moment in declaring it as his opinion that we ought to retain every possession we possibly can, consistent with the orders of our Employers, who, though they knew of Colonel Upton's mission, and must suppose it probable from the tenor of his instructions he would conclude some decesive terms with the Poona Government, are notwithstanding pleased to approve under every circumstance of our keeping possession of the territories ceded to them by the treaty with Raghoba.

*Danger of war*

A pacific system Mr. Ramsay will ever hold to be most for the Company's real interest, and [*he*] would, therefore, wish to avoid every measure which would tend to involve them in war, but situated as affairs now are, it seems next to a certainty that the present ruling Government at Poona cannot long exist. Sadoba is said to be at the head of a very formidable force and ready to support our late ally Raghoba in his pretensions to the peshwaship. This latter, it is further said, is negotiating with the Portuguese for assistance, which should they grant, and he succeed in establishing himself at Poona without our aid, we cannot have the least shadow of a right to withhold from him the cessions made by the treaty of Surat. In short, from the present distracted state of the Maratha Empire it can scarcely admit of a doubt that, in order to secure the possessions we already hold as well as to preserve the Company's influence in these parts, we shall necessarily be obliged to take an active part in the troubles which are likely to ensue; in which case the ill-consequences, which Mr. Draper apprehends from keeping possession of Jambusar, &ca, can have no weight.

As to our infringing Colonel Upton's treaty, it is notorious and will fully appear by our records that everything on our part has been done to carry it into execution in the fullest extent, while not one step appears to have been taken for that purpose on the part of the Poona Government. On the contrary our vessels have been insulted, the communication still continues shut, all intercourse of trade and correspondence is still stopped, and we suffer every inconvenience attending a state of actual war; to which if we add their having made over countries not their own (which may probably hereafter involve us in troubles with the Gaikwad family), sufficient grounds are not wanting to invalidate the Poona treaty without hurting the national faith, if the Governor-General and Council should judge it eligible to take advantage of the present crisis. *Upton's treaty*

Those Gentlemen have already been fully advised of everything which has passed in our neighbourhood, and we may, therefore, hope shortly to receive their orders what conduct we are to pursue; but, as the season for action is now approaching, and we may, be under an indispensible necessity of taking some steps for the Company's interest, Mr. Ramsay thinks their speedy and express orders should be again requested, and a letter in duplicate immediately dispatched to them for that purpose, although he much fears the distance is so great as to render it impossible to give orders with that precision the exigency of affairs may require; which makes it much to be wished that the Governor-General and Council would have sufficient confidence in this Board to give us a latitude to act as from circumstances might be deemed most for the Company's interest, having regard at the same time (as far as the situation of affairs will possibly admit) to the general views and orders of the Governor-General and Council. *Appeal to Calcutta*

*Brigadier General Gordon's minute.*

The Brigadier General continues of the same opinion he has ever been, that the conditions of the treaty with the Maratha Government so solemnly ratified and confirmed by the Supreme Council should be strictly complied with and adhered to on our parts, unless it should be broke through by the Maratha Government. The Court of Directors could not know of the peace being concluded, nor the circumstances that attended it, when their last general letter was wrote and received by the ship *Latham*. The countries ceded by Raghoba were all conditional on his being made Peshwa and on his being established by us in the government of Poona; which on our part was never done nor attempted, as the troops never marched that way, until after the cessation of arms was declared. Should the present treaty of peace, concluded between the Maratha Government and the Supreme Council, be broke through, under pretence of other orders from the Court of Directors, no Country Powers would trust us in future, as they would then have experienced the Supreme Council having overturned the treaty made between Raghoba and this Presidency, and now that the Court of Directors had overturned the succeeding treaty of peace concluded between the Supreme Council and the Ministers for the Maratha Government. *Of Draper's opinion*

*The President's Opinion.*

*Orders revoked* The President with much reluctance agrees to countermand the orders sent under the 20th August to the Chief of Surat and Broach fo their keeping possession of such of the parganas as had not already been delivered to the agents of the Poona Government, as it is contrary to the express orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors; for that he has every reason to expect no assistance from the Governor-General and Council, or that they would permit the Governor and Council of Madras to do it, who are much better situated to assist us with troops, as they are soon got over to this coast. At the same time it gives him real concern to think that we are necessitated to give up in a manner all the advantages we had acquired for the Hon'ble Company (and which they had been long so much in want of on this coast) and at a time he believes, were we to espouse Raghoba's cause, he might be fixed in Poona without any or very little opposition. At this time there is the greatest likelihood that Sadoba will not be many months before he gets thither, when the treaty, that has been made by the present Ministers at Poona, will be void and of no value and that of a Raghoba likewise; nor are we entitled to anything from it, if he should be seated without our assistance.

1776 *Bombay, 4th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to John Upton.*

*Orders revoked* The utmost secrecy has been observed with respect to the measures we have resolved to pursue in consequence of the Hon'ble Company's 'commands communicated to you in our letter of the 20th; and now we have to acquaint you that we have thought proper from some circumstances which have since happened to countermand the orders we had given on the occasion.

1776 *Bombay, 4th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to Rawson Hart Boddam.*

*Surat informed* We hereby countermand the orders given in our letter dated the 20th ultimo, and direct that you consider them as no longer in force.

1776 *Bombay, 4th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to Robert Gambier.*

*Broach informed* We hereby countermand the orders given in our letter dated the 20th ultimo, and direct that you consider them as no longer in force.

1776 *Bombay, 4th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*At a Consultation.*

*Reasons for revoking orders* Read the letters received yesterday from the Governor-General and Council and Lieut.-Colonel Upton.

As it appears by the first of these letters from the Governor-General and Council that, with the orders of the Court of Directors before them, which they admit of in the same sense as the majority of this Board do, they think themselves bound in honour to abide by

their engagements with the Ministers at Poona, and peremptorily enjoin us so to do, having no resources but from Bengal and being unable to act without assistance from thence, we are under a total impossibility of adhering to the treaty with Raghobarao as directed by the Court of Directors, in consequence, it is to be supposed, of the faith of the Company having been pledged to him by this Presidency. There seems now to be no other alternative left but to submit to the will of the Governor-General and Council and to remonstrate to our Hon'ble Employers that, although we are truely sensible their orders should supersede every other, yet whatever ill-consequences may ensue reversing our treaty, dependent as we are for supplies upon Bengal, we are in no condition to dispute the orders from that quarter, however repugnant they may be to those from home. Resolved, therefore, that the orders issued to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach in consequence of our resolution on the 20th ultimo be immediately countermanded, and that advice be likewise sent thereof to the Governor-General and Council and to Lieutenant-Colonel Upton.

*Indignant protest*

We cannot sufficiently express our surprise at the intention of the Governor-General and Council of recalling Colonel Upton from Poona to carry on this negotiation from this Presidency. His interference in political matters in the immediate seat of our Government would be the utmost indignity to us and contrary to every rule of the service. It would most sensibly affect that consequence and importance which is so necessary to be preserved to the members thereof. It is a measure not warranted by any necessity, as no part of the treaty remains unaccomplished on our side; and we also think it implies a total want of confidence in us, which we are not conscious of having merited. These arguments must be set forth in strong terms to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors and their influence requested to exempt us from any such indignity in future.

*Poona, 8th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) **1776**
*John Upton to William Hornby.*

*Information needed*

I could have wished, Gentlemen, you had been somewhat more communicative; for at present I am at a loss to know whether you have totally expunged the resolution of your Board of the 20th of August, or have only countermanded for a time being such orders as had been issued in consequence of the resolves of that day.

I have to request, Gentlemen, you will be pleased to inform me particularly if the purport of your letter to me of the 20th ultimo is meant to be enforced and followed through all its consequences or quite revoked. Upon the receipt of your reply to this letter, I shall know the part I have to take in my future conduct.

*Bombay, 14th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) **1776**
*William Hornby to Warren Hastings.*

*Orders carried out*

We felt the utmost concern upon receiving from you orders so very different in their tenor from those of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, in obedience to which we had formed the resolution communicated to you in our last letter. From the high respect we entertain for both authorities and the present critical situation of affairs, these very opposite orders occasioned us much embarrassment, though we

think it incumbent on us to declare to you our opinion that the orders of the Court of Directors should supersede every other, and that we should never hesitate a moment which to prefer, if we are so circumstanced as to have an opinion, unless our obedience might tend to the manifest injury and danger or the Company's affairs. With these sentiments and a strong persuasion that the conduct we had adopted would prove favourable to their interest, we do yet find ourselves under a necessity of deviating from their orders and of revoking our first resolution from an apprehension of the bad consequences which must ensue, should Your Honour, &ca persist in the new alliance and withhold from us all further supplies, as from the peremptory manner in which your orders are conveyed we had every reason to expect. We have, therefore, countermanded the orders we had issued to the Chiefs of Surat and Broach for retaining Jambusar, &ca, of which we gave immediate advice to Colonel Upton.

*Dissent* Mr. Draper having differed in opinion from us respecting the construction of the Company's orders, and dissented from our resolution in consequence, we at his request transmit you a copy of the dissent he delivered on the occasion. Brigadier General Gordon likewise concurred with Mr. Draper in both points, and delivered in a minute of which the enclosed is a copy; and the other members, thinking it necessary to explain their sentiments on the subject, we have the honour to transmit copies of the minutes made by the President and Messrs Carnac, Mostyn, Stackhouse, Garden and Ramsay.

*Raghoba* Raghoba after quitting Surat proceeded to the southward and has already collected 2,000 or 3,000 followers. He is now at a fort, which surrendered to him, a small distance from Daman, and we hear is negotiating with the Portuguese for their assistance. We cannot yet judge what probability there is of an alliance taking place between them; but this leads us again to lament that more attention was not shown to Raghoba in the late treaty. We foresaw this event with all its bad consequences, if satisfactory terms were not settled for him, and urged this point to Colonel Upton in the most forcible manner in our letter dated the 18th of January. This gentleman has since acknowledged in his letter dated the 7th ultimo that, had Ragoba sent a vakil to him at Poona, the conditions might perhaps have been made more agreeable to him; and we are sorry that any supposed failure of ceremony on the part of Raghoba should have had any consideration in a point wherein the honour and interest of the Company were so much concerned.

*Ministers' delay* We have advices from Broach so late as the 31st ultimo, when the Maratha agents for settling the country of three lakhs were not arrived, though the parganas lately subject to that chiefship have been relinquished so long ago as the 18th of June. The Company must suffer considerably by the dilatory manner in which the Ministers perform their engagements, as the season is too far advanced to take the proper measures for the improvement of the revenues for this year.

1776 *Bombay, 15th September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17)
*Letter from William Tayler, dated 13th July,* 1776.

*Tayler ignored* In the beginning of the month of April I learnt that Colonel Upton had transmitted sundry articles of a treaty concluded with the

Ministers. As the Company's interest at Bombay must form the basis of that treaty, I naturally imagined the Governor-General and Council would submit the articles to me for my opinion, if the engagements of Colonel Upton were not irrevocably conclusive, and they wished to avail themselves of that means of immediate information which formed part of your intentions in deputing me. Something to my surprise, however, I found that with a few exceptions they had resolved without seeking further advice to confirm and ratify this treaty; that this had been done, and a dispatch already gone to Purandhar with one copy of it signed by all the members of this Government. I, therefore, under the 9th of April publicly requested a copy of the treaty and of such orders as they might have given in consequence, intending still to have offered such advice and opinion on them as appeared to me requisite. On the 13th following they did in part comply with my request by sending me the copy desired, but in a manner strongly expressive of that firm determination evinced throughout every part of their conduct to adhere, in despite of every change of circumstance and of every representation and remonstrance, to that accommodation with the Ministers, they at first resolved on. They wrote: In compliance with your request, we have ordered a copy of the treaty to be sent you, intending it merely for your information and for no other purpose whatever.

*Company's orders*

On the 5th instant [*July* 1776] I received a copy of the 48th paragraph of the Company's general letter to this Presidency, also of sundry resolutions in consequence of those orders; both of which and of the commands of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors to the Presidency of Madras received in the *Greenwich's* packet, I now transmit for your information.

*Tayler's protest*

The resolutions of the Governor-General and Council appeared to me diametrically opposite to the orders of the Company, and evidently tending to deprive them (the Directors) of the only opportunity that might ever offer to place their affairs in the west of India in the respectable situation they have so forcibly expressed their wishes to see them [*in*]. I, therefore, thought it my duty, both in behalf of the Company and you, to remonstrate and protest against their non compliance with these orders, more especially as the several infractions of the treaty, pointed out by you, gave them a fair opening for obedience without any *breach* of the national faith. The better to induce them to it, I stated the striking difference in many respects between the advantages arising from our present situation and the advantages to Raghoba.

With respect to their orders to Colonel Upton to remain at Bombay in his present character, I begged the Governor-General and Council would reconsider the gross indignity they were offering you, and recollect that the Company have appointed a Select Committee there expressly for conducting all political measures; that by their having excluded them, since the Act of Parliament took place, from any interference in restoring the king of Tanjore to his dominions, it is evidently the intentions of the Hon'ble Company that they should not interfere in the manner they think themselves entitled to do in the affairs of the other Presidencies; that from the very great difference

between the sentiments of the Court of Directors and theirs on the treaty with Raghoba it [*is*] also evident you have acted conformable to the repeated instructions and wishes of the former, and ought not, in compliment only to them, to be subjected to the disgrace which they, the Governor-General and Council, are about to attempt to inflict on you.

*Authority challenged* The 9th following at night I received a letter dated the 8th, merely desiring to know by what power or authority I deemed myself entitled to protest, in behalf of the Court of Directors and of the Presidency of Bombay, against any act of their Government; that, when they had received an answer to this enquiry, they should consider what reply it would be proper for them to make to the remainder of my letter.

*Tayler's reply* In reply to this I reminded them of my deputation here by you, who are the representatives of the Company at Bombay, being appointed a Government on their behalf to conduct their affairs there; that you cannot be superseded without altering the form of government established by the Company; and I conceived the appointment of Colonel Upton to reside at Bombay and to treat publicly independent of them to be a direct supersession of that Government; therefore, as your representative and a member of the Government of Bombay, I could not but be sensibly affected at such a measure, and thought it my duty to remonstrate.

That with respect to their resolution, it appeared to me they might prove exceedingly embarrassing to you, as the orders of the Directors might probably have reached you by this time; and deeming yourselves fully authorised you will think it your duty to act immediately in obedience to them, and have taken measures accordingly, before the receipt of their directions to the contrary; that I, therefore, thought it incumbent on me to urge them in the strongest manner to alter their resolves; which had I neglected to do, I should have expected your severest censure.

I added that I was convinced from the actions and declarations of Sakharam Bapu, &ca since the treaty that it is not their intention to observe it longer than it suits their own convenience; that, if a proper trust was reposed in you, the Company's views on your side of India might still be obtained with great facility. Under the present circumstances you will be obliged to submit to every insult, except an open attack of the settlements, for the space of three months, which will be required for their determination.

I have not yet received any answer to this, but find that my remonstrances have had no effect in either of the purposes intended by them.

1776 *Bombay, 21st September,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to John Upton.*

*Orders revoked* We have received your letter dated the 8th instant.

Our letter of the 4th appears to us sufficiently explicit and expressive of our intentions. We therein tell you in plain terms that we had countermanded the orders we had given in consequence of the

Hon'ble the Court of Directors, the execution of which we have ventured to dispense with.

*Bombay, 20th November,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) 1776
*Letter from Calcutta, dated 30th September,* 1776.

We have just received advices from Lieut.-Colonel Upton, dated the 28th ultimo, with which he transmits us a copy of your letter to him of the 20th August and of his reply to it on the 27th.

We have read with great surprise the resolution declared in your letter to Colonel Upton that you were determined at all events to keep possession of such of the late cessions as are not yet relinquished, and we are equally alarmed at the fatal consequences which may attend such a notorious breach of a public treaty and consequently a violation of the national faith. *Surprise*

We, hope, however, that the arguments urged to you by Colonel Upton and supported by our resolutions on receipt of the Company's orders respecting the Maratha War, which we communicated to you in a letter of the 1st July, will have had sufficient influence on your conduct to prevent the execution of the measure you have resolved on, or at least to have suspended the issue of any orders in consequence thereof until this may arrive. *Hopes*

We now desire you will call to mind that the treaty with the Maratha State has been executed under the sanction and by the authority of an Act of Parliament; that, therefore, it is not only binding on all the Company's settlements in India, but even on the Company themselves *Orders*

We claim and demand your aid in supporting and maintaining the treaty which is now in force, declaring at the same time that we shall hold you responsible for all the consequences which must follow a breach of it on your part.

But we see no difficulty in reconciling the conditions of the treaty with the object of the Company's orders, although those orders are manifestly framed without any knowledge of the part we had taken. The interchange of Jambusar and the other lands stipulated to be restored to the Marathas for the country adjoining to Broach, which is specified in the 5th article of the treaty to be ceded on their part to the Company, will leave the Company in possession of a territory obtained by peaceable means form the Marathas, equally convenient in point of situation and not much inferior in value to that which the Company have empowered you to keep possession, though originally obtained and still requiring to be preserved by force of arms. *Advantages*

If our positive injunction should effect no change in the resolutions you had agreed to, we desire you will reflect on the means you are possessed of to carry on a war. You have represented to us that the state of your treasury is very low, yet your supplies from this Presidency have been anticipated to a considerable amount. The returns of your troops prove that the establishment of your army is very deficient; and upon the whole, we think your actual condition very far from being such as would in prudence justify your exposing the Company's possessions under your government to the immediate hazards of a war, admitting that no other motives opposed your engaging in it. *Threats*

1776 *Bombay, 30th November,* 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*)
*William Hornby to the Company.*

*Bombay explanation* 1 On the 17th of August we had the honour to receive by the *Latham* your commands dated the 5th of April last [*5th April,* 1775] the 38th 39th and 40th paragraphs of which we considered in this department.

2 The orders contained in the 39th paragraph for keeping possession under every circumstance of all territories ceded by Raghoba being so very express and positive, we resolved in obedience thereto at all events to retain Jambusar, which, as before advised, still remained in our hands, and the Gaikwad cessions; which resolutions we immediately signified to Colonel Upton, that he might act accordingly.

3 Mr. Draper and General Gordon have differed with us in the construction of your orders and dissented to the resolution. In consequence we shall transmit copies of their dissents by the *Latham* and of the minutes made by the other members on the subject.

4 In this determination we continued till the 4th of September, when we took into consideration a letter we had received from the Governor-General and Council with a copy of a resolution they had passed in consequence of the directions you had given them respecting our engagements with Raghobarao—copies of both which we subjoin for your more full information.

5 By these papers it will appear that with your orders before them, equally express and positive as those to us, the Governor-General and Council were still determined not to carry your instructions into execution. peremptorily required us strictly to observe the late treaty concluded by Colonel Upton. Therefore, having no resources but from Bengal and being unable to act without assistance from thence, which from the peremptory style of their letter we had no reason to expect, we were under a total impossibility of adhering to your orders and had no alternative left, but to submit to the will of the Governor-General and Council and to remonstrate to you, our Hon'ble Employers that, although we are truly sensible your orders should supersede every other, yet, whatever ill-consequences may ensue from our deviation, dependent as we are for supplies upon Bengal, we are in no condition of disputing the orders from thence, however repugnant they may be to those from you or to your interests. This opposition of orders gave us the more concern as the measures we had resolved upon were not only dictated by our obedience to your commands, but likewise by a persuasion that such conduct in the then situation of affairs would prove to your advantage.

*Treaty of Purandhar* 16 The Ministers, after repeated delays and evasions, have lately made us some proposals for settling the country of three lakhs, which we have deemed admissible. They have offered Anklesvar, Hansot and Desbarah; and after some necessary preliminaries are settled, we hope this business will be soon concluded.

17 The terms settled by the treaty for the first payment of six lakhs expired on the 1st of September, but no payment was made. The Governor-General and Council had directed us to receive this

money without demur in whatever species of coins it was offered, and Colonel Upton had desired us to send a Gentleman to Poona for that purpose. However he acquainted us under the 19th ultimo that on account of the unsettled state of the country it was inconvenient to the Peshwa to raise so much money; and it was, therefore, proposed to us to accept the revenues of Jambusar and of the Maratha chaukis, in, and round, Surat until the twelve lakhs were discharged, which we thought it for your interest to accept of, and Jambusar in the meantime is to remain in our hands.

*Bombay, 1st December*, 1776, (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) **1776**
*Letter from Calcutta, dated 14th October*. 1776.

***Calcutta approval*** We are pleased, however, to find by a letter just received from Colonel Upton, dated 9th September, that your resolution to maintain possession of the conquered countries on the continent from the Marathas had not been divulged, and that you had thought proper to countermand the orders given on that occasion. We hope that you will not have taken any subsequent measures to preclude you from carrying the injunctions contained in our letter of the 30th ultimo, implicitly into execution, and we again repeat the same, requiring your strict obedience thereto.

*Bombay, 22nd December*, 1776 (1776, *S. & P. D.* 17*A*) **1776**
*William Hornby to the Company*.

***Calcutta determination*** The Governor-General and Council have received our letter dated the 14th of September, though they have not yet sent us any reply. This is the less material as the situation of affairs is so much altered since that period. But by their letters of the 30th of September and 14th October, entered under the 20th ultimo and 1st instant, they appear determined at all events to abide by the present treaty and seem to express their opinion that it is not in your power to annul it.

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جامعہ نگر (دہلی)

کتب خانہ جامعہ ملیہ اسلامیہ
جامعہ نگر دہلی

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